there is something independent of any phenomenal form which constitutes the being of objects. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Could you elaborate on this a bit? Does this imply that objects subsist in themselves, that they have existence independent of a subject experieincing them? Could you give examples of such objects?

I think I agree with what you stated there. Except that the world doesn't have to reflect our concepts entirely. We have gotten quite a lot wrong. I guess he means fundamental things like space and time, but even those have undergone revision.

For a transcendental or Berkeley idealist, are there things that exist independent of their mind, whether it be other minds, or other bodies? — Harry Hindu

Well yeah, they're realists about other minds. Which is open to the same sort of criticism of the OP.

The point is that it doesn't matter whether the external stuff is other ideas, or material, or whatever - only that there is stuff that exists — Harry Hindu

That's true, there are different kinds of realisms. Most of us are realists about some things and not others.

As for the skeptical alternative, that would require a clear definition of what it means to know anything. — Harry Hindu

Yes. Doesn't that tie into the OP's argument?

It does indeed. Examples are incredibly abundant: every single object subsists itself.

In being a distinct thing, each object cannot be granted by any particualr concept of form. No matter which form an object might take, the form cannot be exhaustive of it. There might always be more to the object. It is more than the concept of form in question.

Objects need more than an idea to make them so. I cannot just think of a concpet of an object and make the object so. If I am to speak about am existing or logical object, I need that being to be so, else I won't be speaking about am object which is there. I'll just have an idea of something I imagined. All object are given on themselves because they are not the existence of my experience. My thoughts cannot make them there, no matter how hard I try.

Exactly, which is why any given thought we might have cannot define an object.

Any object is more than our thought about it. There are relations between it and everyth i ng else which are no spoken at any point which we know about it. Even if our awareness of it is perfect, there is more to be spoken about it than the form we've identified.

With respect to our concepts, the answer is yes and no. Any object has more to it than just our concept of it. If we speak about it's form, we don't talks about it's self--defintion. If we speak about its self-defintion ( "there is an object here, disticnt form other things)" , we fail.to identify what form the object takes. Any object is more than a concept we have or it.

But it is also true anything about an object is explicable in a concept, one which we might come to have. There are no "inexplicable" objects of which no-one could know about. We can learn any concept.

the form cannot be exhaustive of it. There might always be more to the object. It is more than the concept of form in question.

Objects need more than an idea to make them so. — TheWillowOfDarkness

There is a difference between arguing that there is more to an object than the form I give it, and arguing that it subsists in itself. One could say, for instance, that my sense of an object anticipates beyond itself , and meets up with that object In that way, I can determine an object to be a relation between what I already expeieince and what is new in that object with respect to my experiecne. Another way of putting it would be to say that all objects of my experience exist for me only in relation to a field. All objects for me are figures on a background which is intrinsic to their meaning for me. Thus no object is completely independent of my subjecdtivity in its meaning, and no object is merely co-opted into my subjectivity.

There is no object independent of the meaning of your subjectivity. All objects, whether you know about them or not, are in a conceptual relation to you, even before you exist-- one could speak, for example, of what Josh would experience once you came to exist. A dinousar could have told of you posting on this forum, if it had the concepts.

No difference exists between arguing an object is more than the form you give it and it existing in itself. If your concept is NOT making it so, something else is. What might this be? The only cohrent answer is itself, else we are saying it is something else entirely.

What I am questiong is the coherence of the "itself'. I can accept if you want to add that the intrinsicality or in-itselfness of an object is unique to my experience of it. But if you are arguing that whatever it is that is intrinsic to an object is universal, independent of all subjectivities who encounter it such that when they do, the object contributes the identical content for each of them, the I would have to ask where this universality comes from and what is the usefulness of talking about aspects of things that are imminent in a way that is independent of a subject.

What it is in the objecgt taht is beyond my concept of it is beyond my concpet in a wasy that is uniue to my concept rather than being common to all subjectivities in the particular content of its beyondness/

P1) The realist argues that “the being of X is independent of its being known.” — PessimisticIdealism

I favor a linguistic approach to this issue. What exactly do we mean by 'being' and 'independent'? In my view we are never and even can never be done clarifying these kinds of metaphysical statements. If we consider various modes of being, some of them sub-theoretical or 'for the hand,' the naive, non-linguistic approach looks even more futile --except to the degree that it provides a kind of wholesome entertainment.

I favor a linguistic approach to this issue. What exactly do we mean by 'being' and 'independent'? — Eee

It simply means there is more to the world than humans. So evolution, stars, big bang, atoms, disease, animals in the deep sea, maybe alien life, etc. We may or may not come to know about all these things. We certainly won't know everything.

Otherwise, the entire universe collapses to just what humans know and experience. What makes us so special? Why does science tell us we're not?

To put my objection another way: the realist position doesn't hinge on finding something out about the world (about X and what we don't/know of it); it hinges on finding something out about ourselves. Not (yet another) piece of positive knowledge, but about the status of knowledge as such (as a 'faculty', as some might put it). Or again: the realist looks 'inward' and not 'out', to secure their realism.

"Mt. Everest" picks out a particular mountain. That mountain existed in it's entirety prior to being named.
— creativesoul

That doesn't really answer Marchesky's question. How do we know that that mountain existed before we knew about it? — Michael

It either did or it did not. I strongly believe that it did.

I know what naming practices require. I know what discovery requires. If things did not exist prior to our naming practices and/or discovery, then there could be no such things. There are countless historical records of things existing unbeknownst to humans that killed vary large numbers of them long before we gained enough knowledge of those things to name them and eradicate or treat them effectively. That's more than adequate ground for believing that some things(Mt. Everest included) exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them.

It's also true. So...

While we cannot literally and physically "check to see for ourselves" if something exists before us, for that would require us to exist before we do, it is of no negative consequence whatsoever. What we can know about allows us to be completely justified in continuing to hold such belief. It is part of our default belief system.

The better questions are asked of those who doubt it.

It simply means there is more to the world than humans. So evolution, stars, big bang, atoms, disease, animals in the deep sea, maybe alien life, etc. We may or may not come to know about all these things. We certainly won't know everything. — Marchesk

I agree. I think a pre-theoretical version of realism is inescapable. It's how we ordinarily think and talk. At the same time, anti-realism makes some strong points against theoretical realism. So my 'linguistic approach' boils down to an awareness of the complexity of language. As I understand and agree with Derrida, the exact meaning of our sentences is not present to us. Nor is it fixed. Nevertheless a certain kind of metaphysical debate proceeds as if it could and ought to be a kind of mathematics of meta-cognition. (I suggest it's more like poetry.)

To put my objection another way: the realist position doesn't hinge on finding something out about the world (about X and what we don't/know of it); it hinges on finding something out about ourselves. — StreetlightX

But the kind of realism that the OP is criticizing doesn't see it that way at all.

A case in point is Einstein's battles with Bohr and others about the meaning of uncertainty. Einstein was renowned for his defense of exactly the kind of realism that the OP is criticizing. From the Wheeler essay Law without Law:

The dependence of what is observed upon the choice of the experimental arrangement made Einstein unhappy. It conflicts with the view that the universe exists "out there" independent of all acts of observation. In contrast, Bohr stressed that we confront here an inescapable new feature of nature, to be welcomed because of the understanding it gives us.

Bolds added.

So it's not so much that the OP is a 'straw man argument', but that yours is a 'straw man defense'. In other words, you're not defending the type of realism that the OP is criticizing.

There has been a move in physics itself towards the kind of realism you're defending, such as Christian Fuchs' QBism, which 'is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes an agent's actions and experiences as the central concerns of the theory. This interpretation is distinguished by its use of a subjective Bayesian account of probabilities.' But then, you can ask whether this is a realist theory at all, and it's often criticized on just those grounds (see Is QBism too subjective?)

There are countless historical records of things existing unbeknownst to humans that killed vary large numbers of them long before we gained enough knowledge of those things to name them and eradicate or treat them effectively. That's more than adequate ground for believing that some things(Mt. Everest included) exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them. — creativesoul

You probably won't get this, but the point of the anti-realist position is that your mind, or rather, human knowledge generally, is providing the background, as it were, against which all such judgements are made. Where, after all, does 'the historical record' reside?

I think Dummett made similar critiques of realism as well, although I think he tempered it by saying his approach might not work against all cases of realism.

Well, his critique was against transcendental truths, which he said realist statements had to assert.

But the kind of realism that the OP is criticizing doesn't see it that way at all. — Wayfarer

It is literally his second proposition:

P2) In order to know whether or not "the being of X is independent of its being known," one must “know X when X is not being known.”

I mean, honestly, no one with an elementary sense of logic - let alone realism - would accede to this. It effectively says: one must X and not-X. This becomes super clear when you swap the words around: 'when X is not being known, one must know X'. It's absurd.

Have you by chance looked into A Thing of This World? It's quite a production. As impressed as I was by the gallery of anti-realists, I still had the sense that they were assuming some kind of a pre-theoretical realism in their attempt to provide knowledge and not just opinion.

I interpret it to be about the stock standard realist claim that things are 'mind-independent'. I would paraphrase it to be arguing that "those things which really exist, exist independently of any act of cognition on our part." That is a succinct statement of old-school scientific realism. Subsequently that kind of realism has been called into question on many grounds. But I still don't think you're defending what the argument is aimed at criticizing, and you may not there's more than one poster here defending that form of 'mind-independent realism'.

Incidentally OP says it was based on an argument by Collingwood, it would be interesting to see the original.

I interpret it as I read it.

"Mt. Everest" picks out a particular mountain. That mountain existed in it's entirety prior to being named.
— creativesoul

I agree, but where does nature draw the line on what is Mt. Everest and what isn't? — Marchesk

Nature doesn't draw lines. We do, and we can be wrong sometimes, depending upon what we're delineating.

If you agree then what's the issue?

What kind of realist are you then? — PessimisticIdealism

I'm a realist in the sense that I strongly believe that some things exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them.

There are countless historical records of things existing unbeknownst to humans that killed vary large numbers of them long before we gained enough knowledge of those things to name them and eradicate or treat them effectively. That's more than adequate ground for believing that some things(Mt. Everest included) exist in their entirety prior to our awareness of them.
— creativesoul

You probably won't get this, but the point of the anti-realist position is that your mind, or rather, human knowledge generally, is providing the background, as it were, against which all such judgements are made. Where, after all, does 'the historical record' reside? — Wayfarer

I agree with that. Our judgments are largely informed by our own thought and belief. Notta problem though, we can get stuff wrong in that we can most certainly be mistaken about all sorts of different stuff.

Nature doesn't draw lines. We do, and we can be wrong sometimes, depending upon what we're delineating.

If you agree then what's the issue? — creativesoul

Alright, so do mountains exist? And by mountains, I don't mean the rocks, dirt, snow making them up. I mean do objects called mountains exist?

What's the issue here? It's an issue of whether nature is the way we conceptualize it to be. The problem with real mountains as objects is where to draw the line on what constitutes a mountain versus a hill or some other formation. It's also a question of where to delineate the end of a mountain versus the rest of the terrain. And a question of identity over time as the mountain gets worn down. At what point is it no longer a mountain? At what point does it become a mountain?

And it's also a question of whether the snow, rocks, dirt, trees, etc. really do combine together to make a singular object we call a mountain, or whether it's just a bunch of different stuff next to each other.

So yeah, I can agree that Everest existed as lump of different collection of matter prior to humans, but I'm not sure about whether it existed as an object we call a mountain, such that it had properties of being the tallest (from when the Indian tectonic plate pushed it up to the highest point until the present day, not counting underwater mountains).

(1) In order for something to be perceived it must cause an impression in one's mind.
(2) This impression cannot be the same as the thing itself, for no thing can occupy two spaces at the same time.
(3) There is a distance between the perceived object and one since the object and one cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
(4) An impression cannot exist without the object that causes it.
(5) For an impression of an object to appear in one's mind, the impression must reach one.
(6) For the impression to reach one, it must travel the distance that separates the object from one.
(7) It takes time for the impression to reach one.
(8) Thus, before being perceived, the object must exist.

If things did not exist before being perceived, it would be impossible to perceive anything. This is because before perceiving an object, an impression from such object must arise and reach one, which would not occur if the object did not exist before being perceived.

To put my objection another way: the realist position doesn't hinge on finding something out about the world (about X and what we don't/know of it); it hinges on finding something out about ourselves. — StreetlightX

Well put. Elegant.

This realist's position most certainly does. After all, everything ever thought, believed, spoken, written, and/or otherwise uttered is existentially dependent upon our ability to do so. There is no stronger justificatory ground upon which to build one'e edifice than knowledge of what all human thought and belief consists of. It's even better when that knowledge is itself based upon statements of which there are no current examples to the contrary. That's the first goal.

Well, unfortunately, you are interpreting the standard realist position wrongly.


You are exactly right, @Wayfarer.

Alright, so do mountains exist? And by mountains, I don't mean the rocks, dirt, snow making them up. I mean do objects called mountains exist?

What's the issue here? It's an issue of whether nature is the way we conceptualize it to be. The problem with real mountains as objects is where to draw the line on what constitutes a mountain versus a hill or some other formation. — Marchesk

I agree that that's the real problem. Where we will inevitably disagree is how to solve the problem.

I agree that that's the real problem. Where we will inevitably disagree is how to solve the problem. — creativesoul

What's the solution? Analysis of how the word mountain is used?

You are exactly right, Creativesoul. — PessimisticIdealism

Given I've made so many different remarks here recently, I'd like to 'hear' what you find to be exactly right.

:smile:

I agree that that's the real problem. Where we will inevitably disagree is how to solve the problem.
— creativesoul

What's the solution? Analysis of how the word mountain is used? — Marchesk

Well, it's a problem with how we're talking about the world and/or ourselves. Typically, I fix such problems by changing how I talk.