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block universe — Pathogen

Also see 'eternalism', which is the same idea, and 'presentism', which is the other mode that time could have.

What would a definition of free entail? — Pathogen

Something clear that would at least give me something to propose a means for, since I always explore both sides.

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made several points in that last post in no particular order, to which one specifically are you referring? I would be glad to explain my position more clearly — Pathogen

Your last point - you said that you were interested in being shown how free will is an objective possibility. If we have free will, then it is an objective possibility.

I would argue that randomness is not necessarily incompatible with free will but determinism always is. — Pathogen

What's the argument though? If we already have free will then yes, I grant that randomness does not preclude our continuing to possess it, likewise with antecedent causation. For instance, if I am wondering what to decide to do but, due to indeterminacy, it is indeterministic whether I will fall down dead or not - and I don't and I make the decision - then my decision was free, even though it was indeterministic whether I would make it or be dead.

But if my decisions are wholly determined by prior external causes - and you accept that this is incompatible with having free will - how would introducing some indeterminacy into the whole process give me free will? It's not as if my resulting decisions would be any more controlled than under the wholesale determinism scenario - I mean, if anything they'd be less controlled.

I don't understand this statement, would you mind clarifying it for me? — Pathogen

Something that exists contingently has come into being. Thus it has either been caused to come into being by something external to it, or it has popped into being out of nowhere (not, I think, a coherent possibility) in which case its existence is a result of pure chance. Either way, everything it subsequently does is going to be a product of antecedent determination and/or pure chance.

A necessarily existent thing, by contrast, has not come into being. It exists by its very nature. As a necessarily existing thing has not been caused to be by anything external and prior, and as its existence is the opposite of chancy (for necessarily existing things 'have' to exist - there is no possibility of them not doing so), then not everything a necessarily existing thing does will be wholly the product of prior external determination or pure chance. Thus, such a thing - and only such a thing - can have free will.

As I do have free will, I conclude that I am such a being.

how free will may be objectively possible — Pathogen

First, we need to know what 'free' means in reference to the will—beyond someone saying that they have it.

What is it free of, concerning the will or what is it free to do, concerning the will, or what is it not fixed to do, concerning the will?

Ok, in my view there are two ways in which we structure the world: causality and freedom. Causality structures the flow of events - time, essentially. Freedom structures the way we interact with the world, our choices and decisions.

One is our observer's perspective, the other is our actor's perspective. We need both to make sense of the world. Neither is "actually real" so far as we know.

Notably, causality is not something that we can establish using the scientific method. The scientific method relies on causality as an axiom. We cannot learn about causality, because in order to perceive the world as a coherent whole we need it to be given a priori.

Searching for free will in the world of causality is therefore useless. The very structure of that world - imposed on it by our minds - precludes freedom. But it does not follow that freedom is not real. Rather, freedom is a different, but equally valid, way to structure reality.

The very structure of that world - imposed on it by our minds - precludes freedom. — Echarmion

Well said. Freedom is not to be found in the list of a priori conceptions, that from which as you say, the very structure of the world is imposed by the mind. But causality is on the list, alongside possibility, necessity, existence, and so on.

And while I agree it does not follow from that, that freedom is not real, I hesitate to agree that freedom is still an equally valid way to structure reality, for in which case it would seem to be in direct conflict with that which does so structure, and from which it is itself excluded. Nevertheless, because from some P it does not follow that freedom is not real, says nothing about how freedom is real, beyond the mere existence of the conception of it.

It would seem, therefore, that if freedom is

a different, but equally valid, way to structure reality. — Echarmion

...it would need to be determined what freedom is, in what manner or fashion it is real, in order to establish the equal validity for what it does.

I’m not sure that can be done.

...it would need to be determined what freedom is, in what manner or fashion it is real, in order to establish the equal validity for what it does.

I’m not sure that can be done. — Mww

So, then, as for free will, I'm figuring that its proponents want to have consciousness to be the cause of what one does, in real time, rather than any subconscious neural brain firings and figurings being already finished by the time their results get into consciousness as a product. So, that's what I'll be going forward with. Consciousness will have to do it all, as it being the will, and we'll still have to get this conscious will not to be fixed, but to be 'free', providing we can define 'free'.

Thank you for laying out your case. Instead of dissecting your post and nit-picking it, I am simply going to engage your argument, if you do not mind. Could you elaborate on what you mean when you say "freedom?" I want to make sure I understand clearly the basics of the case you are laying out

Did you intend this for me? I ask because I have no interest in free, but rather in freedom. And my posting history here makes clear I reject “free will” as such.

I will say I am a fan of your “subconscious neural brain firings and figurings”, but I don’t see them as relevant to the subjective paradigm.

If by chance this was intended for me, I should forewarn you that I’m not going to be able to offer much support for your initial premises. But if you still want to elaborate on them, I’ll pay attention at least.

Did you intend this for me? — Mww

Well, yes, since you're investigating 'freedom', but for everyone, too.

Ahhh, ok. Dialectic courtesy says https://thephilosophyforum.com/profile/3486/echarmion has the right of way, with me just agreeing with a part of what was said.

So, to somehow have the deeper kind of free will hinted at, although not well defined, one approach is to shift the action to a consciousness, as a distinct thing, that is directly in charge in the right now of making thoughts and decisions; however, to do that we have to throw out the brain processes that we formerly had in charge, and, better yet, say that those process were never there. OK, they're gone, as they have to be gone. Now we can continue.

Since Existence is a given, having no opposite that could be, is all there in the block universe as everything, instantaneous, via something like as light being able to be everywhere in no time, for light cannot age. All the block universe is would be every path possible to all events, as their world-lines, it being made of events, just like space-time is considered to be, which gives credence.

The events would be such as occasions of experience already made, obviating any more processing time to make them, allowing consciousness to retain its instantness of decisions/thoughts. Consciousness, then, is fundamental and so it is totally connected to all the events, kind of like that even a part of a hologram still contains the whole, although in a dimmer way.

Are we getting anywhere?

‘Totally connected’ doesn’t take into account the structure of these connections in consciousness. While they appear “to be everywhere in no time”, as you say, these events are nevertheless interacting with experience according to some form of structure: value/significance.

There is a tendency to look beyond time to ‘all possible events’ as a single dimensional leap, but in my view jumping from existence as actuality to existence as possibility misses a step in how we structure and interact with our reality. It is in being aware of the paths (potential) themselves - including how they each connect to our own capacity and the collaboration involved - that the will gains access to its ‘freedom’.

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‘Totally connected’ doesn’t take into account the structure of these connections in consciousness. While they appear “to be everywhere in no time”, as you say, these events are nevertheless interacting with experience according to some form of structure: value/significance. — Possibility

Yes, in this new free will approach, consciousness contains all experiences and their relations and has real time access, somehow, in order for consciousness to be the instant cause. It is disconcerting, though, that the pre-made occasions of eternalism's experience would be even worse that presentism determining events as it went along.

It is disconcerting, though, that the pre-made occasions of eternalism's experience would be even worse that presentism determining events as it went along. — PoeticUniverse

How do you mean ‘worse’?

How do you mean ‘worse’? — Possibility

Seems like there's more hope to intervene in the actions of the 'now' production rather to the same that was carved in stone, but presentism has problems, so I went with the block idea in order to have events already there to pick from, although I suppose that should still work with brain memory. I'm not surprised about running into contradiction with this new free will approach, but I'm leaving out bias as best can do.

Seems like there's more hope to intervene in the actions of the 'now' production rather to the same that was carved in stone — PoeticUniverse

I’m finding it difficult to follow what you’re saying here - is there a word missing?

I’m going to bring Rovelli into the discussion again, with regards to this dichotomy of eternalism/presentism:

The fact that we cannot arrange the universe like a single orderly sequence of times does not mean that nothing changes. It means that changes are not arranged in a single orderly succession: the temporal structure of the world is more complex than a simple single linear succession of instants. This does not mean that it is non-existent or illusory.

“The distinction between past, present and future is not an illusion. It is the temporal structure of the world. But the temporal structure of the world is not that of presentism. The temporal relations between events are more complex than we previously thought, but they do not cease to exist on account of this....

...We do not have a grammar adapted to say that an event ‘has been’ in relation to me but ‘is’ in relation to you....

The fundamental theory of the world must be constructed in this way; it does not need a time variable: it needs to tell us only how the things that we see in the world vary with respect to each other. That is to say, what the relations may be between these variables. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

The concept of ‘eternalism’ for me is not an objective global order of the universe. Rather it is the way each observer structures their subjective experience of the universe. My block universe differs in 5D structure from your block universe - even though we can agree on many aspects of it in two, three and even four dimensional structures.

No, we need cast iron evidence that we have it.

An analogy: I have cast iron evidence that my computer is working - it appears (visually) to be working. But I don't know how it is working. But only a fool would conclude that therefore I do not, in fact, have good evidence that it is working.

Likewise, I have cast iron evidence that I have free will - I appear, rationally speaking, to have it. I do not know 'how' I have it, but only a fool would conclude on that basis that therefore I do not.

If I have cast iron evidence that I have free will, then free will is an objective possibility even if none of us can figure out 'how' it could be.

But the temporal structure of the world is not that of presentism. — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

Rovelli is against presentism, while his good friend and collaborator on Loop Quantum Gravity, Lee Smolin is wholly for it. Each have compelling arguments.

...We do not have a grammar adapted to say that an event ‘has been’ in relation to me but ‘is’ in relation to you.... — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

The relativity of simultaneity favors eternalism

what the relations may be between these variables — Carlo Rovelli, ‘The Order of Time’

Relations are paramount.


“The objective world is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling along the lifeline of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time.”

― Hermann Weyl

So, then, in the new free will attempt, fundamental consciousness traverses already existent world-lines of events previously carved, although this doesn't seem so 'free'. I am failing…

The important part is that randomness only occurs at the observation. That randomness undermines the fully deterministic worldview. — Pathogen

Yes, for the wave function is deterministic before the collapse into a unitary probabilities that add to one, giving all a chance, eventually, and the "observation" probability means interactions of any kind. So I think it means that things could have turned out differently if we could have rerun the universe, but is this enough to free the will the way the proponents would want it? Who knows, without a meaningful meaning of what they are calling 'free'.

I do not see how you're addressing my point. If antecedent determination of our decision making processes is incompatible with them exhibiting free will - and you think it is (as do I) - then how does making them indeterministic to some degree magically mean they do now exhibit free will?

If a past state of the universe that i had no hand in, and the laws of nature, which I also had no hand in, created me and determined both what qualities I would have and how I would develop, then I lack free will.

If, instead, a past state of the universe that I had no hand in, and the laws of nature that I had no hand in, and some chance events, created me, then I still lack free will.

I mean, take the colour of my eyes. I take it that I am not morally responsible for the colour of my eyes and that it is sufficient to explain this to cite the fact that their colour was not something I determined.
Now imagine that it turns out it was indeterministic what eye colour I would have - does that make me morally responsible for their colour? No. It makes no difference, for it was still not something I determined.

I also do not understand why you looked to physics for answers to a philosophical question. Whether we have free will and what it involves are philosophical questions, not questions in physics. Physics know nothing about them. For free will is not something one can investigate empirically - free will is not something we can see, hear, smell, touch or taste. Our awareness of our free will is mediated by our reason, not our sensible faculties.

You need to answer the philosophical questions first before you can possibly know the implications of anything in physics. You're doing things the wrong way around, I think.

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snide — Pathogen

Nothing 'snide' here, just support and advancing the probabilistic quantum mechanic wave function:

Yes, for the wave function is deterministic before the collapse into a unitary probabilities that add adds to one, giving all a chance, eventually, and the "observation" probability probably means interactions of any kind.

So I think it means that things could have turned out differently if we could have rerun the universe, but is this enough to free the will the way the proponents would want it? Who knows, without a meaningful meaning of what they are calling 'free'.

(Your long post was great, indeed.)

'Free' is the key to what free will is.

It is disconcerting, though, that the pre-made occasions of eternalism's experience would be even worse that presentism determining events as it went along. — PoeticUniverse

Why would the "occasions" of eternalism be "pre-made"? There is no before and after in eternity. You seem to be resiling to inappropriately thinking in terms of temporality.

And here you go again;

So, then, in the new free will attempt, fundamental consciousness traverses already existent world-lines of events previously carved, although this doesn't seem so 'free'. I am failing… — PoeticUniverse

thinking in terms of temporality — Janus

All my references are to the block universe of eternalism derived from Einstein. I am for fixed will, but fairly trying to find if free will can be; I've only gotten as far as trying to make conscious free will instant and productive and thus not just showing what is past due to figurings having to take time. The block universe is eternally as it is, predetermined, so to speak. The traversal of it by consciousness is a kind of eternalistic 'time', at least seemingly to us.