Subjects are called 'beings' for a reason; whereas objects lack being. — Wayfarer
Do animals "have being" according to you? — Janus
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all. 1 — Thomas Nagel
You lost me here. Objects aren't beings? — Xtrix
That's a very interesting point and, incredibly, often overlooked when discussing human action. — Xtrix
It's true I can see other people as 'objects' in a sense. But think about the implications of that. When you refer to other persons, you use personal pronouns. You don't treat them as objects, as 'it' - at least, I hope not! - because you implicitly recognise that they are subjects themselves, and not just objects to be picked up and put down. — Wayfarer
Re Heidegger - I've only picked up bits and pieces. I am loath to study him in depth and detail. — Wayfarer
No doubt, and is the ground for refutation of Hume’s human action by mere habit, or, which is the same thing, convention. — Mww
I can tie my shoe via mere image without conscious thought because I already know all there is to know about tying shoes, that is, by habit. — Mww
Subjects are called 'beings' for a reason; whereas objects lack being. I think this is a valid ontological distinction but one that is obfuscated in much modern thought. So it is wrong to treat beings as objects, except for technical purposes, such as demographics or epidemiology. (Interesting to note that the airline industry uses the expression 'sob' for those lost in airline crashes, where the term stands for 'souls on board'. )
I see the as relational antonyms because they’re relational antonyms. Many mistaken them for complimentary antonyms. — I like sushi
I still don’t really understand what is being asked for. — I like sushi
Have I slayed the dragon my quest? — I like sushi
Yes, that's a linguistic distinction. That's not what I was getting at, as I feel I've made clear already. — Xtrix
I'm wondering how many people in this forum still see the world in this way or something similar to it. It seems to be the philosophical basis for modern science, at least since Descartes. — Xtrix
Seems like you and everyone here in this thread is trying to argue for their own objective truth - informing readers how things truly are, and even how things were in your explanation of pre-moderns, for everyone. You're explaining how the world is independent of anyone's beliefs and perceptions.As I see it, the process of 'objectifying' is specific to the modern outlook. I am of the view that pre-moderns did not instinctively think of the world in the objective terms we now take for granted, because the world was seen in terms of an 'I - you' relationship rather than in terms of things or objects; the Universe was animated by spirit. I think that shift to the objective is a matter of historical conditioning or development of consciousness (a theme which I believe is explored in depth by Owen Barfield.)
This is why the use of the term 'objectivity' as the criterion for what is considered truly existent, is a characteristic of modern thought, generally (i.e. to determine whether something is real, we ask if it is 'objectively real'). To the extent that this sense of the 'I-you' relationship was eliminated, then what remains are individual subjects and individual objects of perception; a stance which would have appeared incoherent from the pre-modern p.o.v. (because, lacking in reason or cause.) — Wayfarer
The only options are de-humanization or anthropomorphism? Maybe it's something in between.Of course, the whole point of materialist theories of mind is that subjects are simply the output of large numbers of objective processes which give rise to the illusion of subjective experience. In other words, denying that there is an essential distinction between objects and subjects, through reducing the latter to the former. But that is the sense in which materialism is de-humanising. — Wayfarer
And an as yet unexplained connection with modern science. — Andrew M
What I thought you were talking about was habit, something in which the subject/object distinction (and even consciousness) often plays no role. — Xtrix
Maybe language was originally mostly visual like sign language. — frank
It's is because we are visual creatures. Most of our information about the world is provided visually. Our visual field has more distinctions within it than our auditory, gustatory, olfactory and tactile fields do. We tend to think the world is at it looks, not as it sounds or smells. Dogs and dolphins will probably disagree.Its associated with sight. If thought reduces to linguistic use, then why do we say "I see" when we understand something? Why not "I hear."? Maybe language was originally mostly visual like sign language. — frank
As I see it, the process of 'objectifying' is specific to the modern outlook. — Wayfarer
Even in your apparently simple construction, there's something unstated, which is that 'Bob' is an object for Alice, whereas Alice is an object for Bob. Whether there are objects without subjects, or subjects without objects, is left open. — Wayfarer
I have an interest in Husserl ... ‘Crisis’ maybe? — I like sushi
I was. Except consciousness, which inescapable under any conditions of human action whatsoever, depending on what one thinks consciousness to be, of course. — Mww
The reason this matters, is that habit cannot explain the first learning of what may eventually become habitual. Pure reason, on the other hand, has no problem with it. — Mww
Although it may not be a conscious decision, all thought and action implicity assumes the subject-object distinction — TheMadFool
But perhaps you have a specific thesis with respect to subject/object that you think is basic to (or assumed by) modern science? Perhaps you could give some examples of how it applies. — Andrew M
But it is not as if animals 'have' being, but that they are beings, not simply objects. — Wayfarer
objects lack being — Wayfarer
Or at least Ockham.
— bongo fury
Hmm, really? That's interesting. Never read Ockham. Where does he touch on this? — Xtrix
Now I say that utterances are 'signs subordinated' to concepts or intentions of the soul, not because, by a proper acceptance of the word 'signs', the utterances always signify the concepts of the soul primarily and properly, but rather because utterances are imposed to signify those same things that are signified by the concepts of the mind. In this way the concept primarily signifies something naturally, and secondarily the utterance signifies that same thing...
[...] And the Philosopher says as much, [saying] that utterances are 'marks of affections that are in the soul'[4];So also Boethius[5], when he says that utterances signify concepts. And generally all writers, in saying that all utterances signify affections or are the marks of those [affections], do not mean anything other than that the utterances are signs secondarily signifying those things that are primarily conveyed by affections of the soul...
[...] the concept or affection of the soul signifies naturally whatever it signifies, but a spoken or written term signifies nothing except according to voluntary imposition.
— http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Ockham/Summa_Logicae/Book_I/Chapter_1
This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions — Xtrix
This way of talking about the "outside world" of objects and the "inner world" of thoughts, perceptions and emotions is literally everywhere. It'd be hard not to find examples. — Xtrix
Or we can notice that a falling branch hit Bob. The subject and object are interchangeable and the details of the kind of referent that Bob and the branch each are is abstracted away. — Andrew M
Whereas on a dualist view, subject and object are ontologically distinct and relationally asymmetrical. Science can properly describe objects but not subjects, which are beyond it's purview. — Andrew M
On that framing, naturalism overreaches, objectifying subjects and purporting to provide "a view from nowhere". But that is to misunderstand naturalism, which does neither of those things. — Andrew M
Seems like you and everyone here in this thread is trying to argue for their own objective truth — Harry Hindu
By "being" I'm not talking about "sentient beings." By "beings" I mean to include literally any entity or "thing" whatsoever. This is where the miscommunication is coming from. — Xtrix
Well, I was using your terminology.
objects lack being
— Wayfarer — Janus
This also seems to underlie Wayfarer's theism somehow, where he holds that "God does not exist" but that in some sense still "there is a God", because God has being or is a being rather than existing or being an existent or something like that — Pfhorrest
Beings are capable of perceiving, whereas inanimate objects (minerals, for instance) are not. Is it 'strange and eccentric' to say that? — Wayfarer
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