A feeling, especially if it is not shared by everyone, seems a poor justification for a universal claim and a restriction of behavior that you want to impose on everyone. If you are making the claim that everyone ought to abide by this claim, you seem to necessarily be making some sort of objective claim. — petrichor

Whether it's a good or poor justification is also subjective. If you are prone to believe that this stuff is or can be objective, then you're more likely to think that subjectivity is not a good base for it.

If you realize that this sort of stuff can only be subjective, then you'd realize that it's foolish to expect anything else.

People have to live so that they're interacting with each other--social interaction is necessary. We're obviously going to prefer that people act in some ways rather than others. And there's obviously a need to not just have anarchy, because someone would take control by force anyway, and then no more anarchy. So obviously we'd rather people behave in ways that we prefer. That's what a preference is, after all.

When you say they are wrong, aren't you making an objective claim about what is right or wrong for everyone? — petrichor

No, since I realize there are no such things as objective ethical judgments. Ethical judgments are something that we do as individuals.

I don't feel like I have been proven wrong — S

This isn't about the question of whether S has been proven wrong. I am interested in examining this concept of rights, since most seem to just assert their rights claims without even really knowing what they are saying. This is commonly what practitioners of philosophy do. We will examine things often assumed, just the sorts of things people usually take as so self-evident and universally known that it is silly to question them. The people who think it is silly to stop and interrogate our basic beliefs are not philosophical.

I really want to know. Why do people feel entitled to reproduce? And is their feeling of entitlement justified?

A feeling, especially if it is not shared by everyone, seems a poor justification for a universal claim and a restriction of behavior that you want to impose on everyone. — petrichor

But it's the only possible justification. What's the supposed alternative? There is only subjective morality, irrespective of what you think moral statements seem to imply. And if you think any differently, then you have a burden of proof.

It would seem that all our rights really amount to is a kind of social agreement to respect certain feelings that are more or less universal in the culture. I don't want you taking what I feel is my stuff. And you don't want me taking what you feel is your stuff. So let's agree not to take each other's stuff and let's make it a rule that one's stuff is not to be taken by someone else.

That about sum it up? Would anyone disagree with that?

This isn't about the question of whether S has been proven wrong. I am interested in examining this concept of rights, since most seem to just assert their rights claims without even really knowing what they are saying. This is commonly what practitioners of philosophy do. We will examine things often assumed, just the sorts of things people usually take as so self-evident and universally known that it is silly to question them. The people who think it is silly to stop and interrogate our basic beliefs are not philosophical. — petrichor

If being philosophical means drawing no lines with regards to sensible enquiries, then I'm happy to be unphilosophical. But of course, it doesn't mean that at all. That's just how you're characterising it. You're trying in vein to commandeer the term, and you've done it a number of times now. Yours is a characterisation which I find not only naive, but counterproductive.

It would seem that all our rights really amount to is a kind of social agreement to respect certain feelings that are more or less universal in the culture. I don't want you taking what I feel is my stuff. And you don't want me taking what you feel is your stuff. So let's agree not to take each other's stuff and let's make it a rule that one's stuff is not to be taken by someone else.

That about sum it up? Would anyone disagree with that? — petrichor

I wouldn't disagree, because it's obvious. Isn't philosophy just great? You get to spend ages enquiring into things that you already know, and then, remarkably, you finally reach a conclusion that you already knew to begin with.

Do you know what's even better than philosophy? Making sarcastic comments to people online. It's a favourite pastime of mine.

Consider that sometimes, the "my stuff" that is under discussion is such things as slaves. How would we respond to the Confederate slave-owner claiming his property rights? Does he have such rights?

Consider that sometimes, the "my stuff" that is under discussion is such things as slaves. How would we respond to the Confederate slave-owner claiming his property rights? Does he have such rights? — petrichor

Oh, c'mon. I'd respond as you'd expect me to.

It would seem that all our rights really amount to is a kind of social agreement to respect certain feelings that are more or less universal in the culture. I don't want you taking what I feel is my stuff. And you don't want me taking what you feel is your stuff. So let's agree not to take each other's stuff and let's make it a rule that one's stuff is not to be taken by someone else.

That about sum it up? Would anyone disagree with that? — petrichor

I don't agree with it, really. Some rights are about that, obviously, and that may be rather common, but not all rights are about that (whether we're talking about legal rights or "broader" moral rights).

I don't agree with it, really. Some rights are about that, obviously, and that may be rather common, but not all rights are about that (whether we're talking about legal rights or "broader" moral rights). — Terrapin Station

Well, close enough as a rough picture of how rights tend to work, and as a rough picture it's pretty obvious. But there are most probably deviants from the norm who would insist that they have rights that hardly anyone else would acknowledge, on the same sort of basis as others insist that they have rights, whether they're conscious of that basis or not, namely on the basis of their strong feelings. We both agree that there's no objective right or wrong here. There doesn't really, for all conceivable cases, "have to be a kind of social agreement to respect certain feelings that are more or less universal in the culture". That only really works as a conditional, like if one were to add, "if you want to fit in" or something.

It's not a perpetual roller coaster, it's a perpetual roller coaster ride if you never reach a point where it isn't worth continuing. Personally, I'd get off at some point. — S

Ah I see. But then again, you’re not looking at the whole experience. Say you get off after 1 hour. Then if I asked you: would you like to get on a roller coaster for 1 hour 1 minute, you would say no. Not worth starting and not worth continuing. The point is, you wouldn’t start something you don’t think is worth continuing for the whole duration

No, you're just putting words in my mouth — S

I’m really not. Ok all I’m claiming is that experiences worth starting are a subset of experiences worth continuing, do you agree?

and you can't enjoy anything if you aren't alive. — S

So then, do you think not having children is a bad thing? Because you’d be “denying” someone enjoyment? If not then what’s the relevance of this fact?

Doesn't matter. — S

How doesn’t it matter? And even if it didn’t can’t you just answer the question? You already answered it later here

Life is worth starting because life is worth living for lots of people — S

Which I think is a totally stupid claim. “Blindness is worth starting because blindness is worth living through for lots of people” do you agree with that claim? If not what makes it different from the one you just made?

That's literally nonsense, as they've already started. — S

Their children’s lives haven’t though.... what do you mean?? Their lives have started and are worth living through, that doesn’t necessarily mean they are worth starting for other people. Other examples: if someone had their eyes gouged out their blindness has started and is worth living through, that doesn’t mean it is worth gouging other people’s eyes out

The question is irrelevant. — S

Even if it was can you answer?

Nothing I've said commits me to the view that modifying children to blind them is ethical, so I don't need to answer for that.

I did say that it can be ethical to have blind children, and I stand by that. — S

Why are you treating two acts with the same intent and consequence differently?

I haven't said that it's wrong. I said I don't know — Echarmion

You don’t know whether or not genetically modifying children to suffer is right or wrong?

So, essentially utilitarianism? — Echarmion

No, not necessarily. All I said was that childbirth risks harming someone in the future without their consent. Actions that harm others in the future without their consent are wrong in almost every ethical system. Name one such action that is right.

If you're arguing that consequences, i.e. outcomes by themselves somehow have absolute ethical value, I'd have to hear an argument about how that works. — Echarmion

I’m not. Where did you get that.

My argument is basically this:

1. If an act will impose something significant on another person without their consent, then it is default wrong to perform that act
2. Procreating imposes something significant - life here - on another person without their consent
3. Therefore, procreative acts are default wrong — Bartricks

Well, close enough as a rough picture of how rights tend to work, and as a rough picture it's pretty obvious. But there are most probably deviants from the norm who would insist that they have rights that hardly anyone else would acknowledge, on the same sort of basis as others insist that they have rights, whether they're conscious of that basis or not, namely on the basis of their strong feelings. We both agree that there's no objective right or wrong here. There doesn't really, for all conceivable cases, "have to be a kind of social agreement to respect certain feelings that are more or less universal in the culture". That only really works as a conditional, like if one were to add, "if you want to fit in" or something. — S

Your whole notion of rights is so handwaving and full of assertion, I don't know where to begin. You don't even present a foundation. You mask your lack of foundation in simply trying to denigrate everyone.

Your whole notion of rights is so handwaving and full of assertion, I don't know where to begin. You don't even present a foundation. You mask your lack of foundation in simply trying to denigrate everyone. — schopenhauer1

Do you feel better after that little vent? I clearly presented a foundation in moral sentiment. And those longer-term members who are familiar with my views should already know that. Haven't you been following the discussion?

Based on their words, Bartricks and his tribe hate the world and they hate people. They write off three billion years of our existence based on their brief, pitiful view of life. They sneer at human emotion, loyalty, community, and love. How can recognizing that not be part of a philosophical response to their positions? — T Clark

I appreciate your difference with those that seemingly come from a misanthropic worldview. It repels me as well.

But I also reflect on where I've been and some of the mistakes I've made. As an adolescent I had a real antipathy towards Nietzsche, such that I couldn't get past it to try to make contact with the argument. I have since looked back and realized that it was emotion that blocked intellectual development. I've managed to develop an admiration for the manner in which he attacks the subject matter. I've never had that sort of reaction against Marx, but I've seen it expressed that he was an evil man for no other reason than his writings. At the time the argument was made it baffled me. In reflecting on this person and his reaction to Marx (and comparing it with my reaction to Nietzsche), it helped me unwind some of the less useful mechanisms that I was prone to.

It's not as if that stopped while I was young. When I read about Peter Singer, I was incensed. Since, though, I've been able to mute the reaction to understand the argument. I still refuse to agree, but in as much as it is at no threat of becoming law, emotion strikes me as a limiter to understanding. Understanding not just of the other side, but of my own thought processes.

I don't find the arguments made here (in this thread) to manage weight or credibility. My expectations of those who would persuade would be not only to stake their claim but also to consider the counters and the consequences and to speak to these. When I called the arguments here sophomoric it is due to this seeming obliviousness to the stark results that would arise from universal acceptance of the claims.

The best sorts of philosophical discussions I've been party to have been where the opposing sides helped each other with their arguments, filling in gaps, helping perfect the syllogisms. When we're too married to the result, rather than to the philosophy of the matter, it approaches rhetoric, or worse.

Since being introduced to the website, I've witnessed some interesting, thought provoking threads. I've also read threads like these which seem to be little more than philosophy-cum-politics, where signal-to-noise is depressingly low.

Do you feel better after that little vent? I clearly presented a foundation in moral sentiment. And those longer-term members who are familiar with my views should already know that. Haven't you been following the discussion? — S

Yeah and it is ridiculous. You are mostly just "venting" on others.. spewing the bile, so to speak. Human rights started as a concept arguably from the Greeks, a little more fully in the Middle Ages, actually made into its proto-modern form in John Locke/Enlightenment political thinkers, and essentially goes from there. All of them have some sort of appeal to Natural Law..which is a kind of law that is assumed to be of an ethereal/cosmic/godly kind that is above any time and place. It is a historically-rooted concept that ironically formed in certain times and places. It is a human invention that goes along with Enlightenment notions of universality (think Kant's Categorical Imperative). Moral sense is not so sophisticated that all cultures think of this. The specific idea of human rights, is very much a culmination of Western ideals that came to its more-or-less modern form in the 1700s.

Yeah and it is ridiculous. You are mostly just "venting" on others.. spewing the bile, so to speak. Human rights started as a concept arguably from the Greeks, a little more fully in the Middle Ages, actually made into its proto-modern form in John Locke/Enlightenment political thinkers, and essentially goes from there. All of them have some sort of appeal to Natural Law..which is a kind of law that is assumed to be of an ethereal/cosmic/godly kind that is above any time and place. It is a historically-rooted concept that ironically formed in certain times and places. It is a human invention that goes along with Enlightenment notions of universality (think Kant's Categorical Imperative). Moral sense is not so sophisticated that all cultures think of this. The specific idea of human rights, is very much a culmination of Western ideals that came to its more-or-less modern form in the 1700s. — schopenhauer1

So, you claim that it's ridiculous, and then you respond by referencing way more ridiculous notions like natural law?

Okay. Excuse me for looking for a more realistic source to explain ethical rights. And thanks for the uninvited history lecture, I guess.

Okay. Excuse me for looking for a more realistic source to explain ethical rights. — S

No, I am telling you where our culture even got this notion of human rights in the first place, as it evolved over time and place- that is to say, historically. It was more-or-less based on cosmic/natural law up until very recently. You are putting the cart before the horse by not recognizing this. "Rights" was a concept defined in a certain way. We now take that certain idea as a given and post-facto try to shoehorn our own basis for this very useful concept.

At the end of the day, it is a useful concept for getting certain social arrangements and outcomes accomplished. So yes it is, "If you want this, then you should do this" in a roundabout way.

Ethical rights, not human rights. We are discussing a broader concept than human rights, specifically. And I don't need you to give me a rundown on the history because, firstly, I already know some of it, and secondly, it's not relevant in reply to what I said. You've entered an argumentive discussion, where we we've taken actual stances, in order to give a random history lesson. We were talking about what we believe to be the case, not what the history of philosophy on the topic is. Thanks, but we have access to resources for that and don't need you to chime in uninvited.

It's not as if that stopped while I was young. When I read about Peter Singer, I was incensed. Since, though, I've been able to mute the reaction to understand the argument. I still refuse to agree, but in as much as it is at no threat of becoming law, emotion strikes me as a limiter to understanding. Understanding not just of the other side, but of my own thought processes. — JosephS

I followed the link. Pretty terrible. I can face the things he has to say. I've talked with people who believe things that I find very distasteful without difficulty. I felt it was important to hear them respectfully and try to understand how they feel, but when it comes time for me to respond, if my anger and bitter disagreement aren't there, it's a lie and a passive capitulation. I try hard to be respectful, by which I mean to aim my passion at the argument rather than the person. I owe them that. Sometimes I fail. I don't see why dispassion is required for legitimate philosophy. I don't have to give up my humanity and decency in order to play by the rules.

The best sorts of philosophical discussions I've been party to have been where the opposing sides helped each other with their arguments, filling in gaps, helping perfect the syllogisms. — JosephS

I share that ideal also and I think I even practice what I preach a reasonable percentage of the time. I have had my mind changed here on the forum many times.

When we're too married to the result, rather than to the philosophy of the matter, it approaches rhetoric, or worse. — JosephS

I don't share your disdain for rhetoric. I have toyed with a definition of truth as what you can convince people of. I can make a good argument for that at another time.

Ah I see. But then again, you’re not looking at the whole experience. Say you get off after 1 hour. Then if I asked you: would you like to get on a roller coaster for 1 hour 1 minute, you would say no. Not worth starting and not worth continuing. The point is, you wouldn’t start something you don’t think is worth continuing for the whole duration. — khaled

I could actually, because I could change my mind part way through. But this was a digression anyway, wasn't it? It doesn't even seem to matter.

I’m really not. Ok all I’m claiming is that experiences worth starting are a subset of experiences worth continuing, do you agree? — khaled

Not a subset, no. But a prerequisite. Anyway, relevance?

So then, do you think not having children is a bad thing? Because you’d be “denying” someone enjoyment? If not then what’s the relevance of this fact? — khaled

It can be a bad thing, but not on that basis, since there'd be no one there to deny of anything. And the relevance of the fact that you can't enjoy anything if you aren't alive should be obvious. It's good to enjoy things (within reason, so I'm not talking about murdering babies, for example). Being alive is evidently a prerequisite to enjoy things, and enjoying things (within reason) is good. The logic is easy to follow.

Doesn't matter.
— S

How doesn’t it matter? And even if it didn’t can’t you just answer the question? You already answered it later here — khaled

Why would it matter whether or not I think that every experience worth living through is worth starting? We're not talking about that. That's not the topic. What bearing does it supposedly have on the discussion topic? No, whether you like it or not, I am going to remain firm in my refusal to answer any questions which I do not see as relevant, and instead question you in return about the supposed relevance. And especially if I think that you're trying to catch me out or something like that. Just cut the crap and be straight with me.

Which I think is a totally stupid claim. “Blindness is worth starting because blindness is worth living through for lots of people” do you agree with that claim? If not what makes it different from the one you just made? — khaled

Well I think that it's totally stupid how anti-natalists almost always try to manipulate language to their advantage and think that it will escape everyone's notice. You keep using the phrase "live through", which carries a negative connotation, as though it's a real challenge or a turmoil even. I said that, for lots of people, life is worth living, not that it's worth living through, like, say, one might say that chemotherapy is worth living through.

Life isn't like blindness. Once again, your comparison is inappropriate. Blindness isn't worth starting because, unlike life, it is totally negative, it is a defect, and anyone in their right mind would rather live without it if they had a choice. You're comparing life to a defect, which is ridiculous and artificially skews the set up to favour your own stance.

Their children’s lives haven’t though.... what do you mean?? Their lives have started and are worth living through, that doesn’t necessarily mean they are worth starting for other people. Other examples: if someone had their eyes gouged out their blindness has started and is worth living through, that doesn’t mean it is worth gouging other people’s eyes out — khaled

I've already been over this stupid and inappropriate analogy of yours. I'm not going to keep repeating myself.

Even if it was can you answer? — khaled

I have no intention of answering irrelevant questions.

Why are you treating two acts with the same intent and consequence differently? — khaled

Your question contains a false assumption. They don't have the same intent and consequence.

But it's the only possible justification. What's the supposed alternative? — S

Perhaps there's just no good justification for claims of rights at all. Maybe it's just something we pulled out of our collective asses. So far, I haven't seen any convincing arguments for entitlements. Even if we assume the existence of God, assertions of "God-given" rights make me wonder where people get the idea that such things as God-given rights are self-evident.

Can anyone think of a right that doesn't somehow involve a sense of self and of rightful ownership of something? At the moment, I can't.

It seems to me that claims of rights, especially those having to do with freedom, are rooted in this sense of "mine", of self-possession and rightful possession of other things belonging to that self. And where something is thought to belong to someone else, we have no rights. I don't have a right, for example, to eat your dinner, control your thoughts, use your body for my ends, pollute your drinking water, invade your privacy, silence your ideas, do experiments on you, and so on. Any disagreement?

Suppose we don't challenge this basic sense of mineness and we grant that your body is yours and nobody else's and is therefore yours alone to decide what to do with. You have rights with respect to your body, for example to decide whether or not you'll receive a medical treatment.

What's wrong with saying that I have a right to own my slaves and to do with them as I wish? What's wrong with saying that I have a right to kill my children? Isn't it that there are interests here other than my own? Isn't it that my assertion of rights has crossed into the territory of what properly belongs to someone else? The exercise of my freedom has crossed beyond the boundary of another's nose, no? Some in the past defended such claims by saying that slaves, children, and women do not have rights because in some sense, they aren't properly self-possessed, conscious, soul-endowed, rational beings. Like animals, they are just things and so can rightly be considered property.

But we now recognize that people of dark skin, of the female sex, and of young age, are all real people with their own interests, just like us, and so we recognize their claim to certain rights.

But notice that in the case of a claim that we are entitled to have children, we seem to have an echo of the old view of children and family in general. My kids are mine! None of your business! But we consider it to be the business of the community to intervene to protect the rights of children in the case of child sexual abuse. This is because we see that there is another party here with their own interests. It isn't just the interests of the person claiming to have the right in question. We don't object to someone doing perverse things with sex dolls, but we do object to someone doing such things to unwilling, conscious subjects. And that is the essential difference that makes the moral difference, that my actions cross into the domain of the interests of another sentient being. Right?

If the children I cause to exist are not actually mine in the sense that I rightfully possess them and can therefore decide what happens to them, how can we consistently claim to have the right to reproduce? Don't the interests of the other party, namely, the children, need to be considered? What if the person is totally ill-equipped to raise the child? What if the person is likely a danger to that child? What if the person has a serious, heritable malady that is likely to cause the child a lifetime of suffering? Does a person really have a right to impose that on another human being?

Sure, the state can take away a child being abused. But now the person who reproduced has subjected another human being to orphanage, to the nightmare that being a foster child often amounts to. And the larger community now has to bear the burden of caring for this child. Did that person really have a right to do all that?

I had an unfortunate encounter just the other day with a relative who recently had a child and who provides a perfect example, in my opinion, of someone who should not have children. That poor baby! It almost makes me ill thinking about what it would be like to be him and to have to go through the experience of being helpless and under her power!

Put aside for the moment the objection that enforcing any limitation on reproduction would be problematic. It is fallacious to claim that because it would be hard to enforce restrictions on reproduction, that it follows that people therefore have a right to reproduce.

I question the entitlement to "have" children. They aren't yours. They aren't dolls. They aren't pets. They are people. They don't exist to serve your interests. They have interests of their own.

You don’t know whether or not genetically modifying children to suffer is right or wrong? — khaled

No, I don't.

No, not necessarily. All I said was that childbirth risks harming someone in the future without their consent. Actions that harm others in the future without their consent are wrong in almost every ethical system. Name one such action that is right. — khaled

There are plenty of examples where actions that harm others are right. Self defense is the most obvious one.

I disagree with your claim that harming future people is wrong in "almost every ethical system". Can you provide some examples (of said ethical systems)?

My argument is basically this:

1. If an act will impose something significant on another person without their consent, then it is default wrong to perform that act
2. Procreating imposes something significant - life here - on another person without their consent
3. Therefore, procreative acts are default wrong — khaled

We can argue about how accurate premise 1 is, but the crucial element here is premise 2. Premise 2 is not coherent and therefore false.

You cannot impose life on another person. In order to impose on someone, they need to exist. But if they exist we can't impose life on them, since they're already alive (unless we are talking about assister suicide). They also don't exist as a "future potential person" since that would imply we have already decided to create them and are therefore no longer imposing.

The idea of "imposing life" is also incoherent on another layer, because life is not a condition within life. You could impose poverty or sickness, but you cannot impose life in it's entirety, since there'd be no reference point to compare the imposition with.

It seems to me that claims of rights, especially those having to do with freedom, are rooted in this sense of "mine", of self-possession and rightful possession of other things belonging to that self. And where something is thought to belong to someone else, we have no rights. I don't have a right, for example, to eat your dinner, control your thoughts, use your body for my ends, pollute your drinking water, invade your privacy, silence your ideas, do experiments on you, and so on. Any disagreement? — petrichor

There might be justifications for either of these actions. And arguably, if you are justified in doing it then you have a right to do it.

I question the entitlement to "have" children. They aren't yours. They aren't dolls. They aren't pets. They are people. They don't exist to serve your interests. They have interests of their own. — petrichor

I think this is a false equivalence. Creating something is not the same as owning something. The act of creation cannot violate the rights of whatever you are creating, since only things that exist can have rights.

Perhaps there's just no good justification for claims of rights at all. Maybe it's just something we pulled out of our collective asses. So far, I haven't seen any convincing arguments for entitlements. Even if we assume the existence of God, assertions of "God-given" rights make me wonder where people get the idea that such things as God-given rights are self-evident. — petrichor

The God claims are laughable tosh. But I don't get why the justification which I presented isn't good enough for you. It is good enough for plenty of others, myself included of course. Have you considered the possibility that you're just setting the bar unreasonably high? Rights just wouldn't make sense without the strong emotions connected to them. Imagine a world in which we were all completely indifferent to any claimed rights. Isn't it true that no one would then have any reason to care about them, to respect them, to empathise, to feel a sense of entitlement, to feel guilt or remorse or horror or that it is simply wrong to break them? Would you not expect to see, in practice, a world without any rights at all?

Just cut the crap and be straight with me. — S

Let's start with this one then:

1- Imposing something that risks significant harm on someone without their consent is wrong
2- Childbirth is imposing something that risks significant harm on someone without their consent
3- Childbirth is wrong

There are plenty of examples where actions that harm others are right. Self defense is the most obvious one — Echarmion

In the case of self defense it's they get harmed or you do. So you wouldn't be wrong in preferring your own safety. In the case of having children no one is harmed if you don't do it but someone might be harmed if you do

I disagree with your claim that harming future people is wrong in "almost every ethical system". Can you provide some examples (of said ethical systems) — Echarmion

Rather, name an ethical system under which genetically modifying children to suffer is acceptable

No, I don't. — Echarmion

I don't think there is a point in continuing this then. Because we'll never see eye to eye. You refuse the claim that it doesn't matter whether or not someone existed at the time the harmful action took place and yet do not take the opposite side claiming that it does either. Probably because it is ridiculous to claim that genetically modifying children to suffer is acceptable.

You cannot impose life on another person. — Echarmion

I think this was called the non identity problem or something. Just replace "life" with "genetic modification" and your entire paragraph can more or less be used to argue that genetically modifying children to suffer is acceptable. If you really think that there is no argument that can convince you. Although that choice would commit you to a lot of stances I find ridiculous. Such as, for example, thinking that implanting a bomb in a fetus and setting it to blow up at 18 is ok but bombing an 18 year old isn't.

Let's start with this one then:

1- Imposing something that risks significant harm on someone without their consent is wrong
2- Childbirth is imposing something that risks significant harm on someone without their consent
3- Childbirth is wrong — khaled

That's more like it. But there's a noticeable problem with your very first premise, and this is a problem that has been raised countless times before, here on the forum, by myself and others. The issue of consent is totally inapplicable here, because it is an impossibility. There is obviously no one to obtain or deny consent.

So, back to the drawing board. Or better yet, just give up this futile endeavour.

because it is an impossibility — S

Why does this stop it from being applicable? If it is impossible to give consent, consent is not given. If consent is not given it can't be assumed. It doesn't matter if it was possible to ask for consent or not.