Then what's the measure of someone's authority if there is no ultimate good? — Qwex

There is no such measure. If someone claims moral authority over you, kick him or her in the shingles and spit in his or her face. Unless there are witnesses around, because then you can be charged with assault in some jurisdictions.

What's the point then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly. There is no point. I am a vegetarian; the benefits of eating meat don't apply.

Isn't this just like saying "let's discuss morality, but I have no respect for your opinion, I just want to discuss my opinion"? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it's like saying let's not discuss morality right now."

I WILL begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an
adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. — A

So as to philosophers and the willing, the thesis is that we do not have a basis without religion on which to ground a discussion, and as to someone who will admit torture as being ok if there is a good profit in it or whatever, then we are not remotely talking about the same thing.

Then what's the measure of someone's authority if there is no ultimate good? — Qwex

Oops. I misread you.

Theoretically, there may be an ultimate good. But that has nothing to do with morality. Good, doing good, being good, is not morality. Instead, good, doing good and being good is just that: good, being good and doing good. There is no room for morality in being good.

And being good gives no authority to nobody over nobody else.

Morality is therefore not a FUNCTION of descriptive ethics, but a topic of it. — god must be atheist

I'm pretty sure that's what's meant by being a function of. Theories about what types of proscription are classed as 'moral' are the product of descriptive ethics, hence the term 'function' - to be a product of.

The question might be asked, what is it, which persuades another to accept moral principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Usually the appeal of seeing someone else apply those principles and gaining some degree of success (however measured) in doing so. Thought is incredibly calorie intensive, we have a huge network of functions designed to select and imitate others, it's just massively more efficient than trying to work it out from scratch each time.

The interesting question, for me, is how people select who to imitate - but that's a completely different topic. Moral virtues and duties are usually adopted by imitation. Consequentialist moral decisions are obviously an exception, by their very nature, but the goals against which potential outcomes are measured are still virtues or duties determined by cultural inheritance.

I'm pretty sure that's what's meant by being a function of. — Isaac

Isaac, I did not expect this of you.

A function is not a topic of examination. A function is a response by unit to certain stimuli. Both in life, in mathematics, and in theoretics. A topic of examination is not a function. It is a study on how that function works (if the function is the particular topic of the examination).

Please don't do this to me.

A dinosaur may not care about vegetarianism and may just torture and eat a species of animal; humans do this more than that. When vegetarianism is thought of as good, is that world, or universe logic (I.e. I'll save animal habitats; it's unfair on the animals)? The vegetarian is holding that they have authority, but in reference to what? A greater understanding? Who's the teacher?

So as to philosophers and the willing, the thesis is that we do not have a basis without religion on which to ground a discussion — unenlightened

Not quite. She says "that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology". Now depending on your approach, that it either a task for philosophical discussion, psychological investigation, or both. It doesn't imply we just stop talking about it, it suggests our discussions have strayed off track. It redirects.

"The function of something or someone is the useful thing that they do or are intended to do" - Collins Dictionary.

I'm pretty sure @Galuchat just meant that it is the job of descriptive ethics to produce theories as to what kinds of proscription count as 'moral'. I was just trying to help you with another possible interpretation which I think is more charitable. Where's the harm in that?

I'm pretty sure Galuchat just meant that it is the job of descriptive ethics to produce theories — Isaac

This I agree with. But he said "function", and I assumed he or she was intentionally choosing his or her words.

If you want to forgive that, go ahead. I am on the point of view that "I calls it as I sees it". If people misspoke, it's their job to correct themselves. If they can't, or are oblvious of misspeaking, AND we accept that, then we open the flood gates to communication chaos.

Is that what you advocate, @Isaac? Floods of miscommunication?

The preamble of this site emphasizes the use of proper English. It is not for a pedantic reason. It is for the reason that this is a philosophy site. If we need to keep on substituting things we think others meant in the place of what they actually said, then we create a breeding ground of miscommunication.

Enough said.

Enough said. — god must be atheist

Well no, not really. The term 'function' does in fact mean the job a thing is meant to do, it's function.

So to say ""what morality is" is a function of Descriptive Ethics", is just to say that "providing answers to the question" what morality is" is one of the tasks descriptive ethics is meant to do.

"A function of X", and "one of the things X is meant to do" are synonymous.

"A function of the police is to keep civil order"

"One of the things the police are meant to do is keep civil order"

It's perfectly proper English.

Enough said (now).

I don't know why you are defending @Galuchat, @Isaac. Do you have a personal connection to him or her in real life, or outside this forum?

@Galuchat quoted a passage from a different author, @Galuchat admitting to it later, but not attributing the words to the source when he first quoted it. This is punishable offence in academia, but here it's okay; fine. Plagiarism is not a crime, but it is frowned upon, and I just frowned.

Galuchat quoted a passage from a different author, Galuchat admitting to it later, but not attributing the words to the source when he first quoted it. — god must be atheist

Eh! The quote of yours I was responding to was

Descriptive ethics may deal with this, but only ineffectually. Morality is therefore not a FUNCTION of descriptive ethics, but a topic of it. — god must be atheist

No mention of quotes, sources or plagiarism. Just what seemed to be a complaint about the use of the term 'function'. Where's all this talk of plagiarism come from?

So to say ""what morality is" is a function of Descriptive Ethics", is just to say that "providing answers to the question" what morality is" is one of the tasks descriptive ethics is meant to do. — Isaac

Actually, if you consider the quotes mean to separate the actual morality from studying morality, then you are right. I admit that.

But it is still not clear righting; "what morality is" is a noun, and a function is a verb in the infinite form.

"My function is to argue."
"The function of the police is to keep peace".
etc.

It is incorrect to say,
"my function is argument."
"The function of the police is peace."

Because of the wrong construct, I got confused, and I DISREGARDED the quotation marks. This is my mistake, and I admit to it.

On the other hand, the form of expression was not proper. It gave way to misunderstanding.

I assume 50% of the liability for the misunderstanding, for not noticing the quotes. I attribute fifty percent of the liability for the misunderstanding to the incorrect structure of the sentence by @Galuchat.

I call it a draw.

Why does one state "it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy", and then proceed to do moral philosophy? Do you apprehend the pretense? In extreme cases like this, it's called hypocrisy. Do you think that psychology has a better system for treating this illness, "pretense", than moral philosophy does? Why pretend that psychology can produce authenticity in a human being, when we all know that authenticity is the product of good moral training. Why pretend that psychology is required for a philosophy of morality?

Thought is incredibly calorie intensive, we have a huge network of functions designed to select and imitate others, it's just massively more efficient than trying to work it out from scratch each time. — Isaac

Would you classify imitating others as a form of pretending?

The interesting question, for me, is how people select who to imitate - but that's a completely different topic. Moral virtues and duties are usually adopted by imitation. Consequentialist moral decisions are obviously an exception, by their very nature, but the goals against which potential outcomes are measured are still virtues or duties determined by cultural inheritance. — Isaac

Aren't we taught that good moral standards involve thinking things out for ourselves, and not to simply imitate others?

Why does one state "it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy", and then proceed to do moral philosophy? — Metaphysician Undercover

You are smarter than this. I won't answer the ridiculous.

Sorry, sometimes I don't see what appears obvious to others. That's why I ask for explanations. I don't think it's related to smartness, I think it's a psychological condition. Why not just address the issue instead of expressing a biased judgement of my psyche, in a way meant to insult?

Would you classify imitating others as a form of pretending? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I think what's meant by 'pretending' seems to require a concious deceit. With morality, there doesn't appear to be anything to be a deceitful version of. There's no 'true' moral judgement which copying others is only a pretense of. How others behave just is one of the drives which determine our decisions sometimes.

Aren't we taught that good moral standards involve thinking things out for ourselves, and not to simply imitate others? — Metaphysician Undercover

We might be taught it, and in this day and age, probably with good reason, but the teaching is just post hoc rationalisation of what's already going on. After all, why would we trust the teacher? Our sense of trustworthiness, rightful authority, duty... All must be in place already just to accept the teacher telling us to work it out for ourselves. Not to mention the fact we still need an objective against which to measure the options. If we do the calculations ourselves (which course of action is best) we have to already have in place what constitutes the 'best' we're aiming for, and the idea that us using our own rational capabilities to work this out is itself the best course of action.

No, I think what's meant by 'pretending' seems to require a concious deceit. With morality, there doesn't appear to be anything to be a deceitful version of. There's no 'true' moral judgement which copying others is only a pretense of. How others behave just is one of the drives which determine our decisions sometimes. — Isaac

I don't see any reason to restrict "pretending" so as it only may refer when there is conscious deceit. Actors in a play will pretend, that's what acting is, when there is no intent to deceive the audience, the intent is to entertain. In morality, one may pretend to be an authority, without the conscious intent to deceive. It is a matter of acting the part, and the poser might have the true intention, and belief in bettering the audience.

The problem with authority is that it is not something that can be enforced on the people, the people must give it to the person who will become the authority. The authority is created by the act of giving the person authority, not by imposition. This is due to the nature of free choice. So if a person wants to be an authority, that person must pretend, in order that the people might see that person as an acceptable authority, and actually make the person into an authority. In this act of pretense, it is not necessary to deem the person as deceitful, if the person is truly acting for the interest of the people. It is just like an actor in a play; the actor must act the part in order for the audience to see the intended character, and finally the audience will see the actor as the character. Because it is known and respected that it is an act, we cannot say that the actor is deceitful in doing this.

We might be taught it, and in this day and age, probably with good reason, but the teaching is just post hoc rationalisation of what's already going on. After all, why would we trust the teacher? Our sense of trustworthiness, rightful authority, duty... All must be in place already just to accept the teacher telling us to work it out for ourselves. Not to mention the fact we still need an objective against which to measure the options. If we do the calculations ourselves (which course of action is best) we have to already have in place what constitutes the 'best' we're aiming for, and the idea that us using our own rational capabilities to work this out is itself the best course of action. — Isaac

The teacher is an actor as well, acting the part of an authority. But there is a difference here, and this is that the children do not know that it is an act of pretense. So there is a form of deceit which is inherent within learning, and learning cannot proceed without it. If the children knew that the authorities were just posing, there'd be disorder everywhere, and no education. Therefore the teacher walks a fine line of balance between encouraging the virtues of true independent, authentic, and original thought, while displaying the virtues of accepted principles.

From this perspective there cannot be a "best". "Best" implies an extreme, and as Aristotle demonstrated, virtue lies as a mean between the extremes. The balance the teacher must keep is a mean. One might say "best" is that balance, which the teacher must establish, but a balance is not constant and consistent in a changing world, so there is no static or ideal best. Changes on one side must be met with changes to the other. So the teacher is always balancing the deceitful imposition of principles, pretending to be an authority when the children do not know that it is pretense, with the honest encouragement of independence and authenticity.

Use of the terms "moral obligation", "moral duty", "morally right or wrong", and "morally ought", need not be related to concepts of authority and/or legality (as in Divine Rules) in order to make sense.

They may be related to psychological concepts (as in Universal Rules) having human nature as its basis, inasmuch as:

1) Moral sentiments are a human universal (Brown, Donald E. 1991. Human Universals. New York City: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-87722-841-8).

2) Similarities between the moral codes and value systems of the World's major Book Religions and systems of Moral Philosophy indicate that morality is likely to have a basis in human nature rather than human culture. (cf., Kung, Hans; Kuschel, Karl-Josef, Eds. 1993. Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. The Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions. SCM Press, London / Continuum, New York.)

Sorry, sometimes I don't see what appears obvious to others. That's why I ask for explanations. I don't think it's related to smartness, I think it's a psychological condition. Why not just address the issue instead of expressing a biased judgement of my psyche, in a way meant to insult? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what to say really. To paraphrase A : moral philosophy is in a state because bla bla bla and all this other stuff needs to be sorted out before we can hope to make sense of it. In the meantime, I am not going to discuss any of this with Jeffery Dahmer, Adolf Hitler, or Pol Pot. I cannot justify it, but I'm not going to commit atrocities because philosophy is a mess.

You have to kill to survive. You have to be selfish if no one is selfishly guarding you.

Moral authority that's separate from political authority is something we created when we realized that kings aren't gods and priests are conmen. It's not a tool to manifest our potential. Its a bulwark against meaninglessness.

Moral authority that's separate from political authority is something we created when we realized that kings aren't gods and priests are conmen. It's not a tool to manifest our potential. Its a bulwark against meaninglessness. — frank

:clap:

Thread theme tune.

I don't know what to say really. To paraphrase A : moral philosophy is in a state because bla bla bla and all this other stuff needs to be sorted out before we can hope to make sense of it. In the meantime, I am not going to discuss any of this with Jeffery Dahmer, Adolf Hitler, or Pol Pot. I cannot justify it, but I'm not going to commit atrocities because philosophy is a mess. — unenlightened

Well you've really lost me now. I haven't the foggiest clue of what you're trying to say. I suppose you succeed with "I am not going to discuss any of this..." by saying something completely incoherent.

Un is giving a rough and ready account of the article that this thread is about.

I know. So if Unenlightened's account is accurate, the article suffers the problems Unenlightened has demonstrated.

if Unenlightened's account is accurate, the article suffers the problems Unenlightened has demonstrated. — Metaphysician Undercover

But there is no problem. Moral philosophy depends on morals, not the other way round.

That's clearly not true. Moral philosophy determines what's good, what ought to be done in the future. "Morals" are judged in relation to actions which have been done in the past. And, there are no good acts carried out without first determining what is good, and then proceeding into that act. I.e. good acts are not a matter of random chance, they are chosen.

In other words, we cannot rely on the morality of the past to determine the morality of the future because this would exclude the possibility of bettering ourselves. And the purpose of moral philosophy is to better ourselves. So to say that we're too bad to practise moral philosophy is incoherent, because in reality the worse we get the more potential there is to better ourselves.

Moral philosophy determines what's good, — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't. That's impossible. Philosophy has to be about something. Making shit up is called 'fiction'.

Your conclusion is not supported. The premise that "making shit up is called 'fiction'", doesn't produce the conclusion that it's impossible that philosophy is this type of activity. In fact, there is much evidence that philosophy is this type of activity, 'making shit up'. All you need to do is read some philosophy to see that. And that's why philosophy is frowned upon by many in the scientific community.

Disciplines like psychology and sociology attempt to close this gap between 'making shit up' and science. That's why the validity of many principles in these so-called "sciences" is very difficult to judge, because the made up shit and the true science are woven together into a fabric which supports the discipline. But this weaving together tends to hide the distinction between the scientific principles produced from empirical observations of past events, and the made up shit, which are the principles by which the scientific principles are applied toward producing future events.