Tell me the story of how these properties inhere in a quale? — fdrake

Again, what qualia are in the first place are the properties of the experience, as the experience.

And why are we saying "what it's like" rather than "what it is" to be a bat? — Harry Hindu

Because they are different questions. The first is about consciousness, the second is about the definition of 'bat'. — bert1

I still don't see the need for the term, "like".
Then we should be saying "what it is to be a bat's consciousness" and "what it is to be a bat's body" which consciousness is just part of? Seems like an incoherent distinction to make.

I don't understand Nagel's question. Is he asking what it is to be the whole bat, or just it's brain, or what?
— Harry Hindu

The qualitative properties of the bat's experiences, from the bat's perspective. — Terrapin Station

What would be the point in asking such a question? What knowledge would we be getting that we couldn't acquire by thinking about it differently?

The purpose is to underscore that if bats have conscious experiences--and presumably they do have some sorts of conscious experiences, then (a) those experiences are probably quite different from human conscious experiences (if for no other reason than they have some very different faculties than we do, such as an ability to employ echolocation with high precision during high-speed flight), and (b) it's not possible from a third-person perspective, a perspective which is the only one from which we can talk about bat consciousness (and bat brains if we're physicalists or "reductionists" as Nagel puts it in his paper), to know the properties of the conscious experiences of bats, from the bat's perspective, as the bat knows the same.

As far as terms like “redness”, I don’t know why that has to evoke any kind of essentialism. Does “color” evoke that same essentialism to you, or “appearance”? — Pfhorrest

I guess what I'm trying to emphasise is that maybe associating qualia with facets of experience; like redness or whatever; is rather artificial. There's got to be some principle by which you attend or demarcate the facets; it's not like I can separate the "shape quale" from the "colour quale" in my perception of this table, shape and colour are conceptual demarcations that use perceptual information, rather than perceptual information itself. Concepts rather than percepts.

I'm not going to deny that I see this table as browny-beigy with a wavering wood pattern; but I'm very careful to attend to the processing of experience this requires. The experiential state I have doesn't "have" browny-beigy with a wavering wood pattern - that's there in the table. The table doesn't effect me browny-beigy-wood-patterny-wise; there's a table here, and it looks like this and it suggests interpretation as browny-beige wavey-wood-patterny table.

How this "as" works looks really important to me. I'm not too happy to think of it as a "property of" the experience; that sets up some relational problem of the experiential property and the table properties; which is precisely what that as seems to address. So to put it "in the experiential property"? That looks like it might miss how experience works from the beginning; by asking questions whose framing precludes relevant information.

Might be garbled, might help.

I see the table. (an event)
$x R y$ (x = me, R = sees, y = table)
I see the table as brown.
Is this: $x R y$ ? $x R (B(y))$ ? $x R y \cap x R B(y)$? (x = me, R = sees, B(y) is the brown of the table, y is the table) $\cap$ is logical and.
What's the quale here? I have a quale? Is this:
$x R y$ or $x R B(y)$ or is this $x S (xRB(y))$ where S is some "access" relation, for self-awareness of the relationship I have with the table. Is this the right parsing? Or is it a property of the person... $P(x) \leftrightarrow xS(xRB(y))$ (in that case, where does the y go, does its existence become irrelevant under an epoche? Is usual perception "functioning like it's under an epoche"?)

Let's say there's some entailment relation:

$x R y \rightarrow (x R B(y) \cap xS(xRB(y)) \cup P(x)$

$\cup$ is logical disjunction. What's the status of that entailment with respect to perception? Is it something our perception "does"? Is it really a biconditional (this is what perception is)? How do we get from one to the other?

I don't think that trying to parse it in terms of formal logic is going to be helpful at this point.

First, most people would say that the shape of the table (let's use shape for a minute so we don't get sidetracked with the usual discussions regarding colors and whether they're secondary properties, etc.), as a property of the table, isn't identical (as in literally the same thing) to the shape of the table in your experience (or we could say in your perception of the table).

Do you agree with that?

isn't identical (as in literally the same thing) to the shape of the table in your experience — Terrapin Station

No? There's an underside of the table.

What I asked about has nothing to do with the underside of the table.

Disagreeing with what I said would amount to you believing that the shape of the table in your experience IS identical with the shape of the table as a property of the table.

What I asked about has nothing to do with the underside of the table. — Terrapin Station

Ok. The table has lots of properties. How do these consist in the perception?

Your reading comprehension problem here: somehow you read me as implying something about "physical" versus "nonphysical." I didn't imply anything about that, and my comment has nothing to do with that. — Terrapin Station

For Christ's sake, stop answering everything by telling me what you didn't mean, it's not a fucking guessing game. If you didn't mean the thing I interpreted you as saying, why can't you just say what you did mean in response? What on earth is prompting you to give half a response all the time?

The comment I was responding to was simply...

It's just the qualitative properties of your experiences. You must have qualitative properties to your experiences. — Terrapin Station

Where in that does it make clear that 'it's' refers to your personal opinion and not, the standard treatment of the matter in philosophy (which I'm almost certain was what fdrake was asking about). If the latter then my response is entirely appropriate, it is not treated as you claim by most of the philosophers who use the concept.

lol - you're not going to say which paper that was supposed to be? — Terrapin Station

Why would I do that when the citation is barely a page back and the philosophers I've additionally mentioned are hardly obscure? The main paper on the subject is by PMS Hacker, as I have already mentioned twice, if you can't even be bothered to look it up I can't see why I should.

Again, I'm asking if you agree that the shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table in your experience or as part of your perception of the table.

If you disagree, you're saying that the two are identical.

Sigh, you don't discuss with someone who refuses to answer return questions and defines your options. I don't want a rhetorical pissing match, I want a discussion.

For Christ's sake, stop answering everything by telling me what you didn't mean, it's not a fucking guessing game. If you didn't mean the thing I interpreted you as saying, why can't you just say what you did mean in response? What on earth is prompting you to give half a response all the time? — Isaac

I wrote what I meant initially. I didn't write anything about physicalism in that post. No matter what I write, you read it with weird reading comprehension, so it's not as if it's a simple matter to clear that up. Any clearing-up attempt is going to be read with reading comprehension problems.(Based on a lot of experience.)

I'm not referring to qualia in any unusual manner.

Okay, so I'm guessing that you mean Hacker's "Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Bat"? I'll have to read through that again, but I don't recall him saying anything that amounts to "What it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"

@Isaac also linked this one.

Sure, and in a discussion, you'd answer a simple question like "Do you agree that the shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table in your experience or as part of your perception of the table"?

Especially when the aim is explaining something to you that you apparently do not understand/apparently are not familiar with.

If you respond without answering that, as if you didn't even understand what you were being asked, then I'd clarify with respect to your response and ask again.

In a discussion, you'd not just ignore it and ask your own question and then get pissy about not moving on until you've answered the first question. That's rude behavior, not a discussion.

"Is not technical talk" in no way amounts to "does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"

Do you agree that the shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table in your experience or as part of your perception of the table"? — Terrapin Station

And I did. No. The shape of the table isn't experienced as a totality. If you like; there are table properties that are not experiential properties. Since there are table properties which are not experiential properties, the set of table properties is not identical with the set of experiential properties. Some subset of table properties might be identical to experiential properties of the table, but I don't know how to match the two. How do you match the two? How do you ensure the identity?

Especially when the aim is explaining something to you that you apparently do not understand/apparently are not familiar with. — Terrapin Station

Dude. I'm familiar with qualia (though I do not claim to be an expert). I quoted the SEP article's summary for the purposes of pointing out ambiguities I see in it. If I blur my eyes and drink the kool aid it makes perfect sense.

In a discussion, you'd not just ignore it and ask your own question and then get pissy about not moving on until you've answered the first question. That's rude behavior, not a discussion. — Terrapin Station

... Wow. That's how you behave all the time!

"Is not technical talk" in no way amounts to "does not make sense in terms of conscious experience" — Terrapin Station

Did you even read past the abstract? Or did you substitute a lazy assumption about the whole argument and what's at stake in it with what they say? It's not just about "it's not technical talk" => "does not make sense". It's about how "it's not precise" allows assumptions to creep in.

Which is largely what we've been discussing, in another form.

And I did. No. The shape of the table isn't experienced as a totality. — fdrake

Again, this is a problem, because it suggests that you do not understand what I'm asking. I'm not asking anything about a "totality." That's completely irrelevant to what I'm asking you.

Again, this is a problem, because it suggests that you do not understand what I'm asking. I'm not asking anything about a "totality." That's completely irrelevant to what I'm asking you. — Terrapin Station

More words then please.

A common view is that there's some shape to the table, as a property of the table (whether we're talking about a "totality" of the shape of the table or not--that doesn't matter), AND that that shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table as you experience it, or via your perception.

Or in other words, there's a common view that there is a table, but you don't literally have a table in your perception--that is, your perception is not made out of wood, you can't set a coffee cup on your perception etc. as you can with the literal table.

So on this view, the shape of the table, and the wood texture of the table, and so on, are not literally the same properties as your perception of the table.

Do you agree with that?

Or in other words, there's a common view that there is a table, but you don't literally have a table in your perception--that is, your perception is not made out of wood, you can't set a coffee cup on your perception etc. as you can with the literal table. — Terrapin Station

I agree with this. How could I not? What I don't agree with is that it says the same thing as this:

A common view is that there's some shape to the table, as a property of the table (whether we're talking about a "totality" of the shape of the table or not--that doesn't matter), AND that that shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table as you experience it, or via your perception. — Terrapin Station

"There's some shape to the table, as a property of the table" - when you experience the table, are you saying you experience the shape of the table as a distinct part of the experience? When you experience and attend to your experience is the shape of the table distinct from the table?

To my reading, you've living in a world where there are table properties and experiential properties, and experiential properties are distinct from table properties. My question, and my site of criticism is regarding the phenomenal character of the experience; within the quale. You may say "I am describing what the phenomenal character of the quale is", but I still want to know what account you have of the shape of the table within the quale?

FWIW I completely understand what you're saying (and it seems to me that you've understood everything I've said here so far) and I'm baffled about how Isaac and fdrake manage to not understand it. I'm usually good at explaining things to people who have trouble understanding them, and these seem like generally smart guys, so I'm kinda stymied for a solution to this impasse. Thank you for helping.

FWIW I'm pretty sure we all actually agree on the actual substance of this matter and this discussion is entirely about people thinking things other people are saying mean other than what they mean by them.

I'm baffled about how Isaac and fdrake manage to not understand it. — Pfhorrest

It's funny. Qualia discussions on here usually go like this in my experience. Everyone gets baffled because "the other side just doesn't understand". I don't think I'm baffled by this, because qualia talk has a set of base assumptions which are rarely examined; you have to "buy in" to grok them.

Edit: it's also very hard to not "buy in".

qualia talk has a set of base assumptions which are rarely examined — fdrake

You thinking we are implying those unexamined assumptions that we explicitly deny implying is exactly what I mean about people thinking things other people are saying mean other than what they mean by them.

You thinking we are implying those unexamined assumptions that we explicitly deny implying is exactly what I mean about people thinking things other people are saying mean other than what they mean by them. — Pfhorrest

What assumptions are you explicitly denying? What's a quale to you?

Edit: run me through an encounter you have with a quale?

I don't think I'm baffled by this, because qualia talk has a set of base assumptions which are rarely examined; you have to "buy in" to grok them. — fdrake

It's like we're each trying to look past what the other is saying in order to grasp how the train went off the track.

Like psychoanalysts we say "You arent aware that you're assuming this, but you're just in denial, or just a poor self-historian. More self reflection will show you... something.

I think for the qualia-team, p-zombies are a marker, where the whole raft of existentialism that zeroes in on that "quality of being that comes to rest in the sanctuary of the form" is not working.

The marker for the anti-qualia side is what? That I just really have no idea what you're talking about? I've never had the experience of seeing red?

But it's not that, is it? It's that: your theories make me nervous. Even the theories you dont realize you're employing.

But it's not that, is it? It's that: your theories make me nervous. Even the theories you dont realize you're employing. — frank

Maybe! I see the cup as blue. The (my) phenomenal character (in terms of colour) of the cup has a blue quale. "What it is like to see the cup? Partly, its colour is blue."

Does this pass your "I can talk in terms of qualia" test?

"There's some shape to the table, as a property of the table" - when you experience the table, are you saying you experience the shape of the table as a distinct part of the experience? When you experience and attend to your experience is the shape of the table distinct from the table? — fdrake

No. I'm not saying that. The distinction is between the shape of the table as a property of the table, and the shape of the table as you experience it.

The only way for you to have the shape of the table as a property of the table in your experience is for your experience to be identical to the table--so that your experience is made of wood, can hold a cup of coffee, etc.

The only way for you to have the shape of the table as a property of the table in your experience is for your experience to be identical to the table--so that your experience is made of wood, can hold a cup of coffee, etc. — Terrapin Station

Right! And in the quale is there some corresponding shape property of the table?