How would I know that people can pretend to be in pain, like actors or liars? Is that really going to be your argument? — Marchesk

No, how do you know that such actions can sometimes not be pain. How did you learn that?

By watching people pretend and being told they were pretending, then doing the same thing myself.

So examining this external behaviour is adequate for examining the referent of the name. — Isaac

Is it though? How can examining our behaviour when describing something that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it be adequate for examining the referent?

What measure could possibly be used to know whether or not we've gotten it wrong?

Instead a see the same old repetition where people get bogged down in arguments about dualism, reality, and naive realism. — I like sushi

Arguing in favor of direct perception does not equal arguing for naive realism. I readily acknowledge both direct and indirect perception. The former is not mediated in any way shape or form by/with language. The latter is.

By watching people pretend and being told they were pretending, then doing the same thing myself. — Marchesk

How did the people who told you they were pretending find that out?

How can examining our behaviour when describing something that exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it be adequate for examining the referent? — creativesoul

I wasn't talking about our behaviour whilst describing it, I was talking about our behaviour whilst experiencing it.

How did the people who told you they were pretending find that out? — Isaac

Ultimately because at some point primate/monkey ancestors developed mirror neurons and were able to formulate some theory of mind to understand other people's actions. And one of those kind of actions would be deception.

Ultimately because at some point primate/monkey ancestors developed mirror neurons and were able to formulate some theory of mind to understand other people's actions. — Marchesk

No, that's not how mirror neurons work, they only indicate intentions related to behaviours, they can't magically distinguish different intentions from identical behaviours.

No, that's not how mirror neurons work, they only mirror intentions related to behaviours, they can't magically distinguish different intentions from identical behaviours. — Isaac

But some animals, humans in particular, do develop a theory of mind where we can look at the context of someone's identical actions and infer their intentions. But yeah, we do have to learn that, which partly comes from other humans like parents or older kids teaching us, and in part from just interacting.

I'm not really sure where this is going. You're not defending behaviorism, right? You're defending a Wittgenstenian understanding of the term pain.

we can look at the context of someone's identical actions and infer their intentions. — Marchesk

Right, so actions in one context=pain, actions in some other context=pretending. This is still all externally identifiable. Objective.

some animals, humans in particular, do develop a theory of mind where we can look at the context of someone's identical actions and infer their intentions. — Marchesk

You might want to mention that TT(theoy theory) is just one of three main contenders for explaining the relation between empathy and mirror neurons. The other two are simulation theory and interaction theory, or enactivism. Its this third one that borrows heavily from Husserlian and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology, by rejecting the idea that we consult an internal theory of mind to interpret others actions and instead directly perceive the meaning of their intent in the action itself. How we manage this requires delving into the gestalts that give us access to an intersubjective world, explain realist materialist science and at the saem time deprive materialism of its claim to self-grounding.

It's existence makes no difference, — Isaac

It’s like you read what I wrote with the singular intent to disagree. Yet you agreed and didn’t realise. I plainly said it wasn’t about what exists. I then said ‘existence’ as an ‘object’ of consciousness does matter.

Because phenomenology is concerned with the ‘horizon’ of experience, with ‘intentionality’. By intentionality we’re talking about a ‘mode’ of being. A ‘mode of regard’ toward an ‘object’, yet the ‘object’ is the ‘horizon’ of experience NOT some realised concrete item ‘out there’. That is why you hear phrases like ‘mode of looking’, rather than ‘mode of looking at’, because there is no ‘looking at something’ only a ‘mode of regard’.

The successes snd precision of the natural sciences is due to the utilisation of objective measurement, the holding fast to absconding from subjective noise. The point of phenomenology is to give a means of exploring and making use of the subjective by absconding from objective noise - not to deny it, but to bolster it by establishing the grounding of all human knowledge and experience which necessarily stems from the subjectivity of being not the objectively assembled naturalistic attitude.

I am not pretending to have a full grasp of this. It’s an difficult shift in thinking to make and it’s not one that comes without resistance.

We cannot measure subjectivity by objective means. That is the heart of the issue many either cannot see or refuse to accept. Probably because it’s quite a worrying thought to say that the ‘essence’ of what we regard as most dear (our experience of life) is effectively out of the reach of objective measurement making it seem by the scientific attitude as either trivial, illusional and/or removed of essential ‘value’.

I do think and would strongly argue that language is necessary.
— creativesoul

Yet all you've given thus far is...

they are further thought of as being unfair.
— creativesoul

This implies some sort of agreement
— creativesoul

it requires some measure of morality(what ought happen)
— creativesoul

I'd agree with all of those (with the same caveats as you). But you've not demonstrated any of them are necessarily dependant on language, so I don't see how they're relevant to your argument. — Isaac

A sense of ought/fairness/justice is to assess what has happened in light of what ought to have happened. All such assessments are comparisons between one's morality(what ought to have happened) and what happened. This requires thinking about one's own thought and belief(what ought to have happened) while also thinking about what did happen. Language use is necessary for that sort of division of thought content and subsequent comparison. Thus, language use is necessary for having a sense of ought/fairness/justice.

An agreement most certainly requires language, as it is to stipulate one's own acceptance of certain things(conditions).

When we're claiming that some non human creature has a sense of fairness/justice, we're saying something about that creature's mental ongoings(thought and belief). Thus, it behooves us to know what all thought and belief consist of, lest we have no way to know whether or not some creature or another is capable of forming/holding those kinds of thought and belief.
— creativesoul

Yes, but this just goes over the ground we've already covered with regards to terms. There isn't something which just is what thiugh/belief consists of. There are just the phenomena we observe, how we choose to group them and what we choose to call those groups is arbitrary. I've already defined what I'm referring to by belief and thought. I've not heard (or perhaps not understood) how you're using those terms. — Isaac

You're not talking about observables. The sense of fairness consists of thought and belief, as I've been setting out heretofore. A sense of fairness is not equal to the behaviours that it may play a role in influencing.

Our difference seems to be regarding what counts as warrant for concluding that the animal has a sense of fairness.

I suppose you don't mean each disposition and emotion has its own sense, like that of touch and smell, but is there anything actually contradicting that notion?

And how about consciousness itself is actually a sense like taste or hearing, sixth sense as they say in Buddhism. Is there anything we know that can prevent this for actually being true?

Franz dWaal has placed a large bowl of grapes within reach during the reward experiments, and has given grapes/cucumbers in different combinations in prior exchanges. Together these satisfy me that simple expectation frustration is not the explanation (otherwise prior priming of expectation would have made a difference), nor is it simple greed (otherwise the larger available reward would have made a difference). It does seem to be related to a social peer getting a better reward, so if there's expectation involved, it's an expectation of equal distribution of rewards. I'm happy to call that a belief in fairness. — Isaac

Could you explain the patterns of reward in these experiments? The above is too vague to know what the experiments entailed.

Fairness would require some sort of undeniably altruistic redistributive behavior(hence the earlier suggested experiment). Seeing another receive something that one wants but did not receive themselves could result in discontent, regardless of any prior primings and/or patterns of reward. Wanting what another has does not count as a sense of fairness.

Our difference seems to be regarding what counts as warrant for concluding that the animal has a sense of fairness.

I suppose you don't mean each disposition and emotion has its own sense, like that of touch and smell, but is there anything actually contradicting that notion?

And how about consciousness itself is actually a sense like taste or hearing, sixth sense as they say in Buddhism. Is there anything we know that can prevent this for actually being true? — Zelebg

Isaac and I understand one another regarding a sense of fairness. No, it's not like physiological sensory perception, although it is existentially dependent upon such.

Consciousness - on my view - is the ability to draw correlations between different things. It begins simply and accrues in it's complexity according to the content of the correlations(and the capabilities of the candidate).

What's the difference between behavioural discontent as a result of the cognitive dissonance that takes place when expectations are dashed by what happens and having behavioural discontent as a result of thinking, believing, and/or 'feeling' like what happened is unfair/unjust, or ought be somehow corrected?
— creativesoul

Nothing. The expectation that rewards be distributed equally is what a belief in fairness is. — Isaac

So... All behavioural discontent due to unmet expectations counts as thinking, believing like what has happened is unfair/unjust and/or ought be somehow corrected?

Surely not.

What have you offered here that warrants our conclusion that the candidate has the expectation that rewards are distributed evenly as opposed to the expectation of them (continuing)to be distributed consistently?

Show me an animal not under duress who receives all of the resources and voluntarily distributes them equally, and we'll have an animal that either likes the results of doing that or an animal who has shown a sense of fairness.

Right, so actions in one context=pain, actions in some other context=pretending. This is still all externally identifiable. — Isaac

But it isn't, or we'd always know whether someone was in pain. There's even medical situations where a patient will complain about a condition their doctor can't see a symptom for, resulting in the suspicion that it's psychological. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it turns out the patient was right.

But in either case, the point is the patient experiences some form of discomfort that isn't objectively identified.

Consciousness - on my view - is the ability to draw correlations between different things. It begins simply and accrues in it's complexity according to the content of the correlations.

"Ability to draw correlations between different things", is that not the same thing as intelligence?

In any case, it's only functional description, not ontological, unless you are suggesting these "relations" somehow exist as actual, causal phenomena, and it just so happens they have this property to be conscious.

Consciousness - on my view - is the ability to draw correlations between different things. It begins simply and accrues in it's complexity according to the content of the correlations.

"Ability to draw correlations between different things", is that not the same thing as intelligence?

In any case, it's only functional description, not ontological, unless you are suggesting these "relations" somehow exist as actual, causal phenomena, and it just so happens they have this property to be conscious. — Zelebg

All intelligence is existentially dependent upon thought and belief, for it all consists thereof.

The ontological description begins when we start looking into the content of the correlations.

That was informative. I agree that subjectivity is not measurable. but it's the way we experience the world.

However, that still leaves related ontological and epistemological questions unanswered.

So, after reading through those studies, in addition to relevant links therein as well as other resources regarding the same studies, it seems that studies clearly show some sort of sensitivity regarding inequitable distribution during social circumstances. I'm still not convinced that that equals and/or counts to having a sense of fairness/justice.

However, it most certainly could be the origens thereof!

Thanks for the discourse. If you'd like to talk about something in particular, I'm down. If not, my appreciation in spades!

:smile:

Could you explain the patterns of reward in these experiments? The above is too vague to know what the experiments entailed. — creativesoul

I'd have to just track down the paper, I'll have a look for a non-paywall version.I don't think this format is an appropriate write out the details of what amounts to a very large field consisting of decades of research. If you're amenable to an idea, I can point you in the direction of some more in depth resources (which I hope I have done), but I think that's the limit of a series of short posts. Certainly if you're largely opposed to it, nothing I can write in a few hundred words is going to be sufficient to convince you. Imagine the entire volumes of work that's been done on this, all that writing was not wasteful padding, so I can't give a thorough account without simply repeating it. Does that make sense?

So... All behavioural discontent due to unmet expectations counts as thinking, believing like what has happened is unfair/unjust and/or ought be somehow corrected? — creativesoul

The main thrust of my view is that all beliefs are identifiable by the behaviours they instantiate and are themselves, literally, the arrangement of brain architecture which gives rise to these behaviours. The details of exactly what they that behaviour consists of is undoubtedly quite complex. That being said I think the above gives a fairly reasonable sketch, yes, but it is undoubtedly more complex.

Show me an animal not under duress who receives all of the resources and voluntarily distributes them equally, and we'll have an animal that either likes the results of doing that or an animal who has shown a sense of fairness. — creativesoul

Again, it's probably best if you just read the literature yourself. Heres a deWaal paper with a considerable number of links to the primary evidence. He talks about sharing and the various models that have been proposed to describe it on page 6.

This requires thinking about one's own thought and belief(what ought to have happened) while also thinking about what did happen. Language use is necessary for that sort of division of thought content and subsequent comparison. Thus, language use is necessary for having a sense of ought/fairness/justice.

An agreement most certainly requires language, as it is to stipulate one's own acceptance of certain things(conditions). — creativesoul

Again, you've simply asserted that language use is required for these things, I'd like to hear your full argument for how you link the two. At the moment, as I see it, you seem to be saying that gestures, facial expressions, arrangements of neurons in any way...none of these are capable of carrying the content you're looking for, but making a particular shape with my mouth and voice box magically carries this other world of content. I just don't see how at all.

But it isn't, or we'd always know whether someone was in pain. There's even medical situations where a patient will complain about a condition their doctor can't see a symptom for, resulting in the suspicion that it's psychological. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it turns out the patient was right.

But in either case, the point is the patient experiences some form of discomfort that isn't objectively identified. — Marchesk

I've certainly never encountered such a situation. You're suggesting that a patient might come to a doctor, telling them that they're in pain, but show absolutely no signs at all of being in pain, no alterations to their movements, no sensitivity to touch, no defence recoil, no adjustment to their daily life, nothing...just the statement "I'm in pain". I think in that situation the doctor would quite rightly say "no you're not", that's not what pain is, you've misidentified your feeling".

Pain always results in some behaviour to the effect of demonstrating the pain, even if it's just a micro-expression, even if it's delayed. Until that point we might 'suspect' pain, but we do not know it's pain.

Again, I'll ask, how would you possibly know what 'pain' is (which of your many feelings is the one correctly called 'pain') if you could not identify it at all times in others? If there was even one circumstance where the correct feeling to call 'pain' was hidden from you completely, how would you know that some other feeling you're having is actually also called 'pain', afterall, it might be the one that's been hidden from you? How would anyone properly use the word 'pain' if no-one knew the basic extent of which feelings were to be grouped under that term?

It’s like you read what I wrote with the singular intent to disagree. Yet you agreed and didn’t realise. I plainly said it wasn’t about what exists. I then said ‘existence’ as an ‘object’ of consciousness does matter. — I like sushi

It doesn't matter one jot what terminology you want to use. Call it 'it'. 'It' cannot be used in a conversation with another person unless that other person has some idea what it is you're referring to by, or expecting to achieve by using, 'it'. The use of 'it' must be bounded by at least some joint understanding of that use, some collective, community venture, it cannot be solely subjective otherwise it is useless as a term of communication.

Again, I'll ask, how would you possibly know what 'pain' is (which of your many feelings is the one correctly called 'pain') if you could not identify it at all times in others? — Isaac

But we don't and we can't always identify what someone else is experiencing. That's just a fact of our existence. We only have partial access to other people's minds though their behavior and what they choose to tell us. We simply don't always know whether someone else in pain.

Pain always results in some behaviour to the effect of demonstrating the pain, — Isaac

But it doesn't. People can choose to ignore minor pains. I have a headache, but if it's not severe, I don't have to say anything or hold my head. I can just ignore it and focus on something else. How much pain one can endure without reacting in pain depends on the individual.

If there was even one circumstance where the correct feeling to call 'pain' was hidden from you completely, how would you know that some other feeling you're having is actually also called 'pain', afterall, it might be the one that's been hidden from you? — Isaac

It's not hidden from me because pain is a subjective experience that can be accompanied by behavior, but not always. And if that fact doesn't square with a certain view of meaning acquisition, the so much the worse for that view.

I’m really not sure what you mean here. I just pointed out that ‘existence’ is a ‘mode’ of regard. You seemed to be accusing me of some ‘objective’/‘subjective’ dichotomy. I tried to explain further.

To explain further the ‘it-ness’ is an ‘existential mode’ of intentionality.

If you wish try and untangle where you see possible conflicts of terminology.

I’m just laying out as best I can as how I understand phenomenology. I’ve done this by drawing on the example of natural science being inclined toward an objective approach that actively seeks to leave out subjective perspectives as much as possible. It is probably helpful to view phenomenology as a mirror of this where leaving out what is objectively determined by the naturalistic attitude is a means to investigating subjectivity.

The existent items are not the direct concern of phenomenology, yet ‘existence’ as a ‘mode’ is as a phenomenal ‘object’ of experience - the ‘horizon’.

As what I hope is a more tangible way of expressing this we don’t tend to consider being on Earth orbiting the Sun. We are, yet now that I’ve drawn attention to this our ‘intentionality’ shifts. As soon as the question of ‘existence’ is brought into play then our ‘intentionality’ shifts to phenomenon as existing ‘objects’.

I’m happy to accept that generally people say ‘real’ to talk about number and word concepts and ‘existent’ to talk about this or that ‘box’, ‘chair’ or ‘table’. For phenomenological investigation the ‘real’ or ‘existent’ are only ‘modes of intentionality’; meaning they are not of direct concern for the itemization of ‘objects’ as ‘real’ or ‘existent’. The phenomenon is the subjective regard.

Maybe that only makes partial sense? I’d appreciate it if you could see a way to build a bridge of understanding here and tell me. We certainly seem to be in roughly the same area here.

But we don't and we can't always identify what someone else is experiencing. That's just a fact of our existence. — Marchesk

It's a fact I dispute, a fact I'm asking for your support of, your empirical evidence for. To say something is 'just a fact' is quite a strong assertion (it implies that any and all theories which assume it isn't are all untenable), so it's one I'd expect a significant amount of evidence for.

People can choose to ignore minor pains. I have a headache, but if it's not severe, I don't have to say anything or hold my head. I can just ignore it and focus on something else. — Marchesk

Then how do you know that feeling is a 'pain'? How do you know it isn't some feeling other people are calling something else entirely?

It's not hidden from me because pain is a subjective experience that can be accompanied by behavior, but not always. — Marchesk

I'm talking about the time when you claim it is hidden. Again, it is not a 'fact' simply by your declaring it to be one.

It's a fact I dispute, a fact I'm asking for your support of, your empirical evidence for. — Isaac

Alright, so have you ever found out someone was feeling discomfort when you didn't realize it, or vice versa?

I'm talking about the time when you claim it is hidden. Again, it is not a 'fact' simply by your declaring it to be one. — Isaac

I drink too much the night before and wake up with a mild hangover. At the office I talk to coworker and do my work without saying anything. Nobody asks me about my hangover or offers some aspirin.

I don't know what more to say other than it's a basic aspect of our experience that we don't always know what our fellow humans are feeling, including pain, nor can they always tell what we feel. It's part of of our daily interactions, it's in our language, it's all over fiction.

You seem to be arguing that we should always be able to tell whether someone is in pain.