Objective Idealism as represented by Hegel and Peirce I take to be the position that says that objects are always in conceptual shape, so to speak, even when they are not being looked at. — John

I can't understand what it means to say that 'objects are always in conceptual shape'.

I take objective idealism to mean that there are real ideas, i.e. ideas that are not simply in the minds of humans; I think mathematical Platonists would cite natural numbers as examples, although there are many vexed issues sorrounding that.

In Hegel, the word 'geist' can be translated as either 'spirit' or 'mind'

Pierce went through idealistic phases, i.e. wrote essays of a rather romantic-idealistic-Emersonian feel, however that was separate from much of his work on semiotics and logic (as Apokrisis points out).

However I think it is generally agreed that idealism was the dominant trend in Anglo-American philosophy until Moore's Refutation of Idealism, 'ordinary language' philosophy, and analytic philosophy displaced it, around WW1. Since then, idealism has been an academic speciality.

And now the argument is shifting from realism vs idealism to materialism vs idealism. — John

There is huge scope for arguing at cross-purposes in this matter. What I mean by 'idealism' and 'materialism' refers to the developments after Cartesian dualism. So, after that, 'idealists' tended to be those who looked to mental/spiritual/idealist accounts, materialists those who looked to 'bodies in motion'. In the centuries following, that remained a visible distinction between the two, even though there were many kinds of 'idealism' and many kinds of 'materialism'.

So it is certainly not uncontroversial, even among Buddhist scholars, that 'mind only' must be interpreted as an assertion of the kind of idealism which is understood as a claim that reality is, at bottom, only mind. — John

I agree, there are fundamental differences between Buddhism and Western idealist philosophy, as they originate in very different cultures and periods of history. Dan Lusthaus is a notable Buddhist Studies scholar, and he would agree with that also. He points out that the main emphasis of Buddhist philosophy is 'how do we know', not 'what are things "made of" ':

Yogācāra doctrine is summarized in the term vijñapti-mātra, "nothing-but-cognition" (often rendered "consciousness-only" or "mind-only") which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating a type of metaphysical idealism, i.e., the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created by mind. However, the Yogācārin writings themselves argue something very different. Consciousness (vijñāna) is not the ultimate reality or solution, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end.

Yogācāra tends to be misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as epistemological warnings about karmic problems. The Yogācāra focus on cognition and consciousness grew out of its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation. Two things should be clarified in order to explain why Yogācāra is not metaphysical idealism: 1. The meaning of the word "idealism"; and 2. an important difference between the way Indian and Western philosophers do philosophy.

What Is and Isn't Yogācāra

So 'mind only' is not saying that mind is a polymorphic substance out of which things are 'made'. I suspect that is what you think that 'idealism' is arguing, which is why you reject both materialism and idealism - i.e. they're both theories based on abstractions, i.e. 'mind' and 'matter', that are meaningless in themselves.

I agree with that criticism, but I am trying to pursue an 'epistemic idealism', not 'ontological idealism', i.e. idealism concerns 'the nature of knowledge', not 'the constituents of physical reality'.

But a person who is an ontological materialist could still consistently believe that it is better to be motivated by ethical or even spiritual ideals. — John

But, on what basis? If you believe that a living being is a moist robot, who is only executing the algorithms of the selfish gene, then you might have 'spiritual ideals' but they can't have any basis in reality; they're only devices, clever imaginings, to make yourself feel good.

Have you got any examples of materialists who espouse spiritual ideals? How could the two co-exist?

For an object to be in conceptual shape would be for it to have an intelligible form. All objects have intelligible forms otherwise they would not be objects.

A person who is an ontological realist and yet thinks that one should follow ethical ideals, could be a Christian who believes this world was created by God as a world material through and through, which He has made intelligible to the human soul by giving it a conceptual shape.

When you say you are pursuing an epistemic idealism I must confess I don't understand what you mean. You don't take me to be denying that we understand the world in terms of ideas do you?

I don't agree with you that 'Geist' can mean what we mean by 'mind' for Hegel. I have said this before: you can have a spirit of the times, a spirit of love, a spirit of friendship, a spirit of cooperation, and so on; that is what Hegel mans by spirit. "mind' is not notion adequate to this kind of understanding. Geist is understood by Hegel to be not only what is conscious (mind) but what it is conscious of (world).

Objective Idealism as represented by Hegel and Peirce I take to be the position that says that objects are always in conceptual shape, so to speak, even when they are not being looked at. This is very clearly not to say that objects are dependent on minds, whether human or otherwise, but that being in conceptual shape or form is altogether independent of minds, just as being visible is altogether independent of actually being seen. I think the same can be said for Plato's Forms. — John

For an object to be in conceptual shape would be for it to have an intelligible form. All objects have intelligible forms otherwise they would not be objects. — John

OK, let's assume that an object is always in what you call a "conceptual shape". You also agree that the object must be in a conceptual shape, or else it is not an object. Do you understand the logic which leads to the conclusion that the conceptual shape must be prior to the material object itself? Everything in the world is changing, such that all objects come into existence at some time. Whenever an object comes into existence, it must be predetermined by the "conceptual shape", what that object will be when it comes into existence, or else it will not come into existence as an object (it would be something completely random and therefore not an object with conceptual shape).

A person who is an ontological realist and yet thinks that one should follow ethical ideals, could be a Christian who believes this world was created by God as a world material through and through, which He has made intelligible to the human soul by giving it a conceptual shape. — John

The reason why "God" is necessary, is that we have to assume an act whereby the conceptual shape is given to matter, to produce the object. (Matter itself being the principle of unintelligibility.) This is the act of creation, because as you say, without conceptual shape, there is no object. So this is the act whereby the object gets its existence. Prior to this, it is only a conceptual shape, but not yet a material object, it is the conceptual shape of what will come into existence. But this "will come into existence" is contingent rather than inherently necessary, due to the unintelligible nature of matter itself, time and possibility. It is better stated as what could come into existence at that time, depending on this act. So we appeal to a free will act of God to account for the existence of objects..

First off, there's no real water on the idealist view. The water, as well as the act of drugging the water, is just an idea/just mental phenomena the individual in question has. When the individual drinks the water later, they still have the idea, via memory, of having drugged the water earlier.

A person who is an ontological realist and yet thinks that one should follow ethical ideals, could be a Christian who believes this world was created by God as a world material through and through, which He has made intelligible to the human soul by giving it a conceptual shape. — John

But no Christian believes the soul is material.

"My soul shall make her boast in the Lord: the humble shall hear thereof, and be glad." - King David.

True, but the world and the body are thought to be material.

I pray God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ (1 Thessalonians 5:23).

For the word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow (body), and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart (Hebrews 4:12).

This is most certainly not idealism, monism or even dualism. It is something else; humanity is thought to be in the image of the father; a trinity.

But obviously, if the soul, and God, are not material, then that understanding can't co-exist with a philosophy which sees the world as 'material through and through'.

All of the intricacies of philosophical theology, idealism, and the rest, were worked out over periods of centuries after the Bible was written. The early Greek-speaking theologians, Clement of Alexandria and the like, incorporated Platonist ideas into theology. Then of course Aquinas incorporated many aspects of Aristotelean philosophy, and the whole history of philosophy, up until Hegel, comprised of exploring the fundamental ideas of substance, idea, nature, matter, mind and the rest. Cartesian dualism was created from a modernisation of the previous tradition.

The point that is getting lost here is that it is the modern conception of 'scientific materialism' that is monistic, i.e. there is only one kind of substance, that is 'matter-energy', and everything science knows (what else is there?) is the product of that, via the processes described by physics and evolutionary biology. Mind has come along as a very recent evolutionary development, by way of the output of the h. sapiens forebrain. God, spirits, souls, and the rest, are all anachronistic supersitions of an ignorant age. That is what materialism says. Berkeley, who was a Christian (a bishop, for that matter) intended his philosophy as a rebuttal of atheism and materialism. He may not have succeeded in so doing, but it can't be denied that this was his aim.

But no Christian believes the soul is material

Does anyone believe that anything is immaterial? I mean material in its broadest sense, so the soul, while not constituted of physical matter, is constituted, has a constitution, of some kind of subtle material, or ethereal substance. Even God must surely have a constitution of some kind. By constitution I mean structure, body, matrices. How can a mind operate in a void? An absolute void?

The point that is getting lost here is that it is the modern conception of 'scientific materialism' that is monistic, i.e. there is only one kind of substance, that is 'matter-energy', and everything science knows (what else is there?) is the product of that, via the processes described by physics and evolutionary biology — Wayfarer

When "matter" and "energy" refer to two very distinct things, how can these two be conflated to claim only one kind of substance? We have a very similar problem with wave/particle duality. Through a wave or through a particle, are two very distinct ways that energy moves. Instead of properly separating two very distinct aspects of the universe, under dualist principles, there is an inclination in modern science to deny dualist principles, and conflate.

The desire to simplify ontology produces the inclination toward a monist metaphysics. This desire itself is very complex, probably coming from an atheist denial of God, and the denial of the reality of anything which cannot be seen. Seeing is believing, so what cannot be seen cannot be believed. But the monist metaphysic is nothing other than the conceptual premise that the intelligible (form) is inseparable from the unintelligible (matter). Failure to separate allows that the unintelligible permeates through all aspects of the universe, rendering the entire universe unintelligible.

Have you got any examples of materialists who espouse spiritual ideals? How could the two co-exist? — Wayfarer

Have you got any examples of an Idealist espousing spiritual ideas?

The idealism of whatever school advocates that the basic principle or fundamental ground of reality is mind rather than matter. All Berkeley's arguments are aimed against materialism and atheism. Hegel's major work was The Phenomenology of Spirit. Certain of the Platonic dialogues, particularly the Timeaus and the Phaedro, are mainly concerned with spiritual themes. It's a long list.

As I was explaing above, after Descartes, philosophies tended to cluster around either the mind or matter half of the Cartesian duality. Materialism tended towards the latter, the various idealist philosophies toward the former. But all of that looses sight of the fact that Descartes' model was an abstraction in the first place, so that both mind and matter become reified abstractions (Ed Feser has a good blog post on this point http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com.au/2012/08/concretizing-abstract.html).

Does anyone believe that anything is immaterial? I mean material in its broadest sense, so the soul, while not constituted of physical matter, is constituted, has a constitution, of some kind of subtle material, or ethereal substance. Even God must surely have a constitution of some kind. By constitution I mean structure, body, matrices. How can a mind operate in a void? An absolute void? — Punshhh

That's a very interesting question. The Jains, and the Stoics, both believe that the soul is made of fine material. But the orthodox doctrine of God is that of 'divine simplicity', and one of the meanings of 'simplicity' is not being composed of parts.

One of the principle difficulties of philosophy is arriving at an understanding of the nature of spirit. It is not 'nothing', that is simply an indication of the inadequacy of the mind for the nature of the question. It is also not something. My approach is, it can't be understood through the exercise of thought and reason, so my approach is negative, 'not this, not that'. It is something that has to be realised on a deeper level. (I'm sure you of all people on this board would undersatnd that ;) ).

That has nothing to do with spiritual ideas.

Do you understand the logic which leads to the conclusion that the conceptual shape must be prior to the material object itself? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you mean logically prior or temporally prior? Remember that conceptual shapes or forms are both general and particular. Considered abstractly they are general, considered concretely they are particular. Particular forms are instantiations of a general evolution of forms. Is it reasonable to posit the prior existence of the general form of the rhinoceros, prior to the advent of actual rhinoceri? Would it be reasonable to posit the pre-existence of the the particualr form of a particualr rhino prioir to its birth?

To repeat, I am saying that particular things are conceptually articulated; they are natural symbolic expressions of a spiritual order. But I don't think it makes sense to say that the unique form is an expression of anything pre-existent.You might say that all forms are eternal, but that would not imply anything pre-existent, because eternity does not pre-exist temporality. The idea of etermity is the idea of that which is a-temporal; so that there can be no 'before' and 'after' in eternity.

But obviously, if the soul, and God, are not material, then that understanding can't co-exist with a philosophy which sees the world as 'material through and through'. — Wayfarer

The world can be material through and through; and even the soul, as Aristotle and other ancient thought, may be. Spirit is not, but it is not a part of the world.The world is the material, symbolic expression of spirit. I think Hegel got that right.

All of the intricacies of philosophical theology, idealism, and the rest, were worked out over periods of centuries after the Bible was written. The early Greek-speaking theologians, Clement of Alexandria and the like, incorporated Platonist ideas into theology. Then of course Aquinas incorporated many aspects of Aristotelean philosophy, and the whole history of philosophy, up until Hegel, comprised of exploring the fundamental ideas of substance, idea, nature, matter, mind and the rest. Cartesian dualism was created from a modernisation of the previous tradition.

Ironically, I think much of philosophy has been concerned with objectivization and naturalization of the spirit. So I don't think the problem is with the claim that the world is objective and material, but that God and the spirit are a higher order of objective existence. This rationalistic idea is actually quasi-materialist. The 'super-natural' is then seen as just a transcendent greater naturality subject to its own set of deterministic laws.

The point that is getting lost here is that it is the modern conception of 'scientific materialism' that is monistic, i.e. there is only one kind of substance, that is 'matter-energy', and everything science knows (what else is there?) is the product of that, via the processes described by physics and evolutionary biology. Mind has come along as a very recent evolutionary development, by way of the output of the h. sapiens forebrain. God, spirits, souls, and the rest, are all anachronistic supersitions of an ignorant age. That is what materialism says.

Sure, a materialism that says there is no God and no spirit; nothing at all beyond the material says that. But there is no contradiction involved in saying that the world is material. and that it is a manifestation of spirit. Spirit is not something that has objective existence beyond the material.Spirit exists wholly and only in spiritual experience. Spiritual experience is not an expression of some objective reality; spiritual experience is it own reality. All of these philosophical controversies about the existence of God and the spirit treat God and the spirit as some kind of objective existence that may be real or merely imagined. That is the problem, because it closes people to having faith in their own experience as real spiritual experience.

Of course mind is emergent, it is part of the natural order. Worms have minds, fish have more evolved minds, mammals more evolved still, and so on. So, of course mind is emergent. We might even say that there are evolving vegetal and animal souls, as Aristotle did. Spirit, though is not emergent; emergence is a manifestation of spirit.

That's my take on it anyway.

Do you mean logically prior or temporally prior? — John

I believe all forms of priority are reducible to temporal priority. If logic proves that X is necessary for Y, and therefore prior to Y, then Y cannot occur until after X occurs. So any time there is a demonstration of logical priority, it is also necessarily a temporal priority, whether it be a matter of efficient cause or final cause.

Considered abstractly they are general, considered concretely they are particular. Particular forms are instantiations of a general evolution of forms. Is it reasonable to posit the prior existence of the general form of the rhinoceros, prior to the advent of actual rhinoceri? Would it be reasonable to posit the pre-existence of the the particualr form of a particualr rhino prioir to its birth? — John

Clearly we are talking about particular forms here, as indicated by our discussion of the "conceptual shape" of an individual object. And, according to my explanation, it is not only reasonable, but also necessary, to posit the pre-existence of the particular form prior to the existence of the particular material object. This is demonstrated by the fact that the material object always comes into existence as an object with a particular form. The form is therefore prior to the material object.

To answer your question about the particular rhino, it is necessary that you understand the nature of "change", in the same way which I do, before I proceed with any explanation. The existence of change demonstrates that any object can cease being, and become something other, another object, at any moment in time. This necessitates that we assume that each object ceases to exist, and is recreated according to the form, at each moment of time. But change demonstrates that the form itself is actively changing at each moment. The DNA of the rhinoceros has the capacity to keep changing the form of the object, from one moment to the next, such that a baby rhino develops.

I don't see an actual argument here for the prior temporal existence of particular forms. In any case, would such a postulated prior temporal existence be an objective existence in our spatio-temporal world or would it be an existence in some other spatio-temporal order? If it were in a separate spatio-temporal order then on what grounds would you say it could be temporally related to our spatio-temporal world such as to justify the claim that it would be temporally prior?

But there is no contradiction involved in saying that the world is material. and that it is a manifestation of spirit. — John

No contradiction provided you admit the duality of matter and spirit.

Yes, although as I said before I think it is a trinity of body, soul and spirit. They are 'three-in-one, though; so this is not any kind of metaphysical claim of pluralism, that would be contradictory to a metaphysical claim of dualism or monism. Matter is a manifestation of spirit,they are not the same and yet they are not different, either.

But if you say that matter is a manifestation of spirit, then you're admitting the reality of spirit. In which case, I've forgotten what it is you're taking issue with.

I haven't denied the reality of spirit, though. I am taking issue with the philosophical debates that are based on the presumption that the purported reality of spirit is a purportedly objective reality. i am saying that is the problem, not whether someone holds a metaphysically materialist, as opposed to a metaphysically idealist view. It is the holding of metaphysical views in general that is the problem because they are based on a kind of thinking that objectifies.

I am taking issue with the philosophical debates that are based on the presumption that the purported reality of spirit is a purportedly objective reality. — John

Where did I say that it was that? I go to great lengths to make that point.

It is the holding of metaphysical views in general that is the problem because they are based on a kind of thinking that objectifies. — John

Exactly - as per the 'poison arrow' parable of the Buddha. That is something I well understand.

This current exchange started when you said 'Personally, I don't believe one or the other [i.e. materialism or idealism], per se, is more or less conducive to, or associated with, spirituality'. But now that you're acknowledging the possibility that 'the material world is the manifestation of spirit', then this is a basic tenet of idealist philosophy.

Not exactly; when I say that I don't think that either idealism or materialism, per se are more conducive to spirituality I mean that to hold one or the other metaphysical view makes no difference. To hold either metaphysical view is not so conducive to spirituality; so i can't agree that the material world being a manifestation of spirit in the sense I have in mind, at least, is a "basic tenet of idealist philosophy'. Most idealist philosophies objectify spirit which could be seen to be either almost as bad as, or perhaps even worse than, denying it in my view.

I mean that to hold one or the other metaphysical view makes no difference. — John

So why waste time on a philosophy forum?

In any case, would such a postulated prior temporal existence be an objective existence in our spatio-temporal world or would it be an existence in some other spatio-temporal order? — John

Being non-material, these forms are understood to be non-spatial. And as I explained, being prior to material objects, implies a temporal relation. I don't know what you mean by "objective existence in our spatio-temporal world", but clearly the existence of these forms is as objective as anything can be, though their existence may not be spatial, in the sense of 3d Euclidian space.

If it were in a separate spatio-temporal order then on what grounds would you say it could be temporally related to our spatio-temporal world such as to justify the claim that it would be temporally prior? — John

In reply to this, I can only say that I believe that the best understanding produced by human beings at the present time, of the relationship between space and time, comes nowhere near to being adequate for a true understanding of that relationship. So the spatio-temporal order referred to here is completely different from the spatio-temporal order which you refer to, but this is because human beings presently misunderstand the relationship between space and time.

To sharpen up my thoughts and expression of them. To identify errors of thought. To come to understand what it is that I think about life, the best way to live and so, in dialogue with others.

If I thought the only, or even the main, purpose of philosophy is to hold and defend metaphysical positions then I would, no doubt, think participating in forums, as such, is a waste of time. Sometimes it does, circumstantially, seem to a waste of time, though, I must admit.

I was being polemical. Generally I'm on board with a lot of what you write, but I had to take exception to equating materialism and idealism. X-)

Yeah I get that; I don' t think we disagree about anything of major importance.
:)

Being non-material, these forms are understood to be non-spatial. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wouldn't any form, being extended and configured, have to be thought to inhabit some kind of a space, whether its a logical or purely conceptual space, or an actual or perceptual space?

One of the principle difficulties of philosophy is arriving at an understanding of the nature of spirit. It is not 'nothing', that is simply an indication of the inadequacy of the mind for the nature of the question. It is also not something. My approach is, it can't be understood through the exercise of thought and reason, so my approach is negative, 'not this, not that'. It is something that has to be realised on a deeper level. (I'm sure you of all people on this board would undersatnd that ;) ).

Yes I agree, infact I don't often mention spirit because it is so volatile that it can't be addressed without failing to address it. Rather like God, both terms and concepts became essentially irrelevant to me in my contemplation a long time ago. I simply house them in place referred to as eternity, or for God, perhaps, the one about whom naught may be said.

Refering to material though my position is such that I rarely ever see it mentioned on forums like this. That material as a philosophical concept is all forms of extension, division, differentiation. Or everything which is not "the one about whom naught may be said". So to me the soul, mind, concepts, being, even spirit are all material. And all material behaves according to natural law. So to me the immaterial is a scarce thing indeed, like hens teeth. But vital nevertheless.