assuming — Bartricks
If there is a lot of good evidence that James did the crime, — Bartricks
no matter how much evidence someone provides you — Bartricks
er, yes it is. Explain how it isn't. — Bartricks
No, you really don't have a clue. — Bartricks
an asserter — Bartricks
Yes, not morally responsible, however, it would still make sense, for example, for others to note your behavior and, avoid or incarcerate you, for example. IOW one is still the entity that kills women, or whatever. You can't help it - though perhaps certain new causes could change the behavior. You are a product, only of past causes, yes. So saying you are bad with a wagging finger as if you could have been otherwise, is confused - though also determined - but responding with certain measures that look like moral responses still makes sense.1. If everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance, then I am not morally responsible for anything I think, desire and do. — Bartricks
Or not. This would need support. It is a good argument for cornering determinists who don't want to grant this as false.2. I am morally responsible for some of what I think, desire and do.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), not everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.
that seems true but there needs to be more put in. I don't think there is any clear definition of material or physical anymore. So we would need a definition of material. If one is arguing with most determinists, they will merely grant this, of course.4. If I am a material object, then everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance
Or you are a mixed object, it would seem, unless you are arguing that humans are not material in any way. Now you may have meant 'I' is mind or soul, in this last sentence. But still if we go back to 3 it is 'not everthing is determined' which seems to indicate a potential mix of being partially determined or determined on occasion. Like when the doctor taps your reflex points, say. Unless that isn't you moving your leg in response. And then we need to wonder about the interactin between this immaterial self and the body. If bodies are material, which they seem to be. Two also needs to show what morally responsible means, unless it is granted by the opposition. If i choose to do X, not caused by love, empathy, hatred or rationality. Not caused by anything, I am not sure that is moral behavior. I don't know what it is. It seems to me moral behavior would either come from feelings or have certain goals, so these become causal.5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), I am not a material object
If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative.
And my reason also says that all extended objects - such as my brain - can be divided. Yet my reason says no less clearly that my mind cannot be divided. Well, if my brain is divisible but my mind not, then my reason is telling me that my mind is not my brain (or any other kind of extended thing). — Bartricks
extended things occupy some space and any - any - region of space is divisible. — Bartricks
e the rational intuitions that represent procreation to be ethical - well, those, I think, have been induced not by drugs, but by environmental programming. — Bartricks
But to think that, systematically, one's own count for more just in virtue of being one's own is, I think, prejudiced. I can see no reason to think it would be true — Bartricks
How's that arbitrary? — Bartricks
Our reason represents minds to be indivisible — Bartricks
But you're rejecting one of my premises on the grounds that it conflicts with your theory. — Bartricks
You need first to show that your theory is described by the conclusion of an argument that has stronger - that is, more self-evidently true - premises than the ones that entail my theory. — Bartricks
no-one has raised the least doubt about - that all imply the same thing, namely that our minds are immaterial souls. — Bartricks
I agree. That was an aside on my part, but I think an important one, since some people, not that I asssumed you, think that if there is no moral responsibility, then there can be no measures taken without hypocrisy. So, I mention it. Call it a preemptive strike. Even retribution or punishment can happen, though they are hypocritical, since the one who punishes can say they feel compelled to do it, even to legislate it.re what you say about premise 1 - yes, but that's not real moral responsibility. Incarcerating someone solely to protect others (and/or the criminal) is quarantine, not punishment. — Bartricks
It's support in the sense that it may make the argument interpersonally effective, but other than that this is an ad populum argument, so far.Re what you say about premise 2 - it has considerable support. Like I say, the reason of virtually everyone represents it to be true. If that isn't support I don't know what is. — Bartricks
You haven't provided any evidence, you have said that people believe it, or think that way. IOW if this was strong evidence than it means theism is the default and even is evidence though less, that Kim Khardishan has important things to say.That does not mean that premise 2 is true beyond all doubt, but the burden of proof is squarely on those who would deny it to provide countervailing evidence. — Bartricks
My tack is to argue that the term material object, or the adjectives material and physical, no longer have any meaning. They used to mean things, like stones and chairs, but now the refer to massless particles, fields, things that have more than one in the same place, particles in superposition, neutrinos passing as we speak in their trillions right through the earth and so on. Whatever scientists consider real, they will call physical or material, regardless of the qualities. It is a set that is expanding not just in what it contains but in the types of things it contains, regardless of qualities or the lack thereof. So to me the whole debate about material/immaterial has a problematic ground since one of the two categories's criteria are expanding and are not fixed and has become synonymous with real. I think medieval theologians on hearing the characteristics of neurtrinos, let alone even less physicallike 'things' now considered physical, might very well have said 'oh, well with your use of the term, perhaps angels are physical, it's just they can fly right through the earth also.'for a complex whole that is made wholly of necessarily existing things is not a material object. — Bartricks
Right that's what I'm saying.No, it isn't. All cases for anything appeal to rational appearances - to rational intuitions. Not beliefs, note. it is fallacious to think that you can make something true by getting enough people to believe it. — Bartricks
But then you face the problem of saying that set X is based on this faculty and sey Y is not, like the importance of the Khardishan's and the world being flat, at least once upon a time are in that set Y. Which is where actual evidence has to come in. The empirical component.But my claim is that the reason - a faculty - of most people represents it to be true. Which is stunningly good evidence - the best you're ever going to have for anything, for all appeals to evidence are appeals to reason - for anything. — Bartricks
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