Can you get the Youtube channel PBS Space Time? The commentator is Australian. I was just listening to one of his broadcasts about inflation theory.

In one of his episodes he answers comments (on YouTube you can comment on videos) deriding string theory and condemning it as "not science."

He said that if string theory (or rather M theory) turns out to be considered wrong, the time invested in it will still have been worthwhile. He said that wrong turns in science are often valuable stepping stones.

Plus it's possible that a super symmetric particle was recently detected, so...

From that article:

One of the most prominent is the idea of multiple universes, also known as the ‘many-worlds hypothesis’ or ‘multiverse’ theory.

These are completely different ideas, often confused. The first has to do with 'collapse of wave function' and is subject of Everett's 'relative state formulation', later called 'many worlds'. The second is that the known universe is only one amongst an unaccountably vast number of universes which are all the theoretical outcomes of string theory. They're both regarded as 'fascinating cutting-edge physics' or 'symptoms of a deep crisis in physics', depending on who you talk to.

Popper is mentioned a few times in that article. The idea that metaphysics has no place in science, or that metaphysical speculations are literally meaningless is sometimes attributed to Popper, but this idea really belongs to the Logical Positivists.

The idea that metaphysical speculations are distinct from scientific theories is not the same as the idea that metaphysics has no place in science. Popper disagreed with the latter, as these passages from The Myth of the Framework attest:

It should be obvious that the objectivity and the rationality of progress in science are not due to the personal objectivity and rationality of the scientist. Great science and great scientists, like great poets, are often inspired by non-rational intuitions. So are great mathematicians. As Poincaré and Hadamard have pointed out, a mathematical proof may be discovered by unconscious trials, guided by an inspiration of a decidedly aesthetic character, rather than by rational thought. This is true, and important. But obviously, it does not make the result, the mathematical proof, irrational.

Finally I have not only stressed the meaningfulness of metaphysical assertions and the fact that I am myself a metaphysical realist, but I have also analysed the important historical role played by metaphysics in the formation of scientific theories.

Thus the theory of Boscovitch and the two theories of Kant may be described as the two most important attempts to carry further Leibniz’s programme for a dynamic theory that explains Cartesian extended matter. They may be described as the joint ancestors of all modern theories of the structure of matter; the theories of Faraday and Maxwell, of Einstein, de Broglie and Schrödinger, and also of the ‘dualism of matter and field’. (This dualism, if seen in this light, is perhaps not so deep as it may appear to those who, in thinking of matter, cannot get away from a crude Cartesian and non-dynamical model.) It may be mentioned that another important influence deriving from the Cartesian tradition – and from the Kantian tradition via Helmholtz – was the idea of explaining atoms as vortices of the ether – an idea that led to Lord Kelvin’s and to J.J. Thomson’s models of the atom. Its experimental refutation by Rutherford marks the beginning of what may be described as modern atomic theory.
One of the most interesting aspects of the development that I have sketched is its purely speculative character, together with the fact that these metaphysical speculations proved susceptible to criticism: that they could be critically discussed. This discussion was inspired by the wish to understand the world, and by the hope, the conviction, that the human intellect could at least make the attempt to understand it, and could perhaps get somewhere. And an experimental refutation of a speculative solution to one of its problems led to its turning into nuclear science.

And also left unaddressed was my point about the impressive results which have been brought about through modern methods which ancient Platonic philosophy would have no hope of coming anywhere close to matching. — S

I have seen no impressive modern metaphysics, when compared to the ancients. Can you provide an example? We are talking about metaphysics, are we not?

He said that if string theory (or rather M theory) turns out to be considered wrong, the time invested in it will still have been worthwhile. He said that wrong turns in science are often valuable stepping stones. — frank

:grin:

And the time spent arguing over monads and atoms will still have been worthwhile. Wrong turns in Metaphysics are often valuable stepping stones.

Yeah - I noticed that. It did give me pause to consider the authors authority. But I think it a small point that does not detract from the thrust of the article.

Yes, we have logical possibility and real potential. You could say real potential is actual in the sense that it is, in at least some sense, active; it can activate, bring about, change, future actualities. But what is possible potentially is not yet actual; we don't want to lose that distinction. — Janus

Feel like I'm being singled out here. Darn it. :yikes: Well, my limited comprehension on the matter is that there are actual potentials and potential actualities ... such that the first entails the second. A non-actual potential to me reads as "fictional potential", as in something devoid of reality, hence truth-value as expression, that someone makes up. Are not "possible potentials" liable to the same dichotomy?: that of actual possible potentials and that of non-actual possible potentials. Or maybe I misinterpret something in your post?

Besides, I could argue on and on about how nobody can know how being first started. All such stories to me are creation myths, useful in some regards, but none of which can be knowledge regarding why being is.

Or maybe I misinterpret something in your post? — javra

No, I agree with what you say here. There was a part-typo, part poor expression that in what you quoted, that I have now corrected.

Yes, we have logical possibility and real potential. You could say real potential is actual in the sense that it is, in at least some sense, active; it can activate, bring about, change, future actualities. But what is possible - potentiality - is not yet actual; we don't want to lose that distinction. — Janus

Ah, got it. Thanks.

Whether one leans towards theories extending from use of empiricism and logic or one leans towards “gut feeling” and pure “faith”, there is an inherent need for humans to conceptually grasp the big picture and this is where metaphysics’ finds its true value. — Dave Davidson via Gnomon

This is an unexpected gem. :smile: But it still promotes a misapprehension, I think. For issues where empirical evidence is available, scientific analysis is possible. But when the issue falls short of this, usually due to insufficient empirical evidence, or none at all, we assume that no serious consideration is possible.

This, I think, is an error of binary thinking: no scientific analysis is possible, therefore no form of analysis is possible. Not so. Although formal analysis is not possible for some issues, serious consideration remains a possibility. We need not automatically retreat to <<<“gut feeling” and pure “faith”>>>. Even where the tightly-focused requirements of scientific analysis are impractical, the broader approach of philosophy still has much to offer.

There's another error of binary thinking hidden here: no scientific analysis is possible, therefore no form of serious analysis is possible. The mistake here is to believe that there is only one analysis tool (science). This is a fallacy. Philosophy can often address issues that science cannot.

Many of the issues that metaphysics deals with are of the type where scientific analysis is unhelpful. Considering such matters is much more difficult than simple science. But this is no excuse to abandon reason or reasoning. A quick search for "critical thinking" or "structured thinking" gives all kinds of help. Here's a quote from just one example:

Classifications and Types of Thinking

Convergent or Analytical Thinking: Bringing facts and data together from various sources and then
applying logic and knowledge to solve problems or to make informed decisions.

Divergent thinking: Breaking a topic apart to explore its various components and then generating new ideas and solutions.

Thinking: Analysis and evaluation of information, beliefs, or knowledge.

Creative Thinking: Generation of new ideas breaking from established thoughts, theories, rules, and procedures.

The source of the above text is here.

This, I think, is an error of binary thinking: no scientific analysis is possible, therefore no form of analysis is possible. — Pattern-chaser

Also, when scientific analysis is available, that analysis is sitting on implicit and/or explicit metaphysics. That's what models are, that's what assumptions about laws and order in nature, and likely mathematics underlying various phenomena and so on are. Everyone is a metaphysicist.

Although formal analysis is not possible for some issues, serious consideration remains a possibility. We need not automatically retreat to <<<“gut feeling” and pure “faith”>>>. Even where the tightly-focused requirements of scientific analysis are impractical, the broader approach of philosophy still has much to offer. — Pattern-chaser

So what would you say the difference was between "gut feeling and faith" and the subject matter of what you're calling "serious" analysis? If we're not analysing empirical facts, then we must be analysing feelings and beliefs, surely? I can't see a third category of stuff that is neither empirical fact, nor the product of our minds (feelings and beliefs).

Let's say there is though, we'd then be stuck on this idea of "seriously" analysing it. As opposed to what other form of analysis?

But...most problematic of all, you use the term 'we'. That 'we' can do this analysis suggests a collaborative exercise, and yet if we're not working with empirical data (that which we agree is the case) then how can we even begin to construct an analytical language with which to have this discussion?

when scientific analysis is available, that analysis is sitting on implicit and/or explicit metaphysics. — Coben

Absolutely. But that fact in itself does not mean we can meaningfully "analyse" those implicit metaphysical assumptions. We can point out their presence. We can curate them. We can show how they have changed over time. We can express and talk about our own preferences. We can even speculate on which are most useful to achieve certain goals.

But what we cannot do is actually determine which are true, right, best, or any other measure.

Everyone is a metaphysicist. — Coben

I am Spartacus! :rofl: :up:

I tend to agree, but then I am a bit of an instrumentalist. So,

We can even speculate on which are most useful to achieve certain goals. — Isaac

I would strengthen to say we can do more than speculate, less than determine which is best. IOW we can look at the fruitfulness of the metaphysics, or the fruitfulness of the research based on it. If we notice that there seem to be dead ends, a slowing down of productivity, we could try to tweak or replace some of those assumptions. We could also recognize that we need not per se dismiss something that uses a different metaphysics.

Of course the usefulness of an assumtion or model can have a lot to do with factors that have nothing at all to do with truth or accuracy or even inherent usefulness. But I think some conscious work with that area could be helpful in general, and I mean even in science.

But what we cannot do is actually determine which are true, right, best, or any other measure. — Isaac

Exactly! There are significant issues where there is no certainty to be found. But the issues exist nonetheless. So, do we simply abandon all thought of serious consideration, just because a scientific analysis is impossible? You might, as you choose; I don't.

I have seen no impressive modern metaphysics, when compared to the ancients. Can you provide an example? We are talking about metaphysics, are we not? — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm talking about a critical method of examining the world, irrespective of whether or not you would class it as metaphysics, and I'm contrasting it with Platonic metaphysics, and I was questioning the worth that Wayfarer spoke of in regard to Platonic metaphysics in light of this. That's when you decided to chip in. In political terminology, I would say that Wayfarer is a reactionary: decrying modernity and showing favouritism towards an ancient metaphysics.

So what would you say the difference was between "gut feeling and faith" and the subject matter of what you're calling "serious" analysis? If we're not analysing empirical facts, then we must be analysing feelings and beliefs, surely? I can't see a third category of stuff that is neither empirical fact, nor the product of our minds (feelings and beliefs). — Isaac

Perhaps this is simply a lack of imagination? :chin: Consider - only as an example (there are many others) - whether I might be a brain in a vat. :chin: There is no empirical evidence at all. But I can still make useful observations. Here's one example (there are many others): whatever the actual nature of reality, I have access to only one, the one my senses and perception shows me, so I might as well live with that, and deal with it as best I can.

This latter is not the result of a rigid analytic process, but my observation is not based on feelings and beliefs, but on structured, critical, thinking.

Let's say there is though, we'd then be stuck on this idea of "seriously" analysing it. As opposed to what other form of analysis? — Isaac

As opposed to a formal, logical, scientific analysis, which is impossible in these cases.

But...most problematic of all, you use the term 'we'. That 'we' can do this analysis suggests a collaborative exercise, and yet if we're not working with empirical data (that which we agree is the case) then how can we even begin to construct an analytical language with which to have this discussion? — Isaac

Common sense, coupled with structured, critical, thinking. Isn't this what philosophy is? :chin

Of course the usefulness of an assumtion or model can have a lot to do with factors that have nothing at all to do with truth or accuracy or even inherent usefulness. But I think some conscious work with that area could be helpful in general, and I mean even in science. — Coben

Yes, I totally agree. A lot of my philosophy derives from the British Pragmatists, so I'd go even further perhaps to say that truth itself is only a meaningful notion with regards utility. What annoys me about discussions of metaphysics is that the utility, the elegance, or even the aesthetic of a theor are rarely talked about. What seems prevelant is talk about "understanding", "coherence" as if there was some body of knowledge to correctly understand, so objective measure of coherence to meet.

No, no, no. Look, let's start off simple, shall we? The statement, "Planet Earth is not flat", is true, yes? It's true because Earth is not flat. That's a fact. Is it useful? Doesn't matter. The objective measure, the truth-maker, is the fact, the shape of Earth, not how useful it is. If it was useful for Earth to be flat, or triangular, or hexagonal, that wouldn't make it so. It would not then be true.

I get you here. Hm. I guess we should avoid conflating things. I think elegance and sense of understanding can lead to it being useful - seems like mathematicians chime in about this sometimes. But what I mean is that if a model or meta-model gives its users confidence, a sense of cohesive understanding, this may lay the ground for productivity. Call it a potential placebo effect if one must. I would black box that. But to think that there 'everything is water' is very elegant and we now have a deep understanding of reality means that we have something that matters is to conflate things, at least for me. I don't want to say that experience is useless or even wrong, but as a semi-pragmatist - with a pretty ad hoc bricoleur set of epistemological methodologies (which is a fancy way of saying I am a mixed bag), it shouldn't be confused with being able to change things, make things, get to new knowledge, help people, be practically useful or even, heck, spiritually useful.

It may well be a great first step towards those things.

It also seems to me that it is not a discrete step, that we move in and out of interaction with the world and each other and fussing with our metaphysics, consciously or unconsciously.

whatever the actual nature of reality, I have access to only one, the one my senses and perception shows me, so I might as well live with that, and deal with it as best I can.

This latter is not the result of a rigid analytic process, but my observation is not based on feelings and beliefs, but on structured, critical, thinking. — Pattern-chaser

If that's based on critical thinking, then what is it critical of.... What is the alternative metaphysical assumption that you have used your critical analysis to reject and on what grounds?

As opposed to a formal, logical, scientific analysis, which is impossible in these cases. — Pattern-chaser

Sorry, I wasn't clear enough. I meant as opposed to what other type of non-scientific analysis. You added "serious" to the description of the alternative type of analysis. I wondered if there was a non-serious version of this non-scientific analysis you're describing, and if so, what would distinguish it as such.

Common sense, coupled with structured, critical, thinking. Isn't this what philosophy is? — Pattern-chaser

No, not in my meta-philosophical position. Hence my interest in how you support this conclusion.

No, no, no. Look, let's start off simple, shall we? The statement, "Planet Earth is not flat", is true, yes? It's true because Earth is not flat. That's a fact. Is it useful? Doesn't matter. The objective measure, the truth-maker, is the fact, the shape of Earth, not how useful it is. If it was useful for Earth to be flat, or triangular, or hexagonal, that wouldn't make it so. It would not then be true. — S

Actually it has too matter if it is useful. A fact that has no predictive value is meaningless. At a bare minimum the idea that the earth is not flat will explain prior and future experiences. It will fit observations. It will be by itself or with other facts, lead to better practical decisions: flight paths, say. I suppose if one is an epistemological hedonist, then having a fact one thinks is true would be useful, since it would lead to pleasure. But otherwise truths are only true (for us) in that they connect up with uses. What they do, not what they are. Unless one is a Platonist, I suppose.

Actually it has to matter if it is useful. A fact that has no predictive value is meaningless.

[...] — Coben

Yes, out of context, it does matter. But by taking what I said out of context, you're no longer addressing my point, which was that it doesn't matter in terms of whether or not it's true.

If that's based on critical thinking, then what is it critical of.... — Isaac

Too literal. :wink: Here's a quote:

Critical thinking is self-directed, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of their use. — Wikipedia

The Wikipedia entry also refers to the use of facts, which may not be available in the examples I'm considering. But I might as easily have said "structured thinking", and I think I did. My intention was to be vague and general. I was deliberately avoiding precision. :gasp:

What is the alternative metaphysical assumption that you have used your critical analysis to reject and on what grounds? — Isaac

I have no such assumption to offer. Lacking the means to conduct a more formal analysis, I was trying to work, generally, with what we have. I wasn't trying to emulate scientific analysis, having already concluded that scientific analysis is not possible, and therefore not useful. You're treating this whole thing too rigidly; too rigorously. We've already entered an area where precision and rigour are unavailable.

I wondered if there was a non-serious version of this non-scientific analysis you're describing, and if so, what would distinguish it as such. — Isaac

I suppose the non-serious version would be a round table discussion in a pub, or on Facebook. Entirely without rigour. And therefore of limited use? Probably. :wink:

Common sense, coupled with structured, critical, thinking. Isn't this what philosophy is? — Pattern-chaser


No, not in my meta-philosophical position. — Isaac

Then what, pray tell, is philosophy? [ I have a nasty feeling you're going to say that acceptable philosophy is ... science. :sad: But I've been wrong before...]

Then what, pray tell, is philosophy? — Pattern-chaser

There's what it is, and what it should be. What it is, is largely a parody of itself.

I'm talking about a critical method of examining the world, irrespective of whether or not you would class it as metaphysics, and I'm contrasting it with Platonic metaphysics, and I was questioning the worth that Wayfarer spoke of in regard to Platonic metaphysics in light of this. That's when you decided to chip in. In political terminology, I would say that Wayfarer is a reactionary: decrying modernity and showing favouritism towards an ancient metaphysics. — S

OK, but metaphysics is a necessary support for any epistemology, and even the claim that it is not necessary is itself metaphysics. So any "critical method of examining the world" must be supported by metaphysics. If Platonic metaphysics provides a better support than modern metaphysics then Wayfarer is correct to value Platonic metaphysics in that way.

No, no, no. Look, let's start off simple, shall we? The statement, "Planet Earth is not flat", is true, yes? It's true because Earth is not flat. That's a fact. Is it useful? Doesn't matter. The objective measure, the truth-maker, is the fact, the shape of Earth, not how useful it is. If it was useful for Earth to be flat, or triangular, or hexagonal, that wouldn't make it so. It would not then be true. — S

It's not about how useful the resultant fact would be if it corresponded with reality. It's about how useful the theory about reality actually is. The theory that the earth is flat would not be useful for navigation because distances would not take account of the curvature of the earth. In my view, neither the earth, nor flat, nor sphere, nor shape are real, they're all distinctions we draw because of their utility. I could claim the earth was flat in non-eucildean space. It might even turn out to be coherent to talk about flat objects within curved space if someday we have a different understanding of space-time.

I really do understand your concern about wishy-washy ideas making into common parlance on relativist grounds, but I don't see it being a problem if we're strict about our evidence requirements for utility.

OK, but metaphysics is a necessary support for any epistemology, and even the claim that it is not necessary is itself metaphysics. So any "critical method of examining the world" must be supported by metaphysics. If Platonic metaphysics provides a better support than modern metaphysics then Wayfarer is correct to value Platonic metaphysics in that way. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's supported by the vast results it has produced, which Platonic metaphysics hasn't come anywhere near to producing.

It's not about how useful the resultant fact would be if it corresponded with reality. It's about how useful the theory about reality actually is. The theory that the earth is flat would not be useful for navigation because distances would not take account of the curvature of the earth. In my view, neither the earth, nor flat, nor sphere, nor shape are real, they're all distinctions we draw because of their utility. I could claim the earth was flat in non-eucildean space. It might even turn out to be coherent to talk about flat objects within curved space if someday we have a different understanding of space-time.

I really do understand your concern about wishy-washy ideas making into common parlance on relativist grounds, but I don't see it being a problem if we're strict about our evidence requirements for utility. — Isaac

None of what you just said has anything to do with truth, so it is missing the point. I was criticising the proposition which you previously mentioned, that "truth itself is only a meaningful notion with regards utility". No, it isn't. It is meaningful without that, as I demonstrated with my example. You've got the statement, and you've got the truth-maker. That's what makes truth meaningful. That's the bare minimum. Whether it is useful matters in a different context, but it isn't necessary for there to be truths.