This helps, thanks.

I'm ruminating. Plus about to get ready and have a good old boardgame night with friends. :D But thanks for working on the reply.

So, re the example I gave of Chinese and Western medicine; of course they can both be expressed in Chinese or English or presumably many other (but not all?) languages. What then does it mean to say that one conceptual scheme must be translatable into the terms of another or else one (or both?) of the conceptual schemes cannot be "true and meaningful"? — Janus

Might want to ask the person who said such a thing.

But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm

Davidson doesn't make this claim though...

He clearly talks about his skin being warm...

On a different tangent, does anyone know what Davidson's argument is for denying that Tarski's account is of the same logic as the correspondence account? — Janus

It's pretty clearly not correspondence theory. It's just sentences spoken in two different formal languages.

But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm

Davidson doesn't make this claim though...

He clearly talks about his skin being warm... — creativesoul

Davidson from the final paragraph:



"Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language..."

But if truth is only relative to language — ZzzoneiroCosm

Davidson doesn't make this claim though...

He clearly talks about his skin being warm... — creativesoul

That would make truth relative to language and experience et al. But still deflationary in Banno's sense - when Banno says we already understand what truth is?

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these things make sentences true?

I think that Davidson hold sfirm to the notion that truth of sentences is inseparable from language and thus translation. I suspect, even if it's not expounded upon, that Davidson does not believe that the truth of sentences is all there is to truth. Rather, I think he's argues that it's all that's needed here as a means to assess the translatability of one scheme into the other.

Our attempt to characterize languages or conceptual schemes
in terms of the notion of fitting some entity has come down, then,
to the simple thought that something is an acceptable conceptual
scheme or theory if it is true. Perhaps we better say largely true in
order to allow sharers of a scheme to differ on details. And the
criterion of a conceptual scheme different from our own now be-
comes: largely true but not translatable. The question whether
this is a useful criterion is just the question how well we under-
stand the notion of truth, as applied to language, independent of
the notion of translation. The answer is, I think, that we do not
understand it independently at all...

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these things make sentences true? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I think Davidson is opposed to calling events and happenings "things". He says no thing make a sentence true. An event is comprised of a group of things. My skin being warm is not a thing.

It's not much trouble to pull that word out:

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these make sentences true?

Rather, I think he's argues that it's all that's needed here as a means to assess the translatability of one scheme into the other. — creativesoul

Okay, good, that's clear, thanks.

Truth remains relative to language, experiences (my skin being warm) objects, etc. But none of these make sentences true? — ZzzoneiroCosm

On my view, no. My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so.

My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so. — creativesoul

By "so" do you mean "true"?

Do you agree that Banno's interpretation of Davidson is more deflationary than your own?

It's pretty clearly not correspondence theory. It's just sentences spoken in two different formal languages. — frank

What leads you to say that?

In it's familiar formulation 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.."'Snow is white'" refers to the sentence or proposition 'snow is white' and "snow is white" refers to the actuality or state of affairs of snow being white. So, it says the truth of the proposition depends on the actuality: if and only if snow is white then the sentence "snow is white" is true.

Can you explain why you think the logic here is any different than the logic of the correspondence account, which is that the truth of a proposition consists in its correspondence to actuality?

it's familiar formulation 'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white.."'Snow is white'" refers to the sentence or proposition 'snow is white' and "snow is white" refers to the actuality or state of affairs of snow being white. So, it says the truth of the proposition depends on the actuality: if and only if snow is white then the sentence "snow is white" is true. — Janus

I'm curious about how you got this impression.

If a system of knowledge can be set out in any language, which my examples of Chinese and Western medicine perhaps can (could they, for example be set out in some Australian aboriginal language?) does it qualify as a conceptual scheme?

The point about translatability of conceptual schemes seems to be more saliently concerned about whether a conceptual scheme in a particular language could be translated into the terms of another conceptual scheme in the same language, than it does about merely whether a conceptual scheme in one language could be translated into another language. This seems to be in line with what Kuhn means by "paradigms".

So, what are you disagreeing with precisely, and why?

, what are you disagreeing with precisely, and why? — Janus

There's no actuality in the T-sentence rule. Read about it.

There's also A coherence theory of truth and knowledge, an article which I have not studied in any detail.


Must get a round tuit. — Banno

I was looking for it online but couldn't find a freebie. Any ideas?

I couldn't see it either. I have it in a collection; it's more recent, and has a few replies to critics stuck on the end.

I couldn't see it either. I have it in a collection; it's more recent, and has a few replies to critics stuck on the end. — Banno

I might have to go to an actual library and make actual photocopies, like last century.

@Janus's comments might best be dealt with by continuing the exegesis of the article - since we are up to partial cases. His example of Western medicine vs Chines medicine might serve us here.

And that's a conversation about disagreement.

We need to leave room here for stuff that might be seen as culturally insensitive. When Chinese medicine claims that pangolin scales cure cancer, it's just plain wrong. And it's not just wrong for western medicine; pangolins, scales and curing cancer are the same in Germany as in China.

Bullshit is bullshit.

Nuh. Get The Essential Davidson on Kindle...

Nuh. Get The Essential Davidson on Kindle... — Banno

Sweet.

Do you agree that Banno's interpretation of Davidson is more deflationary than your own? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I would. I would also agree that Davidson is more deflationary regarding all talk about what makes sentences true, as well as all the historical baggage accompanying notions of "fact". Thus, he grants(demands) coherence and meaning as the starting point for what counts as an acceptable conceptual scheme. This is exactly what we're talking about. Coherent accounts of this world.

He's delineating the target, and setting the boundaries of the scope of our inquiry... all at the same time.

Aborigines had no word for the number 114. How do you translate when they dont have the word?

My skin being warm is not adequate. It is but one aspect necessary for "my skin is warm" to be so.
— creativesoul


By "so" do you mean "true"? — ZzzoneiroCosm

Yes.

There's no actuality in the T-sentence rule. Read about it. — frank

I have read about it; I studied it as an undergraduate. If there is no actuality referred to in the T-sentence then what do you think 'snow is white' refers to? In my view 'snow' refers to snow, 'is' refers to being and 'white' refers to white. Snow being white is an actuality, no?

Bullshit is bullshit. — Banno

That there might be erroneous ideas in Chinese medicine, just as there no doubt are in Western medicine, does not entail that the whole scheme is not "true and meaningful". The notion of scientific theories being true is itself far from being uncontroversial within the philosophy of science. Nor is the question of what it is precisely that constitutes science; have you heard of the problem of demarcation within that field?

If all you are saying is that any conceptual scheme which is compatible with Western science is translatable into any other scheme which is also so compatible, then you would not be claiming much, since both would be part of the encompassing conceptual scheme which is the whole of Western science.

Having said that, would you say that biology could be translated into the language of Quantum physics?

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