In short, the implication of neurophilosophy is that the vocabulary of philosophical issues, including terms like 'causality', and 'rationality' are being superceded by brain functioning terms, in the same way the old vocabulary of substances (earth, air , fire and water) were superceded by modern physics and chemistry terms. — fresco
Neurophilosophy involves the application of neuroscience to philosophical issues like 'free will', and 'reasoning'. — fresco
brain functioning terms — fresco
The assumption of several posters here is that neuroscience is 'reductionist' In the sense of 'explainable in terms of causal mechanisms'. The Churchlands deny this... — fresco
In Chapter 3 of Part I - “The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience” - Bennett and Hacker set out a critical framework that is the pivot of the book. They argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.
Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes sense to say “it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The question whether brains think “is a philosophical question, not a scientific one” (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as “the mereological fallacy”, that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes that are properties of the whole being.
the puzzle intentionality poses for materialism can be summarized this way: Brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, the motion of water molecules, electrical current, and any other physical phenomenon you can think of, seem clearly devoid of any inherent meaning. By themselves they are simply meaningless patterns of electrochemical activity. Yet our thoughts do have inherent meaning – that’s how they are able to impart it to otherwise meaningless ink marks, sound waves, etc. In that case, though, it seems that our thoughts cannot possibly be identified with any physical processes in the brain. In short: Thoughts and the like possess inherent meaning or intentionality; brain processes, like ink marks, sound waves, and the like, are utterly devoid of any inherent meaning or intentionality; so thoughts and the like cannot possibly be identified with brain processes. — Ed Feser
In the context of materialist understandings of psychology, eliminativism stands in opposition to reductive materialism which argues that mental states as conventionally understood do exist, and that they directly correspond to the physical state of the nervous system.
Well, yes, as more and more the brain correlations to qualia are getting tracked.
Again, you miss the point. What we call 'conscious experience' tends to be a nebulous hotchpotch involving language, images, and sense data. In our culture we distinguish it from 'dreams' and 'hallucinations', and neuroscience throws some light on the bases for those distinctions. The phrase 'gives rise to' is as premature as the question 'what gives rise to disease' asked in medieval times, since the concept of 'disease' was as nebulous then, as 'conscious experience' is now.
Now there are some, including myself, who are tempted by the conundrum, 'how can thinking think about itself ?', but that assumes we know, what both 'thought' and 'knowing' mean. Neurophilosophy throws those questions back at us. — fresco
'how can thinking think about itself ?' — fresco
I disagree. We 'know' what 'a behavior X' is, if we understand the function of X, and the essential components of X which contribute to that function. I suggest this is not the case for 'thought'. — fresco
The claim that 'thought is not a behavior' implies that 'being animate' is not a necessary condition for thought. 'Thought involves 'brain activity' with or without overt bodily movement. In fact from the pov of 'embodied cognition' (Varela et al) both brain and body are both essential tor 'thought'.
The alternative is to advocate dualism. — fresco
Neurophilosophy involves the application of neuroscience to philosophical issues like 'free will', and 'reasoning'. — fresco
Neurophilosophy involves the application of neuroscience to philosophical issues like 'free will', and 'reasoning'. The Churchlands, for example, have used the phrase 'eliminative materialism' to deconstruct issues like 'free will' in terms of combinations of neural processes such as 'gratification mechanisms' and 'neural pathway establishment', both of which are becoming well understood and are not species specific.
In short, the implication of neurophilosophy is that the vocabulary of philosophical issues, including terms like 'causality', and 'rationality' are being superceded by brain functioning terms, in the same way the old vocabulary of substances (earth, air , fire and water) were superceded by modern physics and chemistry terms.
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