have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus

What you've got is the Janus theory of truth and reference. Deflationism is ironically complex and takes some pondering. There's more than one version. PM me and I'll give you the primo reading list.

There's no actuality in the T-sentence rule. Read about it.
— frank

I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus

What determines the referent within Davidson's use of 'Snow is white'?

So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism". — creativesoul

I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not. — creativesoul

I read the rejection of the conceptual scheme/ empirical content duality to be a rejection of the idea that there are "two major categories of things"; in other words a rejection of the notion that there is empirical content outside of any conceptual scheme; but I could be misinterpreting Davidson. This idea that there is no pre-conceptual content, is certainly the view of McDowell and Brandom whose ideas I am more familiar with.

Thanks for the offer, but this is not my primary area of interest, and there is never enough time to read even what I want to read. You can try to dismiss what I have been saying by being condescending instead of offering arguments against it. It may be stipulated that the T-sentence refers to no actuality, but that remains a mere stipulation. The fact that it is written in English and that the phrase 'snow is white' unquestionably refers to an actuality is enough for me to refrain from taking any such stipulation seriously.

Ordinary usage of the phrase; what else?

Beginning at the end, so we can see where Davidson is headed. The strategy Davidson takes with partial cases is to show that "we could not be in a position to judge that others had a concepts or beliefs radically different from our own".

Partial differences in conceptual schemes, Davidson argues, would just be differences in belief. It's because he is arguing towards this that he goes off on the apparent tangent of disagreement, and why he brings the principle of charity into the discussion.

Hence my rudeness to Janus' Chinese. Sometimes folk are just wrong.

PM me and I'll give you the primo reading list. — frank

I'm interested in the primo reading list too.

Aborigines had no word for the number 114. How do you translate when they dont have the word? — frank

115-1?

113+1?

I would. I would also agree that Davidson is more deflationary regarding all talk about what makes sentences true, as well as all the historical baggage accompanying notions of "fact". Thus, he grants(demands) coherence and meaning as the starting point for what counts as an acceptable conceptual scheme. This is exactly what we're talking about. Coherent accounts of this world.

He's delineating the target, and setting the boundaries of the scope of our inquiry... all at the same time. — creativesoul

All that makes sense.

So, given that Banno was drawing an equivalence between what Davidson called the "third dogma" and what I wrote, then the answer is "No, Davidson did not reject that distinction as the third dogma of empiricism".
— creativesoul

I am further of the view that there are two major categories of things. That which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

I read the rejection of the conceptual scheme/ empirical content duality to be a rejection of the idea that there are "two major categories of things"; in other words a rejection of the notion that there is empirical content outside of any conceptual scheme; but I could be misinterpreting Davidson... — Janus

I'm just pointing out that the duality of empirical content and conceptual scheme is not equivalent to the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.

That's not what Davidson called the "third dogma".

That's all I'm getting at here regarding that bit.

nm

I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.


You interpret this as...

...the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

...? — ZzzoneiroCosm

No. Clearly not the same distinction. Below shows this well enough...

...what is organized, referred to variously as "experience," "the stream of
sensory experience," and "physical evidence"...

Is it fair to say you you've underscored the temporal aspect of the scheme-content dyad to arrive at the idea of "something waiting"?

No. Although, I do underscore temporality.

Two things - the attribution of beliefs, and the interpretation of sentences - underpin understanding what someone is saying.

When using "beliefs" here I take Davidson as implicitly including other propositional attitudes - knowing, wanting, intending, wondering and so on.


The ketch and yawl example shows that in interpreting someone's utterances, we look to both the translation of the words used - did he use "yawl" incorrectly? - and to the beliefs of the speaker - does he believe the jigger is further back than I do?

We make the best of a rough job. Hence, and here we find my favourite Davidson quote,

We make maximum sense of the word and thoughts of others when we interpret in a way that optimises agreement.

That's the Principle of Charity. It's not something that we do out of the goodness of our nature, but rather is "forced on us... if we want to understand others".

I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no? — Janus

As a newbie to this kind of deflationism, and with a pinch of charity, here's how I see it:

Take the T-sentence: "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white.

Let's break it into two parts

1) "Snow is white"
2) is true iff snow is white.

So...

1) is self-referential. The quotation marks denote self-referentiality. The words refer only to themselves. They make no reference to snow (or facts or experience, etc).

2) is a conditional. If I say "if and only if snow is white" I haven't said anything about snow or a fact or an experience.

Hence no reference to actual snow, or a fact or an experience.

Open to any criticism of the above.

I want to urge that this second dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and defensible.


You interpret this as...

...the distinction between that which existed in it's entirety prior to language and that which did not.
— creativesoul

...?
— ZzzoneiroCosm

No. Clearly not the same distinction. Below shows this well enough...

...what is organized, referred to variously as "experience," "the stream of
sensory experience," and "physical evidence"...



Is it fair to say you you've underscored the temporal aspect of the scheme-content dyad to arrive at the idea of "something waiting"?

No. Although, I do underscore temporality. — creativesoul

Yeah. I deleted that comment. I misread you. No problem.

Davidson's rejection of partially incommensurable conceptual schemes is just the observation that sometimes people have different beliefs to us - that there is no clear way to distinguish an incommensurate conceptual scheme from a differing belief. As he says, there is no way to decide between a difference in beliefs and a difference in conception.

Looks fine to me.

SO to the conclusion. We can't talk of conceptual schemes that are so different to our own that we could not understand them - because we do not understand them.

So the sorts of conceptual schemes we can talk about are the ones we can understand.

Int he end, it doesn't seem that hard.

But then there are always folk who think they can "eff" the ineffable. I guess those who discuss at length conceptual schemes that they claim cannot be understood are of the same sort.

2) is a conditional. If I say "If and only if snow is white" I haven't said anything about snow or a fact or an experience.

Hence no reference to actual snow, or a fact or an experience.

Open to any criticism of the above. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I remain convinced that there is a reference there to snow being white. I agree that there is no reference to actual snow (in the sense of any particular drift of snow or whatever) or any particular instance of being white. The reference is general, not specific. Although of course it is more specific than the alternative general formula: "X" is true iff X.

But this is no different than the logic of correspondence, which can be seen in Aristotle's classic formulation: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true".

There is no reference there to any specific entities or states of affairs either, and yet the sentence embodies the logic of correspondence, just as, for me, the T-sentence does. In fact I would go so far as to say that there is nothing in the T-sentence which is not already in Aristotle's formulation.

Is there a reference to snow in the following?

1) snow

2) if snow

3) if and only if snow

4) if and only if snow is white

Yes, I would say there is reference to snow in all of them.

Do you agree that none of these expressions says anything about snow?

if there is no reference to snow, then what does it mean to say snow is white?

I'm not arguing there's no reference to snow. Just trying to locate Janus philosophically.

if there is no reference to snow, then what does it mean to say snow is white? — Marchesk

It might be useful to compare the phrases 1) snow is white and 2) if snow is white.

1) is a statement about snow.
2) isn't.

Davidson's rejection of partially incommensurable conceptual schemes is just the observation that sometimes people have different beliefs to us - that there is no clear way to distinguish an incommensurate conceptual scheme from a differing belief. As he says, there is no way to decide between a difference in beliefs and a difference in conception. — Banno

Do differing beliefs impede and/or prohibit translation?

I agree that no definite statement has been made about snow in "Iff snow is white", but on its own "snow is white" says that snow is white, so it refers to an actuality; namely snow being white. But reference is something else: even in a dictionary 'snow' is defined as referring to snow.

Just trying to locate Janus philosophically. — ZzzoneiroCosm

I'm not sure what this means. To me this is not so much a philosophical matter, but more a matter of simple common sense and usage. I can't imagine why anyone would want to claim that 'snow' does not refer to snow, regardless of their philosophical position; realist, idealist, anti-realist, solipsist or whatever. Likewise i think 'snow is white' refers to the state of affairs of snow being white, and I don't think any amount of stipulation can eliminate that fact from out of Tarski's T-sentence.

Two things - the attribution of beliefs, and the interpretation of sentences - underpin understanding what someone is saying.

When using "beliefs" here I take Davidson as implicitly including other propositional attitudes - knowing, wanting, intending, wondering and so on. — Banno

Here, if I'm using "A" to pick out an individual entity normally called "B", then understanding me would require knowing that, and knowing that would provide the translation necessary. However, convention T doesn't seem capable of doing this.

But this is no different than the logic of correspondence, which can be seen in Aristotle's classic formulation: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true". — Janus

"To say of what is that it is" IFF to say of what is that it is.

Nope.

Not the same.

"To say of what is that it is" IFF to say of what is that it is. — creativesoul

That's gibberish, and not what I was saying. The logical substance, not the grammatical structure, of both formulations is the same.

If snow is white, then that is "what is", and iff to say what is true in this regard just is to say of snow what it is, namely white, then I can see no logically significant difference between the two formulations. If you think you can point out a logical difference then by all means have at it.

Or try this (it may be clearer): To say of snow that it is white is true if and only if it is white. How would that logically differ from Tarski's sentence?