Are you suggesting that it is impossible to understand what a box is without the word box? — I like sushi

Yes, pretty much. I think it's possible to understand what things do, how we can interact with them etc without language, but 'a box' is a distinct(ish) category of thing, and that division arose via our language community, my investigations into the apparent features I can use to distinguish 'box' from 'not box' are all tied up. It's how I learnt what a box is and so it's the way my neural connections represent it.

And this is not arbitrary definition. It's strongly correlated with the very somatic feedback which modulates our perceptual experience. At what angle does a very steep floor become a wall? The angle at which we can no longer walk on it without falling over. Would spiders distinguish between floors and walls? — Isaac

It's also strongly correlated with the floor's physical structure. So there's no necessary connection between the somatic component of our self model and the environmental stimulus, but in usual circumstances our actions and internal states are in strong accord with our environment.

The floor's steepness induces different features in our self model; there's positional adjustments we feel that mirror the floor gradient. We can see the composite of its topography, colour and how it distributes over space. It's definitely there, and we represent facets of it with perceptual features (and derived states of belief). We don't see our visual field, the visual field is a seeing relation between a body (and its history) and its environment.

In the neural model paper you linked me; there are external states with their own dynamics and outputs which are then integrated into ourselves, and modified by our actions. The external states are not phenomenal, nor are the effects of our actions on our environment.

I’m afraid whatever you’re talking about bears no relation to phenomenology then. Semantics and linguistics are no the direct concern of the phenomenological investigation.

For what it’s worth it doesn’t make any sense to me to say we can understand the function of a box yet not know what a box is. If the box is not it’s use then what exactly is the intersubjective naming of ‘box’ giving that wasn’t already present?

Not all thought and belief should be deemed "a report" because some exists prior to language. — creativesoul

Cool. Thanks.

I guess my concern, with respect to understanding each other, was to eliminate “report” as a metaphor, as in the case where, say, the senses “report” their perceptions to their respective receptors. Of course, the metaphoric report from the senses, while such machination certainly “exists in its entirety prior to language use”, isn’t a thought or a belief either, until or unless such machination is taken into account by a thinking subject.

In the neural model paper you linked me; there are external states with their own dynamics and outputs which are then integrated into ourselves, and modified by our actions. The external states are not phenomenal, nor are the effects of our actions on our environment. — fdrake

Yes absolutely. I fear we might be talking past one another here. I'm not in any sense arguing that there are not external states, nor that our internal states aren't tightly connected to them. What I'm concerned to avoid is an assumption that our phenomenal experience of our sense representations marks any natural or real division of those external states.

The difference is between saying there is a real box, and saying there is some reality part of which we can decide to refer to as a box. Hence my example with the floor/wall. When a floor becomes a wall is intrinsically linked to our form of life, it's not one or the other externally.

So, even though it's harder to imagine, I see the same being the case with 'steepness', or for that matter 'colour', 'spatiotemporal extension'... That defining this measure (as opposed to that) is similarly placing divisions in some general field of 'states of affairs' which are intrinsically linked to our form of life, and in this case, the biology with which we carry it out.

I’m afraid whatever you’re talking about bears no relation to phenomenology then. Semantics and linguistics are no the direct concern of the phenomenological investigation. — I like sushi

I'm not so much asking about the correct categorisation as just talking about what I see as the implications. You can call it what you like. The fact remains that introspection cannot determine anything about 'a box' that is not later necessarily mediated by the use of the term in our common language. I cannot find the defining features of a box in my mind, it is a category of my community of language users.

For what it’s worth it doesn’t make any sense to me to say we can understand the function of a box yet not know what a box is. — I like sushi

The first is specific, the other general. Token and type. I can understand the function of a box, or even every box I encounter or can imagine. None of that gives me the first clue as to what a box is and isn't as a type, for that I must consult my community of language users to see if I'm applying the term efficaciously.

misquote. I still don’t know what you’re talking about. Better to leave it I think.

Thanks

Rather than doing so randomly, we do so by minimising variance — Isaac

Whether that's the case or not (that it's really minimizing variance with respect to other models), it would be arbitrary that you're going with "minimizing variance" as the metric.

Is there a way to know the world without our modeling of it? — Mww

Yes. Observe it.

Corrected the quote, doubt it helps though from the sound of it.

Whether that's the case or not (that it's really minimizing variance with respect to other models), it would be arbitrary that you're going with "minimizing variance" as the metric. — Terrapin Station

I think you're not understanding the meaning of the word arbitrary. It just means on a whim, without a system or reason. Not without a system or reason that whomever you're speaking to happens to agree with.

Is there a way to know the world without our modeling of it?
— Mww

Yes. Observe it. — Terrapin Station

Hmmm, yeah, I suppose. Observation tells me that, but use of “modeling” makes explicit I wish to know of. Observation in itself, tells me nothing of the world except it is not nothing.

Token and type. I can understand the function of a box, or even every box I encounter or can imagine. None of that gives me the first clue as to what a box is and isn't as a type — Isaac

Us old-fashion types would say....nothing in the form of a thing can ever give me the first clue as to the matter of it, but only that the matter of it is conceivable. But I guess that is a first clue, so.....

Yes absolutely. I fear we might be talking past one another here. — Isaac

Probably!

I'm not in any sense arguing that there are not external states, nor that our internal states aren't tightly connected to them. — Isaac

Aye! Glad. Sometimes it's hard to distinguish whether someone's making epistemological or ontological claims in cases like this. I was definitely misreading you as some kind of 'external world constructivist' or something. Interpretive bias on my part.

What I'm concerned to avoid is an assumption that our phenomenal experience of our sense representations marks any natural or real division of those external states. — Isaac

I agree that it we don't track all the time, just most of the time we do as far as environmental stimuli are concerned. Keeping ourselves in touch with our body/mind and our environment is what our active perception does (ontologically), but the conceptual representations active perception generates do not thereby have a basis in reality (no epistemological guarantees from introspection or conception); there's always room for misapprehension, error, and the phenomenal character of our internal states being populated with representational entities that don't track the mechanisms that generate them (like an idea like "the will", which is sort of a conceptual feature analogous to a perceptual feature).

That defining this measure (as opposed to that) is similarly placing divisions in some general field of 'states of affairs' which are intrinsically linked to our form of life, and in this case, the biology with which we carry it out. — Isaac

The neatest way of placing divisions (incorporating or representing differences) is by using those in our environment. Like, when we see stuff, it's usually because it's there and reflecting light. Environmental stimuli typically have propensities to be perceived in the way they do; they provide the basis for features consistent with and driven by their character.

I was definitely misreading you as some kind of 'external world constructivist' or something. Interpretive bias on my part. — fdrake

Well yeah, constructivism is pretty much where I'm coming from,im afraid. I mean, there's varieties of constructivist, but in the sense of model-dependent realism and Von Glaserfield in psychology. So epistemological constructivism, yeah, hermeneutic constructivism...bit too far fetched for me.

the phenomenal character of our internal states being populated with representational entities that don't track the mechanisms that generate them (like an idea like "the will", which is sort of a conceptual feature analogous to a perceptual feature). — fdrake

Yes, absolutely with you there.

Like, when we see stuff, it's usually because it's there and reflecting light — fdrake

OK, so take light as an example. One model it's just the opposite of dark, the stuff that we see, visible light. But that's just a model-dependent division of a wider electromagnetic spectrum no reason (apart from our eyes) why 430-770THz has any external world significance. So we see some arbitrary sub-division of electromagnetism. But then electromagnetism is just a model of energy types based on subdivisions we imposed on the experimental data, different energy bands. Then the division between energy and matter...

We're tracking something, but any and all descriptions of that something are themselves just models, and there's only one player in that game.

It just means on a whim, without a system or reason. — Isaac

As when deciding to go with "minimizing variance" for a metric.

Hmmm, yeah, I suppose. Observation tells me that, but use of “modeling” makes explicit I wish to know of. Observation in itself, tells me nothing of the world except it is not nothing. — Mww

I don't really understand "makes explicit I wish to know of."

Observation shows you what things are like, properties they have, patterns that occur, etc. It tells you all sorts of things.

As when deciding to go with "minimizing variance" for a metric. — Terrapin Station

Minimising variance is a well-supported principle of self-organising systems. A large proportion of neuroscience, and significant sectors of biology are now based on the idea that systems aim to minimise variance as a means of maintaining equilibrium steady state, so unless you have anything substantive to counter that theory with contrary empirical data, then just saying it's 'without reason' seems a bit empty.

Minimize variance? The sympathetic nervous system dramatically throws the body out of equilibrium. The parasympathetic does also. Some systems resist change, some create it. How does that fit into your perspective?

We're tracking something, but any and all descriptions of that something are themselves just models, and there's only one player in that game. — Isaac

I think it's very easy to forget that modelling is relational. It's a two term thing. The model might be embedded or represented in some fashion; instantiated somehow; but it being implemented in us distinct from it losing its relational character. It doesn't cease to be a relation because it's instantiated, no more than "X is in a loving relationship with Y" (X R Y) is reducible to "X is (in love with Y)" (P(X)) and "Y is (in love with X)" (Q(Y)).

OK, so take light as an example. One model it's just the opposite of dark, the stuff that we see, visible light. But that's just a model-dependent division of a wider electromagnetic spectrum no reason (apart from our eyes) why 430-770THz has any external world significance — Isaac

Vision guides action. We do a lot with our eyes, just as much as stuff that reflects in that frequency range is relevant to us now, it was relevant to us in the past. We probably don't need to see in UV or IR because there weren't sufficiently strong ecological or sexual pressures driving selection in our ancestors for that. We have bright/dark in old primate ancestors - which makes sense for mostly nocturnal animals, but when we no longer were mostly active at night; there are simply more active and relevant reflectance profiles in objects around us, more light gets reflected just because there's more ambient light during the day; so if we're active in the day, greater visual environmental modelling capacity makes sense... Going from monochrome to colour? That's a lot of distinctions to act upon. We can distinguish rather a lot in our environment with our vision because it is useful for us as a population to do so.

I think it's easier to see models as relational without concerning ourselves specifically with humans, since we're ludicrously complex. A world without models being inherently relational would not have had the grass stripe the zebra, darken nocturnal predators, or make stick insects sticky!

Observation shows you what things are like, properties they have, patterns that occur, etc. It tells you all sorts of things. — Terrapin Station

Of course. As a general rule, nonetheless, when I investigate anything at all, “what it’s like” and “all sorts of things” is inversely proportional to the importance I give to the investigation.

But I understand what you mean: I observe a ZR1 and recognize it is like a Yugo.

Minimising variance is a well-supported principle of self-organising systems. A large proportion of neuroscience, and significant sectors of biology are now based on the idea that systems aim to minimise variance as a means of maintaining equilibrium steady state, so unless you have anything substantive to counter that theory with contrary empirical data, — Isaac

You're not talking about empirical data. You don't believe you have access to empirical data. You're talking about a model that you constructed (just like you're constructing the model of "my reply"). The fact that your personal model makes the "minimizing variance" model common doesn't make it non-arbitrary. Trust me, as this is your model talking to you.

But I understand what you mean: I observe a ZR1 and recognize it is like a Yugo. — Mww

Not "like" as a comparison. "Like" as in characteristics/properties/qualities.

Thanks for the edit; clearer to me now.

All “likes” as characteristics/properties/qualities are themselves comparisons. An observer of the world’s characteristics compares them to the affect they have on him. As esoteric as that may sound, how else do we learn about them?

All “likes” as characteristics/properties/qualities are themselves comparisons. — Mww

No, they're not.

"Compares to the effect they have on him"? What would that even mean?

Ok. So a thing has characteristics because it is ontologically necessary?

Necessary in the sense that it doesn't make sense to say that there's something with no properties/characteristics.

And observing those doesn't imply that one is making a comparison to something else.

:cool: I can't think of any way that complex conceptualizations could occur absent symbolic language, but it may be a failure or limitation of my thought.

Can you imagine a really load noise? Can you imagine the set of all sets? Can you imagine if you forgot where your home was?... — Isaac

Sure, I can "visualize" a really loud noise. I can visualize a set of all sets as a container that contains all other containers. I can visualize myself as being lost.

The making of no sense is a comparison of necessity.

I suppose one can just look at something and not consider anything about it. But what if it interests him?

I suppose one can just look at something and not consider anything about it. But what if it interests him? — Mww

What about that? So, say, for example, that one sees a rock that one is really attracted to--say something like a rock of pink granite, so one picks it up to take it home.