Do you agree that Kant's morals in the world, at present, is like a fish out of water, destined to die?

We have to put Kantian morals in its proper environment - one in which all Kantian principles are in effect. — TheMadFool

I think this is a misunderstanding. Kant's morals are personal. The goal of acting morally is not primarily to make society a better place. Rather, Kant argues that to act morally is to be free. You follow the rules because by doing so, you overcome all outside, contingent influences on your actions.

I think this is a misunderstanding. Kant's morals are personal. The goal of acting morally is not primarily to make society a better place. Rather, Kant argues that to act morally is to be free. You follow the rules because by doing so, you overcome all outside, contingent influences on your actions. — Echarmion

Imagine a world where everyone adopts behavior that is universalizable. Wouldn't all immoral behavior be absent? I would really like to see an immoral act that can be universalized which would contradict my belief that Kantian morals need to be adopted in toto to be realized as true instead of the partial treatment in the murderer at the door thought experiment.

Thank you.

Imagine a world where everyone adopts behavior that is universalizable. Wouldn't all immoral behavior be absent? I would really like to see an immoral act that can be universalized which would contradict my belief that Kantian morals need to be adopted in toto to be realized as true instead of the partial treatment in the murderer at the door thought experiment. — TheMadFool

You're not wrong. In a world where everyone adopts universalizable behavior, no immoral acts would happen. It's just that I don't think Kant assumed, or even required as a prerequisite, that this state would occur. In Kants system, creating the actual "state of freedom" is the business of laws, not of morality.

:up:

My issue lies within the dichotomy: you either have to lie, or you have to tell the murderer where your children are. — Clint Ryan

Why don't you take the fifth? The "no comment" or "withhold information" choice. That's not a lie, yet saves your children.

Philosophers can be so daft sometimes. Simone de Boudouire is not exception, and Kant was a prime example of an idiot gone mad and famous.

Imagine a world where everyone adopts behavior that is universalizable. — TheMadFool

That is easy to imagine. But hard to come by. You'd need to visit all the planets of quite a few galaxies before you'd get to one.

If that was achievable, and diversification was stopped in its very basic, the world would still be just filled with amoebas or with the basic slime of the primordeal ooze.

But I guess I digress. If the world was universalizable in behaviour, AND not following the Kantian rules, then it woudl also attain a stable state, which had nothing to do with Kant's suggestion. For instance, thieveing could possibly be universal behaviour, or bashing each other's heads, or the like.

I think this is a misunderstanding. Kant's morals are personal. The goal of acting morally is not primarily to make society a better place. — Echarmion

Kant is a bit like the bible. Many people misunderstand him, in so many different ways, that a person who happens upon his philosophy will learn nothing of what Kant was trying to say.

Do I believe that Kant's teaching was personal, and not societal? I hardly think so. If I thieved, and raped and pillaged with impunity, I may be freeer than I am now, and society would be a worse place.

To make society a better place is an END; to feel free in a process I adopt is MEANS. So I can see your point, if you take Kant's directive to make moral actions into MEANS and not ENDS; this speaks for personal morals.

But restrictions take away freedom. I restrict my behaviour to those of a set of behaviour which is accepted by Kantian standards. Restrction. I don't become freer.

Therefore Kant finds himself in a terrible fix which cuts his house of cards in two: personally you are not freer, so the MEANS are not met; personally you don't want to work for an END, which is to make society better; these two terrible blows to his philosophy smash and shatter his ideas and ideals into small smithereens.

Kant is a bit like the bible. Many people misunderstand him, in so many different ways, that a person who happens upon his philosophy will learn nothing of what Kant was trying to say. — god must be atheist

I find Kant relatively easy to understand. He repeats his main points a lot, in different ways. Maybe it helps to speak German. Or maybe I'm deluded about my understanding.

But restrictions take away freedom. I restrict my behaviour to those of a set of behaviour which is accepted by Kantian standards. Restrction. I don't become freer. — god must be atheist

Kant explicitly argues otherwise though. Self-imposed restrictions do make your freer. Because if you don't impose restrictions on yourself, you're a slave to your instincts.

Kant explicitly argues otherwise though. Self-imposed restrictions do make your freer. Because if you don't impose restrictions on yourself, you're a slave to your instincts. — Echarmion

So if I am slave to my instincts, I am less free than if I am a slave to my other considerations, which have nothing to do with the embetterment of society as an end?

I don't know if this is right. Who is to say that instincts' restrictions make you less free than arbitrary and self-contradictory restrictions imposed by Kant? Because they are not imposed by ME, I am just a medium via which Kant influences me to self-impose restrictions. Without Kant, I would be void of the self-imposed restrictions suggested by Kant, which satisfy Kantian parameters.

This is a mess. First Kant compares apples to oranges, and declares one is less restrictive than than the other. Then he imposes on us a guidance, which we are supposed to follow when we create our own self-restrictions.

This Kant guy was a sadistical, control-hugry, evil genius, who duped millions of philosophers. But not me.

Kant explicitly argues otherwise though. Self-imposed restrictions do make your freer. Because if you don't impose restrictions on yourself, you're a slave to your instincts. — Echarmion

Kant either uses the word "instinct" in a way which is different from what we understand to be instinctual behaviour; or else he is a moron.

You can't overcome your instincts, as such. Instincts are behaviour patterns developed during evolution that are hard-wired into your psyche and othe response systems. You can't act against your instincts.

You can act against conditioned response. But you can't act against natural instincts.

If you spot something flying fast toward your face, you raise your arm to protect your eyes. This is instinctual behaviour.

If you see a good looking woman, you get an erection. This is instinctual behaviour.

Restricting yourself from boning the woman on the spot if the social milieu is inappropriate for it, and she did not give consent, is NOT acting against instinctual behaviour. You still get an erection and mounting desire.

I can't expect Kant to be well-versed with twentieth-century advances in behavioural psychology. But you can't build an argument on outdated ideas either.

So if I am slave to my instincts, I am less free than if I am a slave to my other considerations, which have nothing to do with the embetterment of society as an end? — god must be atheist

Yes.

Because they are not imposed by ME, I am just a medium via which Kant influences me to self-impose restrictions. Without Kant, I would be void of the self-imposed restrictions suggested by Kant, which satisfy Kantian parameters. — god must be atheist

That's absurd though. Kant is not some deity brainwashing you through time and space. If you read Kant's arguments, you either find them convincing or you don't. If you find them convincing, it's you who makes that assessment, and you who decides to apply Kant's system.

You can act against conditioned response. But you can't act against natural instincts. — god must be atheist

I used instinct as a shorthand. I am not sure Kant uses the word. What is meant is resisting said conditioned responses, among other things, in favour of a deliberative process which Kant calls rationality.

Kant either uses the word "instinct" in a way which is different from what we understand to be instinctual behaviour; or else he is a moron. — god must be atheist

I used instinct as a shorthand. I am not sure Kant uses the word. What is meant is resisting said conditioned responses, among other things, in favour of a deliberative process which Kant calls rationality. — Echarmion

An open ended, somewhat tangential, question regarding proper use of terminology. “Instinct” has two senses: that of a) innate (genotypic) complex behavior and that of b) complex behavior performed in manners devoid of conscious thought. In both cases, instincts are distinguished from reflexes, these being simple behaviors.

In the first sense, to say “learned instincts” is to express a logical contradiction. In sense (b), however, all habits – for one example - are instinctive and acquired from past conscious experience (that has been somehow internalized and automated, this for use in respective contexts).

Academia – in fields of both ethology (study of animal behavior) and modern psychology – favors sense (a) of the term.

That said, sense (b) is still a valid definition of “instinct” and, importantly, there is no other word that I know of which comes close to expressing “a complex behavior that is performed in the absence of conscious reasoning”; an abstraction which can then be further categorized as either innate or leaned.

Examples of sense (b): She instinctively knew the right answer to the question. He instinctively caught the hurled ball. And both these behaviors are not innate (purely genotypic) but are contingent on former learning of how to perform activity X.

So: If use of the term “instinct” is improper to differentiate between innate and learned “complex behaviors automatically performed” - this due to its current academic usage - what alternative term would adequately convey the just quoted meaning?

Or is “instinct” the only term for this quoted meaning? In which case, the distinction of learned instincts v. innate instincts would naturally follow.

ps. I don’t feel this issue deserves its own thread, so I’m asking it at this point in this thread. Obviously, no one is obliged to answer, but opinions would be welcomed … as well as being somewhat relevant to where the thread is currently at.

John Bargh coined the (rather boring) term 'automaticity' to cover behaviours devoid of either awareness, intentionality, controllability or high cognitive load. Does that cover the characteristics you're thinking of? If so then I'm afraid (dull as it is) "She instinctively knew the right answer to the question." simply becomes "She automatically knew the right answer to the question."

If so then I'm afraid (dull as it is) "She instinctively knew the right answer to the question." simply becomes "She automatically knew the right answer to the question." — Isaac

Thank you for the info! To my ear, though, the second sentence doesn't seem to convey the same connotations as the first - even thought the term automaticity, thus defined, does convey the intended concept. I think it's because "instinct" clearly applies only to sentient beings whereas "automaticity" sounds - at least to me - like something that an automaton or machine would do. Though you're right: it's definition is well enough established for wiktionary. I'll mull it over some. Thanks again.

I think it's because "instinct" clearly applies only to sentient beings whereas "automaticity" sounds - at least to me - like something that an automaton or machine would do. — javra

Though less forthcoming with terminology, you might then, prefer to look at the work of someone like Amishi Jha whose approach from neuroscience is supposedly showing how attention is a secondary level activity which can be modulated, thus making behaviour not so much either 'automatic' or considered, but on a scale depending on the amount of attention we give the process.

you might then, prefer to look at the work of someone like Amishi Jha — Isaac

Hey, cheers. Will do.

I don't think that many people really intend to be lazy, for example. — Terrapin Station

Though I think this general topic is up for debate -- for instance, in another thread I defended the position people can intend to believe lies that they know on some level to be lies -- in this case, context of a job (and I even added the sub-clause of "doing the minimum effort on the job" to qualify what I am referring to when I say lazy), someone who decides to put in the minimum, for whatever reason, I agree may not be intending to "be a lazy person", but that doesn't exclude them forming the goal to be lazy at that particular job (whether they don't like their employer, don't think the effort asked is commensurate with the pay, or they just think it's what cool kids do, they can even put in extra effort to be as lazy as possible, then even brag to friends about it; more than a few negligence cases have gone down this way).

They're not free to do so under Kantian morals. But we are not responsible for making them into moral beings. — Echarmion

No, but we are responsible for preventing harm to others by said human beings if we can do so, even if it requires lying to them. This trumps any categorical imperative, because preventing harm is more important than holding to a principle.

No, but we are responsible for preventing harm to others by said human beings if we can do so, even if it requires lying to them. This trumps any categorical imperative, because preventing harm is more important than holding to a principle. — Marchesk

According to the principle that preventing harm is the most important thing. But, as you note, we can disagree about how important different principles are. This isn't the thread for a discussion of deontology vs consequentialism though.