Biological Difference and Philosophical Universality

Now at least we have a bit of ethics, with the introduction of an ought:

...from a moral point of view, sex, race, and nationality, beauty, and intelligence ought to have no predictive value with respect to well-being...

(italics in original)

But then there is the curious use of "I-thou" and "us-them", which I find distracting; Buber, so far as I am aware, would not have thought of the "I-thou" relation as excluding groups of people; but that's what happens here. Perhaps someone with a better understanding of Buber can explain; in the mean time it just seems better to ignore the implied relation to him.

So I take the salient piece here to be the observation the evolutionary ethics applies to groups, not individuals.

Ethical naturalism cannot tell us what we ought to do in particular situations, to be sure, other than the general dictum that we ought to do what we think is best for ourselves and others, for those, that is we consider to be our community. — Janus

I don't disagree with the sentiment, but I think it still places too much emphasis on the individual (within the context of ethical naturalism). In ethical naturalism, moral desires are no different to any other desires in that they provide us with impulse to act, they're not objectives to aim for, so it wouldn't be a matter of working out what we think is best and then doing it (in spite of any desires we might have to the contrary), it would be a matter of doing what we feel like doing, and that being best for society.

Otherwise you end up in this rather contrary situation where you say that people should suppress their basic desires in favour of some goal (social welfare, say), but that the desire for this goal is biologically programmed. Well, if it's biologically programmed, then why doesn't it form part of the first set of desires we're suppressing to achieve this higher goal, and even if its in a different set, if all we have by way of authority, is that it is biologically programmed, then by what authority does it override those other desires (which surely have an even greater claim to biological purity)?

One way out of this might be to say that the desire for social cohesion is biological but in modern society its complicated to see how to bring it about (so it gets left on the back-burner, so to speak). The other, my preferred, is to say that the biological desires are vague and adapt to changing circumstances. The circumstances we find ourselves in these days simply have a broad tendency to yield the kinds desires we see. We see evidence of this even in something like Zebra fish, which change coopertaive/competitive strategies according to resource supply.

Either way, the structure of the society we've created has to bear a huge burden of responsibility for the actions of the people within it, and that's something I find too often missing from moral discourse.

Your first quote reminded me of this one. I thought this was interesting considering of course, his Atheism:

"If we do discover a complete theory, it should in time be understandable in broad principle by everyone, not just a few scientists. Then we shall all, philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason — for then we would know the mind of God."

Stephen Hawking



As it relates to the OP, if one assumes that the universe does not exist reasonlessly, 'goodness' may somehow be compelled to create a universe because it is good that it does so.
Through conscious Beings, the universe has generated self-awareness. Self-awareness creates a sense of goodness, morally and ethically.

Lower life forms may have a degree of sentient attributes from what we know about the small limbic system. But beyond that, there are no survival advantages to Ethics: 'how to live a good life'.

I'm trying to understand is whether we can say 'thou shalt not kill' is 'good' because in the environments we're familiar with those groups that failed to adopt this precept were outcompeted and either withered or went extinct. — JosephS

Sure, we can say that, but we'd be applying the very specific definition of "good" you have just outlined. We need to first define "good" before we can answer the question of what then fulfills these criteria.

Can this sense of 'good' as correlative of group success (within certain environments) be the basis for an 'objective' moral good? — JosephS

It would be an objective measure, at the least. The problem is how we get from an objective descriptive fact to an objective normative rule.

Honestly the search for "objectivity" in moral philosophy is kinda weird. What would it even mean for some moral rule to be "objective"?

The essay says that ‘everyone accepts’ that individuals are entitled to humane treatment - but I think it originates with Christian social philosophy. — Wayfarer

Well not necessarily only christian social philosophy, but in general most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power.

most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. — Echarmion

The essay says that ‘everyone accepts’ that individuals are entitled to humane treatment - but I think it originates with Christian social philosophy. — Wayfarer

Where do you people get this kind of bullshit from. Have you done any kind of historical or anthropological research at all before spewing this covertly racist bile?

The white-western man comes to save the fuzxy-wuzzies from their barbaric savagery...please!

Where do you people get this kind of bullshit from. Have you done any kind of historical or anthropological research at all before spewing this covertly racist bile?

The white-western man comes to save the fuzxy-wuzzies from their barbaric savagery...please! — Isaac

What does this have to do with racism? Religious law was important in all societies around the globe. The specific paths it took from there differed.

Christianity does have a message of universal equality that is absent from, say, Hinduism. It's difficult to say how operative this message was at any point in history, since there are so many factors influencing social norms.

What does this have to do with racism? Religious law was important in all societies around the globe. The specific paths it took from there differed.

Christianity does have a message of universal equality that is absent from, say, Hinduism. It's difficult to say how operative this message was at any point in history, since there are so many factors influencing social norms. — Echarmion

The racism comes from the creation of a 'club' based on a white-western model. Graciously 'allowing' other cultures into that club on the sole basis that they're similar does nothing to diminish the extent to which the myth of the brutal savage is used to justify the systematic extinction of tribal cultures.

The racism comes from the creation of a 'club' based on a white-western model. Graciously 'allowing' other cultures into that club on the sole basis that they're similar does nothing to diminish the extent to which the myth of the brutal savage is used to justify the systematic extinction of tribal cultures. — Isaac

Ok, but this seems completely unrelated to anything I wrote.

Ok, but this seems completely unrelated to anything I wrote. — Echarmion

I quoted the section...

most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power. — Echarmion

To make the 'moral development' argument is to implicitly condone the idea that those less 'well-developed' are less moral. The only alternative is to include in your definition of 'religious law' any and all tribal spiritual beliefs which basically reduces to the original position of ethical naturalism you raised the point in opposition to - that all humans have a moral sense simply by virtue of being human.

Have you done any kind of historical or anthropological research at all before spewing this covertly racist bile? — Isaac

Plenty. There’s nothing ‘racist’ about it.

To make the 'moral development' argument is to implicitly condone the idea that those less 'well-developed' are less moral. — Isaac

When did I ever speak about development?

The only alternative is to include in your definition of 'religious law' any and all tribal spiritual beliefs — Isaac

That was indeed the point.

which basically reduces to the original position of ethical naturalism you raised the point in opposition to - that all humans have a moral sense simply by virtue of being human. — Isaac

Obviously all humans have a "moral sense", or else morals wouldn't ever form. The point was that religious rules were an important step in regulating society. This is especially true for ideas like inalienable human rights, since this implies an absolute limit to the use of force. Historically, such limits to power were almost always religious.

Well not necessarily only christian social philosophy, but in general most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power. — Echarmion

It is clearly associated with the Christian doctrine that Christ died for all mankind. Previous cultures had no such ideal, society was rigidly stratified. The whole concept of human rights as developed in liberal political philosophy was unarguably a product of the Christian west; other cultures don’t necessarily share it, the PRC doesn’t have such a concept to this day.

Obviously all humans have a "moral sense", or else morals wouldn't ever form. — Echarmion

But the underlying worldview of Darwinian philosophy is inclined to attribute 'moral sense', like everything else, to a function of the struggle to survive. That's one of the reasons the essay was written in the first place. Max Horkheimer's book The Eclipse of Reason explores the philosophical implications of this. He argues that individuals in contemporary industrial culture experience a universal sense of fear and disillusionment, which can be traced back to the impact of ideas that originate in the Enlightenment conception of reason and the historical development of industrial society. Before the Enlightenment, reason was seen as an objective reality; now, it is seen as a subjective faculty of the mind. As a consequence, the Enlightenment undermined metaphysics in the sense of an understanding of final cause, and hence the objective concept of reason itself. Reason no longer determines the "guiding principles of our own lives", but is subordinated to the ends it can achieve. In other words, reason is instumentalized.

The effects of this shift are devaluing. There is little love for things in themselves. Philosophies, such as pragmatism and positivism, "aim at mastering reality, not at criticizing it." Man comes to dominate nature, but in the process dominates other men by dehumanizing them - treating humans as objects. He forgets the unrepeatable and unique nature of every human life and instead sees all living things as fields of means ('consumer society'). His inner life is rationalized and planned. "On the one hand, nature has been stripped of all intrinsic value or meaning. On the other, man has been stripped of all aims except self-preservation." Popular Darwinism teaches only a "coldness and blindness toward nature."

According to Horkheimer, the individual in mass society is a cynical conformist. Ironically, the 'idolization of progress' leads to the decline of the individual.

It is clearly associated with the Christian doctrine that Christ died for all mankind. — Wayfarer

But correlation is not causation. There are other factors unique to western Europe.

Previous cultures had no such ideal, society was rigidly stratified. — Wayfarer

The stratification of society differed throughout history. In general, more complex societies tended to be more stratified. Basal Tribal societies are relatively egalitarian. I find it difficult to see much difference in the stratification until premodern times.

The whole concept of human rights as developed in liberal political philosophy was unarguably a product of the Christian west; other cultures don’t necessarily share it, the PRC doesn’t have such a concept to this day. — Wayfarer

The PRC is not the best comparison though, because the social and religious history of China is very different not just from that of Europe. The specifics of European feudalism and the strength of the Catholic Church also played a role in making western Europe significantly more individualistic than the rest of the world.

Plenty. There’s nothing ‘racist’ about it. — Wayfarer

Oh, well I'm glad your racism is well researched, that makes all the difference.

Cite me a collection of anthropologists stating that all non- or pre-Christian cultures do not think individuals are entitled to humane treatment. In fact, just one single source from your extensive research showing that non-Christian cultures have no concept of humane treatment.

it would be a matter of doing what we feel like doing, and that being best for society. — Isaac

I think you are over-analyzing this, and making it more black and white than it really is. So, regarding the above what if what I feel like doing is not best for society? Say I feel like raping someone, for example.

Otherwise you end up in this rather contrary situation where you say that people should suppress their basic desires in favour of some goal (social welfare, say), but that the desire for this goal is biologically programmed. — Isaac

I'm also not concerned with the question of whether desires for social harmony are "biologically programmed". I haven't used that language at all. What I am saying is that mores evolve in the communal context where social harmony is obviously the underlying goal.

Mores, then would seem to be predominately socially conditioned rather than "biologically programmed". The underlying general feelings of desire for social harmony and empathy, for example, may be inherently biological as they can be observed in social animals as well as humans.

There is far more dysfunctionality and deviation in the linguistically, conceptually elaborated lives of humans than there is in the lives of other social animals, though.

Cite me a collection of anthropologists stating that all non- or pre-Christian cultures do not think individuals are entitled to humane treatment. In fact, just one single source from your extensive research showing that non-Christian cultures have no concept of humane treatment. — Isaac

Typically in ancient cultures humane treatment is predominately a matter of compassion, not of what was rationally considered to be fair and just treatment warranted by the mere fact of being an individual who is entitled to it. Think of Buddhist compassion, for example (although that is perhaps a movement away from mere arbitrary, uncultivated empathy to a culture of compassion).

It is well established that the idea of the importance of the individual did not hold much cultural sway in Eastern cultures nor in the West until the times of Socrates and the advent of Judaeo-Christian thought. The idea of the universal rights of the individual was first comprehensively articulated by Locke, if my memory serves, and more fully elaborated by Kant.

If you can cite some counter-examples I am happy to stand corrected.

It is well established that the idea of the importance of the individual did not hold much cultural sway in Eastern cultures nor in the West until the times of Socrates and the advent of Judaeo-Christian thought. — Janus

That was my point also. All I'm saying is that it's easy to take for granted the concept of 'human rights' but it is very much the product of a Western cultural history within which the Christian ethos (in the broad sense as also incorporating many elements from other sources) played a foundational role.

Cite me a collection of anthropologists stating that all non- or pre-Christian cultures do not think individuals are entitled to humane treatment — Isaac

The development of the concept of the individual person is actually very much an aspect of culture. I bought a book on that a few years ago, although I must admit it was excrutiatingly boring. But the literary critic Harold Bloom, I recall, wrote a book on how Shakespeare invented the concept of the modern person - an intriguing idea which I don't know is widely accepted but he makes a case for it.

I agree that we take it for granted, but I also think it should be taken for granted insofar as it is a rational principle that naturally emerges when all biased notions of privelege or special entitlement are dispelled.

well, that's like 'natural law' theory, isn't it? And you can't assume it's universal, as it doesn't seem to be in (for example) the PRC, where individual rights are routinely subjugated to those of the party and state.

Sure, but that's because that culture has not dispelled notions of privilege or special consideration and cone too see the individual as such. Perhaps no culture does fully, just as maybe no scientist is completely unbiased. It is a rational ideal nonetheless.

It would be an objective measure, at the least. The problem is how we get from an objective descriptive fact to an objective normative rule.

Honestly the search for "objectivity" in moral philosophy is kinda weird. What would it even mean for some moral rule to be "objective"? — Echarmion

I've appreciated the responses in this thread as it is helping me get my head around the topic. I'd never come across 'ethical naturalism' prior and so this is helping me read further on the subject of ethics.

I would think that we look for an objective standard in order to justify applying that standard to others. If we regard moral propositions as purely subjective, enforcing law and order amounts to nothing more than 'might makes right', right? Even if that is what it means, it's not how we treat them or talk about them.

the myth of the brutal savage — Isaac

As distinct from 'the myth of the noble savage'.

The specifics of European feudalism and the strength of the Catholic Church also played a role in making western Europe significantly more individualistic than the rest of the world. — Echarmion

Agree.

If we regard moral propositions as purely subjective, enforcing law and order amounts to nothing more than 'might makes right', right? Even if that is what it means, it's not how we treat them or talk about them. — JosephS

This comes up very frequently on this site. I would say that in respect of ethical theory. we're dealing with questions that transcend objectivity. now that will seem a strange thing to say, so I will try and explain. Go back to Hume's dilemma about 'deriving ought from is' (mentioned in the essay). The fundamental issue is that we understand that factual judgements are the province of science and precise measurement. One of the reasons that theories grounded in evolutionary biology are thought to be superior to those grounded in cultural myths is because of the supposed 'objectivity' of science.

However, it remains the case that

People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts. Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense.

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. It makes no sense for a biologist to say that some particular animal should be more cooperative, much less to claim that an entire species ought to aim for some degree of altruism. If we decide that we should neither “dissolve society” through extreme selfishness, as E O Wilson puts it, nor become “angelic robots” like ants, we are making an ethical judgment, not a biological one. Likewise, from a biological perspective it has no significance to claim that I should be more generous than I usually am, or that a tyrant ought to be deposed and tried. In short, a purely evolutionary ethics makes ethical discourse meaningless.

Anything but Human, Richard Polt.

It seems to me that appeals to science, generally, and evolutionary biology, in particular, often fail to come to terms with this explanatory gap, because ultimately ethical decisions encompass qualitative judgements, which, again, transcend the bounds of what can be understood as the purely objective. That's why ethical philosophy, whilst it can and should be informed by science, is not in itself a wholly scientific matter.

When did I ever speak about development? — Echarmion

You said "Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power" ie, before religious law there was arbitrary use of power, after it less . That's moral development. It's the same argument that justifies missionaries going into tribal areas and wiping out their culture (and more often than not their actual population with foreign disease) but I suppose that's nothing to worry about too much if they were all backward savages anyway. All in the march of progress....

Obviously all humans have a "moral sense", or else morals wouldn't ever form. The point was that religious rules were an important step in regulating society. This is especially true for ideas like inalienable human rights, since this implies an absolute limit to the use of force. Historically, such limits to power were almost always religious. — Echarmion

I'll ask you the same as I asked Wayfarer then. What evidence are you basing this assertion on?

You said "most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power." So provide me with the anthropological evidence you're using to suggest that there is frequent abuse of power and no equality in tribal societies, or that where you find these sentiments, they are enforced by religion.

I think you are over-analyzing this, and making it more black and white than it really is. So, regarding the above what if what I feel like doing is not best for society? Say I feel like raping someone, for example. — Janus

I wasn't saying that all things you feel like doing will be good for society. I'm saying that the things which will be good for society must be among the collection of things you feel like doing, otherwise the whole biological origins argument fails.

I'm also not concerned with the question of whether desires for social harmony are "biologically programmed". I haven't used that language at all. What I am saying is that mores evolve in the communal context where social harmony is obviously the underlying goal. — Janus

Why do they evolve, and why would social harmony ever be the underlying goal? Because...

The underlying general feelings of desire for social harmony and empathy, for example, may be inherently biological as they can be observed in social animals as well as humans. — Janus

So why would you "feel like raping someone" and need that feeling to be restrained by some rational consideration of the greater good? At the very least if the above were the case you might feel like having sex but also not want to put another through any great distress. Feeling like raping someone is a pathology, it arises when empathy is either not present or has broken down. It's not the background norm against which rational consideration has to fight.

Typically in ancient cultures humane treatment is predominately a matter of compassion, not of what was rationally considered to be fair and just treatment warranted by the mere fact of being an individual who is entitled to it. — Janus

Evidence?

It is well established that the idea of the importance of the individual did not hold much cultural sway in Eastern cultures nor in the West until the times of Socrates and the advent of Judaeo-Christian thought. The idea of the universal rights of the individual was first comprehensively articulated by Locke, if my memory serves, and more fully elaborated by Kant. — Janus

Wayfarer wasn't talking about individualisation. He specifically said

that individuals are entitled to humane treatment - but I think it originates with Christian social philosophy — Wayfarer

The very entitlement to humane treatment, he claimed started with Christian social philosophy. Not the locating of those rights with the individual, not the first articulation of it. The actual treatment.

The point I was making with that particular quote, was not that no pre-Christian cultures were capable of being humane. It was a comment on how the underlying philosophy of Christian culture is foundational in the Liberal conception of human rights.

As it happened, I did study anthropology at undergrad level for a couple of years, but it doesn't have much to say explicitly about the question. But the concept of human rights, in the modern sense, certainly didn't exist in pre-modern cultures, for a vast number of reasons. In fact as I mentioned before in many pre-modern cultures, there's hardly a conception of 'the person' or 'the individual'. It's hard for us to see that, living in such a pervasively individualist culture. But such fundamental things as jury trial, habeus corpus, the right to private property, and so on, were all things that were thrashed out over centuries of cultural development and mainly in the West (although cultures obviously influence each other also). Can't see how that is controversial. Although I do suspect it is politically incorrect to say anything generally positive about Western culture - covertly racist, or at least that is how it will be seen.

t

Why do they evolve, and why would social harmony ever be the underlying goal? Because... — Isaac

Why would mores not evolve with societies? Of course social harmony is the purpose of mores; what other goal could they have? Can you give an example of a society that valued mores that were designed to promote disharmony? What do you think the purpose of ethical and moral teachings in general could be?

I don't understand most of your objections; when I say things that are more or less established general informed opinion such as that individualism as we moderns understand it, is not emphasized or even existent in primitive and ancient cultures, and that the idea evolved out of conceptions that are more or less unique to Western culture, you seem to be acting purposely obtuse or objecting just for the sake of it. If you want to object to such uncontroversial statements you should provide counterexamples to support your objections.

There would be no point answering any of the rest of what you have responded with. One or two things at a time or it's going to become tedious.

You said "Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power" ie, before religious law there was arbitrary use of power, after it less . That's moral development. — Isaac

It is social and political development. I think calling it "moral development" implies something about the people living in a system that is not warranted.

It's the same argument that justifies missionaries going into tribal areas and wiping out their culture (and more often than not their actual population with foreign disease) but I suppose that's nothing to worry about too much if they were all backward savages anyway. — Isaac

I think it's hard to argue that there are different levels of social, political and economic development around the world. Stating this does not necessarily imply a value judgement. Modern tribal societies are not somehow stuck in the past. But they are more "basal" in that they did not develop more complex forms of social, political and economic systems.

If someone thinks that justifies wiping out their cultures, that is a problem with their moral development.

I'll ask you the same as I asked Wayfarer then. What evidence are you basing this assertion on?

You said "most ideas of inalienable rights and equality are, at least historically, connected to religious ideas. Religious law was the first real check on arbitrary use of power." So provide me with the anthropological evidence you're using to suggest that there is frequent abuse of power and no equality in tribal societies, or that where you find these sentiments, they are enforced by religion. — Isaac

Tribal societies are relatively egalitarian, and don't have large concentrations of power. There isn't much power to coerce that could be abused. Tribal societies also all already have religion. But since there is no judiciary and no other strong checks on "executive" power, what power there is can be arbitrarily applied, unless there are strong social rules against this. And such rules are usually religious. I am not aware of any secular structure of such rules in a tribal society.

You can compare China, India and Europe and see that of the three, China has the least organized religion. It also has no history of a "higher order" of law until contact with western civilization. Chinese "legalism" held that power rests only in the emperor, with no external limits. As a result, China's early states were extremely powerful and totalitarian.

Meanwhile, in both Europe and India, a strong religious establishment forced local rulers to compromise. Failure to compromise with religious authorities could mean a loss of legitimacy, as the investiture controversy illustrates. This lays the groundwork for the power of rulers to be limited in principle. And the effects are still visible when we compare the political situation in China, India and Europe.

The development of the concept of the individual person is actually very much an aspect of culture. I bought a book on that a few years ago, although I must admit it was excrutiatingly boring. But the literary critic Harold Bloom, I recall, wrote a book on how Shakespeare invented the concept of the modern person - an intriguing idea which I don't know is widely accepted but he makes a case for it. — Wayfarer

That's your extensive research? A book you bought that you can't even cite and a literary critic?

the concept of human rights, in the modern sense, certainly didn't exist in pre-modern cultures, for a vast number of reasons. — Wayfarer

...yes, the main one being you've specified "in the modern sense", which pretty much precludes anything not modern from fitting the description doesn't it? But that's not the argument you originally made. You said

The essay says that ‘everyone accepts’ that individuals are entitled to humane treatment - but I think it originates with Christian social philosophy. — Wayfarer

That clearly states that before Christian thinking people did not think that others were entitled to humane treatment. It doesn't just say that there weren't things like "jury trial, habeus corpus, the right to private property". It does not just say something about individual vs tribal identity. It says that pre-Christian people did not think others were entitled to human treatment. Of course it's seen as covertly racist. It's barely even covert.