If esse est percipi, then others are exhausted by your perception of them. — dukkha

For Berkeley it is God's perception of objects, not our perception of them, that holds them in existence. So they really do, for Berkeley, have an existence independent of our minds. Berkeley's position is really a form of naive realism.

Edit: Reading back I see this point has already been addressed, but I'll leave the post as it stands in any case.

Berkeley always described himself as an empiricist and said there was no empirical evidence of objects outside ideas and perceptions. But this was underwritten by the 'divine intelligence' and the reality of sprit, without which his philosophy doesn't stand.

All that means is that one has yet to read Popper. — tom

Reading something, no matter who wrote it, doesn't mean agreeing with it. Hell, even the philosophers I like best are folks with whom I agree no better than half of the time, and there are plenty of philosophers with whom I disagree literally multiple times per sentence.

Ed Feser, who describes himself as 'Aristotelean-Thomist', presents the idea that 'the concept of triangle' is neither a visual representation or a particular idea, but a concept. — Wayfarer

It's not a particular expression of a visual representation--that is, it's not a particular drawing, say. And after all, a drawing by itself can't be a representation in the first place. What makes something a representation is someone thinking about it that way.

I don't agree with saying that it's not a particular idea, however, but maybe he has some specific technical definition of idea in mind.

Where I really disagree with him is in the second part you quoted. Saying that a concept is objective and can be grasped by many minds at once is nonsense. Concepts are subjective/private. They're also specific sorts of concrete particulars, although of course they're dynamic over time. A concept of triangularity can be an image of a particular triangle, of a particular color, etc. It would just be so to a particular individual at a particular time, but all concepts are to particular individuals at particular times.

Concepts are subjective/private — Terrapin Station

You often say that, but then you proceed to write in the full confidence that those who read your posts understand what you mean. But if your posts mean what only you mean, then this would be impossible.

A concept of triangularity can be an image of a particular triangle, of a particular color, etc — Terrapin Station

That is not what 'concept' means. But of course, that doesn't matter to you, because your concept of 'a concept' is your personal private and subjective view of what 'concept' means, which is why it is a waste of time trying to discuss anything with you. When anyone disagrees, you'll just say, 'oh, but that's not what I mean.'

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, to Alice, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”

You often say that, but then you proceed to write in the full confidence that those who read your posts understand what you mean. — Wayfarer

Actually, I don't assume that anyone will understand anything in particular, but I expect folks to express when they don't understand something.

At any rate, what it is to understand something isn't to have objective, shared concepts in mind. So this comment is irrelevant to my remarks on Feser's analysis of concepts.

But of course, that doesn't matter to you, because your concept of 'a concept' is your personal private and subjective view of what 'concept' means, — Wayfarer

Actually, my comments about concepts aren't about meaning per se but about what concepts are functionally, and Feser has it wrong what they are functionally.

Of course it is a particular, but it is not a particular leaf, it is a particular drawing of the generalized form of the maple leaf. — John

So what? Isn't a real maple leaf just a particular instance of the generalized form of the maple leaf? What is the difference between you drawing a representation of the general form of the maple leaf, and the tree creating a representation of the general form? And we could carry that principle to inanimate things as well, the earth creates representations of general forms, rock, water, individual molecules of H2O, and atoms such as carbon, and hydrogen.

Each atom of hydrogen was produced as a representation of the general form. The general form must have been prior to the individual atom, in order that the atom could come into existence as a representation of it. Just like the general form of the maple leaf is prior to any maple leaf that comes into existence, including the one that you drew, as a representation of the general form of the maple leaf.

And after all, a drawing by itself can't be a representation in the first place. What makes something a representation is someone thinking about it that way. — Terrapin Station

When a person draws something as a representation, it was intended by that person to be a representation, and so it exists as a representation, according to that intention. This is the case with John's drawing of a maple leaf. It was intended as a representation of the general form of the maple leaf, produced as such, and so it exists as such.

That is also the case with language in general, it is produced as symbols, representations, and exists as such. It doesn't require someone thinking about it as a representation to actually be a representation, because it was made to represent. But to determine what it actually represents (its meaning) requires someone thinking about it.

Reading something, no matter who wrote it, doesn't mean agreeing with it. Hell, even the philosophers I like best are folks with whom I agree no better than half of the time, and there are plenty of philosophers with whom I disagree literally multiple times per sentence. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but can you find a single point of disagreement with Popper's realist epistemology?

It was intended as a representation of the general form of the maple leaf, produced as such, and so it exists as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

It can't exist as that outside of someone thinking about it that way, though.

It doesn't require someone thinking about it as a representation to actually be a representation, — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes it does. It doesn't matter what it was "made to be." Outside of someone thinking about it as a representation, it's just a set of marks on paper, pixels on a screen or whatever.

Sure, but can you find a single point of disagreement with Popper's realist epistemology? — tom

As I said, even the folks I agree with most I typically disagree with about 50% of the time (especially if we're talking about longer works, as the probability of disagreement goes up with the number of statements they make and opinions they express).

I don't recall where Popper said something about what the "default epistemic position" would be or where he said anything about idealism arising via issues from a default realism, so I'm not sure what work we're talking about. There are a number of texts you could have in mind, since it's not as if he only talks about epistemic issues in a single text. So you'd have to specify what work of Popper's you're thinking of.

can't exist as that outside of someone thinking about it that way, though. — Terrapin Station

Why not? Explain yourself.

Yes it does. It doesn't matter what it was "made to be." Outside of someone thinking about it as a representation, it's just a set of marks on paper, pixels on a screen or whatever. — Terrapin Station

Do you think that if something was "made to be" a house, it doesn't exist as a house without someone thinking of it as a house?

Do you think that if something was "made to be" a house, it doesn't exist as a house without someone thinking of it as a house? — Metaphysician Undercover

The materials exist, just like marks on paper do (re what people think of as representations). There's no concept or meaning etc. of it as a house outside of people thinking of it that way. But there's still the drywall set at 90-degree angles, with a roof, etc.--the materials exist whether anyone does or not.

Re explaining myself--I did. Again, re a representation, all that exists outside of someone thinking about it as a representation is a set of marks on paper or whatever the particular material is that we're talking about.

The general form is just an 'averaging out' of the particular forms. If all of the edges of the dissections of the leaves vary one or the other from straightness, then straightness if the 'averaging out'. If all the dissections are more or less the same size then to be all the same size is the averaging out which produces the perfect form. The drawing is meant to represent the perfectly symmetrical form. Of course it never will be the perfect form, will never have perfectly straight lines and will never be perfectly symmetrical, on very fine scales of measurement irregularities will become apparent; but the lines look straight and the dissections all look equal in size and symmetrically placed. Because they look that way they are a good enough representation of the perfect form; far closer to it than any leaf is.

The materials exist, just like marks on paper do (re what people think of as representations). There's no concept or meaning etc. of it as a house outside of people thinking of it that way. But there's still the drywall set at 90-degree angles, with a roof, etc.--the materials exist whether anyone does or not. — Terrapin Station

By that logic, then there's no drywall, or 90 degree angles, or anything nameable without someone there naming it. But surely these things are there, the drywall, the 90 degree angles, and also the house, without someone there naming it as such. Likewise, the symbol, or representation is there, without someone there to name it as such.

Re explaining myself--I did. Again, re a representation, all that exists outside of someone thinking about it as a representation is a set of marks on paper or whatever the particular material is that we're talking about. — Terrapin Station

You call it "a set of marks on paper", I call it "a representation". I think we're both right, but for some reason unbeknownst to me, you think I'm wrong to say it is a representation. But clearly it is a representation because it was created by someone for the purpose of representing. You are completely unjustified in your claim that the set of marks on the paper exist, but they are not a representation. Clearly the marks on the paper are a representation.

The general form is just an 'averaging out' of the particular forms. — John

It's a category error to say that a group of particulars is a universal, or general form, because it requires reasoning to produce a general form from a group of particulars. And, an average is not the same thing as a universal, it is an average. If you follow Aristotle, the universal consists of the essential properties while leaving out the accidental properties.

Of course it never will be the perfect form... — John

The universal is not meant to be the perfect form, it is meant to represent the essential aspects of the named class of things. So, "triangle" is three sided figure. That's the essential property. Whether it is isosceles or equilateral, or otherwise, is accidental. You can not expect to draw a "perfect form" of the triangle, expecting this to be the best representation of the general form "triangle", because the class of triangle has to include all the possible different types.

By that logic, then there's no drywall, or 90 degree angles, or anything nameable without someone there naming it. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's none of that stuff per those names, sure. It's important not to conflate the names (and concepts, and meanings, etc.) with the objective stuff, though. I used certain names for it because I have to since I can only type words to you here.

Likewise, the symbol, or representation is there, without someone there to name it as such. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, again the marks on paper or whatever are there, but it doesn't represent anything without thinking about it in that way. Again, this is just like concepts, meanings, etc. in general.

You are completely unjustified in your claim that the set of marks on the paper exist, but they are not a representation. Clearly the marks on the paper are a representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Something is a representation by virtue of standing for or referring to something other than itself. How do the marks do this in lieu of anyone thinking about them that way?

Suppose the drug in the water is strychnine and you die :’(
Can either the realist or the idealist conceptualize not thinking, I don't think it can't be done, what is non-thought. Thought itself is contingent, it ends, its horizon is death. So it is with all things, they necessarily exist contingently (contingency is necessary). Idealism seems want to be determinative of all that is, what ever is, is only by our conception of it (at least in some forms of idealism) that it is. This can't be if everything is contingent necessarily.

Working on Meillassoux's argument

I didn't say that a group of particulars is a universal. Nor did I say that an average is the same as a universal. But to express the most general character of the edges of the leaves minus all the particular differences from straightness that exist on all the edges of all the dissections of all the maple leaves as a straight line is to represent the universal perfect form of the maple leaf. The drawing by appearing symmetrical with straight lines expresses the idea of the perfect for me. This does not require the impossible; it does not require the drawing to be perfect.

Also I never said there were not many different shapes of triangles. There are an infinite number in fact, but the form of any one of them can be represented in a drawing.

There's none of that stuff per those names, sure. It's important not to conflate the names (and concepts, and meanings, etc.) with the objective stuff, though. I used certain names for it because I have to since I can only type words to you here. — Terrapin Station

OK, so I assume that without a person to name the stuff, there is nothing there, no "objective stuff"? Or, do I assume that the objective stuff is there, without any names? If the latter, then we can assume that the representations are already there without that name, as they are objectively representations. They are still existing without the name of "representation", just like the drywall, and right angles, are existing without these names.

Yeah, again the marks on paper or whatever are there, but it doesn't represent anything without thinking about it in that way. Again, this is just like concepts, meanings, etc. in general. — Terrapin Station

You seem to be missing the fact, that the representation is a representation regardless of whether any individuals interpret, or know what the representation represents. It is a fact that the marks on the paper are a representation, because they were put there to represent something, just like any other thing in the universe is a thing, regardless of whether it has name. If you want to deny that there are actual things existing, without being perceived as things, then that's another matter. There might be some substance to your argument, from that premise, because a representation is necessarily a thing.

Something is a representation by virtue of standing for or referring to something other than itself. How do the marks do this in lieu of anyone thinking about them that way? — Terrapin Station

The act of determining what the marks stand for, is an act of interpreting. Therefore it is an act of understanding existing relationships. It is not an act of creating relationships. So it is necessary that the relationships exist prior to the act of interpreting, otherwise interpreting would not be interpreting, but an act of creating. Interpreting is to determine meaning which is already there, not to create new meaning. The act of creating has already been performed by the one who put down the marks intending them to stand for something.

The act of determining what the marks stand for, is an act of interpreting. Therefore it is an act of understanding existing relationships. It is not an act of creating relationships. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is where we disagree. It is an act of creating relationships, and interpretations and understanding involve creating meanings. There are no meanings outside of individuals' heads (more specifically, outside of their brains in particular (processual) states). Intending marks one out down to stand for something occurs only in that creator's head. It doesn't somehow transfer or embed meaning in the marks themselves. The marks are just marks. Meaning remains in person's heads.

But to express the most general character of the edges of the leaves minus all the particular differences from straightness that exist on all the edges of all the dissections of all the maple leaves as a straight line is to represent the universal perfect form of the maple leaf. — John

To express the general form is not to express the "perfect form". That is a mistake. It is to express what each and every one of the particulars has in common. It is an inferred necessity. That is why you cannot draw it as a visual object. Each time you draw it as a visual object, it will contain particulars peculiar to that particular drawing, which will negate the essence of the universal, as that which all the particulars necessarily have in common.

Consider the triangle. Any time you draw a triangle, it will be of a particular shape, and therefore will not properly represent triangles of other shapes. You will not understand what "triangle" means from that visual representation, or even a number of them, you will have to refer to the definition. Even the circle is the same. Any drawn circle is of a particular size. You will not know truly what "circle" refers to, just from visiting visual representations, that it is necessarily two dimensional, and the relationship between the circumference and the diameter (pi), etc., without referring to the definition.

This is where we disagree. It is an act of creating relationships, and interpretations and understanding involve creating meanings. There are no meanings outside of individuals' heads (more specifically, outside of their brains in particular (processual) states). Intending marks one out down to stand for something occurs only in that creator's head. It doesn't somehow transfer or embed meaning in the marks themselves. The marks are just marks. Meaning remains in person's heads. — Terrapin Station

We are not talking about meaning though, we are talking about representations. A representation is a relationship between things. Relationships between things are objectively real, and exist outside of individuals' heads. "Representation" refers to a type of relationship. Unless you can show how this type of relationship, a representation, is a special type of relationship which only exists within peoples' heads, then you have no argument.

Do you agree that representations stand for or refer to something other than themselves?

A representation is a relationship between things. Relationships between things are objectively real, and exist outside of individuals' heads. — Metaphysician Undercover

So what's the nature of the special kind of relationship between marks on paper and some other thing such that the former represents the latter? Is it a physical relationship? Is there a special chain of atoms that connects the ink to something else (and only that something else)?

I'd say that the relationship is a conceptual one (i.e. we have a particular kind of cognitive attitude towards the ink), which is why it can't exist outside of people's heads.

Working on Meillassoux's argument — Cavacava

I like how Meillassoux used death and finitude to get around correlationism. That's rather creative. Death by various means is problematic for idealism, or at least the subjective kind. If God's keeping tabs on everything, then death can happen just fine. But if nobody is, then people just stop experiencing for no reason sometimes. And then what? Does the idealist have a coherent answer? Is it okay as long as there is some other experiencer around?

But if nobody is, then people just stop experiencing for no reason sometimes. And then what? Does the idealist have a coherent answer? — Marchesk

Other people continue to experience (until they don't)?

I have his book on order, just tracked it and found out it's going to previous address :(

Anyway, I've been reading the secondary literature. He also argues that the realists suggestion that objects exist separately from us ends in a contradiction. If objects are posited as existing separately from thought, it is still only through thought that they are posited. There is no way to determine if what is in itself, is isomorphic with its appearance, with what we know about the object, making knowledge itself problematic.

I have his book on order, just tracked it and found out it's going to previous address :(

Anyway, I've been reading the secondary literature. He also argues that the realists suggestion that objects exist separately from us ends in a contradiction. If objects are posited as existing separately from thought, it is still only through thought that they are posited. There is no way to determine if what is in itself, is isomorphic with its appearance, with what we know about the object, making knowledge itself problematic. — Cavacava

The ontological separation of thought and subject does seem problematic, especially if one is a physicalist and reduces thoughts to brain activity. We have this physical thing here which is the Sun and this physical thing here which is brain activity, but what is the relationship between the two such that the latter is a thought about the former? Is there a unique kind of physical connection between the two?

It's even more problematic when the thing thought of isn't the sort of thing that can be physically connected to brain activity, e.g. past, future, or distant things.

I just don't think that realism can provide a coherent account of reference (and so nor of truth).

Even though the subject of our thoughts might be conceptually distinct from thought (e.g. when I think about the Sun I'm not thinking about thoughts), it doesn't then follow that the subject is ontologically separate, just as even though the subject of a painting is conceptually distinct from paint (e.g. when I paint a unicorn I'm not painting paint), it doesn't then follow that the subject is ontologically separate (it's not that there's this painting of a unicorn and also that unicorn).

The ontological separation of thought and subject does seem problematic, especially if one is a physicalist and reduces thoughts to brain activity. We have this physical thing here which is the Sun and this physical thing here which is brain activity, but what is the relationship between the two such that the latter is a thought about the former? Is there a unique kind of physical connection between the two? — Michael

This is a matter for the sciences to sort out, ultimately, not philosophers. It's a matter of how human beings learn, form concepts about what they learned, and communicate them.

You've already alluded the the physical connection. We're physical beings in a physical world, so of course there is a connection between the sun and our perceiving it, and then talking about it.

If it's all physical interaction, then it's just a matter for science, right?

You've already alluded the the physical connection. We're physical beings in a physical world, so of course there is a connection between the sun and our perceiving it, and then talking about it.

If it's all physical interaction, then it's just a matter for science, right? — Marchesk

Sure there's a connection (according to the realist). But there's a physical connection between our brain activity (which is us thinking about the Sun) and things that aren't the Sun. So what kind of physical connection counts as reference? This doesn't seem like a question for scientists.

And, again, we can (presumably) think about things to which brain activity doesn't have a physical connection, e.g. future, past, and distant events. So I don't think that reference as being a special kind of physical connection works at all (and so, again, this isn't a question for scientists).