I cannot agree that existence is absurd. I believe the empirical evidence clearly shows that life has purpose and meaning. I can't go into the reasons for this yet. I must finish my contra Hume papers first. — Ron Cram

Fair enough. The forum would be no fun if we all agreed.

You are an amusing conversationalist. I certainly hope the Amazon truck that runs you over is not delivering another load of books to my house. — Ron Cram

Thanks. And I also love my 'primed' books waiting on the porch.

Hume never grasped this important distinction and Hume admitted that he never understood motion, force, power and energy. Indeed, these things cannot be understood until you understand the difference between primary and secondary qualities. The problem persists among the followers of Hume. None of them seem the slightest bit interested in understanding Hume's failures. — Ron Cram

You may be right about Hume on this issue. I don't know. But in general I'm personally less interested in a philosopher's failures than in his or her successes.

Of course I do like Hume. We do seem to have gut-level feelings about various thinkers. In the end, though, I'm more interested in the ideas than in their sources.

As far as the physics concepts go, I'm familiar, especially with the Newtonian stuff. I like differential equations and numerical analysis. I like simulations. But I don't see how it gets around Hume. A differential equation is just something we project on recorded experience, expecting it to apply to future experiences. Newton's 'law' of cooling, for instance, is just a general description of what we are used to and therefore 'irrationally' expect. I don't see how we can purely logically exclude the coffee that never cools in the freezer or the snowball that never melts in the equatorial sun.

I might be wrong, but I have the sense that you aren't grasping the problem of induction, which means you are missing out on a real mindbender.

But in general I'm personally less interested in a philosopher's failures than in his or her successes. — joshua

Normally, I am as well. I've been struck by the complete failure of the Treatise Book 1 to add anything to our store of philosophical knowledge. Hume's epistemology and metaphysics are wrong at every point. I once told a friend that I could go through Book 1 and put each of Hume's propositional statements in one or more of five categories:
1. Patently absurd
2. Demonstrably false
3. Self-contradictory
4. Intentionally obscure
5. Trivially true

I don't blame Hume for some of his passages that are intentionally obscure. He held views that would not be welcomed in an age when excommunication was a thing to be feared.

I might be wrong, but I have the sense that you aren't grasping the problem of induction, which means you are missing out on a real mindbender. — joshua

The mindbender only exists if one doubts the existence of an external world. If our perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes, as Hume argues, then a snowball that never melts on the equator would be possible. But if an external world actually exists, then it cannot. Because an external world exists, we actually know what happens to H2O when it is frozen or heated. We know how temperature changes impact the chemical bonds and how molecules change shape at different temperatures. And we understand the second law of thermodynamics. It is a real natural law and it is never violated on cosmic scales and rarely on much smaller scales.

I once told a friend that I could go through Book 1 and put each of Hume's propositional statements in one or more of five categories:
1. Patently absurd
2. Demonstrably false
3. Self-contradictory
4. Intentionally obscure
5. Trivially true — Ron Cram

At the risk of being redundant, and assuming in good faith that this is to be interpreted as written, into which of these categories would you put Hume's bundle theory of the self from Book 1 of the Treatise? I guess I'd also like to know why.

No gripes with personal tastes, it's just that his bundle theory stands out to me as something both significant and worthwhile.

At the risk of being redundant, and assuming in good faith that this is to be interpreted as written, into which of these categories would put Hume's bundle theory of the self from Book 1 of the Treatise? — javra

I have already claimed here the ability to prove the existence of an external world. If true, then Hume's bundle theory is demonstrably false. It is demonstrably false because objects actually exist and are "made of" something. The properties inhere due to the objects composition. Said another way, the properties the objects display are a result of the matter the object is made of. In the terms of a physicist, matter is made of molecules consisting in atoms which are composed of quanta. Depending on the composition of the matter, objects will display different density or heaviness, different tensile strength, different temperature characteristics and different rates of decay. All of this has been known for a long time. If we didn't know it, we wouldn't be able to engineer bridges and skyscrapers and jet planes. It is a bit of scandal that Hume is still being read in universities. He isn't right about anything.

Oops. I'm sorry. I read your question incorrectly. I missed the words "of the self."

To answer the question specifically regarding "of the self," I think it would be important to quote Hume himself:

I had entertained some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it would be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good general reason for skepticism, it is at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supplied) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. --Hume

That quote appears in Hume's Appendix to the Treatise. Hume himself recognized that his view on personal identity led to contradictions and absurdities.

You didn't quite reply to my question. But, so to address your latest post via a quote from the former:

It is a real natural law and it is never violated on cosmic scales and rarely on much smaller scales. — Ron Cram

I didn't initially reply to this aspect of the previous post mainly because in my own view Hume is very much on board with this quoted perspective. I find that he is in the sum of his works. His critique of miracles - in which he argues that all supposed miracles have as of yet unknown natural causes - comes to mind, but other potentially better examples abound.

Now, I'm not one to treat Hume as infallible, but to me, at least, in Book 1 he was addressing the logic how we justify our beliefs. His observation (I forget where it was made) that we know that tomorrow not all the leaves of all trees in the world will be on the ground - despite our not having any deductive means of evidencing this - was an epistemological observation. I don't personally find that this observation has any barrings on ontology - other than by illustrating how we know of an external world (and that tomorrow will be much like today) via non-genotypic instinct, or habits, and via induction. But not via logically sound deductions. This aspect of epistemology is to Hume universal, and so it can't be used to justify that there is no external world - not that he ever does.

As a reminder, Hume was not an adherent of Berkeley's philosophy, which devoid of Berkeley's all-perceiving god arguably does amount to the absence of an external world.

All the same, you ask in this thread of what original and good philosophical idea(s) exist in Book 1 of the Treatise.

I'm simply curious to find out how you think that Hume's bundle theory fails.

If true, then Hume's bundle theory is demonstrably false. It is demonstrably false because objects actually exist and are "made of" something. — Ron Cram

Hey, my bad. I guess I should slow down a bit. You do understand that Hume's bundle theory of the self basically states that there is no such thing as a permanent, or immutable, self? I presumed you do on account that you've read Book 1 of the Treatise.

But again, going at a slower pace, do you then presume that the something which objects are made of have a permanent, or immutable, core?

edit: Just in case, as quick references:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity#Bundle_theory_of_the_self

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

If our perceptions only exist in our minds — Ron Cram

Where else would our perceptions reside? Presumably, you don't intend to equate the outside world with any single set of perceptions, so we still need perceptions to be separate from that which generates them.

I have already claimed here the ability to prove the existence of an external world. — Ron Cram

The problem is that unless and until there is at least an outline of this proof, your criticism of Hume sounds rather hollow.

To my way of thinking, subjective idealism isn't a hypothesis about nature but merely a grammatical reminder that we employ empirical criteria in our understanding of each and every concept - even including our representational concepts concerning 'presently unperceived' real objects.

The subjective idealist isn't denying the conclusions of causality, for he isn't denying the intelligibility or epistemological significance of counterfactuals. He is merely insisting that abstract objects and causality are intelligible and even undeniable precisely because they are semantically reducible to actual experiments and to thought experiments whose sense in both cases hinge upon mental and sensory experience, even if definitions of physical concepts in terms of particular sensations are impossible to give.

The idea that a thought experiment or actual experiment can disprove subjective idealism, is therefore an oxymoron as far as the subjective idealist is concerned.

I'm simply curious to find out how you think that Hume's bundle theory fails. — javra

I thought I explained it clearly enough. I must have assumed you had some background information that I shouldn't have assumed. Let me back up and take another run at it.

Hume's bundle theory states that an objects consists of its properties and nothing more. That view would make sense if it were rational to doubt the existence of an external world. Once the external world is proven, then the bundle theory falls apart because the objects exist and have an actual substance. The properties of the object arise from the substance. Physicists and chemists are able to describe the material substance very precisely. We know matter is made up of molecules, atoms of different sizes and that the atoms themselves are made up of quanta (quarks, electrons and photons). We have a chart of elements that tell us about the different types of atoms. Materials made from these elements can be tested to measure their density, tensile strength, temperature characteristics, etc. Knowing the properties of the different materials allows us to engineer vast bridges and amazing skyscrapers. Without this knowledge, engineering like this would not be possible.

In the Treatise, Hume is predominantly a skeptical idealist. From the very beginning, Hume talks about how sensations "arise from unknown causes," exist only in our minds, and cannot be used to prove the existence of an external world. Hume also throws in a few comments that indicate he is a skeptical materialist, that is, that even if we could prove an external world - then we still could not know much of anything about the nature of these objects. The problem is that Hume's irrational skepticism in the Treatise leads him into doubt and despair in 1.4.2 and 1.4.7. There he decides it is better to take on a mitigated skepticism, a kind of on-again, off-again skepticism. This means he will talk more about his skeptical materialism and less about his skeptical idealism. This is the position he takes in his first Enquiry.

In the first Enquiry, Hume begins the book as a skeptical materialist. He lists out a number of things that he believes we cannot possibly know (even though knowledge of many of these had already been demonstrated by natural philosophers before he wrote). Then in Section 119, Hume throws in his "tincture of scepticism" and says that we cannot even know that an external world exists. Most philosophers believe that skeptical idealism and skeptical materialism are mutually exclusive. Hume doesn't take that view.

The fact Hume thinks that it is possible to maintain his bundle theory while being a skeptical materialist just shows how ignorant Hume is regarding natural philosophy. As I've mentioned before, motion, force, energy, etc are all concepts that are very well defined in Galileo, Kepler, Newton and others. Hume never studied natural philosophy. He read Newton but didn't understand him because he never read Galileo or Kepler or Huygens which would have given him the background to understand Newton.

Regarding Hume's bundle theory on personal identity, Hume himself admits that the theory leads to absurdities and contradictions. And he goes on to say that he has no idea how to mend this theory to avoid these contradictions. Anytime a theory leads to absurdities and contradictions, it is recognized as demonstrably false. Hume thinks his theory may be rescued by some minor adjustment. He has no reason to think so.

If I still have not answered your question adequately, please try to ask a specific question based on what I've said here.

Hey, my bad. I guess I should slow down a bit. You do understand that Hume's bundle theory of the self basically states that there is no such thing as a permanent, or immutable, self? I presumed you do on account that you've read Book 1 of the Treatise. — javra

Yes. When I first read the question my eye skipped over the words "of the self" and so I answered based purely on Hume's bundle theory of objects. When I realized my mistake, I provided Hume's quote saying that he understands that his theory of personal identity is not correct and that he cannot find a way to rescue it. Anything that leads to absurdities and contradictions is considered demonstrably false. Hume was optimistic that someone would be able to find a minor adjustment to his theory that would avoid these contradictions and absurdities, but I am not optimistic. It has been 250 years and it hasn't happened yet.

But again, going at a slower pace, do you then presume that the something which objects are made of have a permanent, or immutable, core? — javra

No, all material objects are mutable. The substance objects are made of are well characterized. Take any object to a condensed matter physicist and they can tell you all about the substance and its properties.

Where else would our perceptions reside? — Echarmion

Perhaps I used the wrong phrase here. I should have said that "if perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes."

The problem is that unless and until there is at least an outline of this proof, your criticism of Hume sounds rather hollow. — Echarmion

Yes, I understand there are people such as yourself who want to see this proof. I've given some hints and I will be publishing it next year. In the meantime, you can consider if what I say makes sense of the external world can be proven.

The idea that a thought experiment or actual experiment can disprove subjective idealism, is therefore an oxymoron as far as the subjective idealist is concerned. — sime

This is the argument Hume makes, but he's wrong. Stay tuned.

[...] I provided Hume's quote saying that he understands that his theory of personal identity is not correct and that he cannot find a way to rescue it. — Ron Cram

Yes, I recall that statement. What makes his bundle theory of the self imperfect is the presence of what some might term a unified first person point of view. Still, I can well argue that this imperfection does not in any way invalidate the claim that there is no permanent, immutable, aspect of the self.

Hume's bundle theory states that an objects consists of its properties and nothing more. — Ron Cram

OK, I haven't read him in a very long time. Still, I don't recall him saying that "objects consist of its properties and nothing more". All I recall is his argument for the bundle theory of the self, in which he states that the self is a commonwealth of elements that constantly change.

Can you point out where in his own works Hume claims a bundle theory of objects?

No, all material objects are mutable. The substance objects are made of are well characterized. Take any object to a condensed matter physicist and they can tell you all about the substance and its properties. — Ron Cram

As to modern bundle theory, it does not deny substance, but presents the view, roughly speaking, that substance is composed of an aggregate of properties (such that properties can includes relations, which include causal relations.) The link I previously gave can serve as reference to this.

Also, we are addressing substance within contexts of philosophy, not those of science. It makes for a world of difference. If properties do not inhere into the immutable substance of "apple", for one example, I still fail to see how the modern notions of bundle theory are erroneous? (note, I presume an external world throughout) But I gather this issue addressing bundle theory isn't central to the thread.

Yes, I recall that statement. What makes his bundle theory of the self imperfect is the presence of what some might term a unified first person point of view. Still, I can well argue that this imperfection does not in any way invalidate the claim that there is no permanent, immutable, aspect of the self. — javra

Yes, the unified first person is inescapably contradictory to the bundle theory. Hume saw the contradiction. I'm wondering why you don't? I don't think Hume ever claimed that individuals were immutable. I'm not sure where that is coming from.

OK, I haven't read him in a very long time. Still, I don't recall him saying that "objects consist of its properties and nothing more". All I recall is his argument for the bundle theory of the self, in which he states that the self is a commonwealth of elements that constantly change. — javra

I don't have a quote at my fingertips but the Wikipedia article on Bundle Theory, the one you linked above, has this quote:
"Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundle_theory

Wikipedia has it correctly.

As to modern bundle theory, it does not deny substance, but presents the view, roughly speaking, that substance is composed of an aggregate of properties (such that properties can includes relations, which include causal relations.) The link I previously gave can serve as reference to this. — javra

No, the link you provided supports my claim.

Also, we are addressing substance within contexts of philosophy, not those of science. It makes for a world of difference. — javra

I reject the idea that science and philosophy are investigating different subjects when investigating the substance of material objects.

I don't think Hume ever claimed that individuals were immutable. — Ron Cram

No, Hume's bundle theory of the self claims that there is no immutable self - which is what I've previously stated.

What I asked is where Hume specifies a bundle theory of objects.

I don't have a quote at my fingertips but the Wikipedia article on Bundle Theory, the one you linked above, has this quote:
"Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."

Wikipedia has it correctly. — Ron Cram

Its not a long article, form the same article:

"The bundle theory of substance explains compresence. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a substance. Thus, it determines substancehood empirically by the togetherness of properties rather than by a bare particular or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others."

No, Hume's bundle theory of the self claims that there is no immutable self - which is what I've previously stated. — javra

I don't think Hume said anything about immutability in his theory of self.

"The bundle theory of substance explains compresence. Specifically, it maintains that properties' compresence itself engenders a substance. Thus, it determines substancehood empirically by the togetherness of properties rather than by a bare particular or by any other non-empirical underlying strata. The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others." — javra

This is not Hume's theory of substance. Notice that Hume's name does NOT appear in that list. Here's the quote I provided in context. It occurs right at the beginning of the article. You will see that Hume is named.

"Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes.

"According to bundle theory, an object consists of its properties and nothing more: thus neither can there be an object without properties nor can one even conceive of such an object; for example, bundle theory claims that thinking of an apple compels one also to think of its color, its shape, the fact that it is a kind of fruit, its cells, its taste, or at least one other of its properties. Thus, the theory asserts that the apple is no more than the collection of its properties. In particular, there is no substance in which the properties are inherent."

Again, notice the words "consists only" in the first paragraph. Notice the second paragraph says "an object consists of its properties and nothing more." This is Hume's Bundle Theory.

You asked for a quote directly from the Treatise. Here's a quote from 1.1.6:
"I would fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be derived from the impressions of sensations or of reflection? If it be conveyed to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I perceive none will assert, that substance is a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea, of substance must therefore be derived from an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our passions and emotions: none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it."

If Hume was a student of the natural philosophers, he would have learned that natural philosophers had a very good conception of substance and very clear reasons why color and taste are secondary qualities. It is obvious that Hume is trying to preserve his Pyrrhonism and trying to continue his doubt about the existence of an external world. Remember that Hume teaches that sensations of color, taste, etc arise in the mind "from unknown causes."

If our perceptions arise in our minds from unknown causes, as Hume argues, then a snowball that never melts on the equator would be possible. But if an external world actually exists, then it cannot. — Ron Cram

Why not? Because it's not the sort of thing that has happened so far?

And what do we know about $H_2 O$ that isn't based on our past experience? Our entire theory of molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles is a codification of the patterns we have found to hold so far (or since we've been checking.) [If someone did observe a violation, we probably wouldn't believe, them, though.] So saying that the snowball must melt because the electron must do X etc. only shifts the issue to electrons. Why should electrons continue to behave as they have?

The bundle theory of substance thus rejects the substance theories of Aristotle, Descartes, and more recently, J. P. Moreland, Jia Hou, Joseph Bridgman, Quentin Smith, and others." — javra


This is not Hume's theory of substance. Notice that Hume's name does NOT appear in that list. — Ron Cram

Why would Hume appear in a list of individuals whose theories of substance the bundle theory of substance rejects?

You asked for a quote directly from the Treatise. Here's a quote from 1.1.6: — Ron Cram

Greatly appreciative of that. I'm now content, and actually happy to see that he did write something regarding a bundle theory of substance - and not just of self. So I acknowledge being wrong in remembering him to only address the bundle theory of the self. But we obviously interpret his comments in considerably different ways.

As an aside, the IEP says

" here it is important to remember that, in addition to cause and effect, the mind naturally associates ideas via resemblance and contiguity. Hume does not hold that, having never seen a game of billiards before, we cannot know what the effect of the collision will be. Rather, we can use resemblance, for instance, to infer an analogous case from our past experiences of transferred momentum, deflection, and so forth. We are still relying on previous impressions to predict the effect and therefore do not violate the Copy Principle. We simply use resemblance to form an analogous prediction. And we can charitably make such resemblances as broad as we want. Thus, objections like: Under a Humean account, the toddler who burned his hand would not fear the flame after only one such occurrence because he has not experienced a constant conjunction, are unfair to Hume, as the toddler would have had thousands of experiences of the principle that like causes like, and could thus employ resemblance to reach the conclusion to fear the flame. "

https://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/

I am not a Hume expert, i'm just a googler. But doesn't this defence of Hume miss the point, or at least fail to stress the epistemological target of Hume's argument?

Assuming Hume was a rational and non-superficial thinker, he would have granted the possibility that we can "infer" causal relationships even without appeal to resemblance. For example, when a baby is first born, it might initially behave instinctively to avoid fire, implying that it already has a concept of causation.

Surely, any behaviour, especially avoidance behaviour, can be interpreted as embodying a causal understanding of the world, even when the behaviour is without precedent and there are no earlier resemblances to draw upon.

The dispute I'm raising here, concerns conflicting interpretations of 'having' knowledge. On a behavioural interpretation of knowledge, the fire-avoiding baby might be said to "already know" that fire hurts. Yet on a mentalistic, verbal or otherwise representational interpretation of knowledge, the fire-avoiding baby is completely ignorant of fire hurting, even when it instinctively acts to avoid fire.

So assuming Hume was a good philosopher, his concepts of resemblance and constant-conjunction must have been mental concepts referring to the mentalistic interpretation of knowledge, where they make sense. For instance, in our modern world of virtual reality it might be the case that we instinctively avoid virtual fire as we might also instinctively avoid virtual spiders and virtual snakes, even though we consciously appreciate, via resemblence and constant-conjunction, that these virtual entities are likely to be harmless.

Why not? Because it's not the sort of thing that has happened so far? — joshua

Because of physical necessity. We understand the temperature characteristics of snow and of snowballs. We understand that the temperature at the equator is above 32 degrees. We understand snow begins to melt above 32 degrees. We understand why snow melts above 32 degrees because we understand the physical necessity of it.

And what do we know about H2OH2O that isn't based on our past experience? Our entire theory of molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles is a codification of the patterns we have found to hold so far (or since we've been checking.) [If someone did observe a violation, we probably wouldn't believe, them, though.] So saying that the snowball must melt because the electron must do X etc. only shifts the issue to electrons. Why should electrons continue to behave as they have? — joshua

Because of cause and effect due to physical necessity. Each step in the process is well understood. It is like the physical necessity of one billiard ball forcing another billiard ball to move. It can be clearly observed.

I am not a Hume expert, i'm just a googler. But doesn't this defence of Hume miss the point, or at least fail to stress the epistemological target of Hume's argument? — sime

The defense of Hume in IEP is accurate to a point. However, it fails to consider the fact of physical necessity shown by natural philosophers Galileo, Kepler and others that Hume never read. If Hume had read them, then he would have had the foundation to understand Newton's law of cause and effect. Hume's doubt of an external world is his stumbling block. If the doubt is removed, then Hume would be free to investigate physical necessity.

So assuming Hume was a good philosopher, his concepts of resemblance and constant-conjunction must have been mental concepts referring to the mentalistic interpretation of knowledge, where they make sense. For instance, in our modern world of virtual reality it might be the case that we instinctively avoid virtual fire as we might also instinctively avoid virtual spiders and virtual snakes, even though we consciously appreciate, via resemblence and constant-conjunction, that these virtual entities are likely to be harmless. — sime

Hume was not a good philosopher. He was writing as a skeptical idealist and so you are correct that Hume's concepts are mental concepts. Hume could not consider physical necessity as long as he doubted the existence of the external world.

Greatly appreciative of that. I'm now content — javra

Your welcome.

Cool.

Noticed in this thread that you nitpick what to reply to in relation to my posts. Leaves me to believe that you might not address other's writings, such as Hume's, with a fair sense of impartiality. Can you provide any reference to Hume being a "skeptical idealist"? Or else one that critiques Hume as "doubting the existence of an external world"? Fallible though I am, these complaints seem idiosyncratic.

Can you provide any reference to Hume being a "skeptical idealist"? Or else one that critiques Hume as "doubting the existence of an external world"? Fallible though I am, these complaints seem idiosyncratic. — javra

I will be happy to give you some things to read. First, Hume is difficult to interpret which makes him difficult to categorize. This is due in part to Hume's self-contradictory statements, called antinomies, in the philosophy literature.

Hume's Antinomies by Manfred Kuehn
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/389183/pdf

In an Introduction to Hume's writings, Selby-Bigge writes:

“Hume’s philosophic writings are to be read with great caution. His pages, especially those in the Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many different things in so many different ways and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine…. This makes it easy to find all philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement against another, none at all.” - L. A. Selby-Bigge, Introduction to the Enquiries, p. viii. (2nd ed., 1902).

So Hume is harder to categorize than most philosophers. What I have said in this thread is that Hume is primarily a skeptical idealist in the Treatise, although he also wrote some comments that qualify as skeptical materialist in the same book. I have characterized Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as primarily skeptical materialist although Section 119 is clearly skeptical idealism.

I use the term "skeptical idealism" because I think it fits. The link below is by G.J. Mattey, a philosopher from UC Davis. He clearly views to Hume as skeptical idealist. He writes:

The various forms of idealism and realism are based on two other sets of opposing high-level concepts:
* dogmatic/skeptical/critical
* transcendental/empirical
Kant thought that all earlier varieties of idealism were either dogmatic or skeptical. This distinction is one of philosophical methodology. The dogmatic procedure attempts to establish the truth of principles a priori, based on the analysis of philosophical concepts. Dogmatism itself is the attempt to do so without a previous critique of the powers of human reason. Criticism, then, is the "necessary preparation for a thoroughly grounded metaphysics" which itself is subject to the dogmatic procedure (Bxxxv). Skepticism, on the other hand, is a response to the failure of dogmatism, and it denies the possibility of a priori metaphysical principles. Wolff is held up as a paradigmatic practitioner of dogmatism, Hume of skepticism, and Kant himself of criticism.

Kant sought to refute Hume. Although he did a poor job, he certainly viewed Hume as a skeptical idealist.
See http://hume.ucdavis.edu/mattey/kant/IDEALISM.HTM

The term skeptical idealism also has a certain symmetry with Hume's later predominant position of skeptical materialism. Stephen Buckle has written of Hume's skeptical materialism.

Hume's Sceptical Materialism by Stephen Buckle
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20185271.pdf?casa_token=cbmMsRzTA5sAAAAA:UbkipmAgRxfwVyFkHUYzY9VZc77g8Kubv4BaGR0SqVJ6Ou81naiR2jwZKSH4M71n8tRg8Dx5chEVoEzxHkXPmYHeUzNH3_sTSz8IgdrksUQ0Sawl_8c

Because of cause and effect due to physical necessity. Each step in the process is well understood. It is like the physical necessity of one billiard ball forcing another billiard ball to move. It can be clearly observed. — Ron Cram

From my perspective, you are missing the point entirely.

That we all 'project' necessary connection or physical necessity is not in dispute. Our minds seem built to do just that. The point is that this is so automatic that even understanding the problem of induction is difficult. It's not only conceptually difficult (but it's too 'close' to us), but it's also difficult in terms of motivation. First it offends our metaphysical urge toward a reliable theory of existence. Second, there is no practical payoff. Since we are going to keep on projecting necessity automatically even after realizing its metaphysical baselessness, why should anyone bother to suffer a perception of this baselessness? In my guts I believe in the 'laws' of nature, even though I can see that such 'laws' are merely 'irrational' expectations. And I see that we simultaneously define not only rationality but sanity itself in terms of sharing these expectations. The problem of induction reveals the 'animality ' of our thinking. When the bell rings, we salivate. But we are more elaborate than dogs, so we express that salivation in differential equations.

That we all 'project' necessary connection or physical necessity is not in dispute. Our minds seem built to do just that. The point is that this is so automatic that even understanding the problem of induction is difficult. It's not only conceptually difficult (but it's too 'close' to us), but it's also difficult in terms of motivation. — joshua

I'm not missing the point at all. My second paper contra Hume will discuss in detail the fact we can observe cause and effect and that we can know causation is from physical necessity. But I will not be the first person to write such a paper. See
Ducasse, Curt J. "On the nature and the observability of the causal relation." The Journal of Philosophy 23.3 (1926): 57-68.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2014377.pdf?casa_token=ggnTBa3vcIIAAAAA:_IfujdK5d1dYpLjVfdeywH3iR_YU1zbOojcAT1JfUhOHiW_wG4MT2A1RUGGrWBVL03l28UlejQOVPjSEmfXNBkmWlcS3LM3ph4LbVbpq71j1teiXlw

In my guts I believe in the 'laws' of nature, even though I can see that such 'laws' are merely 'irrational' expectations. — joshua

No, they are not irrational. Not believing in the laws of nature is irrational. Consider for example the law of floatation. The law of floatation explains why a big metal battleship floats and a needle sinks. Because we understand the law, we can engineer battleships. If the law was not real, and was only a matter of our imagination as Hume says, then we could not reliably engineer battleships to float.
See https://www.reference.com/science/law-flotation-863f4c00172608f

If the law was not real, and was only a matter of our imagination as Hume says, then we could not reliably engineer battleships to float. — Ron Cram

But the problem is this move from 'battleships have floated' to 'battleships will float.' I do not deny that we just can't take this problem seriously. I emphasize that, yes, it is intellectual candy. But that's just what's fascinating. We have complete gut-level trust in the uniformity of nature, despite not having any 'metaphysical' support for this trust. The mighty edifice of science is built on a faith that runs in our blood. I say this as a lover and student of science who also likes philosophy.

The uniformity of nature is the principle that the course of nature continues uniformly
the same, e.g. if X is the cause Y, then Y will necessarily exist whenever X exists. In particular,
the uniformities observed in the past will hold for the present and future as well. Hume’s query
in Inquiry IV/ii is whether our belief in this principle is founded on reason or not.
After rejecting the notion that its certainty derives from demonstrative reason (because
there is no contradiction in the thought that nature does not continue uniformly the same), Hume asks whether it can be supposed to rest on probable (i.e. empirical) reason. He argues that this assumption leads us into a vicious circle, and therefore must be false... — paper

https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/modern05/Hume_on_empirical_reasoning.pdf



Also, thanks for the links. But please just quote or paraphrase the points you'd like to make. I need to know how you interpret whatever you link me to. I could be wrong, but I'm still not convinced that you are even seeing the problem. Perhaps you could paraphrase the problem as you see it. That might help me locate the disconnect.

But the problem is this move from 'battleships have floated' to 'battleships will float.' — joshua

No. It isn't that "battleships will float" as if battleships suddenly appear out of the blue, but we know how to make battleships float because we discovered the law of floatation. Why pretend that we don't know the things we know with certainty? What makes you think there is any value to humanity in that?

In particular, the uniformities observed in the past will hold for the present and future as well. Hume’s query in Inquiry IV/ii is whether our belief in this principle is founded on reason or not. — paper

The paper you quoted is describing Hume's thought, but it isn't defending Hume's thought. At least the portion quoted is not defending Hume. Hume thinks it is not possible to demonstrate the uniformity of nature "because there is no contradiction in the thought that nature does not continue uniformly the same." But just because there is no contradiction doesn't mean that it cannot be demonstrated in another way. I'm explaining to you how the uniformity of nature can be demonstrated and it relates to what we call "the laws of nature." We understand the physical necessity of these laws, such as the law of floatation. Once you understand the physical necessity behind the laws, then you understand why it is necessary and why it can be called a law of nature and why it isn't one way one time and a different way the next. Hume never understood the physical necessity because he never studied the natural philosophers like Galileo, Kepler, Boyle and Huygens. If he had, and if he wasn't committed to his skeptical idealism, then he might have understood Newton.

The problem as I see it is that Hume is a bad philosopher. None of his original thoughts are true or beneficial. The problem is that philosophy has followed Hume into this dark place where it is at odds with science. I believe in the unity of reality. That is, science and philosophy are both inquiring into the nature of reality, the same reality. Philosophy has a role to play just as science has a role to play. But philosophy has badly misplayed its role. Now there is tension between science and philosophy. This is the fault of philosophy, not science. Philosophy should be helping science think clearly about the standards of science, about the meaning of scientific discoveries, about new things science can investigate, about how to make life better for the greatest number of people. Philosophy has a very important role but it has become more of a hindrance to science than a help right now. Philosophy will not progress out of its current state of darkness until Hume is seen as entirely refuted.

No. It isn't that "battleships will float" as if battleships suddenly appear out of the blue, but we know how to make battleships float because we discovered the law of floatation. Why pretend that we don't know the things we know with certainty? What makes you think there is any value to humanity in that? — Ron Cram

The assumption is unscientific. If we apply the stipulation battleship will necessarily float, we place our own concepts about the battleship over how any given battleship behaves.

We have an idea of how battleship must behave which will lead us astray if we encounter instances of battleships which behave differently. Instead of allowing the state we observe to set what it does, we come in with out prejudice any battleship must float, simply because that's what other ones have done.