Er, no, you're really not understanding this. There's only so much I can do. If - if - moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable. That is a conceptual truth. If you can't see that it is true, then like I say, there's nothing I can do for you.
Now, I am not going to respond to you until you actually address one of my premises rather than insisting on changing them for quite different ones of your own invention.

Er, no, you're really not understanding this. There's only so much I can do. If - if - moral values are made of my valuings, then if I value something necessarily it is morally valuable. — Bartricks

Er, no, you're not really understanding this. It has to be "necessarily it is morally valuable to ____" How do you want to fill in the blank? It's not an option to not fill it in.

I can fill it in for you:

"If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something, necessarily it is morally valuable to me."

That's definitely true.

That makes this:

"If I value something, then it's not the case that necessarily, it is morally valuable to me."

Clearly false.

(I switched around the modal quantifier because if we don't fix that, the premises still wouldn't be true with the modal quantifier present--after all, it might be the case that you only contingently value something. Moving the modal quantifier makes it pertain to the semantics of the conditional instead.)

Oh my word, the less they know the less they know it.

First, there is no 'to me' at the end of my premise, so stop putting it in. Address MY premise, not yours. It won't be morally valuable 'to me', it'll just be 'morally valuable' full stop, because that's the nature of moral value and my valuings will now constitute it. They DON'T of course, but that's the blooming point!!

Second, even if we change my premise for your one - which I won't, because it is thoroughly confused - the argument's conclusion will be the SAME!

Or do you think it won't be? You think, do you, that if I value something then necessarily it is morally valuable? So, if I value raping someone, then necessarily it is good for me to rape someone? Are you crazy? Put in 'to me' all you like, your claims are preposterous and self-evidently false.

First, there is no 'to me' at the end of my premise, so stop putting it in. — Bartricks

Right. There's no "to you" written by you at the end of your premise, which is a problem, because valuations are ALWAYS to someone. There's no such thing as "morally valuable" full stop. The idea of that is nonsense.

Or do you think it won't be? You think, do you, that if I value something then necessarily it is morally valuable? So, if I value raping someone, then necessarily it is good for me to rape someone? — Bartricks

If you value raping someone (and you consider that a moral stance), the necessarily, to you, it is a moral value, or it is morally good, to rape someone.

That's the whole friggin idea behind morality being subjective. So yes, that's correct.

First, take a course in logic.

Then, once you've done that, say which of my premises - MY premises, as written by me, not you - you disagree with.

Then present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of my premise as a conclusion and I'll then inspect the premises of your argument to see if they have any plausibility at all.

Do those things.

MY premises, as written by me, not you - you disagree with. — Bartricks

The first, because it's incoherent as written.

Valuations are always to someone.
Statements about value that don't state or at least clearly imply who is valuing something are incoherent.
Therefore, "If moral values are my valuings, then if I value something, it is necessarily morally valuable," especially in the context of your argument, is incoherent.

Good - so you think that if I value raping someone, then necessarily it is morally good for me to rape them. That is obviously false. If I value raping someone it is not thereby morally good for me to rape them.
Perhaps I'll believe it is good for me to rape them, but again that won't entail that it is good for me to rape them.
You think otherwise. Fine.
But for those who agree with me that valuing raping someone does not entail that it is good for you to rape them, my argument goes through.

Needless to say, my argument will not persuade the morally insane or the unbelievable confused.

Good - so you think that if I value raping someone, then necessarily it is morally good for me to rape them. — Bartricks

Morally good to you yes.

That's not false. It's obviously true, rather. That's the whole idea of you valuing something morally. It's morally valuable to you.

So if Steve rapes Jane and we subsequently find out that Steve valued raping Jane, then we have found out that Steve did nothing wrong. Far from it - Steve did something good.
Ooo, I stand refuted. What an absurd view you hold. LIke I say, you haven't refuted my argument. All you've done is reveal yourself to be morally incompetent on many levels.

So if Steve rapes Jane and we subsequently find out that Steve valued raping Jane, then we have found out that Steve did nothing wrong. — Bartricks

We have found out that Steve did nothing wrong to Steve. Once again, these things are ALWAYS to someone.

Someone else may have a different opinion.

Steve's act of rape is morally bad regardless of Steve's attitudes towards it. You think that's false. Fine, but now you're not worth debating with - to quote Anscombe, you show signs of a corrupt mind.

Steve's act of rape is morally bad regardless of Steve's attitudes towards it. — Bartricks

That's objectivism. It's not subjectivism.

Moral objectivism is incorrect. That's not what the world is like.

Things are only morally good or bad to individuals. Different individuals have different opinions. There are no non-individual moral opinions or valuations to correctly match or to fail to match.

Incorrect again. And like I say, not worth debating with. Tara.

Okay, but what you're arguing isn't subjectivism then.

Yes it is. Read the opening post. Or don't. Then take a course in logic. Then take a course in ethics. Then realize you're wrong about virtually everything. Then come back.

Yes it is. — Bartricks

No, it's not. I'm a moral subjectivist. "X is morally bad regardless of S's opinion" is the exact opposite of subjectivism.

Your stupid modus ponens argument rests on trying to insert objectivism "quietly" by not specifying who is valuing. Because, as you pointed out, you believe that it's a "value full stop"--that's objectivism, not subjectivism.

You're confused is what you are. Read. The. Opening. Post. And do the other things. And realize that you don't know what you think you know.

At least you're entertaining as a clown.

And arguments can't be stupid. People can be, however. Really, really stupid in some cases.

And arguments can't be stupid. People can be, however. Really, really stupid in some cases. — Bartricks

People can be aspies, too.

yes, shall we make a big list of things that people can be and arguments can't?

Or is it nap nap time?

:lol: :lol: :lol:

So we've figured out that your argument works just in case one agrees with it.

Dude, seriously?! Loo
How in the name of almighty Oprah are you still responding after all that?!

Subjectivists about moral values believe that moral values exist as subjective states, if or when they exist.

I think moral values are demonstrably subjective. Here is my simple argument:

1. For something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued.
2. Only a subject can value something
3. Therefore, for something to be morally valuable is for it to be being valued by a subject. — Bartricks

So 'pain' would be a classic example of something that is subjective in this sense of the term. Pain is a feeling and feelings are subjective states - they exist in subjects and nowhere else. So, if you feel in pain, then necessarily you are in pain. — Bartricks

!. For something to be painful is for it to be felt as painful
2. On a subject can feel something.
3. Therefore, for something to be painful is for it to be being felt as painful by a subject.

The analogy you make between feeling pain and moral valuing is, for the moral subjectivist, perfect. There is no requirement that a particular instance of feeling pain should be shared by everyone or by some purported mind apart from everyone's in order to qualify as an instance of feeling pain, just as there is no requirement that a particular instance of moral valuing should be shared by everyone or by some purported mind apart from everyone's in order to qualify as an instance of moral valuing.

When you conclude that a purported mind apart from everyone's is required, this would only be to warrant an objective conception of morality. In other words something is objectively right or wrong because God has determined it to be so. So you are conflating subjective and objective conceptions of morality, and hence the confusion in your argument.

Having said this though, I think the whole polemic concerning whether morality is objective or subjective is flawed and plagued with category errors, reification and shallow thinking. Subjects are not apart from the world, or apart from the inter-subjective context in which the very idea of morality can become coherent.

No, I have said how I am using the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' in the opening post. Precisely because others use them in haphazard and unclear ways, and precisely because I do not want this debate to end up being about labels rather than the positions to which they have been attached, I gave definitions. Those definitions are the ones that apply in this thread. Don't challenge them, start your own thread and use them differently if you find my usage too uncomfortable to adopt. (My usage is, incidentally, entirely conventional - but don't dispute that either, for that's not what this thread is about).

The view I have defended above is subjectivist, not objectivist. I am defending a divine command theory of value - a divine command theorist about value is a subjectivist (in my sense of the term, given above), but a subjectivist is not necessarily a divine command theorist. Indeed, the vast bulk of those who call themselves subjectivists about morality are most certainly not divine command theorists - they're idiots who are (normally) guilty of confusing beliefs and other representative mental states with what they are beliefs about or representations of.

So, most subjectivists - bar divine command theorists - are ignorant fools who know little about morality and can't think straight, or they're ego-maniacs who've mistaken themselves for a god.

By comparison, most objectivists about morality are completely potty (if sincere). Why? Because they think that moral values and prescriptions can emanate from objects, or that they can just dance about all by themselves. It's mad either way.

Just to add - but again, not for dispute - 'objective', as I am using the term, is not synonymous with 'external'. 'Objective', as I am using it, means 'exists outside of minds' or, if one prefers, 'made of something non-mental'.

'External' just means 'out there'.

Most moral philosophers agree that morality is 'out there' in some robust sense. And I think that's quite right - it obviously is. But 'out there' does not necessarily mean 'exists outside of minds'. For instance, George Berkeley thought the external sensible world was 'external' - that is, it exists outside of my mind and yours and his - but not objective. For he held that the external sensible world exists as the mental states of a god. Hence why he is called a 'subjectivist' about the sensible world.

Likewise, I am a subjectivist about morality in the same way as Berkeley was a subjectivist about the sensible world. I affirm its outness, but I deny its objectivity.

Again, that was just to clarify how these terms are operating here and to underline that my usage is not eccentric. It was not to invite discussion of the labels.