What are those different things and how is he not contradicting himself?

The Subject in the subject-object relation is necessarily private. Is that what you’re saying? I don’t think he would disagree with this, but you are also saying there is another kind of knowledge, viz. self knowledge. Right?

The Subject in the subject-object relation is necessarily private. Is that what you’re saying? I don’t think he would disagree with this, but you are also saying there is another kind of knowledge, viz. self knowledge. Right? — Noah Te Stroete

That was one part, that he is making statements about my perception. But really the main point I am making is he is making statements about OR. He told me we can't know OR only AR, yet he tells me what OR must be like, since he describes me. I am a part of OR, yet he tells me what I can know - not just me, I simplified it. And I am quite sure that the reason he thinks he knows this is because he has a model of OR - a perceiving self interacting with sense impressions and beyond this perceiving self a reality we do not perceive. That is a model of OR. Not just a model of AR. He uses that model of OR to tell me that I only know AR. I think that's a contradiction. He could make this less contradictory is he said 'It seems like you couldn't know....' But even that is a claim. That there is a seeming. That this applies to everyone. That other seemings, like that one is in contact with OR, are wrong seemings and this seeming is more likely to be true about the OR.

we can't know about the OR

is based on knowledge claims about the OR.

Ah! I see what you’re saying now. But isn’t it safe to say that OR is shared through a collective AR? It must be consistent, no? One can say that OR is consistent without knowing the things in themselves (a la Kant).

Let me assume you mean that the OR is consistant in the sense that I should be like him, my perception is like his. If that assumption is not correct, let me know.

Well, first of all, no. Why need the OR be consisternt? Perhaps it's a multiverse or like one with different rules in different places, even in what seems, in the AR, to be a single 'thing'.

Then a further no, because my point is not simply that he is making claims about me and that I am, for him, a part of the OR, but that he is making claims about the nature of the OR in general. For example that things are separate from eachother. That they only impinge on each other via intermediate media. Like light comes from the tree, hits my retina, this triggers.....etc. That causes only travel over distance, cause leading to cause, that there is no directing intermingling. I think he has a model of reality in general, not just of my perception. And that is a model of the OR not just the AR. Or he wouldn't communicate with me the way he does.

A lot of this seems so obvious it might not even seems like claims about the OR. Hey, a reality has to be like that. Well, there you go, making a lot of claims about the OR.

I appreciate your mediation, it helped me flesh out the argument. I'll wait and see if he chimes in before responding more, and I think it would be useful for him to read our interaction. Might save some time there also.

Let me assume you mean that the OR is consistant in the sense that I should be like him, my perception is like his. If that assumption is not correct, let me know. — Coben

I think you’re each using the term “perception” differently. Patternchaser is strictly using the term to mean “sense perception” in that we all see, hear, smell, and taste the same things and can communicate meaningfully about our experiences. You’re using the term to mean subjective experience which differs from person to person in that we all model OR differently. Or is that wrong? Correct me if I’m wrong.

I don't think it matters for my main point which of those I am using. I could work with either one and still present the same argument. And actually I would say I was using more in the sense you are attributing to him. I am certainly NOT talking about qualia say and saying that mine might be different from his or that my subjective experience might be different from his. I am talking about his model of reality implicit in saying we can't X. He has a model of the OR and from that model he tells everyone what they can and cannot know. The problem is already there in the model of the OR since he is saying we only know about the AR. He can't have a model of the OR. And I think some of the assumptions I went into in my previous post are key. Like around causes and distance and all causes are mediated by intermediate effects/causes. IOW he has an ontology of the OR.

Perception is the gateway to his OR. What he says about perception indicates a lot of things he thinks are true about the OR that are not just about perception.

Okay. So are you saying that maybe some people could know OR if their model is complete?

I'm not making a claim about whether we can know the OR or not. I am deconstructing his position and saying that I think it contradicts itself. I think it includes claims about what must be the case about the OR while saying we can only know the AR. To say we can only know the AR is to make claims about the OR.
Now I will really stop until he rejoins the discussion.

Forgive me, but I think you’re being pedantic. One cannot “know” things in themselves (OR) but still have a model of OR from AR. You might call that a contradiction. I call it two types of “knowing”. One is modeled socially (OR), but what is known is really AR.

You told me a fact about me. — Coben

It's not all about you. :wink: I told you a fact about the real world.

:up:

It's not all about you. :wink: I told you a fact about the real world. — Pattern-chaser

I said that a number of times to Noah. That it wasn't just about me, or just my perception. That is was a model of reality in general.
About the OR. How come scientists don't get to do that?

Are you saying you just have a subjective model? How come you seem so certain of it? How come it seems to be couched in objective frames?

The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,

But anyone reading your posts would think you think you can approach knowledge of OR. In fact, even this quote is an example of it.

Forgive me, but I think you’re being pedantic. One cannot “know” things in themselves (OR) but still have a model of OR from AR. You might call that a contradiction. I call it two types of “knowing”. One is modeled socially (OR), but what is known is really AR. — Noah Te Stroete

Let me quote him referring to scientists....

No, they're dealing with AR, which could be objective reality, but we have no way of knowing

We have no way of knowing if it is OR. If we have no way of knowing, then we cannot decide which models are likely and which are less likely.
Yet, here he is simply stating thigns about the OR.
If he has no way of knowing, why present his model without qualitification?
Why even come up with one?

Why not just say: I experience X.

That would be an AR description.

Here's another quote...

The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,

If that is the case how can we have models of it? How can he?

I don't think I am being 'excessively concerned with minor details or rules; overscrupulous.' I am working with his own descriptions of what science cannot do, which are very strongly stated and then evaluating his communication about his own models and conclusions about OR. I don't think they fit well at all.

I also pointed out earlier that science is objective, but not absolute. He seemed to think that something must be absolutely infallible to be considered objective. He did not accept that. So, then, what is he doing when he describes the OR?

So presumably his model is subjective, but I am not sure that is meaningful, and then you'd think it would be heavily qualified. Like 'the following model seems to fit my experience and I'm guessing other people's.'

So presumably his model is subjective, but I am not sure that is meaningful, and then you'd think it would be heavily qualified. Like 'the following model seems to fit my experience and I'm guessing other people's.' — Coben

Maybe. Or maybe he was trying to work things out as he was going. Anyway, I think his model is really inter-subjective in that people seem to agree on science which deals with sense data as well as theories explaining sense data. This is a communal activity. Whether or not it is knowledge of objective reality or things in themselves is impossible to know due to the nature of perception and theorizing.

Maybe. Or maybe he was trying to work things out as he was going. — Noah Te Stroete

That's easily sorted out.

Anyway, I think his model is really inter-subjective in that people seem to agree on science which deals with sense data as well as theories explaining sense data. — Noah Te Stroete

I would say scientists do not agree in the least that they are merely drawing conclusions about sense data, nor would they think that the scope of science is related to that. He disagrees, I get that. And if someone was saying to him Science paints every increasing accurate pictures of objective reality, he has a case to be made. But that's a different situation.

Here he is saying that one cannot know, one has no way of knowing and.....

The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,

I think that's a very hard position to defend, because he will need to show why science can't reach OR and this will require him to explain the nature of OR and scientists to show the latter cannot approach the former. Fruit of the poisoned tree and all that.

I think that's a very hard position to defend, because he will need to show why science can't reach OR and this will require him to explain the nature of OR and scientists to show the latter cannot approach the former. Fruit of the poisoned tree and all that. — Coben

Didn’t Einstein say something like objective reality is probably stranger than can be theorized by science? Patternchaser is making a philosophical, metaphysical and epistemological claim about objective reality. That is not science’s domain. Most scientists, unlike Einstein, know jack about philosophy.

Rather than the requirement to show the nature of OR, wouldn’t it suffice to show the limits of AR? If AR could be shown to be insufficient for epistemic certainty with respect to OR, would the nature of it matter?

And to Noah and Pattern,
I just realized that intersubjective doesn't work, because most people experience their model that they can know things about objective reality as working for them.

I just realized that intersubjective doesn't work, because most people experience their model that they can know things about objective reality as working for them. — Coben

But one must confer with the community in order to determine that one isn’t completely crazy, delusional, or hallucinating. This is learned as a toddler in most cases in that a toddler forms ideas about the outside world by learning from others and observing how others interact with the shared outside world. A schizophrenic, for example, if she has insight into her illness will inquire of others about the outside world and listen to those she trusts, trust being something learned through interaction with others. So, yes, objective reality certainly IS a certain way, but that doesn’t give us its objective nature or how it would be absent a percipient.

What is meaningful? — fishfry

Exactly. That's a glaring fault in the opening post. I would have made clarification on that point my top priority.

Meaningful may not be the best word but in the context of philosophy, meaningful discussions use clear terms and the people have a common understanding of the usage of words. — Wittgenstein

And this isn't much help either. I would predict that you'd get a mixture of affirmative and negative answers due to the lack of any firm, consistent, and shareable means or criteria upon which we can make that assessment, which ultimately means that there's no point in answering at all.

I would give this discussion set-up a rating of one out of ten.

The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,

But anyone reading your posts would think you think you can approach knowledge of OR. In fact, even this quote is an example of it. — Coben

OK. To start, even though the whole thing is a waste of time, I accept the absolute definition of "Objective". That is: Something Objective corresponds accurately with that which actually is, regardless of our beliefs or opinions.

Our senses/perception are flawed. We know this; we have observed and confirmed this many times, in many ways. [N.B. I'm not referring here to simple mistakes, like reading a meter wrongly. I'm referring to how, for example, we can fail to notice a man in a gorilla suit crossing the court of a game[/url] we're watching. And many other such shortcomings.]

Given the absolute way in which Objective is defined, we cannot rely on our senses to provide information to this standard, given their flaws. So we have no access to Objective information. Thus we cannot know any details of Objective Reality, except that it exists. How could we? We have no Objective source of information, nor any way to get one.

• I know nothing (Objective) about OR, except what is contained in its definition, or what can be deduced from it.
• I'm not telling you anything (Objective) about OR, except what is contained in its definition, or what can be deduced from it.
• No human is equipped to know or discover anything (Objective) about OR, except what is contained in its definition, or what can be deduced from it.

Surely that is clear now?

I would give this discussion set-up a rating of one out of ten.

Not anymore. :wink:

I would say scientists do not agree in the least that they are merely drawing conclusions about sense data, nor would they think that the scope of science is related to that. He disagrees, I get that. And if someone was saying to him Science paints every increasing accurate pictures of objective reality, he has a case to be made. But that's a different situation.

Here he is saying that one cannot know, one has no way of knowing and.....

The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,
I think that's a very hard position to defend, because he will need to show why science can't reach OR and this will require him to explain the nature of OR and scientists to show the latter cannot approach the former. Fruit of the poisoned tree and all that. — Coben

I bugged out of this discussion a few days ago. I thought I had said everything I had to say. I wish I hadn't. You and @Pattern-chaser have taken it somewhere interesting and are dealing with issues I've thought a lot about.

To start, I think you are being a bit unfair to Pattern-Chaser. Or are you just joking around. He's said this explicitly - when he says you cannot know anything directly about OR, he's not talking about you, he's making a metaphysical statement about what can be known and what can not be. It's not a matter of fact, it's a matter of opinion, a statement about how it is useful to think about things.

Also - it's a very mainstream position. Here's a quote from a book " @Wayfarer posted the reference a few days ago:

The Reality Principle. Reality is a metaphysical concept, and as such it is beyond the reach of science. Reality consists of things-in-themselves of which we can never hope to gain knowledge. Instead, we have to content ourselves with knowledge of empirical reality, of things-as-they-appear or things-as-they-are-measured. Nevertheless, scientific realists assume that reality (and its entities) exists objectively and independently of perception or measurement. They believe that reality is rational, predictable and accessible to human reason. Baggott, Jim. Farewell to Reality: How Modern Physics Has Betrayed the Search for Scientific Truth (p. 8). Pegasus Books. Kindle Edition.

Schopenhauer talked about this stuff back in the early 1800s. Here's what the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy says:

This precipitates a position that characterizes the inner aspect of things, as far as we can describe it, as Will. Hence, Schopenhauer regards the world as a whole as having two sides: the world is Will and the world is representation. The world as Will (“for us”, as he sometimes qualifies it) is the world as it is in itself, which is a unity, and the world as representation is the world of appearances, of our ideas, or of objects, which is a diversity.

He compared his understanding with that of eastern religions - Buddhism and Hinduism. His idea of "will" was similar to eastern ideas that the world as we know it is an illusion and that underlying reality is undifferentiated and unknowable. I think of "will" as being like the "Tao," although nothing I've read indicates Schopenhauer read Lao Tzu.

Again - this is all metaphysics. My point isn't that your way of seeing things is wrong, only that the other way of seeing things is useful, meaningful, and mainstream.

Science is fundamentally knowledge of what's what, of objective reality if you will. — T Clark

I don't think that the ideal of objectivity was well established before early modern science and was strongly associated with the Galilean science of motion. The presumed 'primary qualities' of matter were presumed to be objective, i.e. the same for all observers. It's not much of a leap from there to the presumptions of philosophical atomism, i.e. 'the world consists of ultimately-existing atoms'. However this has been undermined by physics itself, what with the 'observer problem'.

nothing I've read indicates Schopenhauer read Lao Tzu. — T Clark

He did read the Upanisads every evening, according to Magee. Bear in mind, knowledge of Indian and Chinese sources was only just becoming published in his day. Magee has an appendix in 'Schopenhauer's Philosophy' on similarities between German idealism and Indian philosophy.

For example many ethical systems include either in practice or openly the idea that greatness exempts one from the necessity of this axiom. — Coben

Can you name an ethical system which exempts "the great" from this axiom?

Postulate 5 in Euclidian geometry about angles at the intersection of lines or about parallel lines never crossing, is an assumption, now, and not really an axiom, any more, since non-Euclidian geomtries work just peachy while contradicting this one. — Coben

The parallel postulate is more a stipulation than an axiom. Parallel straight lines are defined as being non-convergent. Non-Euclidean geometries do not "contradict" Euclidean geometry; they are contexts in which the axioms of Euclidean geometry simply do not apply.

As to causation; it is axiomatic just because events cannot be understood non-causally.

The parallel postulate is more a stipulation than an axiom. Parallel straight lines are defined as being non-convergent. Non-Euclidean geometries do not "contradict" Euclidean geometry; they are contexts in which the axioms of Euclidean geometry simply do not apply. — Janus

I agree. The fact that parallel lines never cross is part of the definition of parallel lines, not an assumption or restriction imposed on them.

As to causation; it is axiomatic just because events cannot be understood non-causally. — Janus

On the other hand, I don't agree with this. Or am I being inconsistent? Maybe knowing causes is part of the definition of "understanding." Now I'm confused.

On the other hand, I don't agree with this. Or am I being inconsistent? Maybe knowing causes is part of the definition of "understanding." Now I'm confused. — T Clark

The idea of ontological indeterminacy is confusing. I'm not a determinist and can accept that nature is, or at least may be, at bottom indeterministic, but I have no clear idea what that could mean, beyond saying that microscopic probabilities average out to produce macroscopic causal determinations. :yum:

The idea of ontological indeterminacy is confusing. I'm not a determinist and can accept that nature is, or at least may be, at bottom indeterministic, but I have no clear idea what that would means, beyond saying that microscopic probabilities average out to produce macroscopic causal determinations. — Janus

I've been thinking a bit about what it means for something to be caused and whether it makes sense to think of things that way. Right now, I come down on the side that it doesn't make sense to think things are caused, although I can't really give a satisfactory reason yet.

A watershed moment in modern thinking was when the Aristotelian 'four causes' model was abandoned in favor of Galileo's new science of motion. It's because it relegated any idea of 'cause' other than the material and efficient to the domain of the individual mind. That's why, in my opinion, Aristotelian philosophy is enjoying a revival particularly in the biological sciences.