In the case of self defense it's they get harmed or you do. So you wouldn't be wrong in preferring your own safety. In the case of having children no one is harmed if you don't do it but someone might be harmed if you do — khaled

That seems like an irrelevant aside.

Rather, name an ethical system under which genetically modifying children to suffer is acceptable — khaled

Now come on. I didn't make such a claim. You did. Can you defend your claims or not?

I don't think there is a point in continuing this then. Because we'll never see eye to eye. You refuse the claim that it doesn't matter whether or not someone existed at the time the harmful action took place and yet do not take the opposite side claiming that it does either. Probably because it is ridiculous to claim that genetically modifying children to suffer is acceptable. — khaled

I am not allowed to reserve judgement until I hear a convincing argument? Isn't the rational thing to say that you don't know until you have heard a convincing argument either way?

I think this was called the non identity problem or something. Just replace "life" with "genetic modification" and your entire paragraph can more or less be used to argue that genetically modifying children to suffer is acceptable. — khaled

Possibly, but why is it up to me to prove that it's not acceptable? Because you find that conclusion not appealing emotionally?

If you really think that there is no argument that can convince you — khaled

Why? Because I don't agree with your first argument I am therefore irrational and impossible to convince?

Although that choice would commit you to a lot of stances I find ridiculous. Such as, for example, thinking that implanting a bomb in a fetus and setting it to blow up at 18 is ok but bombing an 18 year old isn't. — khaled

A reductio ad absurdum only works if we can agree beforehand that the conclusion would be absurd. But I don't think it's absurd to ask what moral weight future people have.

Why does this stop it from being applicable? If it is impossible to give consent, consent is not given. If consent is not given it can't be assumed. It doesn't matter if it was possible to ask for consent or not. — khaled

Of course it matters. You don't think that it matters whether or not you're making any sense, or whether you're committing a fallacious category error?

You wouldn't take seriously an argument based on the premise that bananas don't consent to being eaten, so we shouldn't take seriously your premise that nonexistent offspring don't consent to being born. It's all a load of nonsense. You can have a lot of fun with this sort of nonsense, but it doesn't constitute a valid argument.

How about lampposts which don't dance the fandango? Bedside tables which never listen to you?

You wouldn't take seriously an argument based on the fact that Bananas don't consent to being eaten — S

I would if it can be shown bananas experience pain to an extent close to us

so we shouldn't take seriously your premise that nonexistent offspring don't consent to being born. — S

You think there is no difference between a banana and a fetus? You think that there shouldn't be any change in how we treat them based on the fact that one will grow to be a human?

I would if it can be shown bananas experience pain to an extent close to us. — khaled

But nonexistent offspring can't be shown to experience pain.

You think there is no difference between a banana and a fetus? — khaled

Oh boy. If that's what you've got from my reply, then Houston, we have a problem.

You think that there shouldn't be any change in how we treat them based on the fact that one will grow to be a human? — khaled

Nonexistent offspring don't grow. Only real, living offspring grow.

Now come on. I didn't make such a claim. You did. — Echarmion

I think you misread. I didn't claim there is any ethical system that allows genetically modifying children to suffer. When you asked for ethical systems that claim the modification should be wrong I was having trouble thinking of any that find it acceptable. So I asked you to name one that finds it acceptable instead

I am not allowed to reserve judgement until I hear a convincing argument? Isn't the rational thing to say that you don't know until you have heard a convincing argument either way? — Echarmion

When did I say you weren't allowed?

Possibly, but why is it up to me to prove that it's not acceptable? Because you find that conclusion not appealing emotionally? — Echarmion

It isn't. I just thought you'd think genetically modifying children to suffer is wrong because it's simply sadistic. But if you don't think pure sadism is wrong and still need more convincing I can't do that.

Why? Because I don't agree with your first argument I am therefore irrational and impossible to convince? — Echarmion

I didn't say anything about irrational.

A reductio ad absurdum only works if we can agree beforehand that the conclusion would be absurd — Echarmion

I thought we did. But if we don't then not much I can do.

Nonexistent offspring don't grow. Only real, living offspring grow — S

You know what I meant cut the crap. One of them becomes a sentient being and the other doesn’t. Do you think there should be any change in how we treat them based on that fact?

I think you misread. I didn't claim there is any ethical system that allows genetically modifying children to suffer. When you asked for ethical systems that claim the modification should be wrong I was having trouble thinking of any that find it acceptable. So I asked you to name one that finds it acceptable instead — khaled

You claimed that "almost every" ethical system concludes that doing so is wrong. So name some of those. Why do you need counter examples? I already pointed out how Utilitarianism would have a problem with that conclusion. Kantian deontology also doesn't seem to me to offer a neat solution. So, again, where are these many ethical systems that solve this problem so clearly?

When did I say you weren't allowed? — khaled

This wordplay is getting tiresome. You clearly want me to support my position, even though my position is agnostic.

It isn't. I just thought you'd think genetically modifying children to suffer is wrong because it's simply sadistic. But if you don't think pure sadism is wrong and still need more convincing I can't do that. — khaled

Sadism is a motivation, not a consequence. One that you are bringing up for the first time now. Is doing something solely for sadistic purposes wrong? I'd say yes, but that doesn't have anything to do with babies or genetic modification. It's purely the moral standing of sadism as a motivation.

You know what I meant cut the crap. One of them becomes a sentient being and the other doesn’t. Do you think there should be any change in how we treat them based on that fact? — khaled

No, nonexistent offspring don't become anything, and it doesn't matter at all how we treat them, because none of it is real. These are your peculiar beliefs, implied by what you've said, which you have a burden to justify, and we can't move forward until you tackle this problem. I understand that you're eager to forget about my objection and to rush ahead with your crappy argument, but that's not how this is going to work.

Would you like to reconsider what your argument is about? Is it about real people or imaginary, nonexistent people?

No, nonexistent offspring don't become anything — S

Fetuses become humans. I was talking about fetuses in the last reply my bad for not making that clear.

Would you like to reconsider what your argument is about? Is it about real people or imaginary, nonexistent people? — S

It is indeed about real people.

I already pointed out how Utilitarianism would have a problem with that conclusion — Echarmion

I was just about to say utilitarianism. When did you do this? Because I can’t find it. I would have thought causing someone to experience more suffering via genetic modification would’ve definitely been bad per utilitarianism.

Fetuses become humans. I was talking about fetuses in the last reply my bad for not making that clear. — khaled

Okay, so it's both true and irrelevant that a foetus can't consent to being born. It's irrelevant because they can't possibly consent. Consent is only relevant where it's a possibility.

But, even though that in itself is a refutation, I'm curious about where you would take this next. At this point, there is already a living foetus, and we don't have a time machine, so what are you saying? It should be killed?

Here is the relevant quote:

So, essentially utilitarianism? The problem I see with this argument is that it relies on there being two alternatives, and one leads to less suffering/more utility for the people involved. But when we are making the decision to create those people in the first place, there are no such alternatives. There is one timeline without people and one timeline with people, and you cannot compare the relative utility of these timelines because for one timeline it's an empty set. — Echarmion

ahhh, you were talking about antinatalism in general. You’re right, there aren’t many ethical systems in support of antinatalism but I was specifically asking for an ethical system that states genetically modifying children to suffer is ok. Utilitarianism would not be an example of those.

so what are you saying? It should be killed? — S

As long as it’s nervous system hasn’t been developed, yes.

But, even though in itself refutation — S

Ad absurdium arguments only make sense if we agree killing said fetus is absurd.

Consent is only relevant where it's a possibility — S

How about: waking people up. The only way you can ask for consent is by doing the act in question. Does that mean you can go around waking up anyone who happens to be asleep?

ahhh, you were talking about antinatalism in general. You’re right, there aren’t many ethical systems in support of antinatalism but I was specifically asking for an ethical system that states genetically modifying children to suffer is ok. Utilitarianism would not be an example of those. — khaled

Only if the children would have been born regardless. In that case Utilitarianism would work, but that's not helpful for the anti-natalist argument.

but that's not helpful for the anti-natalist argument. — Echarmion

I didn’t say it was. I was going to go from there and expand the principle but then you insisted i give examples of an ethical system where genetically modifying children is bad. Now I ask you to find me one where it is considered good.

But then again I can’t do that if you’re agnostic about how to treat genetic modification.

I didn’t say it was. I was going to go from there and expand the principle but then you insisted i give examples of an ethical system where genetically modifying children is bad. Now I ask you to find me one where it is considered good. — khaled

I assumed you meant creating children specifically for this "experiment". But assuming is always dangerous. So perhaps you could make this thought experiment a bit more concrete? What exactly is being done, and with what motivation?

As long as it’s nervous system hasn’t been developed, yes. — khaled

I think that the bigger problem is people who think like you, but fortunately your thinking is only representative of a tiny minority, and I can't see that ever changing.

Ad absurdium arguments only make sense if we agree killing said fetus is absurd. — khaled

You've misunderstood. I was referring to my refutation of your argument on the basis that consent is inapplicable and irrelevant.

How about: waking people up. The only way you can ask for consent is by doing the act in question. Does that mean you can go around waking up anyone who happens to be asleep? — khaled

That's not about consent, that's about the consequences of waking someone up. For it to be about consent, there must be an option to obtain consent. If it was wrong on the basis of not obtaining consent, then you must be able to say to me that I should have obtained his consent first. But we both know that that's not possible.

I think that the bigger problem is — S

What's this referring to. What problem?

You've misunderstood. I was referring to my refutation of your argument on the basis that consent is inapplicable and irrelevant. — S

Oh. I thought it said "Even though, in itself a refutation,....." My bad

That's not about consent, that's about the consequences of waking someone up. For it to be about consent, there must be an option to obtain consent — S

If it was wrong on the basis of not obtaining consent, then you must be able to say to me that I should have obtained his consent first. But we both know that that's not possible. — S

Alright then. What do you suppose we do in cases such as these where consent isn't available? I say, go with the least risky option, aka the one least likely to harm. If I claimed that having children is not wrong on the basis of consent but on the basis of consequences what would be the refutation to that?

1- Having children risks disasterous consequences for the child
2- Actions that risk disasterous consequences for others are wrong when a less risky alternative is possible in cases where consent is unavailable
3- Having children is wrong because a less risky alternative is possible (not having children) and consent isn't available (due to lack of time machine)

What's this referring to. What problem? — khaled

The bigger problem than the "problem" you were referring to, which was the "problem" of there existing a foetus without a developed nervous system, is the problem of people who think that it should be killed because of faulty anti-natalist reasoning.

Alright then. What do you suppose we do in cases such as these where consent isn't available? I say, go with the least risky option, aka the one least likely to harm. If I claimed that having children is not wrong on the basis of consent but on the basis of consequences what would be the refutation to that?

1- Having children risks disasterous consequences for the child
2- Actions that risk disasterous consequences for others are wrong when a less risky alternative is possible in cases where consent is unavailable
3- Having children is wrong because a less risky alternative is possible (not having children) — khaled

Your second premise isn't necessarily true, so the argument falls apart. The greater risk can be worth it. It isn't even difficult to think of examples where that's the case. I'm a living example, for starters. I am glad to have been born. So it paid off. And there are billions of other people in the same boat. So your argument has no chance.

And moreover, if life isn't worth living anymore, then guess what? You don't have to live. There's a way out through suicide. Not that I'm encouraging that, because for most people who are suicidal, it's a mental health issue, not an indication that their life really isn't worth living.

1- Having children risks disasterous consequences for the child
2- Actions that risk disasterous consequences for others are wrong when a less risky alternative is possible in cases where consent is unavailable
3- Having children is wrong because a less risky alternative is possible (not having children) and consent isn't available (due to lack of time machine) — khaled

Nonexistence is not a "less risky" alternative for the child though. Non-existance is not more or less pleasant than existence. That's a category error.

Nonexistence is not a "less risky" alternative for the child though. Non-existance is not more or less pleasant than existence. That's a category error. — Echarmion

The point is one alternative means no one experiences harm and no one is deprived of good (because there is no actual person who exists). As I've seen on here before, there are no "ghost babies" wailing for existence. The other alternative is someone is born and guaranteed will experience some harm.

Non-existence- no one is harmed/no one is deprived = win/win. The idea that someone could have had more good experiences or whatnot if born matters not, in this procreational scenario. The risk khaled is talking about is mitigated and no actual person is alive prior to birth, losing out on anything.

Nonexistence is not a "less risky" alternative for the child though. Non-existance is not more or less pleasant than existence. That's a category error. — Echarmion

True, but not having a child avoids the risk of having a child who lives a life that isn't worth living. Although that risk is vastly outweighed, so, in the vast majority of cases, this risk doesn't matter as much as he suggests.

We've been over this before.

The point is one alternative means no one experiences harm and no one is deprived of good (because there is no actual person who exists). — schopenhauer1

Which is an indifference. Neutral. Neither good nor bad.

The other alternative is someone is born and guaranteed will experience some harm. — schopenhauer1

No, that's not an accurate description of the alternative, as you well know. Why aren't you being intellectually honest? Is that a price worth paying in order to push your stance?

Non-existence- no one is born/no one is deprived = win/win. — schopenhauer1

No, that's not a win. That's a nothing. Whereas a something which includes billions of people enjoying life is better than a nothing. Of course, you don't share that opinion, but that doesn't matter in the bigger picture.

The idea that someone could have had more good experiences or whatnot if born matters not, in this procreational scenario. The risk khaled is talking about is mitigated and no actual person is alive losing out on anything. — schopenhauer1

That's just your rationalisation which hardly anyone finds convincing.

Nonexistence is not a "less risky" alternative for the child though — Echarmion

Non-existance is not more or less pleasant than existence — Echarmion

It has nothing to do with pleasantness. Is it or is it not true that existence has a greater risk of harm than non existence? It is true. That is the definition of risky. Also if you’re really concerned about it being a category error replace it with “living” vs “not living”. You know by now I use them interchangeably on accident

The point is one alternative means no one experiences harm and no one is deprived of good (because there is no actual person who exists). As I've seen on here before, there are no "ghost babies" wailing for existence. The other alternative is someone is born and guaranteed will experience some harm.

Non-existence- no one is harmed/no one is deprived = win/win. The idea that someone could have had more good experiences or whatnot if born matters not, in this procreational scenario. The risk khaled is talking about is mitigated and no actual person is alive prior to birth, losing out on anything. — schopenhauer1

But this argument cuts both ways. If the "good" is of no consequence because a non-existant person looses nothing, then the harm is also of no consequence, because the non-existant person gains nothing either. Put another way, you don't loose out on non-existance if you live a life full of harm.

True, but not having a child avoids the risk of having a child who lives a life that isn't worth living. Although that risk is vastly outweighed, so, in the vast majority of cases, this risk doesn't matter as much as he suggests. — S

I'd agree that the parents avoid that risk. Not the child though, because there isn't any child that has avoided the risk.

It has nothing to do with pleasantness. Is it or is it not true that existence has a greater risk of harm than non existence? It is true. That is the definition of risky — khaled

No, it is false, because it commits the same category error. Existence is not a risk compared to non-existance. There is no grounds for any comparison.

is the problem of people who think that it should be killed because of faulty anti-natalist reasoning. — S

First off, you haven’t shown it to be faulty yet. Secondly, if antinatalist reasoning is actually followed there would be no fetus to kill or not kill.

I'm a living example, for starters. I am glad to have been born. — S

Me too. However that is completely irrelevant. Whether or not you are glad to have been born doesn’t determine whether giving birth is right or wrong. You and me are lucky enough that the risk paid off, that doesn’t mean it was ok to take the risk in the first place. In the same way that if person A stabbed person B and person B turned out to be a masochist and enjoyed it, that doesn’t make stabbing in general okay.

The fact is, in real life the least risky option is always preferred when consent is not available. Name a situation where this isn’t the case.

It isn't even difficult to think of examples — S

Please come up with one not birth related where there someone is said to be justified to do something that risks severely harming someone else when consent is not available and where a less risky alternative is available. Because giving a birth related example and using your own personal experience doesn’t work as I’ve shown.

And moreover, if life isn't worth living anymore, then guess what? You don't have to live — S

As I’ve pointed out before, this line can be used to justify literally any atrocity. The fact that someone can commit suicide to get out of a situation they hate doesn’t justify putting them in that situation the first place or risking putting them there. Name one other act X where people find “We’ll do X to him and if he/she doesn’t like it they can just kill themselves” an acceptable argument for justifying X

check the edit

I'd agree that the parents avoid that risk. Not the child though, because there isn't any child that has avoided the risk. — Echarmion

:up:

First off, you haven’t shown it to be faulty yet. — khaled

I have, but obviously you disagree.

Secondly, if antinatalist reasoning is actually followed there would be no fetus to kill or not kill. — khaled

That's an irrelevant point.

Me too. However that is completely irrelevant. Whether or not you are glad to have been born doesn’t determine whether giving birth is right or wrong. You and me are lucky enough that the risk paid off, that doesn’t mean it was ok to take the risk in the first place. In the same way that if person A stabbed person B and person B turned out to be a masochist and enjoyed it, that doesn’t make stabbing in general okay. — khaled

This is just a really poor response. My point in full was not just about you and I, but billions of people, and it's clearly not irrelevant for any reasonable analysis. And none of your analogies are ever close enough to be appropriate. Stabbing someone isn't close enough to giving birth. They're almost nothing alike. The comparison is a joke. There's nothing inconsistent in objecting to stabbing people, but not objecting to people having a baby. Your arguments suffer from the same structural failings. This failure of an argument is just like your earlier failure of an argument where you mistakenly believed that I had a burden to justify causing blindness, which is just ridiculous. Any argument which relies on a false analogy is worthless.

The fact is, in real life the least risky option is always preferred when consent is not available. Name a situation where this isn’t the case. — khaled

No it isn't, I already have, and the burden is on you, so don't try to fallaciously shift it to me.

Please come up with one not birth related where there someone is said to be justified to do something that risks severely harming someone else when consent is not available and where a less risky alternative is available. Because giving a birth related example and using your own personal experience doesn’t work as I’ve shown. — khaled

That's moving the goalposts, and the initial burden lies with you, not me. Nevertheless, I will make an exception and I will give you a single example, even though you haven't met your burden. But if you reject it, then you will still have to justify your unsupported assertion that the least risky option is always preferred when consent is not available.

The counterexample refuting your assertion is that of a person who has had an accident leaving them unconscious and requiring urgent surgery in order to stay alive, with the alternative of doing nothing almost certainly resulting in death, and the decision being in the hands of the person's next of kin. Now, according to your warped way of thinking, death would be the least risky option, because that would avoid all of the risks accompanied with continued living, whereas the surgery would be considerably more risky, because then, if successful, they'd run the risk of stubbing their toe, or breaking up with their girlfriend, or whatever. You know, all of the things that you think can make life not worth living.

The next of kin should decide for them to have the surgery, because their life is worth living, and because if that turns out to be wrong, then they can opt-out, whereas if they're left to die, then there's no opting back in.

So now it's your turn, and you have your work cut out for you. Not only do you have the burden of supporting your premise in it's own right, but you have a counterexample to contend with.

As I’ve pointed out before, this line can be used to justify literally any atrocity. The fact that someone can commit suicide to get out of a situation they hate doesn’t justify putting them in that situation the first place or risking putting them there. — khaled

That's not an implication of my point, it's just what you've read into it. Arguing against that is just to waste time arguing against yourself.

I don't really see how this changes the argument. If you aren't alive, you don't exist.

Let me put this another way: if you want to say it's "less risk" you need to be able to quantify the risk. So at least in theory you have to able to say "X imposes risk of magnitude 50, while Y imposes risk of magnitude 30, so Y is less risky than X". The problem is that you cannot make such a comparison. If a person isn't alive, their risk of harm isn't 0, it's [ ], an empty set. There is nothing to compare with.