Yeah, I think that's a good way to sum it up. There's a book I really like called Seeing Like a State, that analyzes rationalist projects (like forestry in post-enlightenment Europe, resettlement of extra-state tribes, planned cities in South America etc) and tries to show how the human mind doesn't have the bandwidth to reconstruct stuff from ground up. Human Heuristics have, baked into them, centuries (if not millennia) of trial and error. It's a deep-social scope that exceeds any rational reconfiguring by one mind (or committee). (It's a cool book because on the one hand this accords nicely with Burke's defense of conservatism or Chesterton's Fence. But the author is a likely left-leaning anarchist. The book extrapolitically straddles a line that most books can't (say The Road to Serfdom vs Capital)

Jumping the gun a little, I think there is a way to recapture the thing that Anscombe thinks was lost with the death of god. Maybe there's no longer obligation to a law-giving God. But the patterns of human attachment subsist. Outside of sociopathy, all humans seek to please some authority (but a better word than 'please' is needed here.) & not just any authority - an authority that is legitimate. This fuzzy idea of legitimacy (which begins in childhood) brings with it all kind of ideas of what makes someone legitimate. In other words, from the beginning, there is a blurry blend of Authority & extra-authoritative virtues. The two poles nurture one another. I don't think it's the case that the Absolute Ought vanished with God. She's right that an era of ethics orbited around that vanished god, and its ethical echoes. But that obligation to something/someone else it still alive and well - it's just distributed in another way. (Again, I'm running ahead, but - & I hope further reading of the essay bears this out - she's laying the ground for understanding what's actually going on with God/Law/Oughts in a way that retains its gold, while getting rid of the dross.)

Outside of sociopathy, all humans seek to please some authority (but a better word than 'please' is needed here.) & not just any authority - an authority that is legitimate. This fuzzy idea of legitimacy (which begins in childhood) brings with it all kind of ideas of what makes someone legitimate. — csalisbury

And this is exactly why we need psychology if morality is going to be discussed in these terms. This is pseudo-scientific myth-making. I'm not saying you're wrong necessarily, but do you not see a problem at all with continuing past this point in your thoughts? Maybe it's just me, being weird about it, but I hit a point like that in my thinking and I immediately stop and say "well is it though? I mean, we can actually check that".

I agree.

Regarding ethical maturation, Jean Piaget's work was continued by Lawrence Kohlberg's work, which was continued by James Rest's work...

Piaget, Jean. 1954. The Construction of Reality in the Child (M. Cook, Trans.). New York, NY, US: Basic Books.

Kohlberg, Lawrence; Levine, Charles G.; Hewer, Alexandra. 1983. Moral Stages: A Current Formulation and a Response to Critics. Basel, NY: Karger. ISBN 3-8055-3716-6.

Rest, James R. 1979. Development in Judging Moral Issues. University of Minnesota Press.

The best we can do is just muddle along. Hey, unenlightened? — Banno

There is something towards the end of the piece that is not articulated. If I dare to try and make it explicit, I may be wrong and I may fail, so bite my bum if you will...

Amongst the multiverse of possibilities that one might try to measure and compare as 'consequences', there is one kind that might be called 'psychological' in particular and that relates to a problem that psychology has as a scientific endeavour. And that is that the psyche is made of (or contains) psychological theory in a way that atoms are not made of atomic theory.

And she will not argue against a thought that shows 'a corrupt mind'. And what is a corrupt mind, and what mind can judge the corruption, and according to what psychological theory?

On the one hand, there are ethical theories that tend to corrupt the mind, and on the other there are minds that are corrupted enough to hold such theories. And consequentialism is such because in principle anything at all can be justified. And the reason for the philosophical failure is precisely that such theories cannot measure or account for their own consequences on the psyche that holds them.

So I justify murdering my wife because it will liberate me to do all sorts of good in the world, but cannot calculate the corruption that either the act or the calculation will have on me because the theory cannot conceive that it is itself corrupt, and the calculation cannot calculate the consequences of calculating.

Even if we never had to act while tired or in pain and always had hours to flowchart outcomes, there would be unknowns. — frank

This is a common, and valid, criticism of Consequentialism. However:
1) Children make decisions based on considerations of consequence (reward versus punishment) (Kohlberg, 1983).
2) Having knowledge of possible consequences entails responsibility.
3) Ignorance of possible consequences constitutes negligence.

I think that:
1) An individual's conscience operates on a Deontological basis.
2) With regard to Political Ethics, public policy formulation would best operate on a Consequentialist basis, because:
a) The ethical quantity of action affecting a social group is relatively great, warranting careful consideration of particular circumstances.
b) The problem-solving, decision-making, and planning capacity/resources of a social group are fit for purpose (appropriate to the task).

Given an ethical model, or morality (classification of human events as moral or immoral), the realisation of right (moral) action involves applying one of the following:
1) General approach (e.g., Master Rule, or Method)
2) Particular approach (e.g., Virtue)

The amount of time available for decision-making depends on the exigencies of a situation. Required response time varies along a continuum between immediate and eventual.
1) Immediate decision-making requires automatic processing.
2) Eventual decision-making permits controlled processing.

So, the exigencies of a situation determine the type of mental processing required (automatic and/or controlled), and which right action approach is most suitable. For example, the application of a:
1) Master Rule Approach is suitable for automatic processing.
2) Method Approach is suitable for a combination of automatic and controlled processing.
3) Virtue Approach is suitable for controlled processing.

Yes. The idea that moral decision-making is anything other than a fairly tangled mess of highly context-specific techniques is just wishful thinking.

I'd go even further than you though. I think time is not the only factor determining method. I think confidence in available data also plays a role, particularly between virtue (low confidence) and consequentialism (high confidence). Also position and confidence in social heirachy plays a strong role between deontology (high confidence) and consequntialism (low confidence).

I think 'moral' is just a term we apply to actions (or decisions) of a vaguely related kind. So it's not the decision-making algorithm or heuristic which defines 'moral' and therefore there's no single answer to how moral decisions are made.

All that being said, I don't think anything there excludes the possibility of moral theories being wildly wrong. The mere existence of a wide range of decision-making techniques does not in of itself mean that all the current canon of theories must be accommodated somewhere in that range.

I agree.

theory cannot conceive that it is itself corrupt, and the calculation cannot calculate the consequences of calculating. — unenlightened

Not sure I follow you. If I hold a theory that it is morally good to murder my wife on the basis of the perceived consequences, then I am making two choices;

1) that the 'right' course of action in this instance is best worked out by estimating the total 'good' the action will bring about (where here 'good' is secondarily judged by imagining each outcome, so one outcome might be to satisfy a duty, another might be correspondence with a virtue, another might just be a picture associated with the idea of good)

and

2) that the result of this procedure is to murder my wife.

I don't see what's preventing me from later seeing choice (1) as immoral, by some other method (say, concluding that it is not very virtuous to be 'calculating' those sorts of things), or by using the same technique as (2) to estimate the consequences of repeating the decision at (1).

If I hold a theory that it is morally good to murder my wife on the basis of the perceived consequences, — Isaac

But if someone really thinks, in advance,I that it is open to question whether such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be quite excluded from consideration-I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind. — A

If I have a corrupt mind, I will have corrupt ethics and make corrupt calculations. This much must surely be accounted for, as one has ample evidence for its occurrence in the world. "I am an exceptionally fine fellow, and therefore anything that helps me is a good thing and anything that hinders me is a bad thing." I don't need to name names do I?

If I have a corrupt mind, I will have corrupt ethics and make corrupt calculations. — unenlightened

Well, that's kind of what I (and @Galuchat) have been saying, I don't think the evidence is on your side there. It's doubtful that anyone has such a thing as 'corrupt ethics' or a 'corrupt mind'. Their decision-making methods may be flawed, either by our own or by their standards. Nothing prevents a well-functioning decision-making method in one context from noticing a poor ("corrupt', if you like) decision-making method.

I'm not saying this is always going to happen, the case you alude to is clearly one such exception. I'm just saying that there's nothing in the psychological system which prevents it from reflecting on itself.

Their decision-making methods may be flawed, either by our own or by their standards. — Isaac

Your relativism renders the discussion meaningless. I will not argue with it.

Morality is ultimately about judgement. It's about living with the consequences of our past actions. We head into the future with the innocent but potentially destructive desire to live. — frank

Morality is just as much about judging possible future actions as it is about judging actual past actions.

Outside of sociopathy, all humans seek to please some authority (but a better word than 'please' is needed here.) & not just any authority - an authority that is legitimate. This fuzzy idea of legitimacy (which begins in childhood) brings with it all kind of ideas of what makes someone legitimate. — csalisbury

Authority puts an end to the infinite regress of "why?", which I mentioned earlier. The child continually asks "why?", and ultimately the answers are like this, "because the parents say so", "because the teachers say so", "because the Bible says so", "because the laws say so" etc..

There may be a need to inquire as to why we are often observed to submit to authority, "seek to please", but there is an even greater need to inquire as to why we are often observed to confront authority with doubt and skepticism. This confrontational attitude is the reason why there's no longer obligation to God. And the psychological aspect is not rooted in that desire to please the other. Instead, it might be rooted in a philosophical , or epistemological attitude. The submission to authority is a respect for the knowledge of the other, and the desire to know what the other knows. So even the "seek to please" attitude can be represented as part of the desire to know. If respect for the knowledge of the authority figure ceases, then there is no respect for the posed authority, consequently not authority.

What I believe is the key point to this psychological aspect, is that the breakdown in respect is a breakdown in the respect for the posed authority's knowledge, not a breakdown in respect for the person. This is how the posed authority looses authority and is no longer an authority but a poser. However, the poser may be respected as a person, without being respected as an authority. So we have a necessary distinction to be made between one's attitude toward other human beings, and one's attitude toward the knowledge of other human beings. This separation is evident when people of high moral standard have a disrespect for the law. The gap is widened, and the problem exacerbated when those who are supporting this system of knowledge insist that the knowledge itself is the authority rather than the person who poses. This only provides the people with disrespect for the law more principles of separation, to support the position that one may have high moral standards (respect for other human beings), yet great disrespect for the law.

Understanding this principle reveals the disarray and incapacity of the current socio-economical-epistemological system in relation to morality. The individual who has contempt for that system might still be a loving, caring, moral individual, because disrespect for any given system is not the same thing as disrespect for any human being. I can have great respect for you as a human being, while still not liking your way of doing things. But other individuals who adhere to the principles of the system, as if the system is the authority, cannot apprehend the person who has disrespect for the system, as anything other than immoral. Therefore the gap widens.as the supporters of the system increase efforts to present the system as a "person" to be respected (i.e. as an authority figure).

If I have a corrupt mind, I will have corrupt ethics and make corrupt calculations. This much must surely be accounted for, as one has ample evidence for its occurrence in the world. "I am an exceptionally fine fellow, and therefore anything that helps me is a good thing and anything that hinders me is a bad thing." I don't need to name names do I? — unenlightened

This is exactly the separation I refer to. The exemplified person has a corrupt mind, corrupt ethics, and makes corrupt calculations, in relation to the principles established by the system. Such allegations of "corrupt" can only be supported in relation to the principles of some system. Now figure into your calculations the fact that many people might have a similar general disrespect for that same system, which validates the designation 'corrupt", for a vast variety of reasons. The exemplified person, demonstrates nothing but flagrant disregard for this system. So the person is propped up by others as a symbol of general disrespect for the system, then sacrificed to the system, in the attempt to damage it. The real personality of that person is completely irrelevant because the person has now been thrown into the system, become a part of it as an opposition to it, and is therefore not considered as a person. This person (who is no longer a person) is a symbol of the separation between the people and the system. It's an inversion of the "scapegoat", which may have been perfected by Jesus and his disciples. There is a goodness associated with opposition to evil within a system. The people gather together all this goodness and sanctify someone (Jesus, or your exemplified person) with this goodness, and sacrifice the person to the system.

Given an ethical model, or morality (classification of human events as moral or immoral), the realisation of right (moral) action involves applying one of the following:
1) General approach (e.g., Master Rule, or Method)
2) Particular approach (e.g., Virtue)

The amount of time available for decision-making depends on the exigencies of a situation. Required response time varies along a continuum between immediate and eventual.
1) Immediate decision-making requires automatic processing.
2) Eventual decision-making permits controlled processing.

So, the exigencies of a situation determine the type of mental processing required (automatic and/or controlled), and which right action approach is most suitable. For example, the application of a:
1) Master Rule Approach is suitable for automatic processing.
2) Method Approach is suitable for a combination of automatic and controlled processing.
3) Virtue Approach is suitable for controlled processing. — Galuchat

Interesting, despite 'hints' of psychologism (i.e. Protagorean / species relativism) vis-à-vis rational ethics, or moral philosophy. (Maybe these 'hints' are merely apparent and figments of my own philosophical idiosyncracies, or sensibilities. :chin:)

I think time is not the only factor determining method. I think confidence in available data also plays a role, particularly between virtue (low confidence) and consequentialism (high confidence). Also position and confidence in social h[ie]ra[rc]hy plays a strong role between deontology (high confidence) and conseq[uen]tialism (low confidence). — Isaac

Clarification: Do you mean that consequentialism has higher confidence than virtue but lower confidence than deontology? so that deontology (highest), consequentialism (median) & virtue (lowest)?

Morality is just as much about judging possible future actions as it is about judging actual past actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Strictly speaking, we can only judge hypotheticals. We dont know future events and so there's nothing to judge. 'Looking backward, living forward'. We enter the future ass first.

Clarification: Do you mean that consequentialism has higher confidence than virtue but lower confidence than deontology? so that deontology (highest), consequentialism (median) & virtue (lowest)? — 180 Proof

No. One scale is to do with confidence in the data, the other is confidence in ones social group. I don't intend that these two scales exhaust all possible scales either, they're just to serve as examples. All I'm saying there is that one might be more inclined to use consequentialist decision-making methods if one had a high degree of confidence in the data, like if you contemplated using live ammunition for your target practice, your formost consideration would be "what if I hit someone". Whereas if you owe the grocer five pounds, you'd be unlikely to think "there might be social repurcussions if I don't pay, let me just weigh them against the five pounds I'd gain...calculate net gain... extend hyperbolic discount rate...". No, you'd just think "dishonesty's not right, probably best just pay", if you thought anything at all.

The other scale is similar, but with duty and social groups. People tend to be more happy to use unquestioned duty to determine right actions in groups to which they are strongly attached. It's how soldiering works, for example. Those in less strong social groups tend to question duty (or rules) more and so may defer to virtue or consequences depending on the other factors.

No. One scale is to do with confidence in the data, the other is confidence in ones social group. — Isaac

Okay. Even better ...

All I'm saying there is that one might be more inclined to use consequentialist decision-making methods if one had a high degree of confidence in the data

I guess the Bayesian-ness here gives me less confidence with this "inclination". You may be right though.

The other scale is similar, but with duty and social groups. People tend to be more happy to use unquestioned duty to determine right actions in groups to which they are strongly attached. — Isaac

So duty when higher confidence in social group and (fall back on) virtue when lower confidence in social group? Intuitively makes sense.

I guess the Bayesian-ness here gives me less confidence with this "inclination". — 180 Proof

Not sure what you mean here, could you expand a little?

So duty when higher confidence in social group and (fall back on) virtue when lower confidence in social group? Intuitively makes sense. — 180 Proof

Yeah, always bearing in mind of course, the massive caveat that it's more complicated in the real world than the broad trends identified by psychological research.

Such allegations of "corrupt" can only be supported in relation to the principles of some system. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well indeed. So they remain unsupported.

I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind. — A

You of course are perfectly entitled to seek to provide support or lament the lack of support. I merely point out that such considerations are off topic. Rather as one might decline to exchange recipes with a cannibal.

Strictly speaking, we can only judge hypotheticals. We dont know future events and so there's nothing to judge. 'Looking backward, living forward'. We enter the future ass first. — frank

I agree that we enter the future ass first, because we are looking at things which we have seen and remembered, and that is past. ,However, a past event can be described, a future event cannot be described, that is the point. So we might judge the future on hypotheticals, but the past we judge on memories and descriptions. Neither one is more or less of a "judgement" than the other.

Well indeed. So they remain unsupported. — unenlightened

No they do not remain unsupported, we support them all the time, by referring to ethical principles. That's what I told Banno, and Banno suggested that we might just declare that courage is a virtue without reference to any ethics for support. But that's not reality, in reality we support those judgements with such references.

Given an ethical model, or morality (classification of human events as moral or immoral), the realisation of right (moral) action involves applying one of the following:
1) General approach (e.g., Master Rule, or Method)
2) Particular approach (e.g., Virtue) — Galuchat

Galuchat, I am impressed how methodically you have thought this through.

My only objection to your presentation is the notion of "given ethical model". It is given either in a general approach, or in a particular approach, and both approaches involve a basic sense of morality, but neither approaches spell out what that basic sense of morality is.

Basically, you have designed a well-balanced description of what morality ought to be, or is, without touching the delicately elusive and dangerously explosive task of naming what the essence of morality is.

And whithout that, anyone can state anyting as being moral, without the need, or rather, without the possibility, of proving it, or of getting it proven wrong.

This renders the moral action more than just not scientific; it renders it undefinable and thus: ether, hot air, poof she's gone, a mirage, an illusion.

This is actually the basis of my total objection to invoking morality as the backing for an argument: it IS, it exists, but nobody can own it, nobody can put it in a frame that is true, and accepted by all parties.

What good is something, that we know exists, but we don't know anything about it? What possible use can we get out of something that is all effect and affect, but we can't poinpoint it and delineate it from the chaos of concepts humans can't define?

No they do not remain unsupported, we support them all the time, by referring to ethical principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is true. Very true. The saddest part is, that ethical principles are what each person who refers to them calls them. They are arbitrary, while appearing to have a certain theme (but that is only appearance.)

Ethical principles either don't exist, or we haven't discovered them yet. Therefore the referring to ethical principles is a snow job, a wool over other's eyes, it is a pungent force of argument, without any essence or logical backing.

Given an ethical model, or morality (classification of human events as moral or immoral), the realisation of right (moral) action involves applying one of the following:
1) General approach (e.g., Master Rule, or Method)
2) Particular approach (e.g., Virtue) — Galuchat

Galuchat, I am impressed how methodically you have thought this through. — god must be atheist

Thanks, but I didn't come up with these particular ideas, they are part of Natural Law Ethics.

My only objection to your presentation is the notion of "given ethical model". It is given either in a general approach, or in a particular approach, and both approaches involve a basic sense of morality, but neither approaches spell out what that basic sense of morality is. — god must be atheist

Correct.
The application of an approach to realise (actualise) right action is a function of Normative Ethics (the topic of this thread), whereas; "what morality is" is a function of Descriptive Ethics, which is off-topic.

Well indeed. So they remain unsupported.
— unenlightened

No they do not remain unsupported, we support them all the time, by referring to ethical principles. That's what I told Banno, and Banno suggested that we might just declare that courage is a virtue without reference to any ethics for support. But that's not reality, in reality we support those judgements with such references. — Metaphysician Undercover

I really don't understand your argument. You seem to be declaring what we do and then complaining that we're not doing it. I'm saying that Anscombe is saying that there are positions she will not engage with. If you want to engage with them, that's up to you. As a vegetarian, I am simply not interested in the nutritional value of meat.

The application of an approach to realise (actualise) right action is a function of Normative Ethics (the topic of this thread), whereas; "what morality is" is a function of Descriptive Ethics, which is off-topic. — Galuchat

I don't agree with this. What morality is (the essence and the very kernel of attribute or attribute-set what makes an act moral or amoral), is not defined, it's elusive, and it's undefinable. Descriptive ethics may deal with this, but only ineffectually. Morality is therefore not a FUNCTION of descriptive ethics, but a topic of it.

I really don't understand your argument. You seem to be declaring what we do and then complaining that we're not doing it. I'm saying that Anscombe is saying that there are positions she will not engage with. If you want to engage with them, that's up to you. As a vegetarian, I am simply not interested in the nutritional value of meat. — unenlightened

What's the point then? Isn't this just like saying "let's discuss morality, but I have no respect for your opinion, I just want to discuss my opinion"? Ethics is not a matter of enforcing your morality onto others. There is a necessary requirement of demonstrating to others the superiority of your principles, because people choose freely. If you deny free will, and insist that people must do as you say, you won't get far. That's why platonic dialectics is the classic example of how to discuss morality. Plato at least pretends to take into account the opinions of others.

Pretense is an important issue here. Notice in my post I mentioned the poser. You cannot simply pose as a moral authority, and expect others to submit to your will. You must act the part, and pretend that you actually are a moral authority. It is truly an act, a "pretense", for the reason that god must be atheist pointed out:

This is true. Very true. The saddest part is, that ethical principles are what each person who refers to them calls them. They are arbitrary, while appearing to have a certain theme (but that is only appearance.)

Ethical principles either don't exist, or we haven't discovered them yet. Therefore the referring to ethical principles is a snow job, a wool over other's eyes, it is a pungent force of argument, without any essence or logical backing. — god must be atheist

The question might be asked, what is it, which persuades another to accept moral principles. If it's not the argument (rhetoric) which convinces, nor is there an inherent appeal within the principles (subject matter) being argued, then what is it? Am I missing something? Is it really just rhetoric, "a pungent force of argument"? If so, wouldn't we end up with truly arbitrary principles? I suggest you consider that there is an inherent appeal within the principles.

As a vegetarian, I am simply not interested in the nutritional value of meat. — unenlightened

Ethics is not a matter of enforcing your morality onto others — Metaphysician Undercover

MU, you're right. Unenlightened, you have the right to hold that opinion.

MU, you can see why moralist vegetarians seem like they try to push their morals on you (and me and on everyone else). Because moralistic vegetarianism is not only a question of morals, but it's also a lifestyle, and in a certain sense, it's a religion. Not a religion, because it lacks god, but a strong enough world view so that people will try to PROSELYTIZE it as if they were fervently religious about not eating meat.

There is nothing you can say to a fanatic to change his ways -- and conversely, a fanatic can say nothing to you to change your ways. But the fanatic will ALWAYS feel morally superior and therefore act more insistent.

What does that say about ultimate morality? What is it judged by?

Is the universe or world more corellate?

What does that say about ultimate morality? What is it judged by? — Qwex

Well, there you go. There is no ultimo morality. It is a mirage that everyone believes in, and everyone likes to own. I spit on those people. They make me puke. Hypocrites. Liars. Stupid fucking idiots. People who can't think things through.

In other words, each person in the entire human race.

Then what's the measure of someone's authority if there is no ultimate good?

What does that say about ultimate morality? What is it judged by? — Qwex

It is easiest to judge by moral ultimacy. "I judge you to be morally faulty." Or something to that effect.

You can't prove that you made the right judgment. But judgment on moral grounds needs no proof. It only needs your own conviction that you are right about it.

That's why you are an asshole. (YOU being a general you, not you personally, Qwex. Everyone is an asshole because they take their own moral judging seriously. Whereas it is a mirage, and an unfounded opinion.)