In your conversations with csalisbury, you wouldn't acknowledge that there is actually such a thing as 'personal identity', or that it is, at any rate, 'not the same' as identity as such, saying things like:

Since its dynamic, and since time is identical to change/motion anyway, brain states, just like states of anything else, are always changing. Re abstractions, we can say things like "Joe was hysterically laughing for 15 minutes," as if an identical state persisted for 15 minutes, but that's an abstraction, it's glossing over details to parse a temporal range of states as "one thing." — Terrapin Station

So you will quote a textbook definition of what 'identity' consists of, and condescend to others for apparently not understanding it, and then contradict the definition of what you quoted in what you actually write. In this thread alone, you have cast doubt on the nature of the words 'meaning', 'identity', and 'causality', specifically so as to maintain a position which you're able to change at any time, according to the requirements of the moment. That is why csalisbury gave up on the dialogue, and why I am also doing that.

I'd like to read a post of yours to me without literally sighing and wondering what the fnck you're talking about, what the fnck you're reading, how your understanding of what you're reading can be so off base, etc.

First, where did anyone ask me anything resembling anything in the realm of "Is there actually such a thing as personal identity?"

This sort of comment from you is in the vein of your earlier comment about stating or implying a contradiction, but when pressed to back that up, you simply dropped it/changed the subject.

Where did anyone ask me anything resembling anything in the realm of "Is there actually such a thing as personal identity?"

You seem to have forgotten that yesterday, csalisbury was pressing you on this very point.

Can you elaborate on what you mean by a connection which isn't related to identity? Alex 1 and Alex 2 aren't the same person, they're just connected, is that right? Can you explain how that works? ' — CS

To which you replied:

First, you need to make sure that you're not conflating "personal identity" with the more general, logical notion of identity. I'm not sure that you're not conflating the two. They're two different ideas.

Anyway, sure, Alex at T1 is causally connected to Alex at T2, they're contiguous, memory is involved, there's a sense of a continuous self involved, and so on. Those are some examples, although by no means is it an exhaustive list, of the connections.' — TS

So, the 'two Alexes' are 'casually connected' - but does that mean they're the same person? You won't answer the question.

CS then presses this point by asking four detailed questions, all of which you evaded, and then CS asks

'But what is a sense of self. Is it a brain state?'

But you evade the question by then calling into doubt the 'nature of causality':

I don't think you're using causal connection I the sense that I'm using it. I'm talking about causality in what we could call a (direct) "physics sense." — TS

'If you think that identity does not persist over time, then the very idea of personal identity is incoherent' — CS

to which you answer:

That's a conflation of two different ideas. — TS

Then after all that, you bring up the question of 'what constitutes a good reason', and whether Alex1 and Alex2 are the same person.

[csalisbury appears to express frustration amidst mutual exchange of LOL's and then gives up]

So - this is a muddle. Please stop condescending to others by implying that they 'don't understand philosophy', when the problem is at your end.

Oh, I just can't help myself, damn it. Bolding, below, is mine.

So yes, personal identity is physical. — terrapin

Personal identity is the concept you develop about yourself that evolves over the course of your life. — Terrapin, quoting a definition he suggests is representative

Strangely, Terrapin's definition of personal identity is entirely different from the definition of personal identity he says should be familiar to anyone with a philosophical background.

No one's asking you to change your mind, Terrapin, we're just asking you to be consistent enough to make discussion possible. As things stand, this has proven impossible. This is not an attack on your character, it's just asking that you play by the minimal rules necessary to have philosophical debate. One can't play chess if the other player is free to call the queen a pawn, or a pawn a queen, as it suits them. I have had long debates with many people I staunchly disagree with, I have no problem with brooking ideas that don't mesh with mine. Those are my favorite debates! That's what I've been trying to do here.

If you would like to respond to this by suggesting that I don't understand basic philosophical ideas or some such, I will not be surprised, but I'll be bummed out all over again.

Right. So the whole thing about 'brain=mind' boils down to whether concepts can be described as being physical. I say not. The arguments are long and abstruse, but it all comes down to the simple fact that ideas are real. To understand what that means, study philosophy; and to that end, this would be as good a starting point as any.

Only if you (as I suspect he would argue) make the mistake of considering this concept of personal identity as non-physical.

For the non-eliminative materialist, minds are physical. Any idea or concept we hold, the existence of a "mind" state, is a physical presence. In this sense, I'd say he would by justified in arguing that you are just ignoring any thing he says.

Like much of philosophy, you bring in substance dualism which as a first principle, that our thoughts and experiences cannot by physical, which is to completely dismiss the whole point of non-eliminative materialism. With respect to his position, the discussion can't even begin because you've rejected the idea outright. Anytime he tries to make his argument, you turn around and say: "Your argument is meaningless. Can you please say something that makes sense so the discussion can begin."

The basic philosophical ideas you understand are no doubt many, but it's clear you don't understand the one he's talking about.

You seem to have forgotten that yesterday, csalisbury was pressing you on this very point.

Can you elaborate on what you mean by a connection which isn't related to identity? Alex 1 and Alex 2 aren't the same person, they're just connected, is that right? Can you explain how that works? ' — CS — Wayfarer

What does this have to do with personal identity? You're saying that you understood csalisbury to be asking me about personal identity by the term "identity" when "personal identity" conventionally refers to a very different idea than "identity" does, and when I was clearly talking about identity in the more general, logical sense?

Strangely, Terrapin's definition of personal identity is entirely different from the definition of personal identity he says should be familiar to anyone with a philosophical background. — csalisbury

Haha, yet one of the sources I quoted was the SEP.

Terrapin, we're just asking you to be consistent enough to make discussion possible. — csalisbury

And of course you're specifying examples of inconsistency rather than just making the accusation. Er, uh, wait, I guess you're not.

So if an identical brain state, of someone who is alive, developed somewhere else in the universe, or at a different time. That same person would experience that brain state, wherever it is, like a continuity of consciousness?

So if an identical brain state, of someone who is alive, developed somewhere else in the universe, or at a different time. That same person would experience that brain state, wherever it is, like a continuity of consciousness? — Punshhh

As a nominalist, I don't believe that an identical brain state in someone else, or in the same person at a different time, is possible.

Also, I wouldn't say that "continuity of consciousness" has anything to do with whether one (or someone else) is in an identical brain state at two different times (or at different places). "Continuity of consciousness" has to do with the causal, contiguous, memory-oriented, etc. relations of someone's brain at two different times.

As a nominalist, I don't believe that an identical brain state in someone else, or in the same person at a different time, is possible.

But the OP is asking about whether someone is alive, brain states are besides the point. The point is in reference to the state of being alive. I agree that a person does not have an identical brain state as one they had in the past(although in an infinite universe, it is inevitable that it would happen somewhere else). But they do have life, they are alive as they were in the past. So the OP is asking about either being alive, or not being alive, brain states are irrelevant to this.


What about uploading someone's mind into a computer, or into a replicant, surely provided the same computation that is going on in the nervous system, is going on, the person would remain alive?

Haha, yet one of the sources I quoted was the SEP.

.....

I'm not sure how my post could have possibly gone over your head, but I guess it did.

( I was not calling your source into question? Why do you think that? )

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)

Talk about going over someone's head. my post wasn't at all about you calling a source into question.

Actually Willow, I began a long discussion, asserting nothing a priori, accepting Terrapin's answer on their own terms - until, in one post, he refused to respond to the questions. I asked him to respond to that post multiple times and he not only failed to do so, but failed to give a reason why he's not responding to it - he basically ignored it, repeatedly.

As for his arguments --- what arguments? He's simply stated that he's a nominalist and a physicalist and a few of his beliefs. And that's fine, I'm not saying he shouldn't be those things! but there's nothing philosophically interesting about stating what you believe.

If anyone's interested, I'll lay out that whole first discussion and if there's anyone who's willing to take it up where Terrapin gave up, I'd love to continue it.

I guess you got me. Why did you mention one of your quotes was from the SEP?

I'm not quick enough to understand, so please break it down for me.

You had claimed:

Terrapin's definition of personal identity is entirely different from the definition of personal identity he says should be familiar to anyone with a philosophical background. — csalisbury

Yet one of the sources was the SEP.

Terrapin's definition of personal identity is entirely different from the definition of personal identity he says should be familiar to anyone with a philosophical background. — csalisbury

What do you think I meant - or was suggesting - when I said this?

I still suspect things are going a bit over your head, but maybe I'm wrong. What did my post mean?

I figured that you "meant" just what you typed. If not, you should type what you have in mind instead. that's what I do. I don't type one thing and "mean" something different.

I did type what I have in mind and I have no idea why you would respond with the fact that you quoted the SEP. I could maybe understand that you confusedly thought I was questioning your sources (suggesting that they didn't come from a bona fide philosophical source) -but you said that's certainly not where you were going with that.

So what is the significance of the fact that you quoted the SEP? In what way does that constitute a response to what I said?

I did type what I have in mind — csalisbury

So then why ask what you meant, as if it might be different than what you'd typed? (This isn't a rhetorical question by the way, I'm expecting you to honestly answer it if you'd like to have a conversation.)

I literally don't understand why you would respond with the fact that you quoted the SEP. — csalisbury

Does the SEP have any relationship to philosophy? Or is it "enitrely different" from received views in philosophy?

Does the SEP have any relationship to philosophy? Or is it "enitrely different" than received views in philosophy?

Ok, right, so you think that I was suggesting your quote came from a bad non-philosophical source. That's what I assumed you thought.

I just got confused because you said "Talk about going over someone's head. my post wasn't at all about you calling a source into question."

So, now that we've had a unnecessary exchange of posts because you wanted to also be the one talking about things going over people's heads, even if it didn't make sense for you to do so, let's circle back.

".....

I'm not sure how my post could have possibly gone over your head, but I guess it did.

( I was not calling your source into question? Why do you think that? )

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)"

Does the SEP have any relationship to philosophy?

That's a yes or no question. I wouldn't count any answer that doesn't have "yes" or "no" in it, or at least an explanation why you can't answer yes or no ("I can not answer yes or no to that because ______") to be an answer to that question.

If you want to have a conversation with me, you need to answer questions that I ask you; that is, you need to answer them in a manner that I consider an answer to the question at hand.

Yes, the SEP has a relationship to philosophy.

Now that we've gotten that out of the way, let's circle back (again)

Ok, right, so you think that I was suggesting your quote came from a bad non-philosophical source. That's what I assumed you thought.

I just got confused because you said "Talk about going over someone's head. my post wasn't at all about you calling a source into question."

So, now that we've had a unnecessary exchange of posts because you wanted to also be the one talking about things going over people's heads, even if it didn't make sense for you to do so, let's circle back.

".....

I'm not sure how my post could have possibly gone over your head, but I guess it did.

( I was not calling your source into question? Why do you think that? )

Re-read it again (hint: look at the bolded words)"

Yes, the SEP has a relationship to philosophy. — csalisbury

Thanks for answering, but we're not done yet.

Is the SEP "entirely different" from the received views in philosophy?

No

You're literally playing out in slow motion my initial post going over your head, so I'm glad to indulge you. Go on...

Right, so a definition from the SEP isn't entirely different than what one would be familiar with if one is educated in philosophy, right?

Man, I guess not.

Keep going!