If we want an account, which is falsifiable, of how consciousness arose, then what choice would we have but to try for a physicalist or naturalistic account?

From your previous remarks, I don't think you do agree with the physicalist approach, but that when I criticize it, you take the opportunity to criticize my posts. Fair enough? — Wayfarer

I don't see how a physicalist account could detail precisely how conscious experience arises from neural activity. We have no way of examining first person experience from a third person perspective in anything like the kind of way we can examine sense-phenomena. There are some things which just may be beyond the grasp of rational explanation, because they are too indeterminate. I think first-person experience is arguably one of those things.

So, not everything can be explained in physicalist terms. For example, biology cannot be adequately explained in terms of physics and yet both are naturalistic disciplines, so the inability to explain everything in terms of physics is not an argument against the philosophical idea that everything is physical in nature, and nor is it an argument for anything supernatural.

On the other hand any plausible theory as to how or why consciousness arose would need to be evolutionary in scope, since all the evidence points to consciousness being an evolved phenomenon.

What I criticize is your biased assumption that naturalistic explanations "miss the point" or embody "blind spots", and more particularly so since you are apparently unable to even imagine what any alternative theory would look like, let alone propose one. Remember theories must be inter-subjectively testable; anything which is not testable does not qualify as a theory.

So, in short what I am critical of about your approach is that you simply assume that any physicalist account must be incoherent. You don't read the actual physicalist philosophers, you just assume, based on your own prejudices and polemical reviews that usually don't present any cogent arguments against physicalism, that they are talking shit.

I don't expect you to agree with physicalism, but to be open-minded enough to grant that, from an unbiased perspective, it is at the very least as coherent a philosophy as any of the alternatives you favour. Then I would like to see you try to provide a cogent alternative account, if you have one, complete with explanations and arguments to support it. That is what I never see you doing.

What I criticize is your biased assumption that naturalistic explanations "miss the point" or embody "blind spots", and more particularly so since you are apparently unable to even imagine what any alternative theory would look like, let alone propose one. — Janus

Not fair. In this case, and in other cases, I'm taking issue with posts that exhibit the very point of the 'blind spot' argument. There was another poster, in another thread, who at least understood the counter-arguments well enough to advocate them, but that has not been the case here. ':

We have no way of examining first person experience from a third person perspective in anything like the kind of way we can examine sense-phenomena. — Janus

.

Which is *exactly* what I said, which was then dismissed with 'that's not even an argument, it's just word salad'. And yet somehow from this, it's me who is "exhibiting bias"??

You don't read the actual physicalist philosophers, — Janus

How do you know? I passed two years of undergraduate philosophy and an MA in a related subject. I don't have to recite passages of Das Kapital to express views critical of Marxism.

The point is that science cannot currently deal with the first person perspective, and that is what you refer to as its "blind spot". But what you haven't responded to is the point that science can come up with hypotheses concerning the advent and evolution of consciousnesses. The other point you haven't responded to is that the fact that something cannot be explained in terms of physics does nothing to refute the idea all real phenomena are physical or manifestations of the physical.

Which is *exactly* what I said, which was then dismissed with 'that's not even an argument, it's just word salad'. And yet somehow from this, it's me who is "exhibiting bias"?? — Wayfarer

Yes, well we do agree on that much. Are you quite sure that what was being dismissed as "word salad" was precisely and only the point that science cannot examine the first person perspective from its "third person" vantage point, and was not some further claim or conclusion derived from that, which you were forwarding?

Also, as I have said, I think it is unarguable that science cannot currently do that, but it is not a foregone conclusion that it will never be able to, or that it is impossible in principle (although I do tend to think it is impossible in principle, but I certainly don't insist on that being the only coherent view).

The further point is that even if it were granted that it is impossible in principle, that doesn't tell us anything positive about the ontological status or nature of reality. It's just like how it's impossible in principle to see what's behind a large rock when I remain stuck in front of it; my vantage point simply doesn't allow it.

I admire the spirit of science, and I think it is equally valuable in philosophy; the guiding principle is that if you have a theory, you should do everything in your power to criticize it, and falsify it, rather than doing everything in your power to confirm it. The former approach leads to robust conjectures and theories and the latter leads merely to confirmation bias.

There is speculation and then there is empty speculation. Any speculation which does not take into account the latest scientific results and understanding is empty speculation. — Janus

Sure. But then even that is ok. Especially in the context of the post I was responding to and the one it was.

I agree that empty speculation can be fun, imaginative, even creative, but not generally as much fun, as imaginative or creative as informed speculation. Empty speculation may indeed be more soothing, though, so I guess it's got that going for it. The salient point is that empty speculation does not give much scope for critical thought, or provide fertile grounds from which to derive cogent arguments.

But what you haven't responded to is the point that science can come up with hypotheses concerning the advent and evolution of consciousnesses. — Janus

It might! That's one of Nagel's points in Mind and Cosmos. Heard of the 'third way' movement in evolutionary theory? (https://www.thethirdwayofevolution.com/) There's a lot of those writers I really like, especially Steven Talbott (most impressed Pierre Normand when I pointed it out to him.) But, honestly, it is still regarded as too alternative/fringe/countercultural by the mainstream, which is still committed to an explicitly materialist paradigm. (But the times are a'changing, that is obvious.)

What I am saying is very much in keeping with the 'blind spot in science' article which was not (contrary to the criticisms of it) 'anti-science'. What this article is trying to do, is to point out some deeply-embodied assumptions about nature, science, reality, the way things are, that are at once cognitive AND culturally-constructed. The reigning paradigm based on Galilean-Newtonian-Cartesian science is ineluctably materialist. But it is changing, mainly by virtue of things like biosemiotics.

Are you quite sure that what was being dismissed as "word salad" was precisely and only the point that science cannot examine the first person perspective from its "third person" vantage point, and was not some further claim or conclusion derived from that, which you were forwarding? — Janus

Here are some of the comments I made:

If we study consciousness as a phenomenon - how it appears in others - then we're still basically in the domain of cognitive science, of seeing how conscious beings act and react. But knowledge of our own awareness or consciousness is of a different order to that, because we ourselves are that which is aware. — Wayfarer

And that claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective, and comprises 'an experience of being', hence, can never be satisfactorily understood or described in objective terms. The hard problem in a nutshell. — Wayfarer

Now you've already said that you basically agree with these kinds of statements. And they pretty much in keeping with the approach of phenomenology, right? Yet the response was that they don't amount to an argument - they're meaningless, or the 'ramblings of amateurs'.

Now - fair enough! I get that there are plenty of people who don't want to go down this route. Notice I haven't been super-engaged with trying to press my point. But then I don't really see why you parachuted into the middle of it and started lobbing grenades .( No hard feelings, or anything. :-)

I admire the spirit of science, and I think it is equally valuable in philosophy; the guiding principle is that if you have a theory, you should do everything in your power to criticize it, and falsify it, rather than doing everything in your power to confirm it. — Janus

Bravo. I perfectly accept science, liberal democracy, the spirit of progress, and the associated values. But this is a philosophy forum, and my stock in trade is 'criticisms of scientific materialism'. Even that is usually taken the wrong way - like, I'm accusing someone of something. What I'm pointing out, is that there is a kind of presumption of materialism, and it's perfectly normal in our culture, as it is thought to be a secular philosophy. But when you treat it as a kind of humanistic philosophy or account of human nature, it's reductionist, and this has many ramifications.

Of course.
But in the context of my remark to someone else, my point was 'what is the risk?' I was responding to someone who couched the options in utterly binary terms.

So what is the best way to ensure this caution. Is it to have a series of peer-reviewed controlled trials testing each aspect with strictly defined correlates to see which show some statistically significant link? Or is it for a group of complete lay people who may know as little as nothing whatsoever about the physical brain write entire books about what they reckon consciousness is, and we sit here and discuss it as if it were fact.

Yes, probably so, but if peer-reviewed, controlled, statistically constrained investigations are going to be taken with a pinch of salt because of their potential paradigmatic bias (something I agree with entirely), then the uninformed ramblings of some philosopher are somewhere between gossip and fairy-tale in the order of how much salt to take them with.

There is a lot of middle ground between those options and that middle ground actually occurs here and elsewhere.

i point out why I think there is middle ground from personal experience. They Wayfarer makes a point in support of this, and then I, basically say, and what is the big threat if we do have some mere speculation?

Now you are coming in and saying mere speculation is not as good as informated speculation. Well, sure. I haven't said anything otherwise.

I just don't understand why the issue has to be couched in binary terms, what the great threat is of mere speculation, since, for example here, there are people who will critically work on that when others post it.

There seems to be some underlying panic that may be correct when looking at the world as a whole, but is being used here, it seems to me to paint view critical of mainstream science or even potentially so, or exploratory

as something dangerous.

As Wayfarer pointed out there are science forums.

And also, here, we can deal with individual posts that show varying degrees of being informed and that includes many of the posts that are posted in support of mainstream science. IOW these are often speculative and misinformed and certainly not using the latest research.

Some mere speculation here will not end peer-reviewed journals. Now I know you are not saying that it will, but that might give an indication of what it feels like when you tell me that informed speculation is better than mere speculation.

he first is a philosopher. You can imagine how her ideas would be listened to where they do not line up, or seem not to, with scientific consensus, because to them she is a lay person. — Coben

I brought Up Patricia Churchland specifically because she is a philosopher. There seemed to be some suggestion that the 'thoughtful' philosophers could see beyond the short-sighteded and narrow views of the scientists. Patricia Churchland bases her views on scientific research and, despite being a trained philosopher, still reaches the same conclusions about consciousness that have been dismissed here as "not understanding the issue".

with Susan Greenfield, a scientist, she got lambasted for her work on cellphones. And why? because money didn't like her conclusions. She got treated by some experts in her field, some no doubt brought in by the affected industries, and by experts or at least public talker types in other fields, as if she was a biased non-scientific idiot. — Coben

I don't understand what this has to do with the issue I raised. You understand how peer-review works, right? Scientists do not get to publish just any old crap that they 'reckon' might be true. Their papers are subjected to stringent peer-review, so what Susan Greenfield may have said in other areas does not affect her work in consciousness because her work in consciousness has passed peer-review, ie her conclusion are indeed related to her evidence buy a statistically significant margin. If you don't like Susan Greenfield, you could try Anil Seth, Bruce Hood, Vilynor Ramachandran...

I did lay research into the physchiatric approach, found what I thought were philosophical biases and problematic ones.

One simple one was that the drug this person was given — Coben

Drug companies have a huge financial interest in promoting their drug, it's not the same thing as research scientists who have no interest other than knowledge acquisition. Notwithsatnding that, I have absolutely no problem whatsoever with the fact that scientists are biased. I'd go even further and say that the vast majority are seeking evidence to support a personal world-view. I bolded that because there seems to be some degree of ignoring my comments in this regard so that I fit better into the 'rampant materialist' caricature that's been painted for me. The point is, they are seeking such evidence using a system which is designed to falsify their pet hypothesis, a system which employs other experts to check and double check that the evidence they find is statistically linked to their conclusions, a system which uses the same empirical inputs as everyone else in the field has access to and can repeat for themselves. As a system for finding evidence to support a world=view, it's about the best we've got at not letting people get away with bias.

For me that instance when two lay people meet, and even when a scientist or other expert meets a lay person,is vastly more complicated - in part, but not only because scientists are generally not philosophers - but also because what I called a false dilemma on you part above actually can be a wide range of possible scenarios. — Coben

But that's not what's happened here. Read the posts. Have the posts from the non-physicalists been speculative? Have they presented their position as a possible alternative story? Have they referred at all, even erroneously, to the actual empirical evidence, in an attempt to ensure their thoeries are not overwhelmingly contradicted by it? No, they have consisted almost entirely of a long-winded version of "David Chalmers says its a hard problem, so it is"

It’s more “the property to be able to personally feel, which cannot be measured in others for now” — khaled

Yes, but the point is it is a property which you 'feel' you have, not one you can demonstrate to others that you have. You have defined the term by something which is known only to you. So what use is the term as a means of communicating with others? Your pain cannot ever be known to me in terms of what you feel, but the word 'pain' is used when people show external signs of being in pain (or give verbal indications that they are. The fact that we then have to translate the term back to our own memories and hope that we have a joint understanding, does not prevent us from using the word. Nor does it prevent a huge amount of very good research helping people understand pain and devising therapies to reduce pain. No-one (thank goodness) has taken your approach and said that pain is first-person experience and therefore we can't identify it in others, let's not bother.

No because the statement “cannot be measured in others” doesn’t express a property of consciousness, there may come a day when we can, we just don’t have the consciousness-o-meter yet. It’s just an observation not a property of consciousness — khaled

Yes, but your observations about consciousness depend on your definition of it, they depend on what you're looking for to observe. You are looking for a felling which only you can be sure to have, that is part of your definition of consciousness, that it is "that feeling that only you can be sure to have". If that's what you're looking for, then it is self-fulfilling that you will not find it having been measured.

I have no idea what that even means. “The response is being sensed”. Can you define “sensed”? Because it seems to me like “sensed” = “has subjective experience” which is a phrase you refuse to acknowledge you understand yet I keep seeing you use it — khaled

Sensed means that one of the sensory inputs is stimulated. For us, we form a picture in some way of the world (sound, shape, colour...). For neuroscience they only need see the known parts of the brain active as previous experiments correlating with patient reports, as well as brain damage studies, have shown which areas off the brain are generally responsible for this.

Not all definitions are verbal — Isaac


So why were you repeatedly asking for a definition of “subjective experiences” when I know you know what that means (unless you’re not conscious). — khaled

I don't know what it means. You continuously repeating that I must know doesn't make me know any more. I have no idea what you might be referring to with the term 'subjective experience' that is not covered by the logging to memory of the fact that as sensory stimulation occurred.

Consciousness can be said to be the capacity to feel something if you really want a verbal definition. — khaled

Great. So anything with the appropriate neural and chemical correlates with emotion can be conscious. Job done, can we go home now? Or did you sneak in another vague term 'feel' and thereby move the description no further at all?

No, I’m describing something and then saying we cannot measure it. — khaled

Yes, but read back over the posts where I've tried to get you to give a deeper explanation of what it is you're describing. A part of your actual description includes that it is the thing that cannot be measured. Your saying "things that can't be measured, can't be measured", you're using its immeasurability within your description by saying that consciousness is not the set of phenomena we observe in other, but the thing that only we feel.

You contend it doesn’t “come about” of anything and IS literally the chemical reactions in your brain. I say it is a RESULT of said reactions. I cannot see how consciousness IS a chemical reaction. What is said reaction?
Chemical A (aq) + chemical B (aq) -> consciousness(?) — khaled

Yes.

What feature of the world is preventing that from possibly being the case?

If we want to know why consciousness arose, and by 'why' mean to find a necessary and sufficient set of causes, then we must look to physical chains of events and eliminate each until the phenomena is no longer present. That is an empirical investigation, not a philosophical one. — Isaac


We have had a back and forth since then - I have been arguing, along the lines of the Chalmer's 'hard problem', that consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect which can never be satisfactorily accounted for in purely objective terms. I also introduced Nagel's argument which elaborates a similar point. But the response to these was that: these are not arguments, this is 'word salad', this makes no sense. Which kind of supports my point, I would have thought. — Wayfarer

1. Note the 'if', 'and' and 'then'. I've bolded them because you clearly missed them last time. My statement is just a deductive one (not that that makes it immune from error, of course). I'm not in any sense saying that this is how we must proceed, we need not accept the 'ifs', only that, were we to accept them, the conclusion rationally follows.

2. Quote me, or link to, where you have been arguing "that consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect which can never be satisfactorily accounted for in purely objective terms". I've read dozens of posts that consist of you repeating that conclusion as if it were fact, but I must have missed the posts where you argue that it is the case. Where have you taken some prior axiom and in applying rational deductive steps reached this conclusion. Let's start with what the prior axiom is. Before you reach the conclusion that "consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect", what position did you start from and what rational steps did you take from there to reach this conclusion?

The response to that, was that none of this constituted an argument, that it was meaningless 'word salad', that 'the ramblings of philosophers' have no relevance to the problem, which can only be solved by scientific means, within the physicalist frame of reference. — Wayfarer

Firstly, the 'word-salad' was related to this below (and at no point did I say it was "meaningless", I asked what it meant)

And that claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective, and comprises 'an experience of being', — Wayfarer


That's not a claim, that's just word-salad. What does any of that mean? — Isaac

Secondly the 'ramblings of philosophers' was related to a comment Coben made about having to take scientific conclusions with a pinch of salt, it was not a commentary on the entire subject matter.

Thirdly, you use the word 'solve'. Yes If we ever 'solve' the problem it will probably be by empirical means because we all experience the same empirical reality, conclusions therefrom are inter-subjective and so may reach the status of a widely (or even universally) accepted account.

It is almost impossible for philosophy to 'solve' a problem relating to the nature of some real experience. Philosophy relies on rational arguments from presuppositions which may or may not be agreed upon. There is no way to prove a rational argument 'right' (other than self-referentially by further rational argument) and we widely disagree on the presuppositions. We widely agree, however, on the existence of external objects of reality and on the effect they have on us in terms of sensory stimuli. It is no surprise that the idea that world is round gained has almost universal agreement, but the idea of Platonic Forms is still almost a 50/50 split among philosophers 2000 years after it was first brought up.

It is no surprise that the idea that world is round gained has almost universal agreement, but the idea of Platonic Forms is still almost a 50/50 split among philosophers 2000 years after it was first brought up. — Isaac

Thanks! Revealing comment. I have high regard for Plato as a seminal figure in the foundation of Western culture and indeed science itself, although it is common nowadays to relegate his contributions to the antiquities department.

Quote me, or link to, where you have been arguing "that consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect which can never be satisfactorily accounted for in purely objective terms". — Isaac

Nagel's argument summarised in this post makes this point and is an argument. He says:

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe [i.e. 'that' being 'described by the modern natural sciences'], composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

I take it from your comments that this is your view. However, he goes on to say:

I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So, I don't see how that is not 'an argument', and, furthermore, an argument against the very principles that you were advocating. You say that 'he hasn't given any reason why subjective experience is different to the objects of the natural sciences', but he does this.

The whole argument hinges around the contribution 'the observing subject' makes to knowledge acts - even scientific knowledge. We are nowadays accustomed to accepting that science presents us with a view of reality as it is in itself, irrespective of any contribution of the observer. In fact, one of Nagel's other books, The View from Nowhere, is about this very point.

But before we go further - do these names, like Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Edmund Husserl - mean anything to you? Have you studied philosophy, or philosophy of mind? Because from what you write, your approach seems to be that all of these issues are basically science's problem to solve, and that there's nothing to be gained from study of the philosophy.

Before you reach the conclusion that "consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect", what position did you start from and what rational steps did you take from there to reach this conclusion? — Isaac

The observation that 'the mind' is something that never appears to us as an object, or even an objective reality. That is why behaviourism and eliminative materialism are the most honest empirical philosophies of mind: they recognise that mind is fundamentally unknowable, and start from that premise. But again, that is a 'philosophy of mind' issue, not a scientific issue, per se.

Yes, from outside. If other people are conscious then we can examine their consciousness from outside of it. — Isaac

Wow! Yes, we can do what you say, of course. But what, and how much, will we learn? Your approach will give us what an alien (say Mr Data) could learn if they observed us carefully, in the long term. But will it give us any understanding at all of what it's like to be a conscious human being? What can we learn "from outside", when consciousness is an 'inside' phenomenon? :chin:

So, I don't see how that is not 'an argument', and, furthermore, an argument against the very principles that you were advocating. — Wayfarer

Let's take its premises and steps then.

1.

I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning.

. Here he summarises the conclusion he is about to reach.

2.

The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time

. Here he is providing us with our first empirical fact. A

3.

but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view.

. Here he is making a claim. There is no "because...", no "therefore..." nothing at all linking this claim to the preceding premises.

4.

There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it,

. Another statement of fact. B

5.

but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject

. Another claim, again with no "because..." no link to the facts A and B that are the only facts he has provided us with thus far.

So where in this statement consisting of a summary, two empirical of facts, and two claims unrelated to those facts, is the argument you're referring to?

But before we go further - do these names, like Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Edmund Husserl - mean anything to you? Have you studied philosophy, or philosophy of mind? — Wayfarer

Funny, you're the second person to ask me about my academic background and yet I don't know that of any other poster here. I'm not about to list my CV in the absence of any protocol to do so, but I have already said elsewhere I have an academic background mainly in social psychology, but also partly in philosophy, specialising in ethics, including some professional work in the field. Yes, I am familiar with Chalmers and Dennet, I have read only summaries of Nagel and Husserl.

Now,what background have you got in neuroscience from which to dismiss its findings?

The observation that 'the mind' is something that never appears to us as an object, or even an objective reality. — Wayfarer

Pain doesn't appear to me as an object either. Neither does sadness, nor hunger. Are you saying that faced with a starving child you would treat it as if you could not possibly know if it were hungry?

will it give us any understanding at all of what it's like to be a conscious human being? — Pattern-chaser

You're presuming it's 'like' anything at all. In my lexicon, 'like' means similar to, but you're using differently here to mean, what exactly? What, even in theory, would an answer to that question sound like (meaning here, a description which would be similar, but not necessarily identical)? Also, looked at the other way, what is the barrier in the way of the alien's observational data giving us any understanding of of what it's like (here 'like' meaning similar feelings we've had). When you read a harrowing story, they consist entirely of accounts from the 'outside'. Are you saying that it gives you no idea what it was 'like' for the people involved?

There is no "because...", no "therefore..." nothing at all linking this claim to the preceding premises. — Isaac

Welll, it's a short abstract from an entire book, but the ground-and-consequent nature of the argument ought to be clear. It was a controversial book, and elicited considerable hostility from academia. One would think that would not had occurred, had it not presented an argument.

what background have you got in neuroscience from which to dismiss its findings? — Isaac

As I said before, sign on the door says 'philosophy forum'. If I wanted to talk about neuroscience, I would join a neuroscience forum. But I maintain that the fact you can't necessarily draw conclusions about the nature of, say, reasoned inference from neuroscience, is not a matter over which neuroscience has jurisdiction. Whereas you say unless it has been proven by a peer-reviewed neuroscience paper, then it is the 'ramblings of amateurs'.

I'm not asking you about your academic background but whether you know anything about philosophy of mind, because you don't appear to. And I'm really not meaning that as a pejorative, but simply because of the way that you dismiss the arguments without responding to them.

Are you saying that faced with a starving child you would treat it as if you could not possibly know if it were hungry? — Isaac

That obfuscates the point. As a practical matter, obviously we behave as living beings ought to behave in such cases. But it's not really connected with the philosophical point at issue, which, again, I don't think you're seeing.

But, thanks for engaging in such a courteous and measured way, it's a vexatious question, for reasons which, again, are probably hardly worth discussing. :wink:

everyone and everything that doesn't agree with you has a "blind spot" — Janus

Not 'everyone', right? Do you see my point yet?

but the ground-and-consequent nature of the argument ought to be clear. — Wayfarer

Great, then provide a short summary of it, not the two claims which you quoted. An argument is in the form - axiom, rational step(s), conclusion. All you're presenting so far is conclusions, simple statements about a state of affairs that are purported to be the case. I'm asking you about the argument - one step leads to another, if A and B then C, X causes Z we have X therefore Z... That kind of thing.

As a practical matter, obviously we behave as living beings ought to behave in such cases. — Wayfarer

How do we behave as living beings ought to behave in such cases. We haven't (apparently) got the faintest idea whether the child is hungry. We only know what hunger is to us. We can see that lack of food causes the symptoms of hunger in others, but we cannot ever know if it actually is hunger. According to your argument it is no more likely that a child showing the external signs of hunger is experiencing the unpleasant sensation we do, than it is that they're enjoying it immensely. We cannot tell what it is like (for another person) to go weeks without food. The extreme similarity of their external signs to he signs we show when experiencing hunger are apparently not sufficient to conclude anything from.

will it give us any understanding at all of what it's like to be a conscious human being? — Pattern-chaser


You're presuming it's 'like' anything at all. In my lexicon, 'like' means similar to, but you're using differently here to mean, what exactly? — Isaac

This is what it's like to be a philosopher?

You're claiming ignorance of a well-known English idiom. Perhaps you're American? :razz:

This is what it's like to be a philosopher?

You're claiming ignorance of a well-known English idiom — Pattern-chaser

Yes, and "what it's like" there is doing the job of "similar but not necessarily identical". So the meaning of your expression might be something like "being a philosopher is similar to, but not identical to, the experience we've just had".

That doesn't help me understand what it is doing in "understand what it is like to be conscious", if it was playing the same role, it would parse as something like "understand which of our experiences was similar to, but not necessarily identical to, the category of 'conscious'. But that would not be consistent with your assertion that an external analysis of our situation could not yield such an understanding.

Perhaps you're American? :razz: — Pattern-chaser

How dare you!

I brought Up Patricia Churchland specifically because she is a philosopher. There seemed to be some suggestion that the 'thoughtful' philosophers could see beyond the short-sighteded and narrow views of the scientists. — Isaac

Not on my part. I do think the other perspective/field will catch things, sometimes, that other scientists might not. I have no position on what most philosophers think in relation to science, thoughful ones or otherwise.

I don't understand what this has to do with the issue I raised. You understand how peer-review works, right? Scientists do not get to publish just any old crap that they 'reckon' might be true. Their papers are subjected to stringent peer-review, so what Susan Greenfield may have said in other areas does not affect her work in consciousness because her work in consciousness has passed peer-review, ie her conclusion are indeed related to her evidence buy a statistically significant margin. If you don't like Susan Greenfield, you could try Anil Seth, Bruce Hood, Vilynor Ramachandran... — Isaac

We seem to be talking past each other. I like her very much and agreed with the work that got lambasted. I had another point entirely, that seemed ironic in context, but I'll skip going over it again.

Drug companies have a huge financial interest in promoting their drug, it's not the same thing as research scientists who have no interest other than knowledge acquisition. Notwithsatnding that, I have absolutely no problem whatsoever with the fact that scientists are biased. I'd go even further and say that the vast majority are seeking evidence to support a personal world-view. I bolded that because there seems to be some degree of ignoring my comments in this regard so that I fit better into the 'rampant materialist' caricature that's been painted for me — Isaac

Yeah, I just don't think I am treating you like a rampant materialist. The point of my story was that as a lay person I could see things that the relevent scientists - the researchers who developed the drugs were scientists and the relevent experts (psychiatrists) either could not see or would not admit to seeing. IOW that a philosophical approach can come to useful conclusions in other fields.

My main reaction was in the binary presentation of go with what scientists are saying or allow for anyone to just say anything. That's not how you worded it, but I reacted both times to it as a false dilemma. There is a range of being informed amongst philosophers and other non-scientists. It's not binary, it's a spectrum. I hadn't drawn any conclusions about you as a materialist. I did react to those binary presentations. And there is also a range of being informed by those who think they are supported scientific positions. Here, these are generally also lay people.

But that's not what's happened here. Read the posts. Have the posts from the non-physicalists been speculative? Have they presented their position as a possible alternative story? Have they referred at all, even erroneously, to the actual empirical evidence, in an attempt to ensure their thoeries are not overwhelmingly contradicted by it? No, they have consisted almost entirely of a long-winded version of "David Chalmers says its a hard problem, so it is" — Isaac

Well, you're talking to me. I am not going to go back and read the other exchanges. It seems like you are saying it is binary. Well, I don't think I fit your binary chart. Maybe some others do. If you think it is the binary set up you mention perhaps you will see it only in extremes and even if they are doing some of the things you are saying, they still fall somewhere in the middle. Honestly it feels like you have a bone to pick. Perhaps this is response to them, but it seems to bleed into your response to me. Now I could go and read, for example, you interaction with Wayfarer, to see if that interaction fits your binary chart. But that's a morass I want to avoid.

And now I have Janus telling me that informed speculation is better than empty speculation.

Yes, and "what it's like" there is doing the job of "similar but not necessarily identical" — Isaac

??

I wasn't following this discussion, but "what it's like" refers to the qualities of something from an experiential/subjective perspective.

If @Pattern-chaser is confused by my expression, I've no doubt he'll ask. I'll try to do better than "read what I wrote" in increasingly shrill tones as a response. In the meantime, not sure why it's bothering you if you haven't actually followed the thread, but...

What words would you use to answer the question "what is pain like?". In my experience questions like that have been answered by providing similar but not necessarily identical experiences, or metaphors. I'm not sure I can think of a way to answer the question that would not ultimately consist of relating pain to things which are similar but not identical.

RE: (neuro)science, thoughts, and philosophy. Not intending to stay long in this discussion, but, as an observation:

The actualization of thoughts is not possible in the complete absence of laws (principles) of thought. Things such as the law of identity and that of noncontradiction. At best, a ubiquitous chaos would result in the complete absence of such principles.

I find it indisputable that the study of neuroscience, and the like, benefits us in very many ways. But empirical science is not even close to specifying how laws of thought come about, not to mention what they are. To state the obvious, laws of thought are a priori to thoughts about the empirical sciences and the implications of respective data.

To be explicit about the conclusion: The empirical sciences cannot fully address everything that mind entails (such as its laws of thought). Philosophy as its own branch of study is required if we are to hold any hope of so doing.

empirical science is not even close to specifying how laws of thought come about — javra

I don't think that laws of thought do "come about". I follow Ramsey in considering laws of thought to be habits we develop to better achieve our ends. To say they "come about" as some natural phenomena that any investigation might yield up would be, for me, like asking how "dog" came to mean the hairy four-legged creature.

Why do you think that the laws of thought "come about" in that way?

The empirical sciences cannot fully address everything that mind entails (such as its laws of thought). Philosophy as its own branch of study is required if we are to hold any hope of so doing. — javra

Supplementary question: if the empirical sciences cannot address laws of thought (whatever they turn out to be), then how would philosophy have a better chance? Empirical science's measure of rightness is predictability, what would philosophy's be?

Why do you think that the laws of thought "come about" in that way? — Isaac

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence, i.e. any conceivable existence wherein sentience dwells. However, I also do very firmly uphold the reality of biological evolution, wherein many aspects of mind evolve over time.

To the physicalist, or to those empathetic of this view, it would, imo, only be logical to claim that laws of thought should have evolved together with sentience-endowed organic matter.

will try to better address this later on tonight. Need to go to work for now.

Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence — javra

That's actually what I meant by "come about", I should have been clearer. I meant to distinguish it from my understanding that such laws are made-up, like maths. I don't believe laws can evolve. I don't really believe in laws at all, other than as a human-constructed convenience.

What words would you use to answer the question "what is pain like?" — Isaac

I would just describe it as best as I can, while stressing that one needs to experience whatever it is to really know what it's like for oneself. Words can't capture experiences.

I would just describe it as best as I can — Terrapin Station

Yes, but what expressions would you use to do so. My guess is that they would be similies and metaphors, ie things that are similar but not identical.

Words can't capture experiences. — Terrapin Station

I think they can, but it might take something more like poetry. I don't think, though, that anyone could demonstrate that they had.