Because they are contingent on a subject's will, whether that will is a human, animal, rock, Reason or God. — bert1

I figured. Perhaps the word to be used there is 'intrinsic' - and then point one also falls apart, as it permits both.

I have little idea what you're saying in most of the initial post you made about this. (That's why I responded with a "Say what?"--a lot of your post came across like gobbledygook to me.)

So I said that I could see saying that valuations are a relation between the individual valuing something and what they're valuing. But the valuation is strictly something mental the individual is doing.

The particulars of the dialogue itself, probably not the foundation of subjectivist condemnation. The dialectical form of the conversation may very well be, however, insofar as, no matter what somebody says, somebody else can find something wrong with it if he puts enough effort into it.

I don’t do religion or its philosophies, so I’ll let the aside be.

Thanks.

The particulars of the dialogue itself, probably not the foundation of subjectivist condemnation. The dialectical form of the conversation may very well be, however, insofar as, no matter what somebody says, somebody else can find something wrong with it if he puts enough effort into it. — Mww

I don't know what you're saying really. Again, I'm skeptical about a claim about how "virtually all contemporary moral philosophers" interpret something. The evidence that would counter my skepticism is evidence of what virtually all (or at least a great many) contemporary moral philosophers say about it.

So we'd need to look at how Kwame Anthony Appiah and Johann Frick and Christine Korsgaard and Alex Guerrero and on and on and on interpret the Euthyphro.

I’m more or less agreeing with you with respect to the claim as stated. Even if I hadn’t read a substantial catalog of moral philosophy, in which there is barely a mention of that Socratic dialectic itself, I’d say it’s pretty unlikely a group of folks like moral philosophers would band together enough to agree that dialectic formed part of their respective philosophies.

The form of the dialectic, however, with substitute conditionals, has been tossed around ever since: is it this because of that or is it that because of this.

God favours the big battalions.
What God favours is necessarily good.
The big battalions are good.

Might is right.

Knowledge, or more precisely, the assumption of knowledge and wisdom is at the forefront of the dialogue. Socrates brings into question the knowledge and wisdom of Meletus for indicting Socrates on charges of corrupting the youth. The conversation quickly turns to Euthyphro's own knowledge and wisdom in bringing charges against his father. In both cases the question of guilt or innocence is left to the jury to decide, which raises questions regarding their own wisdom.

Euthyphro claims to be acting not on his own authority but on the authority of the gods. But in doing so he is appealing to his own authority on divine matters. What he is doing is right because it is what the gods demand of men.

What is at issue is whether Euthyphro has knowledge of divine matters, that is, whether he is an authority on the divine. If Euthyphro is not an authority on such matters, and no one else is either, then the question of the gods' authority is called into question. For how can man appeal to the gods authority if he lacks knowledge of the gods?

Socrates eventually turns from the question of piety to that of justice, for the pious is part of justice (12d). Socrates asks what part it is. Euthyphro's response is revealing. He says:

I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice. (12e)

The part of justice that is concerned with the care of men is left unaddressed. If piety is part of justice than what he is doing cannot be pious if it is not just. Appeal to piety is insufficient grounds for establishing the justice of his actions.

Justice stands above piety. Socrates' words and actions might be seen as impious or atheistic, but if it can be shown that what he says and does is guided by his care for men, then either piety and justice are at odds or what is truly pious must be determined by what is just. Although the question of justice is not addressed, it looms over the dialogue.

Justice stands above piety. — Fooloso4

That's the point. The dialogue is remembered for it's attack on god when it should be remembered for its support for equity.

You say that moral values cannot be the values of just any old subject, such as you and I, because we might disagree, and that would make moral values subjective or contingent in a bad way — Janus

That is absolutely not the argument I made! I think moral values ARE contingent.

Yes, moral values are not the values of just anyone, but just one person - the person whose values they are. A person we can call Reason.

But my basis for that claim is that it is manifest to reason that if you or I value something it is not of necessity thereby morally valuable. Thus, our reason - our faculties of reason - tell us that we ourselves are not the ones whose moral values our reason gives us insight into. That is, our faculty of reason is not another faculty of introspection.

It has nothing to do with the contingency moral values would have if they are the values of a subject. My evidence that my values are not moral values is that my reason tells me that they are not. I may be quite sure I value something, yet that does not settle the matter of whether it is morally valuable. I accept that though I may value xing, that does not entail that it is morally valuable. Again, I accept this because it is manifest to reason. both mine and yours and virtually everyone else who isn't crazy or in the grips of a theory.

I think this is an ongoing problem - rather than looking at the argument I have actually given, you project quite different ones onto me and then, when what I say does not seem consistent with the view you've projected onto me, you insist I am not being clear or making sense!

Anyway,

I have allowed for Reason changing her mind when circumstances demand, but if she were able to simply change her mind even though circumstances have not changed, then she could not be a reliable guide to moral values, unless you allow that they are merely subjective and contingent in a bad way. — Janus

Again, I think moral values ARE contingent. Most contemporary moral philosophers - indeed, most moral philosophers full stop - think they're necessary. Hence why they reject ALL subjectivist views on the basis of Euthyphro-based concerns.

I am a subjectivist. I think moral values and norms are contingent. I reject other kinds of subjectivist view - those that identify moral values with our own - not on the grounds that this would make moral values and norms contingent. No, I reject those views because they are self-evidently false upon reflection. I reject them because if I value something, it is manifestly not thereby made morally valuable - not of necessity, anyway.

You seem fundamentally not to understand the view my arguments have entailed. For you say that Reason would not be a reliable guide to moral value. Er, but moral values ARE her values. So how on earth - how on earth - could she be anything other than the most reliable guide to them?

Who is the most reliable guide to what Bartricks Potter values? Why, Bartricks Potter!

Who is the most reliable guide to what Hugh values? Why Hugh of course!

Who is the most reliable guide to what Reason values? Why Reason of course.

How has reason attempted to tell us about what she values - why she's given us a faculty of reason. So, if you want to find out what Reason values, consult your reason and the reason of others.

Now nothing I have said there engages with the Euthyphro. Hence why I don't see how what you're saying engages with it.

Those who think the Euthyphro criticism is a good one - so, you know, the vast bulk of moral theorists - think it is a good one because they think moral truths are necessary truths.

I think they're wrong about that. But my first point is that unless you agree that moral truths are necessary truths, then you can't use the Euthyphro to try and challenge my view - for you'd be committing theoretical suicide. And I am also pointing out that this is actually true whether you're a subjectivist or an objectivist about morality.

So my first point - my first step - is to wipe the smile off everyone who thinks the Euthyphro is a damning criticism by pointing out that it applies to objectivists and subjectivists alike.

I think 2 is false too. But it is not clearly false. It appears clearly true.

Again, I stress, I reject 2. But I accept that it appears to be true.

Imagine someone committing an obviously immoral deed. Now imagine another possible world, that mirrors this one. And in this other possible world, someone commits an identical deed. Mustn't that one be wrong too? Someone who thought the first was wrong, but the second not, is surely confused?

We'd want them to explain why the first is wrong and the second not. Perhaps they merely appear the same, but the agent of one had a quite different intention to the other. But no, by stipulation, everything is the same in terms of the respective agent's intentions, and in terms of the consequences of the acts, and so on.

Someone who, despite recognising this, insisted that one was right and the other wrong, is, surely, confused? Two acts cannot differ in their morality alone, it would seem.

Do you agree?

This isn't about the dialogue. This is about the criticism - that is standardly titled 'the Euthyphro' of 'the Euthyphro problem' or 'the Euthyphro dilemma' or 'the Euthypro objection' - mentioned in the OP.

Again, this is not about the dialogue 'Euthyphro'. It is about 'the Euthyphro', the name given to an objection a form of which was first made in that dialogue.

Not the dialogue. The argument in the OP. Not the dialogue. Not the dialogue. The argument in the OP. Not the dialogue.

Don't make me go all Mr McGregor on you.

I didn't mention God. My argument entails that moral values are the values of a single subject. Not necessarily God. And the argument - the Euthyphro criticism mentioned in the OP - doesn't mention God. It is an argument against any and all subjectivist views, not just one.

So, throw away your cheap off the peg come-backs and get tailoring.

That is absolutely not the argument I made! I think moral values ARE contingent. — Bartricks

I acknowledged you made the argument that moral values are contingent. Read again, more carefully.

You seem fundamentally not to understand the view my arguments have entailed. For you say that Reason would not be a reliable guide to moral value. Er, but moral values ARE her values. So how on earth - how on earth - could she be anything other than the most reliable guide to them?

Who is the most reliable guide to what Bartricks Potter values? Why, Bartricks Potter!

Who is the most reliable guide to what Hugh values? Why Hugh of course!

Who is the most reliable guide to what Reason values? Why Reason of course.

How has reason attempted to tell us about what she values - why she's given us a faculty of reason. So, if you want to find out what Reason values, consult your reason and the reason of others. — Bartricks

You seem to be both saying that what the faculties of reason of individual subjects consider to be moral values do not constitute moral value on account of the fact of their differences, and that they do constitute moral values on account of the fact that they are faculties of reason.

If all we had to do was consult our faculties of reason about what is morally valuable then there could be no disagreement amongst those who did so and no need to posit Divine Reason. But this is patently untrue; there is, and it seems can be, no such agreement.

I do agree that there is general agreement about the most significant moral values such as prohibition of murder, rape, torture and so on, but I think this is simply on account of the fact that virtually no one, understandably, would want to live in a society that would promote or even condone such acts, and society that did son would not last long. So, no need for Divine Reason, then.

Perhaps you want to draw a distinction between what individual subjects simply value and what they rationally value; but I don't see how you could make that work. The notion of a Divine Reason is too attentuated and remote from the visceral exigencies of human lives as they are lived.

And you haven't addressed the problem with your claim that Reason could simply change her mind (presumably by Divine Fiat) about what she values even though no circumstances had changed, and that we should follow her nonetheless (whatever following her could even mean given the problem of how we could know what Divine Reason values or dis-values).

Ah, he was saying that reason is a subject? I'm not sure how that would make sense to him/wouldn't just be equivocating the word "subject," but I don't suppose I'd get an honest, straightforward answer from him. — Terrapin Station

I've tried hard and failed to get a coherent answer, so I don't think the chances are looking too good.

You really think you're in a position to lecture me on reading carefully? Again: you attributed to me an argument I did not make! I did not argue that moral values are not our values due to this making them contingent! I mean, they're every bit - every bit - as contingent on my view! I repeat, actually read what I say and stop projecting shop-bought views onto me.

If all we had to do was consult our faculties of reason about what is morally valuable then there could be no disagreement amongst those who did so and no need to posit Divine Reason. — Janus

What? How does any of that follow?

I've tried hard and failed to get a coherent answer, so I don't think the chances are looking too good. — Janus

You wouldn't know coherence if it built a house in your bottom. My view is coherent. To show it to be incoherent you'd need to show it to contain a contradiction. Where is that contradiction?

And you haven't addressed the problem with your claim that Reason could simply change her mind (presumably by Divine Fiat) about what she values even though no circumstances had changed, and that we should follow her nonetheless (whatever following her could even mean given the problem of how we could know what Divine Reason values or dis-values) — Janus

Erm, this thread is about that problem. So, I'm addressing it here! That problem - or supposed problem - is the Euthyphro. A problem that is addressed to all subjectivist views. A problem I have outlined in the OP. A problem that I think is not really a problem. The first step to seeing that it is not a problem is seeing that it applies to everyone, objectivists too.

There's really no way I could be confronting the problem more squarely!!!

Justice stands above piety.
— Fooloso4

That's the point. The dialogue is remembered for it's attack on god when it should be remembered for its support for equity. — Banno

As I read it, Socrates' concern is with justice, but that what justice is leads to aporia. It is an example of Socratic or zetetic skepticism. I have never interpreted it as an attack on god but an attack on Euthyphro's assumption of wisdom regarding divine things.

Although Socrates does raise the question of the justice of the gods according to the stories of the poets, such questions are not unique to him, as Euthyphro's responses make clear.

I have never come across anyone competent in such matters who refers to the Euthyphro dilemma as "the Euthyphro". Have you? In any case, it is evident that neither the dialogue nor the dilemma have been understood by someone who relies on bar tricks instead of careful reading, scholarship, and reasoned argument.

Value is a relation between an experiencing subject and the events/objects of their experience. It is neither an inherent property of the subject nor of the event/object. — Possibility

Er, yes, I said that. Me. My argument is that for something to be morally valuable is for it to be the object of a valuing relation. That's my view. Being valuable means featuring as the object of a valuing relation. See the moral subjectivism thread.

My argument is that only a subject - a subject of experiences, a mind - can be the one who is doing the valuing.

Therefore, for something to be morally valuable, it needs to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude.

I then argued that as if I value something it is not necessarily morally valuable, moral values are not my values. That is, though what it takes for something to be morally valuable is for it to be featuring as the object of a subject's valuing attitude, something is not made morally valuable by me valuing it.

Thus, I am not the subject whose values constitute moral values. There is such a subject. But it is demonstrably not me, not you, not one of us.

That's the argument.

You say it fails and then say some things that are entirely consistent with my view. You are presumptuous. You think you already know the argument fails - don't you? Without understanding either my position or understanding that the argument is logically valid, you insist it fails.

It doesn't fail. But if it does fail, it is going to be the Euthyphro that refutes it. Hence this thread.

I have little idea what you're saying in most of the initial post you made about this. (That's why I responded with a "Say what?"--a lot of your post came across like gobbledygook to me.)

So I said that I could see saying that valuations are a relation between the individual valuing something and what they're valuing. But the valuation is strictly something mental the individual is doing. — Terrapin Station

Well then, I appreciate the attempt to connect.

So I don’t assume where you’re coming from, do you regard subjective experience to be informative, or do you draw the line at what can be measured or objectively verified?

What information do you have regarding this ‘something mental’ that the individual is doing?

I have never come across anyone competent in such matters who refers to the Euthyphro dilemma as "the Euthyphro". — Fooloso4

That's because you don't hang out with people competent in these matters. They don't tend to mill about in the park. Anyway, if you prefer to talk about the dialogue Euthyphro - you know, the one whose title you got wrong - then start up a threat to do so. Here the topic is 'the Euthyphro', a problem to do with moral contingency. Read something written by an academic philosopher about it. Note that it is to do with the supposed 'arbitrariness' that identifying moral norms and values with those of a subject (be it me, you, God, a god, anyone) would confer on them. Which is just another way of saying that it is to do with the supposedly troublesome variability that moral norms and values would have if they were the values and prescriptions of a person. That's the problem. The problem I am trying to address here. It is a biggee. Huge.

Then, duly humbled, return with your head hanging in shame and resume trying to best me.

"This"?

I was replying to @Fooloso4, not you.

Your comments have not been interesting enough to warrant a reply.

The point we agree on is that the role of justice in ethics is prior to, or higher than, or of more import than, the role of piety or divine will or... pretty much anything.

Is that right?

Don't forget that moral realism includes all forms of ethical naturalism as well as some of the 'true to archetype' forms of virtue ethics, so the moral realism required for the premise to be acceptable (arguments from authority issues aside) is not specified by the survey. Ethical naturalism particularly would class as realist, but be in opposition to the premise that moral values are not our values.

Then there's realists about morality who don't see morals as values at all but laws, or those who think moral statements are not normative at all but descriptive, those who think morality is a virtue, not a value (but still a non-subjective one). All of whom would still describe themselves as moral realists.

In all, I think the number of philosophers who believe in a non-subjective external source of moral valuing (which is what the premise here demands) is very slim. Certainly a minority. — Isaac

The less they know, the less they know it. No, not "certainly a minority', but "the majority".

You really don't know what you're talking about, yet you're alarmingly confident. it's quite disturbing. For instance, you've run together metaethical and normative theories. Virtue ethics is a normative theory, not a metaethical theory. I'm not a virtue ethicists, but nothing stops me from being. That is, one can be a subjectivist and a virtue ethicist. One can be a subjectivist and a utilitarian. One can be a subjectivist and a deontologist. One can be a subjectivist and a pluralist. And so on.

That's because subjectivism is a metaethical theory, not a normative one.

Moral realism denotes a family of metaethical theories. A great big unruly family whose members do not get on.

What unites them? Well, they believe the following: that normative moral propositions - such as "X is right" or "Y is morally bad" - are truth-apt (that is, capable of being true or false) and that some of them are true.

The anti-realists take two forms, because realism combines two claims and one might deny either one.

For example, some anti-realists deny that normative moral utterances are truth-apt. They're the expressivists. The others accept that they're truth apt, but deny that any of them are true. They're the error theorists.

Now, my point is that whichever one of those views you hold, the Euthyphro objection can be raised against you.

They can't all be false though, can they? So, if the Euthyphro criticism would be just as effective against any view as it is against mine, then something must be wrong with the Euthyphro criticism.

Everyone must agree to that.

I don't think you're in a position to judge what is and is not interesting from a philosophical perspective. Clue: it isn't constitutively determined by what 'you' think is interesting.

Those who haven't read Plato's dialogue Euthyphro are mistakenly thinking that this thread is about his dialogue, despite the OP making clear that it is about a particular criticism that has its origins in his dialogue. A distinction that is too subtle, it would seem, for you and certain others. You prefer to discuss a label than the view or criticism the label is being applied to. And when someone points out that the use of the label is perfectly legitimate and that it is the position that is important not the label that is put on it, you prefer to take issue with 'that' rather than anything philosophically interesting. Why? Becusae you don't know what is or is not philosophically interesting or significant. That's my analysis anyway.

To avoid this derailing, here is the objection this thread is about:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then moral values are contingent not necessary
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

That argument is valid and it appears to be sound. And note, it doesn't seem to matter who the subject is. You could insist otherwise by insisting that if you identify the subject as 'God' then because God's nature is fixed, 1 is false. But that is not evidence that 1 is false, it is just an expression of a religious dogma. To defeat the argument you have to show - not stipulate - that either 1 or 2 is false.

No good just stipulating that the subject's nature is fixed. For on the face of it a subject's values are contingent, not necessary. And thus if you think this particular subject is the exception, you need to make a case for the reasonableness of that belief, rather than just express it with confidence (which I know many of you think can do the work of an argument, but can't).

And no good just insisting that premise 2 is false because it contradicts your theory, for that is question begging.

I think the argument is not sound. I think premise 2 is false. But I think it is first worth noting that the argument 'must' be unsound, because it can be addressed to all views, and not all views can be false.

To see this just substitute for 'a subject' some objective thing and see what happens.

↪Fooloso4 The point we agree on is that the role of justice in ethics is prior to, or higher than, or of more import than, the role of piety or divine will or... pretty much anything.

Is that right? — Banno

Yes, it is.

We are agreed on the measure of Bartrinks as well.

And in so doing we are following a well trod path.

On both counts.

Just the place for a Snark.

"What I say three times is true!"

that is your view. Say it and it will be so. Your view. A view well represented hete. You don't seem to have any arguments for anything. Yet you're not doing philosophy until you argue something.