Just to add - but again, not for dispute - 'objective', as I am using the term, is not synonymous with 'external'. 'Objective', as I am using it, means 'exists outside of minds' or, if one prefers, 'made of something non-mental'.

'External' just means 'out there'. — Bartricks

It's synonymous with "external" in context. In other words, "external to minds," or rather "external to brains functioning mentally."

It is not clear to me from what you have said what the problem is supposed to be. You are talking in general terms and not addressing the view that my arguments have led to.

Once again you keep talking about 'God' despite God not being mentioned anywhere in my argument. I said that the subject whose values constitute moral values would seem to be a god, just in virtue of the fact their values constitute moral values. You don't seem to get this and keep substituting 'a god' for 'God' (or gods). This is just bizarre. The analogy again:

Me: it looks as if someone killed Janet

Detective Janus: So you're saying Mr Someone, the local bank manager, killed Janet. Well, there's a problem there because Mr Someone has an alibi - he's overseas.

Me: No, not 'Mr Someone', I said 'someone'.

Detective Janus: yes, Mr Someone, right, he was away overseas.

Me: The word 'someone' just means some subject or other, it isn't someone's name. Mr Someone is someone's name - he works at the bank and is currently overseas. Mr Someone is a someone, of course. And perhaps we'll discover that he's not actually oversees and that he killed Janet. I haven't ruled him out entirely. But nevertheless, the important point is that the evidence we currently have available to us tells us that 'someone' - not Mr Someone - 'someone' did it.

Detective Janus: Mr Someone is overseas though.

Me: someone, not Mr Someone

Detective Janus: yes, Mr Someone. I get it. he's overseas.

Me: Not Mr Someone. Someone.

Detective Janus: there's good evidence Mr Someone is overseas.

And on and on and on.

Moral values are the values of a subject. God, if God exists, is a subject. But all we have evidence for, at the moment anyway, is that moral values are the values of a subject. We do not have evidence that moral values are the values of Mr God.

So, again, what is the problem that the Euthyphro raises for my thesis? Not some other thesis that you're familiar with, but the thesis that the evidence is supporting.

Tell you what, to move things along I'll suggest what the supposed problem may be, and you can just confirm that it is as I say it is.

The problem is that if moral values are the values of a subject, then they can change over time. What's morally valuable at one time, may not be at another. For after all, we know from our own case that what we value can alter. I may value sunshine at one time, but not at another. Tastes can and do change.

And thus, though - for example - pain seems to be in generally something that is morally bad, nothing stops it from being the case that in the future pain might be morally good. For the subject-whose-valuings-constitute-moral-values - let's call her Trisha for convenience and so that you don't keep calling her God - may value us suffering in the future even though she currently seems to disvalue it.

Why is that a problem? Well, because, as most contemporary moral philosophers agree, moral truths appear to be necessary truths. Just as it is necessarily true that the conclusion of this argument will be true if the premises are -

1. If P, then Q
2. Not Q
3. Therefore not P

likewise it is necessarily true that sadism is morally bad, when it is bad.

The above argument does not just happen to be valid at the moment. It is always and everywhere valid. Its validity does not alter. It does not have a best-before date.

Likewise for substantial moral truths. Such truths may be very complex and sometimes hard to discern - like the answers to complex sums - but whatever they are, they are necessary truths.

So, expressed as an argument, the problem the Euthyphro draws attention to is this:

1. If moral values are the values of a subject, then what is morally valuable will be contingent, not necessary.
2. Moral values are necessary, not contingent
3. Therefore, moral values are not the values of a subject

Fair enough?

Relevance?

The problem, as I see it, is that you don't listen (figuratively speaking) to anything anyone says. You are not on your own in that but are a member of a select group.

No, the problem is that you're not addressing my position or my arguments.

you don't actually know what the Euthyphro problem is - that's clear from your description.

And you don't actually know what position my arguments have led to - that's clear from the fact you keep talking about God and gods and not the view that the evidence supported.

It is 'someone' not Mr Someone.

It is 'a god' not 'God'.

She's a god because her value are moral values, rather than her values being moral values because she's a god.

Now, I can explain this to you again and again and urge you to address the actual evidence that supports this view. But you do have to understand and not switch what I've said for some codswallop that your criticisms are designed for.

Me: it is someone, not Mr Someone. The evidence at the crime scene tells us, unequivocally, that someone - not Janet herself or some non-agential object, but a subject - killed her.

Detective Janus: the problem with you is that you don't listen. It is Mr. Someone - it has to be, because I can't imagine how it could be anyone other than Mr Someone and I'm so narrow minded and stuck in my ways I think others are not listening to me when they contradict me - and Mr Someone can't have done it because Mr Someone is on holiday. And nobody killed Janet anyway, because you haven't yet told me why my killings don't qualify as Janet killings, even though you did repeatedly and I ignored you. So there.

Damn. I was with you up until then.

It is 'a god' not 'God'.

She's a god because her value are moral values, rather than her values being moral values because she's a god. — Bartricks

OK, I'll try once more. "She" cannot be merely "a god" because only one god could be the absolute subject required for your argument. If there are other gods they might value differently, which would return us to moral values being not absolute, but relative.

And don't talk bullshit about me not understanding the Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma is precisely as I already outlined it: 'Is something virtuous because the gods love it, or do the gods love it because it is virtuous'. If you want to claim there is an alternative Euthyphro dilemma then give an account of it, complete with sources.

I like the way you are following through on your argument.

I think moral values are the values of one subject. — Bartricks

Here's a distinction we might usefully make. Although I've pointed it out before, I will not apologise for bringing it up yet again.

I prefer (value) vanilla chocolate. But that's not a moral judgement. I am quite happy for you to prefer chocolate.

My valuing vanilla is not a moral judgement.

I value helping the unfortunate. That is a moral value. I am not happy for you not to help the unfortunate.

Hence, a rough distinction can be made between values per se and moral values, in that some values govern just my choices, while other values - moral values - govern the choices expected of others.

That is, moral values set out what we, and they, ought do.

Would you accept this as a defining characteristic?

Where I say that it implies a god exists? Why? If you're genuinely interested in what's what, then you should just follow arguments where they lead, not decide in advance what is true and then refuse to follow arguments that suggest you're wrong. So I'm quite confused by your approach and attitude.

No, I would not accept that characterisation. When you value helping the unfortunate you value something that is morally valued. But your valuing of that activity, though it accords with what has moral value, does not itself constitute a moral value.

This, I think, is easily demonstrated. For though you may value helping the unfortune, it is surely clear to our reason that it is morally valuable to help the unfortunate regardless of whether you happen to value it?

that would be impossible if your valuings are moral values. So therefore your values are not - and will never be - moral values. Your values may be morally valuable, of course, but that's different.

...meanwhile quantum physics holed scientific realism beneath the waterline, — Wayfarer

I will differ here - or at the lest say that the case needs to be made. But I suppose that would be for another thread.

...you should just follow arguments where they lead — Bartricks

Sure. But that might take a while.

Relevance? — Bartricks

Morality is "subjective" to the context of the basic rules that you accept. The term "subjective" is not really appropriate here, though. The proper term is rather "context-sensitive". Within a system of morality, however, moral rulings are perfectly objective. You could criticize theorems in any axiomatic system for being context-sensitive. It still works perfectly fine, though. Critical infinite-regress considerations about the axioms is not the solution.

I do think there is something in what you say, however, but it seems to me that you are saying something about what may characterise moral values as opposed to other kinds of values (such as, say, epistemic, aesthetic or prudential values).

My arguments assume nothing about what distinguishes moral values from other kinds of values apart from being distinct from our own values.

So, for instance, I value other people behaving in certain ways and instantiating certain character traits. And I value such things not because in doing so I perceive any of my interests to be being served, but just because. They are brute valuings. If someone asked me, for instance, "why do you value kindness in others, including in others you will never meet?" I would say "I just do".

I think moral values are those kinds of valuings - valuings that concern the conduct of others and that concern how others are affecting others, or how the world is affecting them - but that do not have either me, or you, or any of the rest of us, as their bearer.

If someone asked me, for instance, "why do you value kindness in others, including in others you will never meet?" I would say "I just do". — Bartricks

Yes, moral values may just be functionally healthy human feelings, based on empathy or kind-ness, such as can also be seen in social animals.

So I do not deny that moral values differ from other kinds of values - from epistemic, aesthetic and prudential - but I think that what can be said of moral values can also be said of them as well.

So take the epistemic value of truth. Well, truth is valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it. And thus the epistemic value of truth does not have me as its bearer. I do value truth, but my valuing of it is not what makes it valuable, though it does give me insight into what actually makes it valuable, namely its being valued by someone.

And take the aesthetic value of beauty. Well, beauty is valuable regardless of whether I happen to value it. And thus the aesthetic value of beauty does not have me as its bearer. I do value beauty, but my valuing of it is not what makes it valuable, though it does give me insight into what actually makes it valuable - namely, its being valued by someone.

And so on. So all those values and prescriptions that some say are personally subjective, or inter-subjective, or objective, I say are the values and prescriptions of a subject who is not me, or you, but utterly herself.

the values and prescriptions of a subject who is not me, or you, but utterly herself. — Bartricks

And who is this "she who is utterly herself"? Mother nature perhaps?

This, I think, is easily demonstrated. For though you may value helping the unfortune, it is surely clear to our reason that it is morally valuable to help the unfortunate regardless of whether you happen to value it? — Bartricks

This is a nice variation in Moore's open question?

Yep, it is morally valuable to help the unfortunate whether I think it so or not.

Going back to the distinction I wish to make...

A moral value is one that is taken to apply to everyone. Hence my preference for vanilla is not to be considered a moral value; and nor would my preference for helping the unfortunate, unless it is take to apply to everyone.

So again, would you agree that we can distinguish mere preferences from moral values in that moral values are taken to apply to everyone?

it seems to me that you are saying something about what may characterise moral values as opposed to other kinds of values — Bartricks

Exactly.

My arguments assume nothing about what distinguishes moral values from other kinds of values apart from being distinct from our own values. — Bartricks

Understood, and I agree.

Seems my point may be becoming clear.

She is who she is. Again, you keep doing this - keep assuming that we need to identify her from among a list of suspects of your invention. She is who she is, and who she is is the one whose values are moral, epistemic, prudential and aesthetic values, and whose prescriptions are the prescriptions of moral, epistemic, prudential and aesthetic normativity.

Traditionally her name has been Reason, but you can call her Trisha.

That's a bit too quick for me, but yeah, something along those lines perhaps.

Well you have said she is "a god" and now that she has traditionally been named 'Reason'. There have been many gods, would you say there have been many conceptions of reason? Has she not also traditionally been named 'The Good' and 'God'? Do you think vagueness really suffices for a philosophical argument?

No, for I think a value that applies to some and not others could still be moral - but I am perfectly happy to accept that there are, in fact, universal values and that most of the values we call moral do, in fact, apply universally.

Take me and my valuing of kindness (which is not, of course, a moral valuing but it serves as a model). I value kindness in others in a basic way. And I value others being kind regardless of whether they want to be kind. So I do not value others being kind just when or if it will serve their ends or satisfy their desires to be. No, I value others being kind just for the sake of it.

But let's say there are just some people that I do not value being kind. That is, bizarrely, I value tall people being kind and tall people alone. Well, now my value is not universal but it seems to me that were the subject - Reason, Trisha, she who is utterly herself - do value kindness in this kind of way, then kindness would still be a moral value.

So the universality of moral values, though an apparent feature of most of them, is not, I think, an essential feature of them.

But really it doesn't matter, I think, because the arguments still lead where they lead.

I am entirely unclear why you are finding me unclear.

Me: Someone has killed Janet. Not Janet herself or an object, but someone. A killer.

You: Mr Killer?

Me: no, not Mr Killer - he works at the grocery (I mean, he could have done it, I suppose, but I am not saying he did - I am saying that a killer killed Janet, not that Mr Killer specifically killed her). Again, I mean 'a killer'.

You: which killer?

Me: the one who killed Janet.

You: Well, there have been lots of killers over the ages. Which one of them is it?

Me: why do you think it has to be one of them? It is Janet's killer. Janet's killer is Janet's killer and not another person.

You: why are you being so vague? Do you think such vagueness is really fitting in this kind of police work?

Can't the process of judging value be made objective?

So, while a subject values x or not the valuation itself is objective? It would be like someone using an instrument (objective) to do the measurement instead of without one (subjective) — TheMadFool

I'm interested in this line of argumentation. If the genesis of moral codes derive and are patterned, a la the capability for language, in our brain via selective processes that support group survival, does a statistical correlation of principle development against survival support derivation of a moral code, in an objective sense?

In this regard, narratives aside, some of the rules of behavior that arise as part of the group dynamic are described as 'moral'. Our actions, the prohibitions and prescriptions that surround them, are tied to the environment in which we develop. The narratives (e.g. God, Gaia, philosophical arguments) of their defense and their application, even if by force, are borne as a 2nd level rationalization and are part of the selection process.

This does not imply that the moral principles are fixed. They may very well develop and morph in a dynamic environment. This premise may support the development of physical/social principles, independent of a specific, human situation (e.g. alien species, animal species) predicting the development of specific social mores and actions within a group.

Is this unreasonable? If we, sociologically/ethologically, can develop statistically valid predictions of which actions (and under what narrative) are likely to give rise to counter-action (social stigma, physical aggression), does this not deserve the label of 'objective'?

This does not deny a subjective component to morality any more than the subjectivity of pain doesn't deny the objectivity of neuronal patterns consequent with the expression of that subjective mental state. Am I missing the boat?

So the universality of moral values, though an apparent feature of most of them, is not, I think, an essential feature of them. — Bartricks

OK. Think on it some more. You can value kindness, sure - but that's not a moral value. The moral value would be that everyone ought value kindness.

That's what I denied above. I've thought about it a lot and am unclear why you assume I haven't. Moral values are not essentially universal. Most are, in fact, valuings of us all being certain sorts of people. But that is not an essential feature of them.

Like I say, it doesn't matter though, for the subject of this thread is whether moral values are subjective, not whether they are universal.

And I have presented a deductively valid and apparently sound argument demonstrating that they are subjective - they are the valuings of a subject who is not me, or you, or anyone else apart from herself.