No. Consciousness has never been found. It has been assumed so far. — khaled

This is not true. At the very least we each find our own consciousnesses, and we know that biological processes are always present in that discovery. The fact that I can say we all find our own consciousnesses means that I know others are conscious, and that when I observe behavior that shows consciousness, consciousness has been found. This is not a matter of "absolute certainty", but a matter of having no good reason to think that consciousness is not to be found in great profrusion across the animal and human domains.

Your "box" analogy is kind of weak and seems inappropriate because we observe boxes moving lots of places not just at high altitudes.

The salient point is not a deductive one that says that because consciousness has only been found in organisms, biological processes therefore logically must be necessary for consciousness to exist, it is an inductive argument that says that because consciousness has never been found anywhere other than in organisms it is reasonable to conjecture that organic processes are necessary for consciousness to exist.

At the very least we each find our own consciousnesses — Janus

But never someone else’s. Which means you can’t assume WE find our own consciousness. You do (hopefully) and I do (definitely)

The fact that I can say we all find our own consciousnesses — Janus

You can’t say that though. How do you know others have found their own consciousness. I’m not implying solipsism here, just pointing out that we actually don’t have a way to measure consciousness. We assume everyone else is conscious for social reasons

behavior that shows consciousness — Janus

What is that behavior exactly? And, again, we have no evidence such behavior is necessary for consciousness. Such behavior could be possible without consciousness. And consciousness could be possible without such behavior. There is no reason to assume that having subjective experiences necessitates certain behavior

Your "box" analogy is kind of weak and seems inappropriate because we observe boxes moving lots of places not just at high altitudes — Janus

I said in parenthesis “assuming this is the only instance of a box moving that we do see” didn’t I (or something to that effect)

because consciousness has never been found anywhere other than in organisms — Janus

Again, it hasn’t been found in organisms either. It has been assumed to exist. If rocks were conscious would we have found a way to detect it? That’s my point.

The objections you have stated there to my contention that we have every reason to believe that others are conscious, and that evidence of that consciousness is to be found in their behavior is devolving to the fact, that I have already acknowledged but also stated that I think is irrelevant, that we cannot be absolutely certain. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything. Our knowledge, to count as knowledge, does not need to be absolutely certain. On the contrary all non-tautologous and/ or non-analytic knowledge is fallibilistic.

So, we cannot be absolutely certain that solipsism is not the case, sure, but I think that fact is trivial and irrelevant, and warrants nothing more than a "So what?". We have every reason to think, and no cogent reason not to think, that other humans and animals are conscious, and that their behavior manifests their consciousness.

So, as I see it, for all intents and purposes, consciousness has been found in organisms, but never in, to refer to your example, rocks. We thus have no reason to think that rocks are conscious, because we have never observed them to behave in any of the ways we associate with being conscious.

Language, is pretty much the answer to your whole post. We talk to each other. That's how we obtain enough certainty about the consistency of our concepts to make use of them. We give them words, we talk to other people about them, we make use of them in our forms of life, communication works and as long as it works we must be getting the concepts at least broadly right. That's the point of the private language argument (or at least the point in the context of this discussion).

Where this system goes wrong, the problems of philosophy Wittgenstein was trying to dissolve, is when people reify words. They make a word (like consciousness) and then say because we have that word, there must be an accompanying concept. They search for the pure concept attached to the word, but there is none, the word was just doing a job, and a different job in different contexts. There's no sublime concept attached to it. It's what leads to nonsense philosophical dilemmas like...

No. Consciousness has never been found. — khaled

OK, I see where you're coming from now. So, I know that I am identifying the same concept from day to day because its meaning is established by conventional use. If that is waht you mean I agree. I had thought you were making some entirely different point even though I wasn't clear on what the point was.

Yes, that's it. The reason I brought it up has got somewhat lost because I don't think I've explained it clearly enough for the people I was talking to to understand, but it was that last quote I added (and others like it), that I raised the issue to counter. The subliming of a word into an as yet unidentified concept is incoherent.

What I do remember questioning is the necessity for some intermediary process between biological and mental processes. I tried to make it clear that I don't think such an intermediary is needed. To me, there's no mystery. I think biological processes in the human nervous system are enough to explain mental processes, including consciousness. As I said previously, I think the reason that's hard for some people to swallow is that they see consciousness as something special, fundamentally different from other phenomena. I don't see it that way. — T Clark

I think the argument for the particular nature of human consciousness comes from observing the nature of meaning. That's obviously an extremely broad kind of statement, but the ability to grasp meaning is basic to language, logic and abstraction. That is something that I am doubtful there is a biological account of. The way I put it is that, yes, humans evolved to have the capacity for language and abstraction, but those capacities can't be reduced to or understood in biological terms.

And co-incident with that - maybe a cause, maybe a consequence - is self-awareness, self-consciousness, the awareness of oneself as a separate being with his/her own identity.

In order to make a claim about how the nature of consciousness makes it difficult for science to investigate, you have to first make a claim about the nature of consciousness — Isaac

And that claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective, and comprises 'an experience of being', hence, can never be satisfactorily understood or described in objective terms. The hard problem in a nutshell.

And that claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective, and comprises 'an experience of being', — Wayfarer

That's not a claim, that's just word-salad. What does any of that mean?

"The nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective" - for subjective, my dictionary gives me
"influenced by or based on personal beliefs or feelings, rather than based on facts:" So you're saying that consciousness is a personal opinion? Doesn't sound right. I've heard subjective used in terms of "mind related activity, as opposed to external to the mind". Could be that, but neuroscience deals with stuff that goes on in the mind, so can't see the problem there.

"...comprises 'an experience of being'" I have no clue on at all. being I can only get to equate to something like existence, but experience, we've already talked about, can perfectly legitimately be parsed as the logging of sensory inputs to memory. So we get that consciousness is to do with the logging to memory of the sensory inputs relating to being alive. Still not seeing why that means neuroscience can't investigate that.

So you're saying that consciousness is a personal opinion? Doesn't sound right. — Isaac

Because it’s not right. The nature of consciousness is first-person, and can generally be described as ‘subjective’ in a certain sense. It’s not ‘subjective’ in the everyday sense of the word, but in the sense of being ‘a property of a subject’. It is first-person in the sense described by Chalmers’ well-known essay ‘Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness’.

Still not seeing why that means neuroscience can't investigate that. — Isaac

I guessed not. There’s a pretty good answer given by Thomas Nagel in his NY Times OP that lays out a summary of the argument in his book, Mind and Cosmos:

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained.

That’s nearer in meaning to what I wanted to convey with the term ‘subjective’.

But none of that provides an argument, in the normal sense of the term. All he's said is "...they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view.", which is just the unsupported conclusion we're examining here.

He hasn't given any reason why they cannot apart from the fact that he thinks they're different.

"... such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.", is not an argument. Why will it leave it out? What is preventing science from describing subjective experiences in material terms? What on earth is the" Subjective essence of the experience "?

cannot be absolutely certain. We cannot be absolutely certain of anything. Our knowledge, to count as knowledge, does not need to be absolutely certain. On the contrary all non-tautologous and/ or non-analytic knowledge is fallibilistic. — Janus

This isn’t the same degree of uncertainty we’re talking here. We’re talking “let’s make an entire scientific theory about the necessary conditions for something we cannot confirm is there”. Find me one other situation where that would be acceptable scientifically. The problem is, consciousness doesn’t have any logical impacts on the world. By that I mean, a rock may or may not be conscious and not display any change in behavior (or lake thereof). That’s why we can’t detect it.

No “let’s make a scientific theory about the sufficient conditions for something to be there, and we’re gonna reasonably assume it’s there” seems much more modest but it doesn’t then imply that the only way said thing can arise is through said sufficient conditions (because that’s what a sufficient condition means)

We have every reason to think, and no cogent reason not to think, that other humans and animals are conscious, and that their behavior manifests their consciousness. — Janus

But we have no reason to think, based on that, that rocks aren’t conscious. We have “found” (assumed) a way in which consciousness arises. We cannot go from that to saying it’s the only way

consciousness has been found in organisms — Janus

If you’re going to define consciousness behaviorally then you’ll obviously only find it in organisms. But that will be a definition that has nothing to do with what most people think of consciousness which is “can this thing have subjective experiences”. The problem is, whether or not it can has nothing to do with its behavior as far as we know. In other words, if panpsychism was true, you wouldn’t notice any difference than if it wasn’t.

in any of the ways we associate with being conscious. — Janus

Again, we have found that certain chemical interactions cause consciousness
We cannot go from there to saying that they are necessary for consciousness, we can say they’re sufficient

Other examples include: if we find that kicking a box leads to it moving it is reasonable to assume that the kick is sufficient to produce movement, but not that it is necessary. To confirm whether it is necessary, we would have to have good reason to believe that we have seem most of the ways a box can move AND see most of them begin with a kick.

We have no good reason to believe we have seen most of the ways consciousness can arise, because we haven’t actually seen it arise with the same certainty required to make a scientific theory. We have no measure of whether or not something is having a subjective experience.

They make a word (like consciousness) and then say because we have that word, there must be an accompanying concept. They search for the pure concept attached to the word, but there is none, the word was just doing a job, and a different job in different contexts. There's no sublime concept attached to it — Isaac

I gave a very simple definition though right? “Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences”

It's what leads to nonsense philosophical dilemmas like...

No. Consciousness has never been found.
— khaled — Isaac

First off, nothing about this claim is philosophical, it is empirical. Also nothing about it suggests a dilemma (obviously I meant consciousness hasn’t been found by me except in me).

Second, can you say someone else is conscious with the same degree of certainty you can say the length of a 1 m long rod is 1 m? Where is your measuring instrument?

The way I put it is that, yes, humans evolved to have the capacity for language and abstraction, but those capacities can't be reduced to or understood in biological terms.

And co-incident with that - maybe a cause, maybe a consequence - is self-awareness, self-consciousness, the awareness of oneself as a separate being with his/her own identity. — Wayfarer

As I've said, I disagree with this statement.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

I think this is a pretty good description of the impasse we find ourselves at. All I can say is "I don't get it." Biology doesn't describe subjective experience, that's what psychology is for.

I gave a very simple definition though right? “Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences” — khaled

No. That is an extremely complicated and vague definition. What are 'subjective experiences'? You've replaced one vague term with another.

First off, nothing about this claim is philosophical, it is empirical. — khaled

As I've said a dozen times now, it can't possibly be empirical, as 'consciousness' is a word, not an empirical fact. If I say, "no one has yet identified hjyhfdrddf" is that an empirical claim, or nonsense?

Second, can you say someone else is conscious with the same degree of certainty you can say the length of a 1 m long rod is 1 m? — khaled

Yes, nearly. By defining consciousness as a set of observable phenomena and then observing those phenomena.

All I can say is "I don't get it." Biology doesn't describe subjective experience, that's what psychology is for. — T Clark

Exactly.

I gave a very simple definition though right? “Something is conscious if it has subjective experiences” — khaled

This is an odd phrasing. What would “subjective experience” stand in contrast to? “Non-subjective experience” comes to mind, but this would be a semantic quagmire at best.

I’m preferential to using “the property of being aware” instead. This since awareness and consciousness are synonymous in most, if not all, ways (save for ocasions when consciousness, unlike awareness, connotes an entailed ability to be aware of awarness).

Second, can you say someone else is conscious with the same degree of certainty you can say the length of a 1 m long rod is 1 m? Where is your measuring instrument? — khaled

Were one to ascribe the capacity of will to consciousness—this as per common sense understandings—then the issue would be resolved for all intended purposes. That which exhibits actions and reactions relative to environmental stimuli will be endowed with consciousness. This because it exhibits both an ability to be aware and an ability to will.

As to strenght of certainty that something which looks like, sounds like, and moves like a duck is in fact a duck and not a robotic decoy, I will grant that the degree of certainty is lesser than that which I hold that I myself am not a robotic decoy. Nevertheless, until evidence emerges that might sugest otherwise, when I will witness something that looks like, sounds like, and moves like a duck, I will remain psychologically certain that it in fact is a duck. For emphasis, this yet remains a type of certainty—rather than an uncertainty or doubt.

as 'consciousness' is a word — Isaac

It's a word describing a phenomena we're looking for.

If I say, "no one has yet identified hjyhfdrddf" — Isaac

If hjyhfdfddf is a phenomena with a specific definition it's an empirical claim.

By defining consciousness as a set of observable phenomena and then observing those phenomena. — Isaac

But that's not the definition most people you disagree with are using

No. That is an extremely complicated and vague definition. What are 'subjective experiences'? — Isaac

What you're having right now. (Assuming you are conscious) Also you seem to know what it means considering this:

All I can say is "I don't get it." Biology doesn't describe subjective experience, that's what psychology is for.
— T Clark

Exactly. — Isaac

You wouldn't have replied "exactly" unless you knew what subjective experience meant

What would “subjective experience” stand in contrast to — javra

Not having it

I’m preferential to using “the property of being aware” — javra

Sure

Were one to ascribe the capacity of will to consciousness—this as per common sense understandings—then the issue would be resolved for all intended purposes. — javra

Yes, but I don't think ascribing will is per common sense understanding. That's the point

It's a word describing a phenomena we're looking for. — khaled

Describing means to put into other words to make more clear. At the moment we've been give 'subjective experience which is no more clear.

But that's not the definition most people you disagree with are using — khaled

That's not the point. Your argument is that science cannot say what it says about consciousness. Not that it doesn't identify a phenomena you personally feel should be there.

What you're having right now. (Assuming you are conscious) Also you seem to know what it means considering this:

All I can say is "I don't get it." Biology doesn't describe subjective experience, that's what psychology is for.
— T Clark

Exactly. — Isaac


You wouldn't have replied "exactly" unless you knew what subjective experience meant — khaled

I know what I think subjective experience means, and I've said as much many times. For me it means something like the logging to memory of sensory inputs. I've been told that doesn't cover it.

I know what I think subjective experience means, and I've said as much many times. For me it means something like the logging to memory of sensory inputs. I've been told that doesn't cover it. — Isaac

Couldn't we say that a computer, with security camera feed, does this, perhaps, shuttling anomolous movements, recorded ones that is, to special files and throwing out the rest or storing them elsewhere?

I realize this is dependent on a number of the terms you used, so I'm probing.

I wonder if some kinds of genetic and epigentic process might also be covered by that description also.

I know what I think subjective experience means, and I've said as much many times. For me it means something like the logging to memory of sensory inputs. I've been told that doesn't cover it. — Isaac

I think what you're missing is the role of the subject in interpretation and integration of meaning. The subject makes judgements - not simply conscious judgements, but continuously, from a subliminal level up to the conscious level. That is intrinsic to the nature of intelligence - the word itself is derived from 'inter-legere' meaning 'to read between'. That is the human intelligence at work. At it is really a marvellous thing. But we never actually see it working, because we're never outside of it - we only ever look through it, and with it, but not at it.

We don't notice that, and we don't usually need to notice that - but when we're discussing 'philosophy of mind' (as distinct from cognitive science or even psychology) then we had better notice it - otherwise we're not really coming to grips with the nature of the subject.

useful primer on current philosophy of mind.

Couldn't we say that a computer, with security camera feed, does this, perhaps, shuttling anomolous movements, recorded ones that is, to special files and throwing out the rest or storing them elsewhere? — Coben

Often a problem with this format. Terms are disputed so I try to replace them with definitions using less disputed terms, but those definitions are long and I get lazy typing them and increasingly miss out qualifying elements. In this case, the distinction I missed is that the logging is of the fact that some logging of sensory data has occurred. Ie logging the logging event. If a computer did that, then, yes, I would say it was self-aware. If it could make use of those logs in its computation I would say it was conscious. I'm not precious about the term being restricted to living things.

The subject makes judgements - not simply conscious judgements, but continuously, from a subliminal level up to the conscious level. That is intrinsic to the nature of intelligence - the word itself is derived from 'inter-legere' meaning 'to read between'. That is the human intelligence at work. At it is really a marvellous thing. But we never actually see it working, because we're never outside of it - we only ever look through it, and with it, but not at it. — Wayfarer

This doesn't make sense. If it is a facet of the human brain then we can get 'outside' of it by observing other humans. We can see judgements being made, we can observe and record the evident results of those judgements. There's nothing in there an empirical investigation can't get at.

You keep saying ‘it doesn’t make sense’ or that I’m writing ‘word salad’ but I think what’s coming across is that you don’t understand the subject.

You keep saying ‘it doesn’t make sense’ or that I’m writing ‘word salad’ but I think what’s coming across is that you don’t understand the subject. — Wayfarer

Uh huh. I don't agree with you so I must not understand. Such clichéd response.

No, it’s not that - your responses don’t convey a grasp of the issue.

Then I must, unfortunately, ask for a definition of logging. Apologies in advance.

Then I must, unfortunately, ask for a definition of logging. Apologies in advance. — Coben

Well, it's me who should apologise if I haven't explained my terms clearly enough. Unfortunately 'logging' to memory is not a simple process to explain. Despite the convenient shorthand, we don't really have a 'memory' like a hard drive part of our brain, but rather memory is like the strengthening or weakening of neural networks, such that certain inputs are more likely to trigger certain responses next time. We usually experience this as recollection..

Anyway, so what I mean by logging is capturing the relationships by strengthening the network connections in this way.

Is that any clearer now?