So is experiencing eating cake different from eating cake? — Banno

Yes, although in a human the two would nearly always occur together. I mean, it is theoretically possible to separate them. You could somehow feed cake to a person who is asleep and dreaming about eating sausages. Then you would have the action without the experience. Conversely, you could fiddle with a brain in a vat to have the experience of eating cake without the action (although I don't know if this is actually possible or not).

EDIT: Also, depending on what you think about robots, it might be possible for Roger the Robot to eat cake without experiencing anything at all.

it might be possible for Roger the Robot to eat cake without experiencing anything at all. — bert1

Wouldn't that just be what it is like for Roger to eat cake?

Wouldn't that just be what it is like for Roger to eat cake? — Banno

Only in the sense that there would be nothing it is like for Roger the Robot to eat the cake.

There's something profoundly amiss with the "...like..." in "something it is like...". We see what it is like for Roger to eat cake.

I don’t see the exact relevance of the manner in which you’re doing semantic somersaults. The question at hand is a ‘question’ of ‘experience’/‘experiencing’. There is a felt experience existent through variegations of held information. The ‘question’ arises due to differentiations of processing.

Who?

There's something profoundly amiss with the "...like..." in "something it is like...". We see what it is like for Roger to eat cake. — Banno

We see what it is like from our point of view: presumably a messy and pointless exercise. The point of using 'something it is like' is to try to focus attention on Roger's point of view, and if it has a point of view at all in the same sense that humans do. If the language of 'what it's like' doesn't conjure that for you, then yes, it is unhelpful and should be ditched, as it's not doing what it is supposed to be doing.

We see what it is like from our point of view: — bert1

...as we see from our point of view.

"...what it is like..." looks no more than an odd reification, creating an it where there is none.

That's not how the turn of phrase is supposed to work, as far as I understand. — bert1

That is exactly how it is supposed to work, which is why I disagree with it so strongly. It is the basis for a whole load of mystical woo around consciousness. The phrase is used in discussions around whether there are non-physical facts. To make this claim it is necessary for there to be some thing it is to experience red, which is itself a fact, but which is not derivable from the physical facts of seeing red.

There is something it is like for John to see red = John experiences red

There is nothing it is like for Roger the Robot to see red = Roger the robot does not experience red — bert1

This is the very issue at stake. How can you demonstrate that this is the case? Of course there is something it is like for the robot to see red. It is like having some sensation register and some action occur in response.

I don't understand Nagel's question. Is he asking what it is to be the whole bat, or just it's brain, or what?

And why are we saying "what it's like" rather than "what it is" to be a bat?

And why are we saying "what it's like" rather than "what it is" to be a bat? — Harry Hindu

Because they are different questions. The first is about consciousness, the second is about the definition of 'bat'.

"...what it is like..." looks no more than an odd reification, creating an it where there is none. — Banno

Should we stop saying 'it's raining'?

To make this claim it is necessary for there to be some thing it is to experience red, which is itself a fact, but which is not derivable from the physical facts of seeing red. — Isaac

But you can make the same metaphysical point without 'what it's like' language. For example: one might assert that "It is impossible to derive experiential knowledge of seeing red from the physical facts of seeing red." No 'what it's like' language is necessary if you don't like it.

This is the very issue at stake. How can you demonstrate that this is the case? Of course there is something it is like for the robot to see red. It is like having some sensation register and some action occur in response. — Isaac

Yeah, I wasn't making a metaphysical claim, these were just examples of language use. It was a statement about language. I was pointing out an equation between 'what it's like' language, and the language of experience.

I was pointing out an equation between 'what it's like' language, and the language of experience. — bert1

OK, then yeah, I think sometimes 'what it's like' language is trying to capture experience. But part of the problem is that it acts as a technical referring term in other cases.

Jon Farrell has written an excellent paper on this. The key point being that in order to avoid the critiques of people like Peter Hacker about the use of 'what it's like' in ordinary language, one has to treat the term as a technical one. Yet, as Farrell goes on to argue, the term is not properly technical either in that it was not introduced, it is never defined, and it is not used consistently.

So I think the linguistic issue is actually central. Something unjustified is being 'snuck in' by alternatating between saying it is a technical term not at all like other uses of the word 'like', but then when pressed for a definition, resorting to "oh, you all know what I'm talking about" as if, again, it were an ordinary use term.

I just don't experience things like that. I've never felt like there's something which it is like to be me. How the hell am I supposed to tell? — fdrake

It's just the qualitative properties of your experiences. You must have qualitative properties to your experiences.

I don't understand Nagel's question. Is he asking what it is to be the whole bat, or just it's brain, or what? — Harry Hindu

The qualitative properties of the bat's experiences, from the bat's perspective.

I think the natural language use and techincal use (if there is such a distinction) intersect in, for example, the following reasonably natural exchange between two people at the beach:

Jack: I wonder what it would be like to be a seagull?
Jill: Fantastic, I would imagine. The feeling of swooping through the air, the effortless traversing of long distances. Pecking people, nicking chips. I'd love it.
Jack: I dunno, it might not feel like how you imagine at all. We're very different from seagulls. It's like trying to imagine what it's like to be a snail, we're just too different.
Jill: Maybe, but even though I can't imagine what it is like to be a snail, I reckon there is still something it is like to be a snail, even though I'm not sure what. I think they have nerves don't they?
Jack: Sure. Not like rocks though, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. No nerves or even cells, so they couldn't possibly have experiences.
Jill: Agreed, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. Although some philosophers think there is according to my friend bert1.

Does anyone not understand what these two people are saying?

It's just the qualitative properties of your experiences. You must have qualitative properties to your experiences. — Terrapin Station

It's not though. Not in Jackson, not in Chalmers, not in Lewis, Byrne, Janzen. In all of these uses, and the use it is put to here, it constitutes more than just the qualitative properties of your experiences (where qualitative is meant as in subjective judgement, feeling). The feeling one has when experiencing something is entirely measurable and comminicable "it made me feel happy". The argument of Jackson is that the facts there are non-physical. The argument of Chalmers is that they cannot be reduced to physical mental states, even in theory...

Having been so often accused by you of reading comprehension issues, the first thing I did before responding was to look up 'qualitative' in my dictionary, to check that there wasn't some odd way it's sometimes used that you might mean. The first definition was "relating to what something or someone is like". It's like a disease people have, some compulsion maybe to write anything difficult to explain off as 'what it's like'

It's not though. Not in Jackson, not in Chalmers, not in Lewis, Byrne, Janzen. In all of these uses, and the use it is put to here, it constitutes more than just the qualitative properties of your experiences (where qualitative is meant as in subjective judgement, feeling). The feeling one has when experiencing something is entirely measurable and comminicable "it made me feel happy". The argument of Jackson is that the facts there are non-physical. The argument of Chalmers is that they cannot be reduced to physical mental states, even in theory... — Isaac

Your reading comprehension problem here: somehow you read me as implying something about "physical" versus "nonphysical." I didn't imply anything about that, and my comment has nothing to do with that.

Seriously, you've got to be one of the most annoying posters I've ever encountered because all you want to do is argue, but I don't think I've ever seen you respond to a single thing where you're not instead just exhibiting reading comprehension problems.

Usually I'd try to be more gentle and more or less ignore the reading comprehension problems, but you just won't stop trying to argue.

And by the way, no, "qualitative" does not denote a subjective judgment. Qualitative refers to properties (just not quantitative properties).

Anyway, how about intentionally trying to not argue with everything? That might work better.

less a color or a thing, therefore, than a difference between things and colors, a momentary crystallization of colored being or of visibility." (The Visible and the Invisible) — StreetlightX

Thanks for the quote! I think there are multiple differences.

1. The difference between the color and the thing
2. The difference between red and other colors
3. The difference between orange-red, true-red, and purplish red
4. The difference between saturated and unsaturated red

And maybe more.

Does anyone not understand what these two people are saying? — bert1

Yes, obviously. As I've just cited, whole papers have been written by eminent philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists entirely on the subject of the fact that 'what it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience.

Jack: I wonder what it would be like to be a seagull?
Jill: Fantastic, I would imagine. The feeling of swooping through the air, the effortless traversing of long distances. Pecking people, nicking chips. I'd love it. — bert1

All the answers Jill gives here are measurable brain states. She's answering the question with an attitudinal judgement. "I'd like it" essentially. She's using her past experience to literally image what it would be like (as in most similar to) in her experience and reporting what her feelings were related to those things. If this were the case then we do know what it is like to be a bat.

I dunno, it might not feel like how you imagine at all. We're very different from seagulls. It's like trying to imagine what it's like to be a snail, we're just too different.
Jill: Maybe, but even though I can't imagine what it is like to be a snail, I reckon there is still something it is like to be a snail, even though I'm not sure what. — bert1

Now they are both changing the meaning. It was previously answered as "what in your experience is it most similar to and how did you feel about that?" but now, such an interpretation would not make sense "what (in the seagull's/snail's experience) is it most like to have the seagull's/snail's experience?" it's become nonsense.

Not like rocks though, there's nothing it's like to be a rock. — bert1

Now jack does know again this previously ineffable fact. Where before some barrier prevented him from knowing what it was like to be a snail, that barrier has now confidently been removed simply because rocks don't have nerve endings. But is 'what it's like' simply the having of nerve endings, the signals coming therefrom? Apparently not.

whole papers have been written by eminent philosophers, cognitive scientists and psychologists entirely on the subject of the fact that 'what it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience. — Isaac

Did you give an example of a paper that you believe is claiming that "'What it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"?

Did you give an example of a paper that you believe is claiming that "'What it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"? — Terrapin Station

What It's Like to Freakin' Hate the Phrase: "What It's Like"

Chapter 1:

:lol:

it seems to be more of a reification. — Janus

Concur.

Qualia: what gets invented when “representation” isn’t good enough.

Did you give an example of a paper that you believe is claiming that "'What it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"? — Terrapin Station

Yes.

You’re going way out of the way to import much deeper metaphysical baggage to this really ordinary way of talking than is called for, which makes it look like you’re just looking for something to disagree with just to win the argument, when nothing you’re saying in “rebuttal” disagrees with anything I’m saying so I really see no need for that. — Pfhorrest

I don't think that's right. That we 'have experiences with content' in a pre-technical sense is uncontroversial. What's controversial about it is that as soon as we start describing it in a philosophical context, there's always lots of conceptual baggage. When "the content of our experiences" is transposed into this kind of discussion, rather than the usual stuff we do when we ask "how was your day?" or "how was that for you?" and answer it, we bring an interpretive style to it; a framing of the 'facts of first person experience'; what gets rejected or strongly questioned is the framing, rather than the facts.

Say I perform some mindfulness exercise (an instance of active attentive meditation @Wayfarer) and my current experiential state is attended to, I'll always have some focus (some things are attended with more intensity than others), colours are on objects; I recognise, say, the colour of my walls as white, but I perform such a cognitive act during the perception. I'm currently listening to a podcast, and my awareness keeps switching between what I hear, what I see, and what I think about while writing. Much of this is transparent, when I'm typing the thing I notice is the tactile feedback of the keyboard, but other than that I'm in some reflective flow state (interrupted by misphrasings, imprecisions, cool stuff on the podcast).

Even that description contextualises the "first person facts" of experience as occurring over time and leveraging historical understandings (why do I see the wall as white? Why do I automatically understand the words coming into my ears? Or write the next sentence as is?) an experiential context that I am currently in. Focussing on "what is it like" for me is an extremely artificial cognitive state, requiring effort to maintain. It removes most of the texture of the world as I experience it.

So, rather than doubting "what is it like" makes sense as a framing device because I'm being insufficiently attendant to first person phenomenology, I'm doubting that it makes as a framing device partly because how people talk about it just doesn't accurately describe how I experience the world. So I suspect that what people think of when they think of a quale is actually a rather structured concept; generalisations of experience, instances of memory, analogies; much different from the sort of stuff 'simply attending to your first person experience" is supposed to reveal.

And when you take all this texture as a given, inherent in a first person experience, all the hows fall away due to the framing of the intellectual exercise... so it's no longer surprising that it appears to be a "brute fact" or a "given" of experience, because the priming for interpreting experience induced by "what is it like" hides that it's ultimately a philosophical-intellectual exercise, rather than derived from a state of "pure self awareness".

What's even more fun is that if you actually artificially make someone just experience nothing but a saturated, unstructured color field - as with a Ganzfeld - the closest thing to the mytical color patch - you end up hallucinating. Color patch thought experiments are literally insane. 'What it is like', is visual madness.

lol - you're not going to say which paper that was supposed to be?