In the context of the conversation, I think this is irrelevant. I have already posited that mental phenomena are really just products of material causes, an illusion that our brain generates, so suggesting that there is a distinction between causal chains and chains of logic does not mean anything to me. You are just reasserting your claim using philosophical jargon.

Don't put words in my mouth. — Pathogen

Times two. The accusations are false. I won’t bother with specifying the reverse.
——————-

Whenever a will is unhindered to operate within its means, and seeing this is the normal state of human beings possessing the faculty of will, a logical conclusion is that their will is free. — Pathogen

Which is an exact demonstration of the flaw in common understanding: convention mandates “unhindered to operate” is synonymous with freedom, when it is more precisely synonymous with autonomy. Granting that the will is the sole determinant of our volitions should grant the logical conclusion that the will exists as an autonomous causality. That freedom is the necessary condition for autonomy serves as the aforementioned logical separateness and temporal displacement (that made “no sense whatsoever”), relieves infinite regress, and does not impinge on the natural principle of cause and effect.
——————-

Free will is not essential to morality as it is a set of rules society has set up to dissuade potentially harmful behaviors between its comprising members. — Pathogen

Another example of mere convention, the mixing of the subjective nature of personality manifestation with the objective nature of civil administration.

With that, I leave you and your....er.....scientific literature. And Google.

It would manifest as an action free of prior causes. This is why I think free will (or true freedom as you put it) is an incoherent concept. — rlclauer

Actions seemingly without cause exist on the micro scale. But randomness isn't freedom.

But more importantly, why do you conclude that freedom is incoherent because it can not physically manifest as freedom?

You do not "know" what is real, if you can only experience it subjectively. — rlclauer

But I do experience freedom subjectively.

If you do scientific testing, and continuously get the same result, you can conclude that there is probably a real property which is affecting this outcome. — rlclauer

But scientific testing will only reveal causal connections, because causality is one of it's core assumptions. It only provides a constructed reality, albeit a very useful one.

I do not really know what you mean by "internal perspective" vs "external perspective." — rlclauer

In my internal experience, I have freedom. But from an external perspective, e.g. yours, there is only a causal chain of brain-states. The question is, why would we call one of these perspective an illusion?

In my opinion, there is your perspective, which is subjective and therefore fallible, and there is the world we inhabit, which seems to be real, and we have discerned some properties about this world, but the discovery of those properties requires placing a check on our subjectivity, namely the scientific method. — rlclauer

I think there is a difference between having a subjective perspective on objects and experiencing yourself as a subject. The observer is not part of that which is observed.

why do you conclude that freedom is incoherent because it can not physically manifest as freedom?

Because the type of "freedom" humans care about, human actions, cannot possibly meet this criteria. If you want to talk about some abstract "freedom" that's fine, but I am thinking in terms of what matters to humans. I answered your question on what it looks like to me.

But I do experience freedom subjectively.

I am referring to knowing something epistemologically, not having self referential conclusions with reference to subjective perspective.

But scientific testing will only reveal causal connections, because causality is one of it's core assumptions. It only provides a constructed reality, albeit a very useful one.

I was answering the question of how can you know something to be true. I said scientific method is a good way to know things about reality, and account for fallible subjectivity. I am not saying science is infallible.

In my internal experience, I have freedom. But from an external perspective, e.g. yours, there is only a causal chain of brain-states. The question is, why would we call one of these perspective an illusion?

That's a good question. What you refer to as "external experience," e.g. "my perspective," or to say it in a more precise way, the argument which was typed onto this forum by the user called "rlclauer," my argument is not based on my subjective or "internal perspective" as you referred to it, experience. My subjective experience is that I am a free agent, I feel like a driver of a biological suit, giving the body commands and seeing it respond, etc. My subjective experience happens to be wrong, as shown by Libet experiment, "Pantyhose experiment." These experiments show that the reasons we conjure up to explain why we "did" something, are just post hoc rationalizations. It follows that our experience of the "self, will, agency," are all just like this. This is not even invoking material cause and effect, which once those are factored in, it's pretty obvious to see that the notion of "an agent performing a free action," is completely incoherent. So, you framed it as me calling "one of these experiences" false, but your framing is incorrect. Without thinking of whose perspective is being discussed, let's examine what is actually happening here, and not frame it as me being biased toward my own perspective.

I think there is a difference between having a subjective perspective on objects and experiencing yourself as a subject. The observer is not part of that which is observed.

I do not even know what this means, sorry. I am just a working class person, not a philosophy degree holder.

:death:

You speak of temporal displacement with respect to will, I speak of temporal displacement with respect to freedom.

I never gave even a hint of anything being separated from time. I wouldn’t know how such a thing could be conceivable, much less expressed in a dialogue.

Unless you have something to pique my interest, you may have the last word.

I do not even know what this means, sorry. I am just a working class person, not a philosophy degree holder. — rlclauer

Right, so perhaps we can discuss this further, since it's critical to my position. I don't want to ignore the rest of your post, just try to get this out of the way first.

Whenever you observe anything, including when applying the scientific method, the you, the observer is an important part of the resulting observation. Whatever you experience has been structured by your mind - certain information has been left out, certain principles have been applied. This includes all scientific knowledge.

The world you are seeing is not "out there". It is in your head. And hence, causality and determinism are also in your head. In the same place freedom is. It's just that you apply the concept of freedom to one perspective, and the law of causation to the other. One is not more real, or more subjective, than the other.

Ok thanks for explaining that. I would disagree with the characterization of the results of any scientific experiment being beholden to the subjectivity of the observer. I agree completely, what you experience has been structured by your brain, omitting certain information, and we are not really "seeing out there," but more or less "seeing" the model our brain creates.

That applies to your notion of free will also. The difference between your subjective experience of free will, and the subjective position of the observer relative to the scientific method, is repeatability, and physical analogues.

I do not think "causality" is just in your head, the same way free will is in your head, unless humans the world over have collectively hallucinated the reliability of things we have learned through science.

Ok thanks for explaining that. I would disagree with the characterization of the results of any scientific experiment being beholden to the subjectivity of the observer. I agree completely, what you experience has been structured by your brain, omitting certain information, and we are not really "seeing out there," but more or less "seeing" the model our brain creates. — rlclauer

It's not really about subjectivity in the sense of individual experiences and more about the realisation that experience is something subjects have.

That applies to your notion of free will also. The difference between your subjective experience of free will, and the subjective position of the observer relative to the scientific method, is repeatability, and physical analogues. — rlclauer

But free will is entirely repeatable. I don't know what you mean by "physical analogue".

I do not think "causality" is just in your head, the same way free will is in your head, unless humans the world over have collectively hallucinated the reliability of things we have learned through science. — rlclauer

Of course causality is not a hallucination. It's a part of the structure of our reality. But, crucially, we don't know whether this structure is part of "things as they really are" or added by human minds. The same is true for freedom. It's possible that causality is "how things really are", but we cannot know this without access to a non-human observer's perspective.

I'm just describing my account of accountability. You don't have to accept it. My account treats individuals as causal agents which makes them a nexus of accountability. In this context, the distinction between a logic chain and causal chain is relevant. I can extrapolate from here to some notion of "free will", but you seem averse to the term so I didn't take it there.

I think my account is coherent. My only issue with your position is that I don't see that you have a basis for accountability. You accepted that it's reasonable to have accountability, but I don't understand how you can rationalize it without there being a causal agent to HOLD accountable.

Can you explain how free will is repeatable? By physical analogues, I mean we can have a theory for planetary motion, and then look through a telescope and see a physical analogue to the theory.

Could you please explain how it is not possible to know if causality is "how things really are?" In my opinion, if you are going to be skeptical as to whether or not we are correctly perceiving reality, how can you not also be skeptical of your experience of free will?

I do not think I framed it as "accountability." I believe I framed it as taking a pragmatic approach to isolating dangerous elements of a system. So if you have a robot that is going haywire, you move it away from the general population and quarantine or take it to the repair shop. You do not need to assume the robot is "causing itself to go haywire through agency," in order to do something about the issue.

The same is true for humans. Agency is just an invention. Sure, if your goal is to "account for a breach of a moral code based on chosen actions," you will need to invoke agency in order for that line of thinking to be "self-coherent." But I have taken a different course to not throw what humans normally call "justice" out the window on a deterministic world view. It is basically Sam Harris' argument, that if there is a bear roaming the streets, you will act upon the knowledge of a bear which could hurt you.

If you have someone who enjoys flaying humans and wearing their skin, and they appear to have no remorse and wish to continue doing it, locking them in a cage forever is viable. You do not need to add the extra element, "the reason we are locking them in a cage is because they are an agent who we must hold morally accountable." in my opinion it's an unnecessary extra step, let alone the fact I do not even think it is a correct description of how humans function.

The will existing as an autonomous casual means in no way requires it to be separate from time itself. It acts in time, is constrained by it, and to say it is temporally displaced is nonsensical. — Pathogen

This concept of free will requires a particular understanding of the nature of time and change. We see that time passes, and as time passes, time which was to the future of us becomes to the past of us.

Now, we understand a continuity of existence, which is at the base of determinism. What has existed in the past will continue to exist onward into the future, unless there is a force which acts to cause change. This is expressed by Newton's first law, the law of inertia. However, we also can conclude that anything, and/or everything, including Newton's law, could possibly change at any moment of the passing time. This indicates that Newton's first law, which is the basis of causal determinism, is not itself a necessity.

So we have the brute fact that the continuity of existence, expressed by Newton's first law, which is fundamental to determinism, has no support as a universal law. This is sufficient to support the reality of the observations which produce this statement:

4.) Non-deterministic factors do exist in the physical universe. — Pathogen

Furthermore, we observe that these non-deterministic factors, things which are not subject to Newton's first law, are very active within the internal parts of living beings, and this supports the thesis of free will.

:death:

:death:

The term “free will” is a misnomer; there exists no such thing except as yet another mere convention or rationally lackadaisical habit. “Free will” is not the autonomous faculty of volitional causality, for it is easy to understand the circumstances under which the will is not free at all, but must determine its volitions in flagrant opposition to our most valued inclinations, such being the highest demonstration of the moral constitution. Will, all by itself, a stand-alone object of pure reason unmodified by any superfluous conception, represents that causality. That being the case, it is more apt to say, “freedom is the condition the will takes place under”, which still isn’t quite right, but is close enough to work with, and incorporates the added bonus of showing how and why free and freedom both are necessarily separated/displaced from will. Logically separated because free will is always susceptible to self-contradiction, and temporally displaced because freedom is always antecedent to the will for which it is the condition.

So much for last words, huh? You’re welcome to the next last last word. (Grin)

If "freedom is the condition the will takes place under", then why is "free will" a misnomer? For example, lets say that "flow" is the condition a river takes place under. Why would it be a misnomer to talk about a flowing river?

That being the case, it is more apt to say, “freedom is the condition the will takes place under”, which still isn’t quite right, but is close enough to work with, and incorporates the added bonus of showing how and why free and freedom both are necessarily separated/displaced from will. Logically separated because free will is always susceptible to self-contradiction, and temporally displaced because freedom is always antecedent to the will for which it is the condition. — Mww

Of course "free" is logically separable from "will", the former is the predicate and the latter the subject. So "free" may be predicated of subjects other than will. Because of this, we can see that there were free things prior to there being a free will, and therefore conclude that freedom is antecedent to the will. But this does not mean that free will is temporally displaced, nor is this conclusion produced by any self-contradiction. The claim that free will is susceptible to self-contradiction represents a misunderstanding of free will.

Why would it be a misnomer to talk about a flowing river? — Metaphysician Undercover

The concept “flow” is a condition of the concept “river”, but it is not a necessary condition, for a river that does not flow, i.e., tidal access rivers, is still a river. The concept “free will” is a misnomer, because a free will that is not free in its volitional determinations cannot be a “free will”, but nonetheless a will.

Freedom is an indirect condition of the will, insofar as it is a necessary condition for autonomy, which in its turn is the necessary condition for the will to operate in conformity to its prerogatives. Forgive me; I took liberties with the theoretical philosophy of morals by not specifying the distinction between conditions and necessary conditions.
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this does not mean that free will is temporally displaced — Metaphysician Undercover

I gave no indication that free will is displaced; I specifically itemized free as being separated from will.
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The claim that free will is susceptible to self-contradiction represents a misunderstanding of free will. — Metaphysician Undercover

That the will is susceptible to self-contradiction not only represents a misunderstanding of will, but represents an impossible circumstance. To say that a free will is susceptible to self-contradiction is readily affirmed.
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Now, just between you and me and the fencepost, there is more to this moral philosophy than has been presented. Suffice it to say I favor Enlightenment deontology combined with the pervasiveness of the subjective mandate, which would do more to obfuscate the topic than clarify it, if I dragged my co-conversants any further into the proverbial rabbit hole. Hence, my liberties taken therein.

Can you explain how free will is repeatable? — rlclauer

I consistently experience myself as having free will, and others do likewise.

By physical analogues, I mean we can have a theory for planetary motion, and then look through a telescope and see a physical analogue to the theory. — rlclauer

Ok, so basically physical evidence? It doesn't make sense to ask for physical evidence of free will since, as was noted before, there is no reason to expect such evidence.

Could you please explain how it is not possible to know if causality is "how things really are?" — rlclauer

Only by asking the counter question: How could we possibly know? There is not a time any human can remember when they "discovered" causality. It seems to develop in some children somewhat graudally, but whether that is from the brain developing or the brain receiving external input is impossible to say.

In my opinion, if you are going to be skeptical as to whether or not we are correctly perceiving reality, how can you not also be skeptical of your experience of free will? — rlclauer

I am not really sceptical that we are "correctly" perceiving reality, in the sense that you might be sceptial about correctly identifying a fata morgana. It's more that physical reality is only part of the universe hat I inhabit, and I see no reason to elevate it above all else. In that sense, I am equally sceptical of free will. I am not claiming free will is "more real" than physical reality either, just that we don't know either way.

The concept “flow” is a condition of the concept “river”, but it is not a necessary condition, for a river that does not flow, i.e., tidal access rivers, is still a river. — Mww

This is nonsense, a tidal river still flows according to the direction of the tide. You've just rejected the generally accepted definition of "river", for personal reasons, to say that "flow" is not a necessary condition of a river. Anyway, it's not relevant to the discussion. Either you accept the analogy or you do not, and obviously you do not.

The concept “free will” is a misnomer, because a free will that is not free in its volitional determinations cannot be a “free will”, but nonetheless a will. — Mww

I can't see your point. You seem to be suggesting that there is such a thing as a will which is not free, such that "free" is not a necessary condition of willing. How could that be, without accepting determinism. Care to explain, or are you just arguing determinism?

Freedom is an indirect condition of the will, insofar as it is a necessary condition for autonomy, which in its turn is the necessary condition for the will to operate in conformity to its prerogatives. Forgive me; I took liberties with the theoretical philosophy of morals by not specifying the distinction between conditions and necessary conditions. — Mww

If freedom is a condition of the will, as explained here, wouldn't this contradict your prior statement, where you talk about a "free will that is not free in its volitional determinations"? Isn't this contradictory in the first place, to refer to a free will which is not free?

I gave no indication that free will is displaced; I specifically itemized free as being separated from will. — Mww

OK, I do not mind separating "free" from "will", but then we must dispose of the idea that freedom is a necessary condition of will. If "free" is separate from and not a necessary condition of "will", then we have a will which may or may not be free. But if freedom is a necessary condition for will, then the will cannot be anything other than free. Which are you proposing? You seem to be talking both, which is contradiction.

This is nonsense, a tidal river still flows according to the direction of the tide. — Metaphysician Undercover

C’mon, man, really? Nonsense? Look at what you wrote...river still flows according to the direction of the tide. If the tide is the major determinant factor, then the necessity resides in the tide, not the river, re: estuary. I can see one from my deck, complete with lobster boats. Navigational charts call it a river because shoreline proximity precludes calling it a bay, cove, inlet or sound.

And it does relate to the present discussion, insofar as the necessity for freedom (flow) resides in autonomy (tide), not the will (river), but common understanding nevertheless attributes freedom (flow) directly to the will (river).
———————

You seem to be suggesting that there is such a thing as a will which is not free, such that "free" is not a necessary condition of willing. How could that be, without accepting determinism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Ahhh.....now we’re getting somewhere. There is a kind of determinism in play. Granting that a moral disposition is predicated on certain qualifications, whether innate genetically or instilled very early on from experience, then in order for proper moral agency to manifest, the agent must conform to whatever those qualifications happen to be. Hence, a form of determinism. It follows that the volitional determinations of the will must adhere to one’s moral disposition in accordance with his pre-established personal qualifications. Hence, a form of determinism.

The will has no part in that determinant condition given by innate qualifications, its job being to represent them in the volitions it determines as being exemplary of them. Hence, determinism of the same kind, re: non-physical, immaterial, insofar as a consequent is solely dependent on a particular antecedent, but in a different form. The former as innate qualifications is merely a natural condition, the latter as willed action is a product of pure practical reason alone.

All well and good, peachy, have a nice day.......right up until the will is called upon to determine a proper moral volition in direct conflict with a vested interest of the agent called upon to act. Here, the will is not free to relieve the conflict at the expense of the agent’s moral constitution. To do so is the epitome of immorality, which manifests in the agent as “guilty conscience”, “dishonor”, ill-will” and the like. And NOT....oh jeez, can you believe people actually think so???......as farging court appearance!!!!! (Gaspsputterchoke) ‘S-ok, though; they can’t separate ethics from morality either, so what can you expect?

Immorality is a reflection on the self, fercrissakes, not the freakin’ community. Commit a crime, go to jail, get out, you’ve re-paid your community for your crime as far as they’re concerned. Commit an immoral act that is not a crime.......ain’t no paybacks for that, nosiree bub. You just stabbed yourself in the back with your own knife and you get to live with it, as far as you’re concerned.
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we must dispose of the idea that freedom is a necessary condition of will. — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct. Freedom is the necessary condition of autonomy. One of the two more explanatory reductions pending, one even more metaphysically speculative than the other, but if you find no value in any of what’s been said, there’s no point in continuing, right?

C’mon, man, really? Nonsense? Look at what you wrote...river still flows according to the direction of the tide. If the tide is the major determinant factor, then the necessity resides in the tide, not the river, re: estuary. I can see one from my deck, complete with lobster boats. Navigational charts call it a river because shoreline proximity precludes calling it a bay, cove, inlet or sound. — Mww

So it's not a river you're talking about, it is an "estuary". Make up your mind, because my analogy did not refer to estuaries, it referred to rivers. Show me a definition of "river" which does not contain 'flow" or something synonymous. Then you might have an argument that some rivers don't flow.

Ahhh.....now we’re getting somewhere. There is a kind of determinism in play. Granting that a moral disposition is predicated on certain qualifications, whether innate genetically or instilled very early on from experience, then in order for proper moral agency to manifest, the agent must conform to whatever those qualifications happen to be. Hence, a form of determinism. It follows that the volitional determinations of the will must adhere to one’s moral disposition in accordance with his pre-established personal qualifications. Hence, a form of determinism. — Mww

I really don't see how this is a form of determinism. We can choose to go against our moral disposition. This is called doing what one knows is wrong, and people do it commonly. So one's moral disposition cannot act as a determinist force.

All well and good, peachy, have a nice day.......right up until the will is called upon to determine a proper moral volition in direct conflict with a vested interest of the agent called upon to act. Here, the will is not free to relieve the conflict at the expense of the agent’s moral constitution. To do so is the epitome of immorality, which manifests in the agent as “guilty conscience”, “dishonor”, ill-will” and the like. And NOT....oh jeez, can you believe people actually think so???......as farging court appearance!!!!! (Gaspsputterchoke) ‘S-ok, though; they can’t separate ethics from morality either, so what can you expect? — Mww

So this is where you're wrong. We often act against what our moral disposition dictates, and your appeal to "guilty conscience" does nothing to resolve this. A person may or may not feel a guilty conscience, but this is irrelevant to the fact that one is free to go against the dictates of one' moral disposition, and is evidence of this freedom.

but if you find no value in any of what’s been said, there’s no point in continuing, right? — Mww

I don't know, you seem to be arguing both sides of incompatible positions, as if they are compatible.

Well. If you didn’t dig any of that, you’re gonna really shake your head over this:

We can choose to go against our moral disposition. This is called doing what one knows is wrong, and people do it commonly. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, my friend. This is where you’re mis-informed. I won’t say you’re “wrong”; this is speculative philosophy, not a history class.

Morality speaks to what is good, not what is right. What people commonly do that is not right is with respect to an objective want, called inclination, in opposition to cultural acceptance, thus not necessarily against moral disposition. What people much less commonly do that is not good is with respect to a subjective interest, called obligation, in opposition to moral law, which is very much so against moral disposition.

Cultural acceptance makes explicit contingent objective validity in the form of an accessible code; moral law makes explicit necessary subjective validity in the form of a private law.

Moral law is the source of the form of determinism you said you don’t see. The laws conform to the agent’s innate qualifications, and determine one’s moral constitution, that which the will uses to formulate its volitions.

:death:

Here's an argument for free will:

1. If my reason and the reason of virtually everyone else represents something to be the case, that is good evidence that it is the case other things being equal.
2. My reason and the reason of virtually everyone else represents free will to be a reality.
3. Therefore, we have good evidence - other things being equal - that free will is a reality.

Morality speaks to what is good, not what is right. What people commonly do that is not right is with respect to an objective want, called inclination, in opposition to cultural acceptance, thus not necessarily against moral disposition. What people much less commonly do that is not good is with respect to a subjective interest, called obligation, in opposition to moral law, which is very much so against moral disposition. — Mww

Now you leave "moral disposition" as meaningless.

Moral law is the source of the form of determinism you said you don’t see. The laws conform to the agent’s innate qualifications, and determine one’s moral constitution, that which the will uses to formulate its volitions. — Mww

This is not true, by what you've said above. People behave in opposition to moral law, so moral law cannot act as a determinist force.

Now you leave "moral disposition" as meaningless. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’d be very interested in being informed as to how I managed to do that.
——————

People behave in opposition to moral law, so moral law cannot act as a determinist force. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here I was thinking you were a metaphysician. Since when would a metaphysician think a thing as immaterial as theoretical moral philosophy have any kind of deterministic force incorporated in it, as a means of its justification? Considering the hints you’ve been given with respect to the form of determinism in use, re: logical product of pure practical reason, immaterial, non-physical, necessary consequent from particular antecedent.....should suffice as ground to allow moral law to be nothing but the logical explication of a principle for what it is to be moral, not a force that prohibits a moral agent from being otherwise.

We as rational moral agents are guided by our moral dispositions, not unconditionally regulated by them.
——————

People behave in opposition to moral law, — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, so what? Trivially true and has nothing to do with the formulation of a logical moral theory, but only exhibits relative manifestations of it. Offend a moral law, you’re immoral. Simple as that. Breaking a law says nothing about the law, but only says something about the breaking.

:death:

:death:

Oh. Sorry.

Hope nobody turns blue.

I stated my argument as plainly as I know how.