'Ontology' is derived from the Greek verb 'to be', specifically, from the first-person present participle of the verb 'to be' (i.e. 'I am'). So it's not the analysis of 'what exists', — Wayfarer

As if etymology necessarily and perpetually determines what a term refers to.

not always but in this case the etymology is significant.

But ontology is typically a philosophical "inventory" of what exists.

Heidegger: "A few examples should help. Over there, on the other side of the street, stands the high school building. A being. — StreetlightX

Why would one categorise a building as a being? What would the German term have been? And do you think that to demolish a building is to kill it? If it is a being, then the answer would be 'yes'.

Incidentally, Heidegger is known for his neologism 'dasien', is he not?

Heidegger uses the expression Dasein to refer to the experience of being that is peculiar to human beings. Thus it is a form of being that is aware of and must confront such issues as personhood, mortality and the dilemma or paradox of living in relationship with other humans while being ultimately alone with oneself.

The distinction implicit in this word, I am sure you will be obliged to agree, is an ontological one, i..e. it distinguishes the being of a human, from the existence of objects such as buildings. Does it not?

That is why I quoted the original etymology - to show the inadequacy of that definition.

Why would one categorise a building as a being? What would the German term have been? And do you think that to demolish a building is to kill it? If it is a being, then the answer would be 'yes'. — Wayfarer

Because anyone with a modicum of philosophical education doesn't equate Being with things that are alive. Cf. Aristotle:

"Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are either parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the physical universe and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or others as well, or none of these but only some other things, are substances, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid..."

(And to preempt an objection, yes, Aristotle equates substance with Being: "That which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance." (Metaphysics Bk VII).

Nothing of course, will stop you trying to define being in your own utterly idiosyncratic and historically cockeyed manner, but it'd be nice if you'd at least acknowledge the entirely eccentric nature of your understanding, rather than pass it off as anything close to resembling general knowledge.

So you don't think there's an ontological distinction between beings and things?

What I said was: 'The question of 'dogmatic realism' arises because of the influence of naturalism or natural philosophy in today's thinking. Notice that one of the guiding principles of scientific method is the exclusion of the first-person perspective, so as to arrive at what Thomas Nagel calls in his book of that name 'The view from nowhere'. Naturalism will always tend to try and treat mind as a natural object, which is what is behind a great deal of the debates between materialism and idealism. Materialism must insist that mind is a product of, or consequence of, matter - otherwise, what are they claiming? - whereas idealists will generally try and argue from the primacy of mind, via various transcendental arguments, the argument from reason, and so on.'

That is not eccentric, and it is perfectly in accordance with the debate between materialism and non-materialist philosophers.

What I have gotten from you StreetlightX, for almost 4 years, is continual insults, derogation, and outrght scorn. It does trouble me, but then I think it's because you detect something in my posts which creates in you something close to a feeling of 'fear and loathing'. And furthermore, I think I can identify exactly what that is, although trying to spell that out would be of no avail until you yourself can understand why you react the way you do to what I post.

But suffice to see, I generally try and refrain from insults, sarcasm, or belittling of those whom I argue against, I hope the one day you will develop the maturity to do likewise.

'Thing' is a word that barely belongs in the philosophical lexicon (with the exception perhaps of Heidegger's analysis of the term), so I don't know what you're driving at. And I am unapologetic about my scorn of the intellectual dishonesty and philosophical miseducation of which you sow in spades, no matter how politely or conciliatory. I couldn't care less if you believe in voodoo dolls or the ghost of Christmas past, but if you diminish and cheapen a field I hold dear at every point with your half-truths and philosophy-by-allusion-and-Google-search, you can expect to be called out on it.

I could totally subscribe to a philosophy by dogs. — 0 thru 9

My dog patrols my property. I own the property, but that is an arrangement made with other human beings. My dog knows, with a very high degree of certainty, that she is the ruler of that domain.

Thing' is a word that barely belongs in the philosophical lexicon (with the exception perhaps of Heidegger's analysis of the term), so I don't know what you're driving at. And I am unapologetic about my scorn of the intellectual dishonesty and philosophical miseducation of which you sow in spades, no matter how politely or conciliatory. I couldn't care less if you believe in voodoo dolls or the ghost of Christmas past, but if you diminish and cheapen a field I hold dear at every point with your half-truths and philosophy-by-allusion-and-Google-search, you can expect to be called out on it. — StreetlightX

It sounds like you want to confine philosophy to the tertiary level discipline. You write as if someone needs to be an expert on a billion specific books, know all these esoteric definitions, as well as the history of philosophical works and authors since Plato in and out, before one even opens their mouth during a philosophical discussion. As if one needs some sort of educational qualification, or be some sort of scholar in order to even do philosophy.

This thread has made you mad.

By all means, speak about philosophy, but don't make things up about it. If you're going to say that ontology "arises in relation to first-person perspective and experience", this is a fabrication, a lie. It is not true, not in any understanding of the term. Yeah, this 'makes me mad'.

If you're going to say that ontology "arises in relation to first-person perspective and experience", this is a fabrication, a lie. — StreetlightX

Where else does ontology arise other than in relation to subjective experience? You might say that it arises in relation to inter-subjective experience, but you must have subjective experience before you can have inter-subjective experience, no?

You seem to have misread the context of the quote, which relates to the subject matter of ontology.

I take it you are referring to being or beings as the "subject matter" of ontology. I think there have been quite a few philosophers that have equated being with experience in one way or another. The philosophers Meillassoux broadly refers to as "correlationist" purportedly hold to this equation. Meillassoux distinguishes between "weak" and "strong" correlationists, with, if memory serves (it's quite a few years since I read After Finitude) , Kant as an example of the former and Hegel of the latter.

So I can't see why you think Wayfarer's position is so eccentric and against the grain of the whole Western philosophical tradition.

But even in idealist ontologies, Being is almost never denied to the non-living: the Being of the fire or the hat or the society might be 'mind-like' or 'of mind' (however you want to put it), but that's not the same as saying that buildings (say) simply don't have being at all.

Ah, OK, I think I see where the two points intersect now. It seems you were referring to the imputation of being to only those entities with "first person perspective and experience", and not to the ontological status of being in relation to experience and thought.. If that's right, then from one angle I guess I agree with you. It is quite ordinary English usage both within philosophy and without it, to refer to "sentient beings" as opposed to, presumably,non-sentient, beings. On the other hand stones, chairs, rivers and mountains are not commonly referred to as beings, so I am somewhat ambivalent on this point.

Perhaps Wayfarer is thinking along Buddhist lines, where, perhaps but I'm not sure, only sentient beings are referred to as beings. But, if this is so, then I may have to agree, it perhaps could be against the grain of Western philosophy, but I'd need to look into it more than I have time or will to do first.

That is why I quoted the original etymology - to show the inadequacy of that definition. — Wayfarer

? It's not inadequate if that's the most common way the term is used (for quite some time now, at least in analytic philosophy).

If you're just getting at the idea that the characterization doesn't capture historical usage and some non-analytic usage so well, that's a fair point, but we can't forget about analytic philosophy of the past 100+ years either.

If you're going to say that ontology "arises in relation to first-person perspective and experience", this is a fabrication, a lie. It is not true, not in any understanding of the term. — StreetlightX

I didn't see the post in question--Maybe it was a ways back? But it sounds like dukkha (I'm guessing it was him) was merely giving his own view about the preconditions of (doing) ontology. It doesn't sound like he was presenting it as a conventional view or anything like that.

On the other hand, you often seem to present your own (relatively) idiosyncratic views (relatively because you're often presenting the idiosyncratic views of interdisciplinary authors you've enjoyed) as if they are conventional views or even as if they're considered the only acceptable views, the only views that wouldn't be laughed across the street, etc ., and that is rather a fabrication.

Perhaps Wayfarer is thinking along Buddhist lines, — John

I think it's more that he's using "being" where he means something like "qualia" (... that "quality of being that comes to rest in the sanctuary of the form" as Kierkegaard puts it.)

I always thought ontology is about what exists, whether that includes minds, material things, forms, etc. And maybe with the qualification of what fundamentally exists, such that the many categories of things can be reduced to the four elements, water, atoms in the void, instantiations of the forms, ideas in the mind, whatever.

So being in an ontological sense, without making any commitments, is just about what fundamentally exists. Are objects like houses part of one's ontology? Not for mereological nihilists. So a building doesn't exist, ontologically speaking, for a mereological nihilist. It has no being. For an idealist, a building exists as a perception. A panpsychist, though, would say that a building is something that has it's own experiences.

But being might differ for existentialists, whose overriding philosophical concern is the nature of human life, and not what a building is.

Perhaps he is saying something like 'no being without the quality of being'? Awesome line from K, by the way!

Isn't ontology also about how what is is? Isn't it about how being is related to experience, to perceiving minds, und so weiter?

Perhaps he is saying something like 'no being without the quality of being'? Awesome line from K, by the way! — John

Sounds like a good sign for a protest march. Yea.. I think that line is from his journal. I don't remember now.

I’m new to this forum, so please forgive the intrusion. But I thought it necessary to point out that in either case, there are elements of both philosophies of realism and idealism on the part of each party. The right footed realist by virtue of considerable effort to maintain a standard of reality must have began his journey from the left foot of idealism. And by design of perfunctory faculties the idealist must have began his journey from the construct of a form of reality as a foundation for his ideals. Yes?