t's apparent from discussion elsewhere that infinity holds a terror for you that I, and I think most others, do not share. — Banno

It's not a terror at all, it's a respect for the reality of it. Infinite regress is an unintelligibility which is repugnant to a rational mind. A healthy philosophical mind, with the desire to know and understand, will not accept the proposition that some things are unintelligible, because that proposition is contrary to the philosophical desire to know. A mind which accepts that a thing be described in terms of unintelligibility is not a healthy mind. And an unhealthy mind puts a scourge on virtue.

Arguably Aristotle sort to promote, say, courage because it presented a path to eudaimonia; but I don't see why we could not simply accept courage as worthy in itself. — Banno

It is unreasonable to simply accept a proposition as true, without a reason for accepting it. You might call this the justification. The reason why this proposition is true is that if we accept as true, any such propositions without any justification, we will be deceived and taken advantage of by those with an ulterior motive.

One can step over the pit of regress. — Banno

What you describe is not stepping over the pit of regress, but actually turning away from it, as if in fear of it.

It is unreasonable to simply accept a proposition as true, without a reason for accepting it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish.

It is unreasonable to simply accept a proposition as true, without a reason for accepting it.
— Metaphysician Undercover

Rubbish. — Banno

It's irrational (like believing in God).

It's irrational (like believing in God). — frank

Rather, it's outside of rationality - like "I prefer vanilla".

Rather, it's outside of rationality - like "I prefer vanilla". — Banno

To hold a belief without any reason is to hold it irrationally. Surely there's some reason you prefer vanilla?

Surely there's some reason you prefer vanilla? — frank

What could possibly count as a reason here?

What could possibly count as a reason here? — Banno

Because chocolate stains your tie? I suppose you might prefer it for no reason at all, like a person might prefer being a Catholic for no reason at all?

To hold a belief without any reason is to hold it irrationally

I believe the cat is sat on the mat. My reason for such a belief is nil.

It's not irrational or unreasonable - it's just an errornous statement.

To continue to hold that belief, is pure stupidity.

Banno is right by saying it's outside of rationality.

What could possibly count as a reason here? — Banno

With all due respect, there may be no reason, but there may be a cause. Which is as good as a reason.

However, "I like vanilla" is not a proposition. It is a statement of status quo. I propose that it is reasonable to expect philosophers to recognize a proposition, and it is a status quo that you failed at it, @Banno. The original proposition, which you called "rubbish" was about accepting propositions as true only if they are reasonable.

Banno is right by saying it's outside of rationality. — Qwex

"Irrational" is commonly used to mean "without reason" whether it's modifying an action or the way a belief is held.

"I like vanilla" is not a proposition. — god must be atheist

Yeah, it is. Unless you want to indulge in special pleading - arguing that it can't be a proposition because it doesn't do what you expect propositions to do.

If that's all you mean, then that's fine.

My beef is with Meta's tedious assertion that every accepted proposition has a justification.

But fuck him. This discussion is derailing an otherwise interesting thread.

Doesn't 'held' imply there is already a reason?

I believe in God. Is just a statement.

I hold a belief in God, surely refers to some sort of held weight.

I think it's a semantical error resulting in a red herring.

A belief without any reason is irrational belief.

A held belief, without any reason, is not irrationally held. It's an irrational held belief. (This statement is errornous I know, but hopefully it shows you the semantical error).

Yeah, it is. Unless you want to indulge in special pleading - arguing that it can't be a proposition because it doesn't do what you expect propositions to do. — Banno

Thank you for further proving your inaccurate knowledge of English and of meaning in general.

proposition: "a statement or assertion that expresses a judgment or opinion."

It is not your judgment that you like vanilla. It is not your opinion. An opinion is a statement which is uncertain. You are certain, because it's your preference. A judgment it is not, because you did not decide for someone else or about someone else. You did not estimater. (As in "I judge the distance to be 2 Km.) you just stated a status quo.

If you want to argue that it is one or both of the two of judgment or opinion, then you further prove your inaccurate knowledge of English and of meaning in general.
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You, Banno, just are a self-effacing, bloated, narcissist. <- THIS was an opinion.

So getting back on to the topic of virtue...

Why not just say that courage is worthy of cultivation - and if you disagree, that's not a fact about courage, but a fact about you.

Why invoke eudaemonia?

Why would you accept an unjustified proposition, @banno? Give us three examples in which you have accepted propositions without justification.

Why invoke eudaemonia? — Banno

To sell self help books.

To learn to cultivate yourself and others.

To leverage that understanding for political criticism and intervention.

And your mum wears army boots.

Quality, this chat.

To learn to cultivate yourself and others. — fdrake

That one I could go with.

Virtue ethics strikes me as providing a much richer environment for teaching than, say, deontology. Compare punishing someone for breaking the rules with cultivating kindness, courage and resilience.

You like to unreasonably derail valid criticism. That is perfectly ego-driven, not reason-driven.

Check the circumference of your ego, my friend. If it reaches somewhere between 13 to 16 billion light years in its radius, you just about got it right.

Virtue ethics strikes me as providing a much richer environment for teaching than, say, deontology. Compare punishing someone for breaking the rules with cultivating kindness, courage and resilience. — Banno

This takes us outside the text.

A common criticism (IIRC) is that virtue ethics provides no rules that engender moral behaviour. I quite like this; as if being moral or living well wasn't (1) very contextual and (2) leant on other sources of knowledge (3) a perpetual process of (interpersonal/skill set) growth (and mitigation of decay). There's no "special domain of problems" associated with virtue ethics; its problems are just those life happens to throw up.

Edit: well, that's intended idea, there are of course philosophical problems, virtue in the face of randomness (moral luck) etc.

This immerses back in the text:

The analysis of "relative brute facts", the appeal to both social institutions and natural properties when considering what it means to do an injustice ("bilking") and a latent "naturalisation of the connection of need to ought" (scare quotes because it's not in the text) speaks to the contextual nature of ethics in (my interpretation of) Anscombe's vision of it. Allying virtue ethics with conceptual analysis rather than vouchsafing the origin of prescriptive morality (warrant and nature of ought claims) makes it more of a tool or an elaboration on life. In one breath it's empty of (allegedly more standard) philosophical problems, but that's because its domain is as broad as human action and leverages all that goes into it.

A common criticism (IIRC) is that virtue ethics provides no rules that engender moral behaviour. — fdrake

Well, the point of virtue ethics was to avoid rules, so...

I agree; that's where she is going - ethics as conceptual analysis. Neat.

Well, the point of virtue ethics was to avoid rules, so... — Banno

(I agree) What do you think the objects of it are, then? EG: People and properties?

Roughly, getting on with it.

Showing the fly the way out of the bottle.

Dog barks at kid and approaches, dog is all waggy and friendly. Kid is scared, kid's never been near a dog before. "Don't worry, they're just excited to see you, be calm and slowly put your hand out." Kid does it, has dog pats. "Well done, you were courageous". An important learning experience, why?

"Some questions can't be answered and that will have to do."

Not good - nowhere near bedrock here.

Think of the article as an admonition not to do ethics but to act; following Wittgenstein in not looking to the meaning of ethical terms but to what one does. Virtuous acts are what count, not endless discussion of which rules to follow, not calculations aimed at achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Learning what courage is, is bedrock.

Learning how to cultivate it is not. "Never do for a patient what they can do for themselves" was discovered.

I think that's what Anscombe is saying here though. 'Ought' doesn't make any sense without laws. Something just is 'unjust' because of the definition of 'just' which is provided by society's use of the word. Something simply is 'bilking' because tradition means you 'owe' the grocer as a result of his having delivered some potatoes. There is no 'ought' in that sense. Hence the sociological investigation is all there is (apart from our own group, of course, which we already know about, being language-users within it ourselves) — Isaac

The addendum to that is that something would be unjust in a cross-cultural sense if all (or the vast majority) of people intuitively felt it was unjust.

Courage is a virtue because it is universally admired, just as cowardice is universally deprecated, and hence is a vice.