The assumption is unscientific. If we apply the stipulation battleship will necessarily float, we place our own concepts about the battleship over how any given battleship behaves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The issue here isn't that I'm claiming that every battleship will always float, but that we know how to make battleships float. Unerringly. We know. If a particular battleship doesn't float, we can investigate what went wrong and then we will know that too. There is no guesswork here. This is engineering based on science, not science fiction or imagination. Why pretend we don't know things with certainty when we obviously do?

But that's the assumption: that all battleships will work like this, such that any which don't float have some kind of problem explicable in these rules. Hume's point is we might encounter a battleship which fails to behave as stated in our laws. For example, a battleship which appears with all the features of one which out laws expect will float, but then behaves differently.

The point is that when we ascribe that battleships necessarily behave as per these laws, we start to engage in guesswork. We guess that all instances of a battleship must behave this way, rather than respecting a given battleship defines it.

It's not that we do not know, even with a certainty, that some battleships behave a certain way.

Rather, it is our concept of necessary behaviour is being stated in the wrong terms. We can know, with certainty, but only when we grasp how a given individual state behaviour. We cannot substitute out the existence of a state with our concepts and laws.

But that's the assumption: that all battleships will work like this, such that any which don't float have some kind of problem explicable in these rules. Hume's point is we might encounter a battleship which fails to behave as stated in our laws. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I know that is what Hume thinks. That's why he is a bad philosopher. It is impossible for a battleship to behave contrary to the law of floatation. How do I know this? Because we understand the concept of physical necessity. Hume did not understand this because he did not read the natural philosophers.

Rather, it is our concept of necessary behaviour is being stated in the wrong terms. We can know, with certainty, but only when we grasp how a given individual state behaviour. We cannot substitute out the existence of a state with our concepts and laws. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't understand what you are trying to say here. It is the last sentence that baffles me. What do you mean exactly? Why would you think that?

That's why he's one of the best metaphysicians and scientists.

He doe not allow our concepts to override the question of what they world is doing.

We cannot have a concept which delivers all information about future states. Hume is rejecting these natural philosophers because they put our ideas above how the world behaves.

Hume rejects physical necessity because it requires ignoring the difference between our concepts and what constitutes an existing state. It must suppose existing states to be given by our concepts, rather than recognising they are they own beings who may or may not behave a we expect.

Hume is rejecting these natural philosophers because they put our ideas above how the world behaves. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Hume is not rejecting the natural philosophers, he is ignorant of them. He only read Newton and he doesn't understand him.

Hume is outright rejecting the claim you ascribe to these natural philosophers, physical necessity.

It's not a question of ignorance of concept in the sense of never having come across it. Hume is actively taking a metaphysical position that physical necessity is impossible on the grounds the world is distinct from our concepts, that states are their own author, rather than being determined by what we think they must be.

Hume is actively taking a metaphysical position that physical necessity is impossible on the grounds the world is distinct from our concepts. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Can you provide a quote where Hume says that?

Since Hume was a skeptical materialist (when he wasn't being a skeptical idealist) I very much doubt that Hume would be so dogmatic as to say either that physical necessity is impossible or that the world is distinct from our concepts.

First, Hume is difficult to interpret which makes him difficult to categorize. — Ron Cram

OK. So he is difficult to categorize. Yet this directly contradicts your stance throughout this thread that the proper way to categorize Hume is obvious. I get the sense that this too will be ignored by you. But I find it very significant.

This is due in part to Hume's self-contradictory statements, called antinomies, in the philosophy literature. — Ron Cram

Antinomies are not logical contradictions; they're two or more conclusions that are each equally well justified yet appear to contradict each other. To me, Hume's greatest antimony, so to speak, is his justification that free will and determinism not only coexist but require each other. But this doesn't make him contradictory to himself, i.e. self-contradictory, this makes him a compatibilist.

Likewise, he was neither an obvious idealist nor an obvious materialist. With both SEP and Wikipedia as references, Hume is commonly considered a neutral monist. This conclusion is not devoid of criticism, but it is what most subscribe to. In this light there are no contradictions in his philosophical works as regards idealism and materialism.

I can't grasp why it is that you're so certain of what was going on in Hume's head. Especially when you characterize him as someone who is difficult to categorize.

OK. So he is difficult to categorize. Yet this directly contradicts your stance throughout this thread that the proper way to categorize Hume is obvious. I get the sense that this too will be ignored by you. But I find it very significant. — javra

I say he is difficult to categorize, not in the sense that it is difficult for me, but in the sense that different philosophers put him in different categories. There is no agreement about the right category. Kant sees him as a skeptical idealist. Buckle sees him as a skeptical materialist. I see him as both even though most philosophers think the two categories are mutually exclusive. Many other people put him in entirely different categories. The most errant category of them all is British Empiricist. The great British Empiricists are Bacon, Boyle, Locke and Newton. Hume is nothing like them.

Antinomies are not logical contradictions; they're two or more conclusions that are each equally well justified yet appear to contradict each other. To me, Hume's greatest antimony, so to speak, is his justification that free will and determinism not only coexist but require each other. But this doesn't make him contradictory to himself, i.e. self-contradictory, this makes him a compatibilist. — javra

Hume certainly is a compatibilist. But he is so about things when they truly are mutually exclusive.

Likewise, he was neither an obvious idealist nor an obvious materialist. With both SEP and Wikipedia as references, Hume is commonly considered a neutral monist. This conclusion is not devoid of criticism, but it is what most subscribe to. In this light there are no contradictions in his philosophical works as regards idealism and materialism. — javra

Neutral monism is not a view that Hume ever used for himself as the term was coined only after he died. Hume certainly did embrace skepticism.

I can't grasp why it is that you're so certain of what was going on in Hume's head. Especially when you characterize him as someone who is difficult to categorize. — javra

Hume says that his philosophy in the Treatise and in his first Enquiry are the same, that the manner is different but not the matter. Some people read the Treatise and try to interpret the Enquiry to fit the Treatise. Others read the Enquiry and try to interpret the Treatise fit the Enquiry. For me, the key is found in the Treatise 1.4.7. This is the passage in which Hume talks about his doubts about his own philosophy and then claims the answer is to "doubt your doubts" and "not think" about the contradictions and difficulties. That is the approach Hume takes in the Enquiry. He is following his own advice. He never discusses his doubts or how his philosophy is unlivable. As a result, the Enquiry appears to be less skeptical than the Treatise. And then Hume throws his "tincture of Pyrrhonism" in Section 119. It all fits. Now the Treatise and Enquiry can be said to have the same philosophy even though EHU reads like it is much less skeptical than THM. That's why I'm certain of how to interpret Hume. My interpretation fits both his words and what he wrote about his philosophy.

If you haven't read the Treatise Book 1, you will never understand Hume. You must pay special attention to 1.1.1., 1.1.2, 1.4.2 and 1.4.7.

No, philosophers were unable to refute Hume's claim that the external world cannot be demonstrated. — Ron Cram

Hume's claim that the external world cannot be demonstrated? Okay, let's indulge on this.
May I ask what this means to you, if Hume said this? What does it mean to demonstrate the external world.
Thanks in advance.