"To be seen" is not a proper way of putting it. "To be apprehended by a mind" is better. That is because we can conceive of things without seeing them.

I'm playing fast and loose with the terminology for simplicity's sake. Because obviously it also includes hearing and feeling and smelling and whatnot.

What about conceiving of things which have no sensible existence, such as is the case when the conception precedes the existence of the thing?

Then why do cameras work, particularly automatic ones?

If a tree falls in a forest....

nobody cares.

Unless your house was directly beneath the tree.

Of course, there's no way of knowing that a giant didn't accidentally step on your house and then tried to cover it up by strategically placing a tree in the indentation. Since we weren't there to see it, after all. :-}

... trees need to be seen for there to be trees. — Michael

Do minds need to be experienced (not sure how we see 'em) for there to be other minds?

If not, then you admit of the existence of that which is not experienced. Which is equivalent to materialism - materialist's call it "matter", you call it "mind stuff". This is what HH is trying to make you understand.

To claim that "mind stuff" is different from "matter" is to claim knowledge of that which you can never know. It is base speculation, nothing more. In fact, by your own admission, if trees are "mind stuff" (i.e., experiences only), then it seems that they should be subject to the same persistence as other minds.

Do minds need to be experienced (not sure how we see 'em) for there to be other minds? — Real Gone Cat

In the sense that includes minds experiencing themselves (i.e. self-awareness), sure.

In fact, by your own admission, if trees are "mind stuff" (i.e., experiences only), then it seems that they should be subject to the same persistence as other minds.

Sure. But the point is that they persist (if at all) as someone's experience, and not as some mind-independent object (where "mind-independent" refers to being independent of all minds, not simply being independent of my mind).

Your very question presupposes that idealism isn't the case. All that happens is that you have the kind of experience described as "looking at a photo taken by a camera".

But if the photograph is of a forest, then does the forest come into existence when you look at the photograph? If not, then why is it a picture of a forest and not an ocean?

But if the photograph is of a forest, then does the forest come into existence when you look at the photograph? If not, then why is it a picture of a forest and not an ocean? — tom

What exists is the experience of a photograph of a forest.

But why the forest and not some other experience, to reiterate Tom's question. Realism has a really simple explanation. What's the (subjective) idealist explanation, just because?

But why the forest and not some other experience, to reiterate Tom's question. Realism has a really simple explanation. What's the (subjective) idealist explanation, just because? — Marchesk

What's the realist's really simple explanation? Because there's a forest? Then why is there a forest and not some other thing? The realist has the same questions to answer as the idealist, just pushed further back along a proposed causal chain.

Then why is there a forest and not some other thing? The realist has the same questions to answer as the idealist, just pushed further back along a proposed causal chain. — Michael

Cause of the Big Bang. There are entire fields of science to explain how the forest got there.

Cause of the Big Bang. There are entire fields of science to explain how the forest got there. — Marchesk

So your explanation is that there just is world of material objects that performs steps A, B, and then C.

And how is that any different to the idealist's explanation that there just is a world of mental phenomena that performs steps A, B, and then C?

And how is that any different to the idealist's explanation that there just is a world of mental phenomena that performs steps A, B, and then C? — Michael

The objective idealist can do that. I don't see how the subjective idealist can perform those steps. It's just a brute fact of experience that a lot of stuff appears to have happened in between minds perceiving things.

It's just a brute fact of experience that a lot of stuff appears to have happened in between minds perceiving things. — Marchesk

What do you mean by "appear" here? Obviously you can't mean it in the sense that we see something happening that isn't being seen?

What do you mean by "appear" here? Obviously you can't mean it in the sense that we see something happening that isn't being seen? — Michael

I mean we experience the world as if stuff happens when nobody's around. I used the word appear to avoid realist sounding language. The subjective idealist can deny that anything actually happens. We only perceive it as if it did.

What exists is the experience of a photograph of a forest. — Michael

Why is it a photograph of a forest, and not a photograph of an ocean?

Do minds need to be experienced (not sure how we see 'em) for there to be other minds? — Real Gone Cat
In the sense that includes minds experiencing themselves (i.e. self-awareness), sure. — Michael

Are there times when a mind is not self-aware? (I.e., during non-dreaming sleep, coma, or unconsciousness?) Perhaps you do not believe that a mind can ever be non-self-aware. OK. But if you do believe that there are such times, then what happens to that person when everyone leaves the room? Where do they go? No one (including themselves) is experiencing them.

Also, there are qualia suggestive of other minds. But I have never actually experienced another mind. It seems that I must infer that which I have never experienced. How is the certainty of other minds ever achieved?

Also, there are qualia suggestive of other minds. But I have never actually experienced another mind. It seems that I must infer that which I have never experienced. How is the certainty of other minds ever achieved? — Real Gone Cat

I don't think it's ever certain. It's just an inference.

Are there times when a mind is not self-aware? (I.e., during non-dreaming sleep, coma, or unconsciousness?)

I'd say not. I'm inclined to equate the mind with self-awareness.

Are there times when a mind is not self-aware? (I.e., during non-dreaming sleep, coma, or unconsciousness?) — Real Gone Cat

I'd say not. I'm inclined to equate the mind with self-awareness. — Michael

Just to be clear : When I stagger home drunk and my wife hits me in the head with a rolling pin, and I go down for the count, I am still self-aware. Is that correct? I mean, obviously my brain is present, but what am I thinking about?

When do babies become self-aware? Does a new-born continue to exist when you put it down for a nap? How far back along development does self-awareness go? Birth? Conception?

And by the way, how - besides base speculation - do you know any of this?

Are there times when a mind is not self-aware? — Real Gone Cat

It seems to me that people make way too much of "self-awareness."

Mentality is awareness. Self-awareness is simply thinking something like, "I'm aware, or I have mental phenomena, of seeing a hawk" (or whatever it might be that one is aware of, including strictly internal phenomena). There's not much to that. It's not much different than simply having awareness of a hawk.

Just to be clear : When I stagger home drunk and my wife hits me in the head with a rolling pin, and I go down for the count, I am still self-aware. Is that correct? — Real Gone Cat

If you're down for the count then, no, you're not self-aware.

I mean, obviously my brain is present, but what am I thinking about?

When do babies become self-aware? Does a new-born continue to exist when you put it down for a nap? How far back along development does self-awareness go? Birth? Conception?

This is the problem. You're trying to make sense of idealism while assuming realism. If you want to make sense of idealism then forget the notion of there being some physical thing present (e.g. the brain, or a foetus) that exists even in the absence of mental activity.

And by the way, how - besides base speculation - do you know any of this?

How do I know what? That idealism is true and realism isn't? How does the realist know (according to him) that realism is true and idealism isn't? Because it seems the most reasonable position.

But the veracity of idealism isn't the issue here. The issue is whether or not idealism entails solipsism.

How does the realist know (according to him) that realism is true and idealism isn't? — Michael

I'd say for one because we experience real things.

'd say for one because we experience real things. — Terrapin Station

We also experience unreal things, so the realist needs something more to justify what's considered real.

I'd say for one because we experience real things. — Terrapin Station

And the idealist would agree. They'd just say that the real things we experience (trees, cups, etc.) don't continue to exist after the experience ends.

They'd just say that the real things we experience don't continue to exist after the experience ends. — Michael

But what makes a perceived tree more real than a dream tree for the idealist?

Similar to what I said in the other thread, that a thing is real or not is an instrumental narrative that develops according to whatever epistemic conditions are satisfied. The (realist) notion of whether or not it's real being independent of how we talk and think about it is a fiction.

And the idealist would agree. They'd just say that the real things we experience don't continue to exist after the experience ends. — Michael

What do you gain by adding that much complexity, plus the added problem you have of non-observed-therefore-non-existent reality creating records.

What do you gain by adding that much complexity, plus the added problem you have of non-observed-therefore-non-existent reality creating records. — tom

What's complex about it? Mental phenomena exists and behaves in certain ways. How is it any different to saying that physical things exist and behave in certain ways? I'd say it could even be simpler, being that the mind-body problem, for one, doesn't arise.

And even if it's more complex, the idealist will likely argue that the (simpler) alternative doesn't even make any sense at all; that if you take away the look and feel and smell of the world then there's nothing left to imagine. They'll say that the world as being composed of something other than experiential qualities is unintelligible, and an unintelligible notion, no matter how simple, isn't a correct one.