‘Survival is unnecessary’ - is this statement true or false according to Reason? — Possibility

Obviously that would depend.

Do you think it is true? If you think it is true, does that entail that it is true? If not, why not?

Apologies in advance for not having read the whole thread.

When Reason asserts that something is the case, it is the case. Her asserting it, and its being true are one and the same. — Bartricks

Why not start simpler?
Something like: true and false are properties of propositions.
Relating propositions and ontology may then be a whole other thing, but for starters at least.

Surely, whatever is the case does not depend on her?
Her reasoning about something may then become good justification for her beliefs.
Looks like conflating ontology and epistemics, truth and justification/beliefs, which has a few odd implications.
Ordinary logic is common to reasoning.

Apologies in advance for not having read the whole thread. — jorndoe

Why not start simpler? — jorndoe

How do you know I didn't? You admit you have not read the whole thread, but then you talk as if you have. Confusing.

This thread is about what truth is - and in the OP I explain what I think it is and why.

It is uncontroversial that truth is a property of propositions. But that is not, however, an answer to the question "what is truth", as I have explained to others. It leaves the question of what the property is, entirely open.

This thread is not about propositions, but about what truth is.

Now, I have argued that truth is constituted by the assertions of Reason. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting its contents.

Why? Because that's the ultimate test for whether a proposition possesses the property of truth. And thus, as a working hypothesis, it is reasonable to assume that truth itself is that property.

Looks like conflating ontology and epistemics, truth and justification/beliefs, which has a few odd implications.
Ordinary logic is common to reasoning. — jorndoe

Looks like you've strung some big words together in the hope that the resulting sentence expresses something coherent. It doesn't.

I see absolutely no justification for this claim.

What's this: "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true"?

Well, it is an assertion I have made, certainly. I just made it. But that's not all. It is also asserted by Reason.

What do you think it is if not an assertion? — Bartricks

Of course it's your assertion I just don't agree with you that reason itself universally "asserts" anything. Even the principles of reason are asserted by us on account of their intuitive self-evidence, not on the basis of any more fundamental reason. You're really just arguing over ways of speaking. If I make a claim it is me making the claim, not reason, even is it is a reasonable claim.

The point is that there is no ambiguity involved in the statement that persons make claims, because persons are understood to possess the requisite agency to do so; whereas there is an ambiguity in the statement that reason makes claims; you can word it that quirky way, sure,
provided you are careful not to impute agency to reason; which is precisely the pitfall you are failing to avoid.

Reason directs, prescribes, asserts, values. Deal with it. — Bartricks

Why should I accept a statement which issues from a misunderstanding due to a reification of an ambiguous way of thinking about reason? I do not accept it because reason tells me it is completely unfounded. So my reason, to use your ambiguous locution, does not "assert"' the same as your reason apparently, and I would say mistakenly, asserts. So how do you justify appealing to some overarching "Reason" if different persons' reason tells them different things?

Of course it's your assertion I just don't agree with you that reason itself universally "asserts" anything. — Janus

Evidence? Again, you have no justification for these claims. I am justifying mine.

You have agreed that my example was an example of an assertion.

Now, it is also a 'true' assertion. But it is not true because 'I' assert it, is it?

So, why is it true, then?

Because Joe Bloggs asserts it?

No.

Becasue Reason asserts it?

yes.

There's no other plausible answer.

Now, don't just nay say. That's not arguing.

Again, you have agreed that this - "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true" - is an assertion.

You should also agree that it is 'true'.

Is. It. True. Because. I. Assert. It?

No.

Why is that assertion true, then?

Don't explain why we 'think' it is true. Explain why it is actually true. In virtue of what is it true?

Why should I accept a statement which issues from a misunderstanding due to a reification of an ambiguous way of thinking about reason? — Janus

Question begging. I am not misunderstanding anything. I am just saying things you - you - disagree with. That is not equivalent to being mistaken.

Reason does all of the following, as a cursory read of any philosophical text on the matter will show: command, direct, require, bid, favour, prescribe, assert, value.

Now, don't just say "no she doesn't". That's just silly. She does. And she has to be a 'She' (or He - whatever) becaues only shes and hes do that kind of thing. Q.E.D.

Argue something and stop just farting out assertions, Hugh.

‘Survival is unnecessary’ - is this statement true or false according to Reason?
— Possibility

Obviously that would depend.

Do you think it is true? If you think it is true, does that entail that it is true? If not, why not? — Bartricks

Well, it doesn’t matter what I think, does it? It only matters what appeals to Reason. You’ve already made it clear that I’m unable to determine this.

So what does Reason tell you about the truth of this statement? And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)?

It is manifest in the way we perceive and/or understand it. Why would energy be potential? Because it is assigned a certain degree of probable capacity for work. Therefore, the potential of any energy is manifest with respect to activities and the conditions they take place in. — BrianW

Like ‘God’ is manifest in the way we perceive and understand it? Or with respect to the activities and conditions of the universe? I’m trying to understand what evidence you have of actual energy that isn’t doing any work.

I recognise that my perspective is unconventional, and I don’t expect it to be intuitively understood in this way. But the more I apply this conceptualisation to experience, the more sense it makes.

Don’t get me wrong - I realise that potential energy is real. We perceive it and understand it as a prediction in relation to a capacity for work. Manifest as energy, however, as an event, it is a reduction - a collapsed wave, if you will. There is more to what we refer to as ‘potential energy’ than what it manifests as, more than its relation to any specific activity or conditions. It’s real because it has a value aspect and a meaning aspect, but its temporal and spatial aspects are undefined. It cannot exist as actual energy except in the past: the energy in an activity was potential energy. But it’s not anymore.

The way I see it, the existence of potential energy points to an aspect of reality with which we interact that is beyond time, enabling us to accurately structure predictions in relation to the manifestation of energy. I can see that activities and conditions are caused, but how is energy caused? The language around energy and ‘doing work’ disguises the reality that energy is not exactly caused, but rather manifests from its own potential in relation to the potential of interacting events.

There seems nothing confused in the idea that it may sometimes be useful to believe false propositions — Bartricks

I would guess this is true. But if we know they are false, that means they are not working in some way. They may be working in one way, but not in others. I think it is clear we might be wrong about some things we think are true. No idea of truth is going to eliminate this possibility. It seems like we are fallible. The other theories of truth, it seems to me, all boil down to some kind of pragmatism

for us.

Since it is we who will test these ideas.

Or find that they do not work.

Or find exceptions and need to refine.

Maybe we 'shouldn't' have a pragmatic idea of truth.

But in reality, here we are. What option do we have? we don't have direct access. The truth doesn't shine in a way so we can recognize those true propositions from false ones. So we are always seeing they work, finding out they don't, regardless of how we define them.

Here in our fallible in situ groping.

I suppose another way of putting this is: I think it is pragmatic to act as if the conclusions we make that work are true, until they do not work. We have no direct access to final knowledge, we learn over time, we are fallible. And further, as far as I can tell, pretty much everyone does this, though some fail to notice that some of their truths are not working, even for them.

Maybe we 'shouldn't' have a pragmatic idea of truth. — Coben

We should have a pragmatic idea of truth.
Anything that makes you feel you are 'better off' today than yesterday is truth. And once you believe things can't get any better you have arrived at you destination.

Now, I have argued that truth is constituted by the assertions of Reason. That is, for a proposition to be true, is for Reason to be asserting its contents. — Bartricks

The obvious question is, what is Reason? and why the capital letter? Just to reifying it?

The followup question is, how is it that Reason never errs? How is it that Reason never arives at falsehood?

And the conclusion, using the open question argument, is that since we can ask if Reason can arrive at falsehood, Reason is not the very same as truth.

‘Survival is unnecessary’ - is this statement true or false according to Reason? — Bartricks

So what does Reason tell you about the truth of this statement? And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)? — Possibility

I don't even know what the question is - it's like asking "is it true that blue?"

"And what does its truth depend on (apart from an appeal to Reason, of course)?"

Truth is not an appeal to Reason. Appealing to Reason is how we find out about what's true. But truth itself is the property of "being (sincerely) asserted by Reason".

If you now ask "what does truth depend on (apart from the assertions of Reason)?" the answer is "nothing" - for that's like asking "what does water depend on, apart from hydrogen and oxygen?" It expresses a refusal either to understand or accept the analysis just provided. Which is your prerogative, of course, but the fact is that I've argued for it and the argument has yet to be challenged.

The obvious question is, what is Reason? and why the capital letter? Just to reifying it? — Banno

Reason is a person. That's not reification. Reification involves making a mistake - the concept incorporates the idea of error. But Reason 'is' a person - there can be no reasonable doubt about it, for Reason asserts things and only persons - minds - can do that (as is itself manifest to the reason of all of those apart from the insane).

Why the capital letter? Because the word 'reason' is multiply ambiguous and historically a capital letter has been used to denote the source of reasons.

Anything that makes you feel you are better off today than yesterday is truth. — ovdtogt

That's obviously false. It's as obviously false as saying "truth is a table. Anything that is a table is true". It's just confused.

"Useful" and 'true' clearly denote different properties, otherwise the idea of a false but useful belief would make no sense (and it clearly does make sense).

you now ask "what does truth depend on (apart from the assertions of Reason)?" the answer is "nothing" - for that's like asking "what does water depend on, apart from hydrogen and oxygen?" It expresses a refusal either to understand or accept the analysis just provided. Which is your prerogative, of course, but the fact is that I've argued for it and the argument has yet to be challenged. — Bartricks

Are you saying that water depends on nothing apart from hydrogen and oxygen?

I'm saying truth depends on Reason asserting things because that's what truth is. Truth, not water, is the topic of this thread, water-boy.

You brought up the analogy to water, not me. I’m just trying to work out your reasoning, so I went with your analogy. I assumed you brought it up because you thought it was relevant. My apologies for thinking you were going somewhere with it.

What's unclear about my reasoning?

Is there a universal consensus among those who use their reason to figure out what truth is (philosophers) about what truth is?

No. There are just several theses, theses that most of those who are trying to figure out what truth is agree are not very plausible.

Given that there is, at present, no consensus on what truth is, it is worth asking "what would it take for there to be?"

That is, when would philosophers agree that they have found the true theory of truth?

That answer is unquestionably this: they would all agree that theory X is the true theory of truth when the reason of all of them represents theory X to be the true theory of X. For what more could anyone want than this?

Well, then it makes sense to suppose that 'that' is what truth is. That is, that truth itself is none other than the property of being a proposition that Reason is representing to be the case.

That's my reasoning.

So what does truth depend on?

Reason.

It depends on Reason asserting something. Why? Because if and only if she asserts something will anything be true. Why? Because that's what truth is.

Is there a universal consensus among those who use their reason to figure out what truth is (philosophers) about what truth is?

No. There are just several theses, theses that most of those who are trying to figure out what truth is agree are not very plausible.

Given that there is, at present, no consensus on what truth is, it is worth asking "what would it take for there to be?"

That is, when would philosophers agree that they have found the true theory of truth?

That answer is unquestionably this: they would all agree that theory X is the true theory of truth when the reason of all of them represents theory X to be the true theory of X. For what more could anyone want than this? — Bartricks

Thank you for laying it out. I agree with you up to this point. But the rest does not follow, by my reasoning (for what it’s worth).

Well, then it makes sense to suppose that 'that' is what truth is. That is, that truth itself is none other than the property of being a proposition that Reason is representing to be the case.

That's my reasoning.

So what does truth depend on?

Reason.

It depends on Reason asserting something. Why? Because if and only if she asserts something will anything be true. — Bartricks

‘Reason’ is a concept that you’ve constructed, like ‘God’, to represent a supposedly ‘objective’ position that is inclusive of a ‘consensus’ (ie. of reasoning) - which so far has changed from what one would assume was ‘all people’ to only ‘reasonable people’, and is now only ‘philosophers’. Just as ‘God’ cannot be an objective or ‘omni’ position if you exclude contributing perspectives from the consensus (such as ‘Evil’), so ‘Reason’ as you’ve constructed here can only be a subjective position of reasoning.

Truth depends on more than the property of being a proposition that your ill-defined consensus is representing to be the case, because a comprehensive understanding of truth must be an objective consensus. That doesn’t mean everyone has to agree - but it does mean that what is deemed unreasonable, unethical, inhuman, impossible, improbable, contradictory, unheard of and unknown ALL must contribute to an understanding of what truth is. Otherwise you only have a limited perspective of truth, and so you cannot claim to have fared any better than all those philosophers whose efforts you disparage.

Therefore your argument rests entirely on who or what is ‘Reason’ (hence my initial question), which by all accounts renders any understanding of truth from your theory limited, and therefore subjective.

But hey, if it’s only the truth of your relationship with ‘Reason’ as you (and people like you) understand her, or if you’re arguing that truth as an objective position doesn’t exist, or that we cannot reach a universal consensus on what truth is, then we can explore that. But I don’t think you are.

A comprehensive answer to ‘what is truth?’ must be inclusive of understanding the relationship between truth and supposedly ‘unreasonable’ perspectives like mine. You can’t just exclude us - that’s not what truth is.

I was arguing for a pragmatic version of truth.

"Useful" and 'true' clearly denote different properties, otherwise the idea of a false but useful belief would make no sense (and it clearly does make sense). — Bartricks

And again, if we know it is false but it works, it is also not working. Not predicting some outcome, not explaining something. It is not useful in some way or we would not know it is false. The situation we are in is not with a list of truths where we can check the useful items and say these are useful but false, these are useful but true. All we have are claims that are useful in a wide variety of ways. A subet is their explanatory power and allowing us to work with something we want to work with in some way. Any truth that is not useful gives us no way to know it is true.

Useful" and 'true' clearly denote different properties, otherwise the idea of a false but useful belief would make no sense (and it clearly does make sense). — Bartricks

If you want to look for some esoteric 'mumbo jumbo' definition of truth, that is your prerogative. I think that is just about as useful as digging a hole and filling it in again. If you want to cleverly rearranging words, why not do a crossword puzzle?

we know it is false but it works — Coben

That does not make sense.

We know it is false because it does not work.

idea of a false but useful belief would make no sense (and it clearly does make sense). — Bartricks

Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful.
Our belief in an anthropomorphic God may be false but that belief may still be useful. The truth in this case is that the ' unverifiable belief' can be useful. The truth again lies in the usefulness of the belief even though the belief itself may be false. The fact that this belief (in God) remains useful, is because it can not be verified.

↪ovdtogt I was arguing for a pragmatic version of truth. — Coben

Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful.
Our belief in an anthropomorphic God may be false but that belief may still be useful. The truth in this case is that the ' unverifiable belief' can be useful. The truth again lies in the usefulness of the belief even though the belief itself may be false. The fact that this belief (in God) remains useful, is because it can not be verified.

Again this is the point I was making. Though it is not binary. A belief may work but be in part or nearly all false. Certain kinds of positive thinking in relation to physical skills can be useful even if we start using them when they are false. Saying 'my backhand is smooth and effective' to oneself can improve a tennis stroke, even when it is not true (yet). But it is not, obviously, fully true, though there must be some minimal truth or one will not be able to say the belief to oneself with any certainty. There is only so far one can wag a dog.

Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful. — ovdtogt

Well, there you go.

The fact that this belief (in God) remains useful, is because it can not be verified. — ovdtogt

Actually I would say that it does seem to be verified to most believers. They experience a presence. They are able to quite drugs. There will be some though nto entire verification. There is so much binary thinking around this issue, as if things are completely verified or not verified at all. Or completely true or not true at all.

Beliefs that are believed to be false have no usefulness. False beliefs that are believed to be true can be useful. — ovdtogt

You're just thoroughly confused. First, you have suggested that if a belief is 'useful' then it is true.

Now, that's obviously false, as false as saying "if something is a biscuit, it is true".

And it's incoherent, because to truly be useful it has to be 'true' that believing the proposition is useful. Which is now going to set you off on a regress.

But anyway, it's false on its face.

But you've decided to double-down. That's a mistake. First, grossly implausible views require considerable ingenuity to defend well. You're not qualified.

Second, you keep stating things that are obviously false in the hope that confidence about them will somehow make them true. For instance. "beliefs that are believed to be false" - what do you mean? If you believe a proposition, then you believe its contents obtain. That's just what it is to believe something. I can't believe it is raining and at the same time believe that my belief that it is raining is false. If I believe it is raining, I believe that raining is the case.

Our belief in an anthropomorphic God may be false but that belief may still be useful. — ovdtogt

Er, what? So you now agree that a belief can be useful yet false? Yes, I know.

So, this thread is about what truth is. It's not about whatever pseudo profound utterance occurs to you. It is about 'truth'.

Now, if a belief can be useful yet not true, then we know - or those of us who have powers of reason can know - that truth and usefulness denote different properties. Which is something we already knew, because it is directly self-evident. Deal.