Per Sartre, even under torture, the victim determines the exact moment at which he chooses to submit to the torture.... — Pantagruel

Which, let us note, is (maybe) a choice, and if a choice, the choice of a moment and nothing more. (By "submit" I assume you mean break, or something like.) But I suspect Sartre himself is not quite so ambiguous: do you have a citation?

Not in your mind. It is in the more discerning ones — Gnostic Christian Bishop

So you got nothing. :up:

Per Sartre, even under torture, the victim determines the exact moment at which he chooses to submit to the torture.... — Pantagruel

Mayhaps, but even Satre would recognize that the torturer has exerted higher authority by whittling down all the multitude of your usual choices to two.

So you got nothing. :up: — Artemis

I got that you cannot follow a logic trail and cannot refute it.

Regards
DL

I got that you cannot follow a logic trail and cannot refute it. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

It's clear from the way you've interacted with pretty much everyone on this thread, that you just can't stand people making valid points against your own. Some "highest judge."

making valid points — Artemis

If you had such thing, I would acknowledge it.

Regards
DL

I would acknowledge it. — Gnostic Christian Bishop

Keep telling yourself that.

Sartre views our freedom as essentially unlimited. To the point that he characterizes "vertigo" as the sensation, not that we are going to fall off a high place, but the fear that we might throw ourselves off....

Which, let us note, is (maybe) a choice, and if a choice, the choice of a moment and nothing more. (By "submit" I assume you mean break, or something like.) But I suspect Sartre himself is not quite so ambiguous: do you have a citation? — tim wood

Sure, I scraped these from the online version of BN.

In fact no matter what pressure is exerted on the victim,
the abjuration remains free;

We have already shown that even the red-hot pincers
of the torturer do not exempt us from being free.

In a preceding chapter we
observed that even torture does not dispossess us of our free-
dom;

That particular book was the first philosophy text I ever read, and I've read it maybe seven or eight times, so it isn't likely I would misinterpret something as clear as his stance on freedom.

Sartre views our freedom as essentially unlimited. To the point that he characterizes "vertigo" as the sensation, not that we are going to fall off a high place, but the fear that we might throw ourselves off.... — Pantagruel

Early Sartre. He got smarter later on.

Actually, I think I read recently that psychologists agree with that idea about vertigo. It's a survival mechanism to stop you from actually doing it or getting too close to the edge.

We have already shown that even the red-hot pincers
of the torturer do not exempt us from being free. — Pantagruel

I think that's an exaggeration. Clearly the torturer has already, de facto, limited our choices and thus our freedom.

If at point A you have 100 choices, and point B only 2, then your freedom has been limited.

Sartre views our freedom as essentially unlimited. To the point that he characterizes "vertigo" as the sensation, not that we are going to fall off a high place, but the fear that we might throw ourselves off.... — Pantagruel

"Later, especially in Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre shifts to the view that humans are only free if their basic needs as practical organisms are met (p. 327)."

https://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-p/#H3

I think it is the furthest thing from an exaggeration, and I'll tell you why.

Nothing constrains our free choice more than our own pre-existing (cognitive) habits. Evidence of this is the fact that many people will walk the road to ruin before addressing issues which are clearly within their own control, substance addiction, gamboling addiction, etc. This kind of "constraint" is even more severe than external constraint, because it is self-imposed. And it is far more significant. What someone does or doesn't do under threat of bodily harm is, let's face it, begging the question. It is self-evident that anyone "could" refuse to submit to the torture and, point of fact, lots of people have died rather than submit.

But, to the point, we do possess the power of being so free that we can, at any time, actually choose to do something, even if that thing is completely uncharacteristic of any choice we have previously made. I ascribe to this view of radical freedom, because I know it to be true in my own life. Moreover, what is most interesting, once you have tried and learned that you possess this ability, it gets continually easier to make "radically new" choices. And this can definitely be a great power to have.

edit: I think Sartre explicitly discusses this example in "Psychology of the Imagination". Not completely certain on that source, but I wouldn't want to take credit.

. I ascribe to this view of radical freedom, because I know it to be true in my own life. Moreover, what is most interesting, once you have tried and learned that you possess this ability, it gets continually easier to make "radically new" choices. And this can definitely be a great power to have. — Pantagruel

Well, Sartre evolved and refined his thinking eventually, and I suspect so will you :wink:

Later, especially in Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre shifts to the view that humans are only free if their basic needs as practical organisms are met (p. 327)." — Artemis

I've never read the Critique of Dialectical Reason, but I'm starting now, and the preface sure seems consistent with the views I've cited"

"This is the moment to remember the profound resonance
of this theme of treason and the traitor throughout all of Sartre: as the
'objective treason' of the intellectual, never fully or ontologically
committed to any cause; as the jouissance of treason in the rebel
(particularly in Genet), or of the homme de ressentiment ( particularly
in the collaborators); the great test of my authenticity as well"

Well, Sartre evolved and refined his thinking eventually, and I suspect so will you :wink: — Artemis

From what I see, he became even more committed to freedom as an intellectual ideal. And so, during the forty years since I first read Being and Nothingness, have I.

edit: and I think "material freedom" refers to particular context while "formal freedom" remains an intellectual ideal.

but I'm starting now, and the preface sure seems consistent with the views I've cited" — Pantagruel

Keep reading. Or just flip to the requisite page.

No matter what you or Sartre might say about human freedom under ideal circumstances, the torture victim from our example is clearly exempt in Sartre's later theory, since "basic needs" of a "practical organism" are obviously not only not met, but also perverted.

exempt — Artemis

But exempt from what?

People choose to endure something because and when it is meaningful to do so. And when people do, historically, it often is meaningful.

People choose to endure something because and when it is meaningful to do so. And when people do, historically, it often is meaningful. — Pantagruel

You keep in saying people "endure" torture, but it's not clear what that even means or who has done so? Can you be more specific?

You keep in saying people "endure" torture, but it's not clear what that even means or who has done so? Can you be more specific? — Artemis

Now I'm really confused. It was the exact example that we have been discussing? I quoted Sartre. You disputed, then rebutted based on an interpretation from his later writings from an third party online source. I reviewed and clarified, what part of all that was unclear?

We have already shown that even the red-hot pincers
of the torturer do not exempt us from being free.
— Pantagruel

I think that's an exaggeration. Clearly the torturer has already, de facto, limited our choices and thus our freedom. — Artemis

In any case, I'm ok with leaving it there. I think what I wrote expresses my personal position pretty clearly. I'll definitely be reviewing the later works of Sartre on "material freedom" (thanks for that!).

Cheers!

Now I'm really confused. It was the exact example that we have been discussing? — Pantagruel

Here:

We have already shown that even the red-hot pincers
of the torturer do not exempt us from being free. — Pantagruel

And here:

Per Sartre, even under torture, the victim determines the exact moment at which he chooses to submit to the torture.... — Pantagruel

Yep, it was on our theoretically unlimited freedom, and that even under coercion we are technically free to choose. Pretty much sums it up, I can't really say more about that.

We have already shown that even the red-hot pincers
of the torturer do not exempt us from being free. — Pantagruel

"Exempt" is the key word. According to Sartre, we are condemned to be free. Any notion of freedom as shield, or freedom as ground for some particular moral obligation, no. In every sense, then, yielding to what must be yielded to in no wise is connected to freedom. And this is the only way to reconcile that notions that we're free, and that sooner or later the torturer gets what he wants.

Resisting the torturer is a nice fantasy of courage, but a fantasy. It leaves the question as to the moral worth, if any, of resisting the torturer at all. It seems this latter consideration is simply a transaction - maybe not "simply" - but in any case an effort to arrive at a meeting of the minds in an unfair and unfree market.

"Exempt" is the key word. According to Sartre, we are condemned to be free. Any notion of freedom as shield, or freedom as ground for some particular moral obligation, no. In every sense, then, yielding to what must be yielded to in no wise is connected to freedom. And this is the only way to reconcile that notions that we're free, and that sooner or later the torturer gets what he wants. — tim wood

Sorry, that is all a non-sequitur. We are "condemned" to be free in the sense that we can not escape it. Our freedom is absolute and inescapable.

"Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does."

What's the non-sequitur?

And the categorical always comes with the possibility of internal contradiction, like a tin-can tied onto the tail. Am I or others not free to constrain my freedom and thereby be not free?

We're going to have to know more about Sartre's idea of freedom to make any progress. As to the notion of responsibility, I understand Sartre as in essence saying that whatever cost is due you, is yours and cannot be escaped (though you may fool yourself into thinking you have - but then you're a fool and fools in there foolishness are never free). That is, one way or another you pay!

↪Pantagruel What's the non-sequitur? — tim wood

Everything you said does not apply to Sartre. His notion of freedom is central and pivotal and includes certainly the concept of responsibility - that is the whole point. We are responsible not only for what we do, but for who we are. It is ongoing and omnipresent.

I understand you are reacting to and possibly reinterpreting Sartre in a way that makes more sense to your own beliefs, but that's not Sartre. Authenticity is another of his core concepts, also not one that works with the notion of "compromise" in the negative sense of that term.

"Condemned to be free" is his. "Existence precedes essence" is his. You know this, yes?

Yes, that's why I appended the full quotation. I really think it pretty much sums it up.

"Man is condemned to be free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does."

"Therefore, the onus for defining ourselves, and by extension humanity, falls squarely on our shoulders. This lack of pre-defined purpose along with an 'absurd' existence that presents to us infinite choices is what Sartre attributes to the “anguish of freedom”. With nothing to restrict us, we have the choice to take actions to become who we want to be and lead the life we want to live."

You are free to be the kind of person who succumbs to pressure, who compromises his ideals, or not.

"Jean-Paul Sartre decried the idea of living without pursuing freedom. The phenomenon of people accepting that things have to be a certain way, and subsequently refusing to acknowledge or pursue alternate options, was what he termed as "living in bad faith". According to Sartre, people who convince themselves that they have to do one particular kind of work or live in one particular city are living in bad faith."

The question goes to what "responsible" means. Moral? Or transactional? I read Sartre as saying we pay the bill. In that sense even the infant is responsible for her fate.

Not that Sartre denies the possibility of moral responsibility, rather that, as you mention, it ought to be authentic.

So my interpretation of Sartre is borne of extensive reading and rereading of many of his books, in the context of actually consciously trying to shape my life in accordance with many of his principles. I don't claim that mine is the only interpretation, or the right interpretation, or even the best interpretation. But it is a good interpretation, and one that has worked well for me. I can honestly say that I am much better off and, I hope, a much better person for having embraced his philosophy, authentically. And I think that is perhaps the best result that philosophy has to offer, and the spirit in which he wrote, I believe.