Possibly. Quote: Sorry I wrote you such a long letter. I didn't have time to write you a shorter one.

well I'm not so sure that concludes anything. If a non-human observed something out of our comprehension, there's absolutely no way of telling and we would never even realize it.

well I'm not so sure that concludes anything. — ep3265

Well I’m not sure I claimed it did.

If a non-human observed something out of our comprehension, there's absolutely no way of telling and we would never even realize it. — ep3265

That’s a little defeatist, isn’t it? How do you think we developed a way to comprehend what other humans experience and observe? Do you think that’s conclusive?

That’s a little defeatist, isn’t it? How do you think we developed a way to comprehend what other humans experience and observe? Do you think that’s conclusive? — Possibility

Even comprehending how a dog views 'reality' will just remain an educated guess.

Even comprehending how a dog views 'reality' will just remain an educated guess. — ovdtogt

As will you comprehending how I experience reality.

Because you and I share the same machinery I have far less of a problem comprehending how you operate. Society is built on the fact that as humans we are capable of empathizing with other humans.

I guess some people can’t be helped... — Possibility

The arrogance of thinking I need your help. I don't need your help matey. You need mine - you need to understand that you can't reason without attempting to listen to Reason, just as you can't be a bachelor and have a wife. Reasoning is attempting to listen to Reason.

Now, you think that Reason is not the ultimate guide to what's what. So, that makes you - not me - deluded, okay? You. Not me.

There's listening to Reason, and then there's what's called 'making stuff up'. If you can't show that your beliefs answer to Reason - and worse, if you don't even care - then you are living in a fantasy world. And you're locked in too - for only someone who listens to Reason is capable of recognising the problem they're in.

This statement is true if and only if it is true

Based on this definition, we can tell the truth conditions for all statements that involve existential quantifier, universal quantifier and all other logical operators including negation. We can extend this system to natural languages too.

The controversial matter is whether the definition involves truth correspondence theory or not. — Wittgenstein

How are you addressing the argument of the OP?

This - This statement is true if and only if it is true - is not a theory about what truth is. It is a theory - a vacuous theory - about when a statement is true.

There's when a proposition is true, and then there's what the truth of it consists in. It is the latter - not the former - that is at issue here.

Because you and I share the same machinery I have far less of a problem comprehending how you operate. Society is built on the fact that as humans we are capable of empathizing with other humans. — ovdtogt

Society is built on an assumption that you and I ‘operate’ the same way. On a basic level, that may be fairly accurate. On a more basic level, we also ‘operate’ the same way as dogs do in many respects. That’s not a bad place to start in comprehending how a dog views reality.

But at the higher level of subjective experience, value and meaning, you cannot just presume to comprehend how I operate simply because we’re both human. You would need to speculate, predict and test. And you would need to care about the differences you find.

Many people have taken the trouble to care about the differences between how a dog views reality and how a human does. The more we interact with them, the more refined our comprehension becomes.

On a more basic level, we also ‘operate’ the same way as dogs do in many respects. — Possibility

We do share similarities with dogs. It is just that because their sense of smell and hearing is so vastly more acute than ours we will never understand it's 'world view' apart that it wants to eat, shit, sleep and fuck like we do. I am more concerned with the difference in it's perception of 'reality'. Our 'truths' are more or less 'predetermined by the ability and dis-ability of our senses.
Seeing in ultra-violet or infrared or hearing beyond 22,000 hertz does change your perception of 'reality'.

That's the point. The question about the content of a statement is irrelevant with regards to the logic of truth conditions.

Other than that, we have statements that are self evidently true.The rest can be compared to the world and if the state of affairs are identical then the statement are true, that's correspondence theory.

You keep assuming that I don’t listen to reason at all. I’m not sure you realise that it’s possible to listen to reason AND to have a broader perspective of reality.

It is just that because their sense of smell and hearing is so vastly more acute than ours we will never understand it's 'world view' apart that it wants to eat, shit, sleep and fuck like we do. — ovdtogt

Hmm, do you spend ANY time with dogs at all? I’m only asking because that is a particularly limited understanding of what a dog wants, and the distinction between dogs and humans.

I am more concerned with the difference in it's perception of 'reality'. Our truths are more or less 'predetermined by the ability and dis-ability of our senses. — ovdtogt

Well, if that were the case, then I have NO idea how we cure or prevent diseases or infection...

Hmm, do you spend ANY time with dogs at all? I’m only asking because that is a particularly limited understanding of what a dog wants, and the distinction between dogs and humans. — Possibility

Dogs have a keen sense of smell which has them living in a world far more dominated by smell than vision. How a dog 'sees' the world with his nose is beyond our comprehension.

How a dog 'sees' the world with his nose is beyond our comprehension. — ovdtogt

No it isn’t. It’s only beyond yours at this moment.

No it isn’t. — Possibility

Clever...

Minds - or persons, or 'subjects of experiences' the terms can be used interchangeably (I certainly use them interchangeably) - are the only kinds of thing that can make assertions, or value anything, or command anything, or hope, or desire, or prescribe. — Bartricks

That's an unusual usage. As defined here, "mind" ordinarily refers to a faculty or ability of a person, not that it is a person. Anyway since they're interchangeable for you, I can just read your use of "mind" as "person".

I have argued that Reason is a person, a mind, a subject of experiences and I am talking about her accordingly. — Bartricks

My argument is that you're reifying an abstract term (reason) as something substantial. And your motivation, it seems, is that you want to model assertions as a kind of performative utterance. So Reason is posited as a mistake-proof assertor, analogous to the meeting chair who adjourns the meeting. But that outcome should be an indicator that the model doesn't fit.

Now, if you assert something to be the case, you are claiming it is true. That is, you are representing it to be true. But no matter how sincerely one does that, it remains the case that what is actually true, and what we represent to be true, are not necessarily the same. There's a gap. So, truth is not plausibly constituted by my assertions — Bartricks

Agreed.

- and my evidence that it is not, is that Reason asserts it not to be. — Bartricks

The evidence that it is not is that we can recall assertions that were later shown to be mistaken. Or point to two people making contrary assertions, only one of which can be correct.

Truth is simply a function of a meaningful assertion in some context. For example, this is an apple (points to apple), this is a table (points to table). If the apple is on the table (the context) and Alice asserts that the apple is on the table then her assertion is true.

and is therefore false. — Harry Hindu

If it is false, then it's true. So you are incorrect.

Just sayin'.

Now let's go through the looking glass and take a peer at your bizzaro argument, shall we -

All assertions are made by language users.
Reason is not a language user.
Reason does not make assertions.
— creativesoul

Your second premise is just an assertion rather than a self-evident truth of reason. — Bartricks

:rofl:

Yeah... whatever dude.. Wie auch immer...

Well, we have to make a few assumptions first. I don't know for a fact that humans even experience anything anyways, all I know is that I do. The only way to truly know if there is anything beyond our comprehension is with a non-human who can communicate to humans. A.I.? Maybe, but we're still operating on our plane. I try to avoid defeatist mentality as much I can though, so let's examine. What does it take to make an A.I.? A programmer. Actually, if anything, all computers are operating on the principle that objectivity, as in what we can sense, is what is, which we can say we don't know conclusively that that's the case, only that logic is the only determining factor for complete thought.

If we assume and act as though truth is found outside of our feeling, we actually get pretty far. We can specify where our minds originate from, how we came to be, what happens if we do a certain action etc. And because operating on the assumption that existence exists and is outside of us, we can obtain logic without even trying. It's already there. At this point, we're still on an assumption, but at least its coherent. What about science? The scientific method is perhaps the best source for why this assumption has merit. Under science, assumptions are only met with the most stringent tests, and when those assumptions are concluded with coherent results, we assume its truth, i.e. evolution, gravity, cell theory, etc.

Okay fine, but how do we define what this reality is and where does it stop if it is "everything," what even is "everything." Hmmm, now we have a real problem. Well first we need to find if existence is a dichotomy or a spectrum. We really have no way of answering it per se, other than what we experience. We only experience a dichotomy of reality right? We might have to conclude that. Doesn't mean there isn't anything outside of it, only that it's outside of our comprehension, making it non existent in our terms. What we can comprehend is something telling us that something's outside of our comprehension, so the thought exists, but not the actuality of the statement. What we're not saying is that humans are the only way the universe can exist, but merely that we abstract and define the terms of it.

That's the point. — Wittgenstein

But that point - the point in question - shows that that answer is no answer to the question.

And again, nobody disputes the correspondence theory of truth - it is just that it is not a theory of truth.

It's as if I've said 'morality is subjective' and you've said 'if an act is right, we ought to do it'. The latter is true, but does not contradict the first.

Likewise, my theory - one I've argued for, not just stated - is that the property of truth is one and the same as the property of being asserted by Reason. You haven't said anything to challenge that.

No good talking about correspondence to facts, or reality, or what is the case - for again a) not a theory of truth and b) facts, reality and what is the case are just other ways of talking about the same property, namely being true, or else are less basic than the truth in that any analysis of what they are will have to appeal to our analysis of what truth is.

That's an unusual usage. As defined here, "mind" ordinarily refers to a faculty or ability of a person, not that it is a person. Anyway since they're interchangeable for you, I can just read your use of "mind" as "person". — Andrew M

No, not unusual - for time immemorial 'the mind' has been used to refer to the thing, whatever it may be, that is the seat of our consciousness. Mental states, for instance, are 'states of mind'. 'I' - this thinking thing - and 'my mind' are, and always have been, used interchangeably. Using the term 'mind' - a word that denotes an object - to refer to a 'faculty' is confused. Philosophy of mind is that area of philosophy that dedicates itself to figuring what kind of an object the mind might be.

My argument is that you're reifying an abstract term (reason) as something substantial. — Andrew M

That's not an 'argument', it is a question begging assertion. Note, to 'reify' something is to 'mistakenly' think of it as an object. Now, I have argued that Reason is a person - a mind, a thing - not just stated it. So, you need to defeat this argument before you're entitled to use the term 'reify'.

1. Reason makes assertions
2. Minds and only minds can make assertions
3. Therefore Reason is a mind

Otherwise all you're doing is describing my view and using a term to describe it that implies it is mistaken. But you're not showing it to be mistaken at all. So, do you dispute 1 or 2?

And your motivation, it seems, is that you want to model assertions as a kind of performative utterance — Andrew M

No, why analyse my motives? They're irrelevant. And no, wrong way around. I want to know what truth is, I have concluded that truth is the assertions of Reason, and from that - from the fact Reason makes assertions, I have concluded that Reason is a mind and thus truth is constituted by the assertions of that mind. These are 'conclusions' validly derived from premises that appear to be true. I haven't started out with a bunch of claims and then gone hunting for arguments to support them - someone who does that is a crook, not a philosopher.

The evidence that it is not is that we can recall assertions that were later shown to be mistaken. Or point to two people making contrary assertions, only one of which can be correct. — Andrew M

Well, first that's wrong because we can know that our assertions do not make things true just by reflection. But anyway, even if your process is the correct description, it too involves appeals to Reason. First, to recognise that an assertion is mistaken you have to note that it does not match some representation of Reason. And second, to then 'infer' that from the fact they are sometimes mistaken that truth therefore cannot be constituted by one's own assertions is, once more, to appeal to Reason. It is Reason who tells us - asserts - that if one thing is constituted by another thing, then if you have the first you have the other, yes?

There's no way of arguing for anything - including no way of recognising one thing on the basis of another - without having to make recourse to assertions or prescriptions of Reason.

Truth is simply a function of a meaningful assertion in some context. — Andrew M

Question begging. And confused. I don't know what you mean by 'a function of a meaningful assertion'. Either you're using 'meaningful' as a synonym for 'true' - in which case you're not giving an analysis, just repeating yourself - or being meaningful and being true are not synonymous, in which case your analysis is false because by hypothesis a statement could be meaningful and not true. Perhaps by 'in some context' you mean 'a context in which the statement would be true'. Okay, but now once more you've gone in a circle and told us nothing.

Once more, then, I have provided a substantial analysis of truth - I have argued that truth is constituted by the assertive activity of Reason, for we can never have any better evidence that a proposition is true than that it is asserted by Reason. That thesis refutes any other view, and so rather than stating a rival view - which is instantly to beg the question - one must overturn my case first.

I have stated that we can never have better evidence that a thesis is true than that it is asserted by Reason, for the entire enterprise of philosophical investigation is precisely the search for what Reason asserts. Anyone who thinks a proposition is true despite it not appearing to be asserted by Reason is a dogmatist, for they are defying the evidence (evidence itself being that which indicates what Reason asserts).

I have then argued that given that 'being asserted by Reason' is the most we can ever conceive of having in terms of evidence that a proposition is true, it is reasonable to assume that truth itself is that property.

You keep assuming that I don’t listen to reason at all. I’m not sure you realise that it’s possible to listen to reason AND to have a broader perspective of reality. — Possibility

No, I'm sure you listen to Reason when it is convenient for you to do so - that is, you listen to Reason on your terms (if you didn't listen to Reason at all you wouldn't survive long in the world). But when confronted by reasoning that leads to a conclusion you dislike, or that would be inconvenience for you to acknowledge, you're going suddenly to decide that Reason lacks authority in this area and listen to yourself instead.

Yeah... whatever dude. — creativesoul

I take it you mean by that, "yes, I see that to construct an argument that has the negation of one of your premises as a conclusion I need to incorporate a premise that has nothing to be said for it" or "I no understandy - something went wrong but I no clear what".

1. Reason makes assertions
2. Minds and only minds can make assertions
3. Therefore Reason is a mind — Bartricks

It makes no sense to say that reason makes assertions; reason is the basis upon which reasonable assertions are made by persons (or minds, if you want to speak in that quirky way).

So, your argument, although valid, is unsound.

Now, I have argued that Reason is a person - a mind, a thing - not just stated it. So, you need to defeat this argument before you're entitled to use the term 'reify'.

1. Reason makes assertions
2. Minds and only minds can make assertions
3. Therefore Reason is a mind

Otherwise all you're doing is describing my view and using a term to describe it that implies it is mistaken. But you're not showing it to be mistaken at all. So, do you dispute 1 or 2? — Bartricks

I dispute 1 and 2.

Per premise 1, I can point to people making assertions. But you can't point to reason making assertions since it is an abstract term. Premise 1 depends on personifying (anthropomorphising) an abstraction.

That’s an unusual way to approach it, but it looks like you’ve reached a similar understanding: nothing is conclusive, unless we deliberately stop accepting new information and declare it to be. In which case it is limited.

So we should recognise that our limited information renders the structure of our knowledge inconclusive. When we are aware of the prediction error this causes, we are called to make an effort (find energy) to revise the information we do have, accepting new information and discarding structures that are no longer relevant. We need to interact and relate more with what we cannot comprehend, rather than defining the terms of existence and then striving to avoid the prediction error. The first step to doing science is recognising the gaps and inconsistencies in our knowledge. Sometimes we need to be prepared to take structures apart and rebuild them to accommodate new information. For me, gaps are less painful than inconsistencies - but then, I’m not a scientist.

The way I see it, there is no conclusive ‘everything’. The amount of relevant information about a system is finite, yet there is always more information to be gained about the system.

‘Survival is unnecessary’ - is this statement true or false according to Reason?

How is potential energy manifest? — Possibility

It is manifest in the way we perceive and/or understand it. Why would energy be potential? Because it is assigned a certain degree of probable capacity for work. Therefore, the potential of any energy is manifest with respect to activities and the conditions they take place in.

It makes no sense to say that reason makes assertions — Janus

I see absolutely no justification for this claim.

What's this: "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true"?

Well, it is an assertion I have made, certainly. I just made it. But that's not all. It is also asserted by Reason.

What do you think it is if not an assertion?

Reason directs, prescribes, asserts, values. Deal with it. Pick up any book on philosophy and see how far you get before you encounter talk of Reason's directives, biddings, demands, requirements, and so on.

Reason does those kinds of thing. Logic is the attempt by us to describe some of those assertions. Reasoning is our best attempts to listen and follow them.

Only a mind can assert, describe, prescribe, demand, bid, value.

Hence, Reason is a mind.

Don't just cough up an inchoate view about Reason and declare it to be true and my view nonsense.

Nonsense doesn't make sense. My view, even if false, makes sense. SO it isn't nonsense if you're using that word correctly.

My view also answers to the facts. If you think not, then answer my question - what is this: "if an argument is valid and has true premises, then the conclusion is true" if not an assertion?