Nothing wrong with that, right? — Aaron R

If it's just an intellectual challenge, akin to playing chess or doing crossword puzzles, then nothing wrong. But I suspect for a lot of people interested in metaphysics, there is the nagging question of whether one's preferred metaphysics is true. That eventually leads to questioning its assumptions, and taking other metaphysical systems at least a little bit more seriously.

He’s no better or worse than the idealist who ultimately does the same. — Aaron R

I think that statement would make you a neutral apologist. To be a realist apologist, you'll have to make the case that realism is more successful or explains more.. or explains better... right?

What's the difference between realism and materialism, btw?

In other words, there’s probably an infinite number of consistent metaphysical systems that can be built by simply adding or subtracting assumptions at one’s discretion. In metaphysics, the question of whether any given system better explains the explanandum than another can only be judged by the palatability of its consequences, and that begins to seem more a matter of taste and temperament than anything else. A dogmatic realist is a realist by taste and temperament, and will simply tweak the assumptions accordingly. He’s no better or worse than the idealist who ultimately does the same. — Aaron R

While it's true that a philosopher is always bound by the assumptions they make and the conclusions that result from them, and is not, so far as he is doing philosophy at all, simply free to hold onto premises, admit they have certain conclusions, and reject those conclusions, I don't think it amounts to taste what sorts of premises that one is willing to accept to begin with. The reason for this is that realists and idealists both have things in common they want to do justice to, otherwise they couldn't argue. And it's the fact that their varying assumptions do more or less justice to these things that make it coherent for one to accuse the other of inconsistency, not merely a difference in taste.

Roughly, the idealist is motivated by some variant of the dreaming argument to show that even the realist, on his own terms, is more convinced that he experiences than that something causes these experiences. The realist, I gather, insists that we are more sure there is something real beyond these experiences than that logic and evidence are relevant to philosophy (this may be a harsh appraisal, but from my years and years arguing about this, I think an honest one – the realist always ends up, when pressed, admitting that he does not care about the evidence, and this topic is an example of this rhetorical move).

I think that statement would make you a neutral apologist. To be a realist apologist, you'll have to make the case that realism is more successful or explains more.. or explains better... right? — Mongrel

Yeah, I mean a common refrain you’re going to hear from the dogmatic realist is that idealism collapses into solipsism when taken to its logical conclusion. Assuming that solipsism can’t be decisively refuted, that it is internally consistent, that it is consistent with everything we could possibly experience, etc., then one is simply faced with a choice that amounts to a matter of preference. So either bite the bullet and accept solipsism, or try to find an intelligible alternative.

Or so the story goes…

What's the difference between realism and materialism, btw? — Mongrel

Materialism – the doctrine that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical.

Realism – the doctrine that the world is as it is independently of how inquiring agents take it to be.

Realism seems broader.

NOTE: No one seems to be able to agree on what exactly the word “realism” actually means.

But I suspect for a lot of people interested in metaphysics, there is the nagging question of whether one's preferred metaphysics is true. — Marchesk

The dogmatic realist believes realism is true, and will attempt to justify it when pressed. But at the end of the day he admits that no metaphysical system can be proven to certainty. If someone doesn’t want to be a realist, then they’ll inevitably find some reason not to be. The dogmatic realist thinks that if the consequences of idealism aren’t reason enough to reject it, then nothing is.

Roughly, the idealist is motivated by some variant of the dreaming argument to show that even the realist, on his own terms, is more convinced that he experiences than that something causes these experiences. — The Great Whatever

More convinced, perhaps, but not unconvinced as a consequence. I’m more convinced that 2 + 2 = 4 than that Fermat’s Theorem has been proven, but I don’t reject the latter claim as a result.

So given my firm intuition that I find myself in a world not of my own making, I’m going to devote my efforts toward making intelligible the notion of an independent cause of my experience, since it’s my preference that such be the case anyway. I mean, why throw in the towel just because “I could be dreaming”? Amirite?

I think it depends on whether said meta-physician admits to having argued this or that based on, in some way, taste. There is nothing wrong with utilizing taste in making choices between beliefs.

But I'd also hastily qualify this and note that taste is not the same as whether or not I prefer vanilla ice cream to chocolate ice cream. In epistemology we differentiate between knowledge and opinion. I would hazard to say that as knowledge is to opinion in epistemology, taste is to preference in aesthetics (just to coin a term to refer to the ice cream example -- not sure if its the best word). And the diversity of beliefs with respect to aesthetics does not, in and of itself, make dispute somehow non-negotiable in the same way that arguing over whether vanilla ice cream is better than chocolate ice cream is non-negotiable.

People argue about aesthetics very frequently, in fact. And it's a really interesting branch of philosophy.

I don't know if I'd say that all metaphysics comes down to aesthetics -- that seems a bit of a stretch. But in many cases we are probably drawn to this or that position on the basis of some sense of taste which we gravitate towards. (and explicating that sense of taste -- or, what we might consider good taste -- would be really quite worthwhile).


If a person is just asserting they belief this or that without having any kind of an explanation, I'd think that that is dogmatism -- but not quite philosophy.

NOTE: No one seems to be able to agree on what exactly the word “realism” actually means. — Aaron R

For instance, I understand realism as Dummett described it; the claim that truth is verification-transcendent (and bivalent). Theories on metaphysics effectively reduce to theories on truth. Others disagree with me on this.

The dogmatic realist believes realism is true, and will attempt to justify it when pressed. But at the end of the day he admits that no metaphysical system can be proven to certainty. If someone doesn’t want to be a realist, then they’ll inevitably find some reason not to be. The dogmatic realist thinks that if the consequences of idealism aren’t reason enough to reject it, then nothing is. — Aaron R

You mean, by definition, a dogmatic realist expresses an irrational belief in reality because they can only take the existence of reality on faith.

NOTE: No one seems to be able to agree on what exactly the word “realism” actually means. — Aaron R

It probably calls for some narrowing down, otherwise pitting this nebulous realism against a very specific sort of idealism (the consequences of which are necessarily solipsism) is kind of odd.

Yeah, I mean a common refrain you’re going to hear from the dogmatic realist is that idealism collapses into solipsism when taken to its logical conclusion. Assuming that solipsism can’t be decisively refuted, that it is internally consistent, that it is consistent with everything we could possibly experience, etc., then one is simply faced with a choice that amounts to a matter of preference. So either bite the bullet and accept solipsism, or try to find an intelligible alternative. — Aaron R

It seems that solipsism proposes a theory of reality exponentially more complicated than realism without providing an explanatory structure. Solipsism is forced to admit that the reality that it creates is exactly like physical reality, as surprising as physical reality, and precisely as difficult to understand as physical reality but on top of that it is created by a mind to be that way for no reason.

Solipsism (and variants) is just an indefensible over-elaboration of realism, while remaining logically consistent.

It seems that solipsism proposes a theory of reality exponentially more complicated than realism without providing an explanatory structure. Solipsism is forced to admit that the reality that it creates is exactly like physical reality, as surprising as physical reality, and precisely as difficult to understand as physical reality but on top of that it is created by a mind to be that way for no reason. — tom

Nah, you can argue that reality and any other concept is ultimately nebulous because its impossible to know your own mind just like its impossible to see the back of your own head without a mirror.

So let's take stock:

The common thread running through many of the replies (with some exceptions) is that dogmatism errs insofar as it sacrifices "reason" at the alter of common sense, cultural prejudice, personal bias, etc.

Questions:

1. Is it ever ok to remain skeptical of an "absurd" conclusion to a clever argument even when one can't pin-point the exact flaw in the reasoning?

2. How long can one hold out in search of a rebuttal before they are transgressing the norms of rational discourse?

NOTE: "Absurd" is another one of those words that is tossed around fairly liberally but, again, no one seems to know exactly what it means. What I have in mind is this: a claim seems absurd to someone in proportion to number of that person's "core" beliefs that it contradicts.

A dogmatic realist is a realist by taste and temperament, and will simply tweak the assumptions accordingly. He’s no better or worse than the idealist who ultimately does the same. — Aaron R

Where I take issue with dogmatic realism, is the extent to which it really amounts to a critical philosophy at all. It seems to me to be a form of 'arguing from normality' - that the consensus reality that is adjudicated by current social mores and scientific judgement is normative with respect to philosophical claims.

But I think that the role of philosophy is intended to subvert that order, or at least the very least call it into question. Many of the seminal figures of philosophy were like that - Heraclitus, Socrates and Plato all come to mind, but there are numerous others. Remember what Socrates was sentenced to death for. They 'wonder at what we think is ordinary', what appears to be the 'common sense' view, the kinds of things that 'everyone knows is true'. I think that Kant and the later idealists also exhibited that kind of attitude, but regrettably, German idealism 'collapsed under its own weight', so to speak, leading to the ascendancy of analytical and 'ordinary language' philosophy (in the English-speaking world, anyway.) And now analytical philosophy is rather like tea and scones in the cafeteria of the LHC (where the real work is being done.)

But I think that the role of philosophy is intended to subvert that order, or at least the very least call it into question. — Wayfarer

Is part of philosophy's role also to find answers to the questions that philosophy poses? In your opinion, would you say that the defense of the accepted order is necessarily an anti-philosophical enterprise?

But I think that the role of philosophy is intended to subvert that order, or at least the very least call it into question. — Wayfarer

The role of philosophy in academia is to promote the interests of the wealthy and powerful establishment, while the role of philosophy outside of academia is promote the interests of humanity, but the two can overlap at times as happened to Socrates.

In your opinion, would you say that the defense of the accepted order is necessarily an anti-philosophical enterprise? — Aaron R

It depends on the nature of the order it's defending! The reason I advocate an idealist philosophy is because I am opposed to philosophical materialism or physicalism, or what is nowadays called naturalism (even though distinction can be made between all of them). My 'philosophical project' originated in interest in what can generally be called spiritual philosophy (even though the word 'spiritual' is not one I like much). I suppose you could say that I am a 'perennialist' - I believe that the great philosophical traditions embody a real wisdom, now generally forgotten. But I don't believe that the mainstream of the Western philosophical tradition is materialist - scientific materialism, of the type now dominant in secular academia, is a kind of parasitic development within Western philosophy. But it has such huge firepower and technological prestige that it seems impossible to argue against.

Hence my avatar!

In any case, I can identify strains of the perennial tradition in Western philosophy, and that is what I usually try and argue from, generally against what Nagel calls 'neo-darwinian materialism'.

1. Is it ever ok to remain skeptical of an "absurd" conclusion to a clever argument even when one can't pin-point the exact flaw in the reasoning? — Aaron R

Not only is it ok, it's what I'd expect of a rational person. :D Indeed, wouldn't it actually be kind of irrational (just in the common use of the word) if we knew someone who, upon coming across an argument they hadn't considered before, suddenly abandoned their belief just because they hadn't considered the argument before? But that's at the extreme end, which your following question seems to allude to: (since, given time, it might be irrational to hold onto belief)

2. How long can one hold out in search of a rebuttal before they are transgressing the norms of rational discourse?

This one's harder to answer for me. It's just such a big question, from my perspective.

If we're allowing a general sort of rational discourse, then I'd say that rationality is not about which propositions someone believes, but is rather defined by the process by which they got to those beliefs. As such, I don't think it would make sense to put a time limit on propositional content. It would very much depend on whether or not the person is adhering to some kind of process of thinking which is rational -- it's certainly not the case that wide agreement on a proposition is what makes a belief rational, so a person could, theoretically at least, even hold onto the belief after society has changed until they die and, as long as they are doing so by way of a rational process, the belief could still be considered rational (even if it is, in fact, false! :D )

((Also, because I'm remaining general, I'm putting to one side what that process would be. I'm just drawing the line of rationality away from believing in true propositions, and focusing on the process by which belief is arrived at))

1. Is it ever ok to remain skeptical of an "absurd" conclusion to a clever argument even when one can't pin-point the exact flaw in the reasoning? — Aaron R

Sure, but it's also appropriate to remain skeptical of your dogma when given a good argument to the contrary that you can't refute and that poses devastating problems for it if it holds, rather than continuing to assert it.

I mean, you can be dogmatic, but then you're just admitting you'd prefer not to do philosophy, so I don't see why you'd ever have a philosophical discussion about it. Just state your conclusion without evidence and hold to it in spite of any evidence to the contrary – that's what you're proposing, and how can any philosophical discussion challenge such a strategy? It's a core difference of goals, which is why I wonder why philosophers bother making such claims, rather than just not doing philosophy in the relevant area.

What's the difference between realism and materialism, btw? — Mongrel

Materialists believe that only material things exist (as well as whatever structures/relations they're in).

Realism asserts that the existents in question are extra-mental/independent of mind.

You could be an anti-realist materialist if you were to think that only minds exist, or that all existents are dependent on mentality, but where you believe that nothing but minds or mind-dependent things exist.

You could be an anti-realist materialist if you were to think that only minds exist, — Terrapin Station

I don't think so. An anti-realist denies that a statement of materialism can be truth-apt.

Part of the problem is that neither realism nor idealism ought to be 'starting points': these positions ought to follow (or 'fall out from') from other points of departure, broadly speaking. For @Michael, it's a matter of one's take on truth. For myself, it's a question of ontogenesis. In either case, realism nor idealism are not positions to be argued for 'in themselves', they are derivitive, secondary outcrops of more originary - and far more interesting - philosophical problems. Arguments for either will remined mired in dogmatism to the extent the the stakes upon which they turn are unarticulated.

Taken in itself, the question 'is it all in my/the mind or not' (and variants thereof) is such a terrible question that it barely merits any serious discussion. If there's truth to the deflationary position, it's that trying to tackle the problem of anti/realism 'directly' is indeed a false problem; anti/realism is an answer, a result, not a problem from which answers follow.

As I just explained:.

Materialists believe that only material things exist (as well as whatever structures/relations they're in).

Realism asserts that the existents in question are extra-mental/independent of mind. — Terrapin Station

Part of the problem is that neither realism nor idealism ought to be 'starting points': — StreetlightX

You're not presenting an argument for why that should be the case in your view though.

Realism asserts that the existents in question are extra-mental/independent of mind. — Terrapin Station

Per Fine, it's a belief in a definite world structure and belief in epistemic access to this structure. Language regarding the mind-independence of worldly stuff is limited to "..to a large extent." I think Fine allows that the issue boils down to truth.

Which Fine--Arthur? Kit? And why are we going by one particular person's characterization (which I'd say is an idiosyncratic characterization)?

Because my version is better.

Because literally nothing of philosophical consequence follows if you take a position one way or the other. The whole barren debate turns upon the ontological status of 'things' or 'the world' or whathave you: mind/matter/other? But ontological status is an empty concept without the actual ontology that underlies it; not their 'status' but what is being talked about is what everything turns upon. What even is mind? Or matter? Or better, how do these things - whatever they are - function, how do they work to give rise to the variety of the world about us? And if not mind or matter, in what way would process X (whatever you want) individuate? And how would these processes account for X, Y and Z?

If 'everything is mind' (for example), then what you're really arguing that mind can account for things because mind has the kind of properties, or the kind of qualities that can make good on such an account. What matters is not 'that' it is mind, but how it 'works'. And if you can't explain that, then who cares about your position in the anti/realism debate? The same applies if you want to begin with matter, or anything else whatsoever: what matters is the function, not what you call it, which is a surface effect, a nominal non-question.

Frankly the reason that questions of anti/realism are so prevalent on boards like this is such a 'base' level question that anyone can chip in without having to be all that familiar with more interesting, more involved questions from which anti/realism flows. Insofar as there's any interest in these questions, it's because they flag deeper, underlying questions about the nature of mind, the nature of things, or even truth, if one were to follow Michael, for example. But in and of itself, it's a rather banal triviality that isn't that philosophically interesting (note that I don't say this to 'deflate' the question, but to 'inflate' it far beyond the narrow confines in which is usually resides).

1. Is it ever ok to remain skeptical of an "absurd" conclusion to a clever argument even when one can't pin-point the exact flaw in the reasoning? — Aaron R

Not if you're doing philosophy. If you can't pinpoint a flaw in the reasoning, then what ought follow is skepticism towards your already held conclusion. Otherwise you're just a cultist, essentially. You might as well just pick the religion that appeals to you the most and then dogmatically assert it's truth.

Interestingly, Werner Heisenberg referred to many of the adversaries of his and Bohr's 'Copenhagen intepretation' as 'dogmatic realists' - and with reason. Those adversaries, chief amongst them Einstein, insisted that quantum theory could not be a complete theory, because of the indeterminism of quantum behaviours ('jumps') and because of the so-called 'wave-particle' duality (which, arguably, mirrors the notion of the dialectic.) They insisted that there must be some really-existing particle which is 'there anyway', regardless of how your experiment is set up, or what kind of experiment you run; whilst Heisenberg famously said 'We have to remember that what we observe is not nature herself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning.'