Are this reconstruction of the argument and Hume’s objections to it correct? — ModernPAS

Sound good to me.

How might one respond to Hume? — ModernPAS

Waiting to find out with baited breath ...

I think that the argument as formulated relies heavily on the definition of "design," which probably needs to be stipulated. If "design" is used in a relatively weak sense, then 2 is clearly false; but if "design" simply means "deliberate arrangement," then 2 is trivially true and 3 is the dubious premiss. Proponents of "intelligent design" arguments typically try to establish objective criteria for "specified complexity" that is considered to be evidence of design in this stronger sense, citing forensics and archaeology as examples of scientific fields that employ a similar approach to distinguish human intervention from natural causes. That is where Hume's objection about artifacts vs. universes comes into play.

For all we know, design can arise in nature through natural processes (for example, through the process of natural selection). — ModernPAS

Hume lived and worked a long time - about 100 years? - before Darwin. The objections you're attributing to David Hume are much more like those of Richard Dawkins who has devoted many books, such as Blind Watchmaker and Unweaving the Rainbow, to exactly this question.

actually the Wiki entry on Hume has the following

Hume also criticised the argument (from design) in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). In this, he suggested that, even if the world is a more or less smoothly functioning system, this may only be a result of the "chance permutations of particles falling into a temporary or permanent self-sustaining order, which thus has the appearance of design."[152]

A century later, the idea of order without design was rendered more plausible by Charles Darwin's discovery that the adaptations of the forms of life are a result of the natural selection of inherited characteristics.[152] For philosopher James D. Madden, it is "Hume, rivaled only by Darwin, [who] has done the most to undermine in principle our confidence in arguments from design among all figures in the Western intellectual tradition."[155]

Where I think both Hume and Dawkin's argument fails, is that science itself presumes an order which it doesn't explain. Science itself is based on observation and inference - but it is created on the basis of existing order, namely, 'the order of nature'. I don't think there's any sense in which science explains that order.

actually the Wiki entry on Hume has the following — Wayfarer

Ha, you beat me to it. Haven't read it in a while but in my notes-laden copy of David Hume's "Principal Writings on Religion including Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and The Natural History of Religion" (edited by J.C.A. Gaskin; Oxford Univ. Press; 1998) not only does Hume argue against the design argument via the voice of one of his speakers, Philo, but - as summarized within an abstract within this book:

Part VIII: Investigations of a new hypothesis of cosmology, namely that the universe could be as it is through a process of natural selection operating within a large but finite physical universe: the natural selection being the persistence of forms (things) and processes (repeating chains of events) which once hit on by chance are well adapted to endure. [note: My take is that this part is tacked on because, if he'd have gotten around to publishing this while still living, he'd have been burnt at the stake for heresy without the incorporation of such statements as that which follows.] But nature is more generous, more orderly and more well adapted than this would lead us to expect. So: 'A total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.' — Abstract of Part VIII of Hume's Dialogues

emphasis mine

The Dialogues - whose style was inspired by Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods - was published in 1779. Close enough to 100 year's before Darwin's The Origin of Species was published. The rough idea of natural selection is within it - although somewhat indirectly addressed as a possibility. And I'd find it hard to believe that Darwin didn't read Hume.

Also, though the book ends by claiming that Cleanthes - who upholds the design thesis - has the best arguments, a careful reading will - or at least might - reveal many an understanding for and potential sympathy with the nature centered religions of the ancients. Hence:

Where I think both Hume and Dawkin's argument fails, is that science itself presumes an order which it doesn't explain. Science itself is based on observation and inference - but it is created on the basis of existing order, namely, 'the order of nature'. I don't think there's any sense in which science explains that order. — Wayfarer

I obviously can't prove this, but I doubt that Hume would have been in any way antagonistic to this notion.

But, at any rate, Hume wasn't keen on there being a Sky Father deity that created everything. Which is what the design argument typically is about: as with inferences made after finding a watch in the middle of a desert, since there is apparent design to the universe there then must also be an onmi- this and that designer of the universe.

Hume wasn't keen on there being a Sky Father deity that created everything. Which is what the design argument typically is about: as with inferences made after finding a watch in the middle of a desert, since there is apparent design to the universe there then must also be an onmi- this and that designer of the universe. — javra

I think there's a misunderstanding at the back of this, though, arising from the anthropomorphism of 'God as super-engineer'. In that vein, both the pro- and anti- sides of the argument have it wrong - if you believe that the order of nature 'proves' that God exists, then you're tending towards Biblical literalism, i.e. interpreting myth as fact; and if you believe it 'proves' that God doesn't exist, then you're tending towards scientific materialism, which is kind of a mirror image. (That's why, as many have noted, Dawkins himself comes across as a kind of secular fundamentalist.)

Incidentally, I commented in another thread recently that the name 'Jupiter' is itself derived from the Indo-European 'dyaus-pitar' which means 'sky father'. I think, arguably, one of the main sources of equivocation about this whole issue is because many (although certainly not all) believers and atheists alike have this image in mind. And it’s understandable, because the ancient pantheon of gods were exactly what was displaced by monotheism, but I wonder if as a consequence, the ’One’ began to be seen in the guise of what had been displaced.

In any case, interesting to note that many modern classical (e.g. Thomist) theologians and philosophers will have no truck with any design arguments whatever. For that, they are sometimes branded as atheists or closet atheists by the ID advocates - which says a lot, in my view.

"2. Anything with a design is created by an intelligent designer."

I think that statement is more highly probable than not. For instance, why would someone create a watch, if it confers no survival advantages? To make our quality of life better?

And most importantly, why should we care or even wonder about it(?).

I think there's a misunderstanding at the back of this, though, arising from the anthropomorphism of 'God as super-engineer'. In that vein, both the pro- and anti- sides of the argument have it wrong - if you believe that the order of nature 'proves' that God exists, then you're tending towards Biblical literalism, i.e. interpreting myth as fact; and if you believe it 'proves' that God doesn't exist, then you're tending towards scientific materialism, which is kind of a mirror image. (That's why, as many have noted, Dawkins himself comes across as a kind of secular fundamentalist.) — Wayfarer

I'm not in disagreement with this. I do tend to think that most people, be they theists or atheists, associate the term God with an omnipotent psyche (meaning soul or mind). I'm reminded that even the "teleological argument" most often aims to validate just such a personage. This means of conceptualization, however, stands in stark contrast to Stoic concepts of an anima mundi of logos, or to the Neo-Platonic notions of the One, among other similar outlooks in western culture alone - all of the latter being in some form of another teleological without invoking the idea of a creator deity, be s/he theistic or deistic.

In any case, interesting to note that many modern classical (e.g. Thomist) theologians and philosophers will have no truck with any design arguments whatever. For that, they are sometimes branded as atheists or closet atheists by the ID advocates - which says a lot, in my view. — Wayfarer

It does say a mouthful. I haven't taken the time to read Aquinus carefully, but I've perused enough to get the cliff-notes version. I remember admiring him, in large part, because he upheld the reality of Divinity while simultaneously drawing attention to what we'd now term empirical approaches to studies of nature. Maybe in time I'll have a second look at his writings, but, for now, I'm a little overwhelmed by my reading list.

I think that the argument as formulated relies heavily on the definition of "design," which probably needs to be stipulated. If "design" is used in a relatively weak sense, then 2 is clearly false; but if "design" simply means "deliberate arrangement," then 2 is trivially true and 3 is the dubious premiss. Proponents of "intelligent design" arguments typically try to establish objective criteria for "specified complexity" that is considered to be evidence of design in this stronger sense — aletheist

Yes, "design" seems to have two different meanings, and it is not clear which one Paley might mean, and he may be guilty of equivocating or begging the question. By "design" one might mean something like "observable complexity of patterns." However, by "design" one might also mean "intelligent design" or, as you put it, "deliberate arrangement." If by "design" Paley means "observable complexity of patterns," then he may be guilty of equivocating, since he seems to infer "deliberate arrangement" from "observable complexity of patterns," and it is just not clear that this inference is right. If by "design" Paley means "deliberate arrangement," then, I think, his claim is not trivially true, as you put it, but question-begging, as he is assuming what he is trying to prove.

Hume lived and worked a long time - about 100 years? - before Darwin. The objections you're attributing to David Hume are much more like those of Richard Dawkins who has devoted many books, such as Blind Watchmaker and Unweaving the Rainbow, to exactly this question — Wayfarer

Of course Hume lived one hundred years before Darwin. My point is that Hume seems to be arguing that the belief that "observable complexity of patterns," as I put it above, can only arise as a result of intelligent design is an unsupported assumption. To make his point, he seems to argue that, for all we know, "observable complexity of patterns" can arise through natural processes. I was just using natural selection as an example of such a natural process. I take it you realized later that is my point.

Where I think both Hume and Dawkin's argument fails, is that science itself presumes an order which it doesn't explain. Science itself is based on observation and inference - but it is created on the basis of existing order, namely, 'the order of nature'. I don't think there's any sense in which science explains that order. — Wayfarer

I don't understand this criticism. When we do science we look for "observable complexity of patterns," and we try to give explanations for them according to natural "laws." It seems to be a huge leap to say that we presume "deliberate arrangement." I would think that science is nothing if not the attempt to explain order, if by "order" we mean something like "observable complexity of patterns." Isn't one of Hume's points that to explain "order" in this sense, we simply do not need to appeal to an intelligent designer, because we can appeal to natural "laws," even if we can't justify the regularity of causal laws according to anything but custom or habit? It seems you're making the exact assumption that Hume denies as unsupported.

I would think that science is nothing if not the attempt to explain order, if by "order" we mean something like "observable complexity of patterns." — ModernPAS

But science doesn't and can't explain why laws obtain, or the sense in which they're really laws. Certainly we observe those regularities and hopefully find the mathematical order in them which enables scientific discovery. But science doesn't explain how they arose. To say that 'for all we know, "observable complexity of patterns" can arise through natural processes' is not really to say anything, is it?

I’d like to respond to your question, “How might one respond to Hume?” I do believe that your reconstruction of the argument and Hume’s objections to it are accurate.

Hume is misrepresenting Paley by accusing him of committing the fallacy of composition. Although Paley discusses the design of both human artifacts and natural objects, he is not stating that the design of human artifacts serves as the basis of proof for the design of natural objects. He is not saying that because that part is X, the whole is X.

Here is what Paley’s argument would look like if Hume was accurate in his representation. Notice how, as a fallacious argument, it doesn’t follow any of the common argument forms.

1. Human artifacts are a part of the universe.
2. Human artifacts are intelligently designed.
3. Therefore, the universe is intelligently designed.

This is what the fallacy of composition actually looks like, but as you can see this is not Paley’s argument. Hume is claiming that Paley’s argument relies on the relationship between the part and the whole. However, Paley is not even considering this relationship. Here is an argument form that clarifies that Paley isn’t concerned with the part-whole relationship.

1. All man-made objects that we’ve ever observed are created by an intelligent designer.
2. Man-made objects are simpler than natural objects.
3. If simpler man-made objects require an intelligent designer, then more complex natural objects must also require an intelligent designer.
4. Therefore, natural objects require an intelligent designer. (1, 2, 3 MP)

So, Paley clearly isn’t considering the part-whole relationship, because his argument does not hinge on that relationship in order to prove why natural objects require an intelligent designer. Hume’s objection therefore fails because it is aimed at a misrepresented argument.

Let me know your thoughts on this.

One modern defense for the teleological argument come from Richard Swinburne saying that even if there’s another possible explanation for the universe, we should go with the explanation that’s most likely to be true. It’s simply more probable that God designed the world, than that it came about through the pure chance of evolutionary processes. This defense in the teleological argument is less about making assertions and more about making claims about probability. Fine-tuning arguments also fall into these kinds of probability-based defenses. This is because the probability of the world to become as we know it is extremely precise. These defenses accept scientific theories like the Big Bang and evolution, but explain that for the evolution of life to occur, it is most likely that God set up the exact conditions that were required for life to happen rather than having it come by chance or accident.
Almost everything about the basic structure of Earth for life to occur, let alone the universe, is balanced on a knife’s edge. This is because the possibility that the basic structure of our universe took shape just by chance is as statistically improbable as hitting a dart board that is one-foot wide from the other side of the galaxy. Unless the dart has hit the target, life would be impossible. For short, I am attempting to say something like this:
1. The possibility that the basic structure of our universe took shape just by chance is as statistically improbable as hitting a dart board that is one-foot wide from the other side of the galaxy.
2. The dart has indeed hit the target.
3. The fact that the dart has hit the target strongly suggests that someone aimed the dart as it would be extremely improbable that such a coincidence could have happened by chance.
4. So we should go with the explanation that is most likely to be true and accept the theism explanation over the non-theist explanations.

The Fine-Tuning arguments are based on the prime principle of confirmation which favours the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability. However, Michael Huemer provides "the doomsday argument" where he provides two alternative hypothesis

(1) hypothesis 1: the human species will not last long into the future
(2) hypothesis 2: the human species will last long into the future
(3) evidence: you find yourself living in this primitive time with a relatively small population
(4)prime principle states: if some evidence is not improbable on hypothesis 1 but very improbable onhypothesis 2, then the evidence provides strong proof for hypothesis 1
(5) we observe strong evidence that the human species will not last long into the future. (1,2,3,4, HS)

Because Michael Huemer believes that we should view our existence surprisingly in the current time as a primitive time because humans will evolve into a more advanced future with the high population. But we believe that we live in advanced time with a high population compared to what was before, so according to Huemer the human species will not last long into the future.

Thus, Huemer provides the argument against the prime principle of confirmation, so this is the argument against that we should consider that someone aimed the dart because it seems to the most probable outcome.