In all seriousness though, there's a point in any debate where you can tell your interlocutor has moved the goalposts way back in order to deflect the actual questions that they're not sure how to answer. You've quite clearly done this. I am perfectly willing to have a good faith conversation with you, but if it's going to devolve to 'well, someone who's about to be tortured doesn't have a 'good reason' to be worried about that,' what's the point, man?

In all seriousness, LOL again. I didn't say anything about whether anyone had a good reason for anything. I said "That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time" in response to your silliness that that could be the only connection, you asked me to explain, I did, and then you poorly attempted to play Socrates. When that backfired on you, you bailed, but of course it was my fault.

Just to note, by the way, that this whole thing started because I had said, "That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time," and then you asked me to elaborate that, so I did.

Yes, you gave a two or three sentence elaboration, and I responded to it very clearly, point by point. Here's that post again, since it's where you appear to have lost the plot:

Fair enough. One might think that 'personal identity' is a subclass of the much broader class of 'identity' but if there is no identity over time, then personal identity is just a way of talking. The 'identity' part of 'personal identity' is far too loose. Yes? Personal identity literally can have nothing to do with identity if identity doesn't persist across time. Do you agree?

Let's look at each of your connections with reference to this central question: Why should nervous Alex (Alex1) be nervous about becoming tortured Alex (Alex2)?

1. Causal connection. The executioner's feeling of duty is causally connected to Alex's anguish. [in other words the executioner has a 'brain state' that is causally connected to Alex's anguished 'brain state'] Does that mean that the executioner should be nervous about the torture he himself is to soon feel, being causally connected to it? Clearly not. So causal connection does not get at the matter.

2.Contiguity. The executioner's blade is contiguous with alex's flesh, both in space and in time. Does that mean the blade should be nervous about the torture it is to soon feel? Clearly not. So contiguity does not get at the matter.

3. Memory. If nervous Alex is aware he'll be knocked unconscious prior to execution and given a drug that'll prevent recollection, would he be right not to be nervous about the impending torture (since, at that time, he won't remember earlier states?) Clearly not. So memory does not get at the matter.

4. Sense of self. Well what is this? Is the sense of self a physical thing? Is it a brain state? But if it's a brain state the only way it can extend across multiple brain states is to be connected. Through what? Through a sense of self! But what is a sense of self. Is it a brain state? But if it's a brain state...

And what did my comments have to do with supporting whether someone has a "good reason" for feeling some way?

And what did my comments have to do with supporting whether someone has a "good reason" for feeling some way?

Ok, let's do a recap and recall how we got here.

The first line of questioning established that you hold two important beliefs: A person has many many many brain states throughout their life and identity does not persist through time.

This raises an obvious question:

If, as you say, "Your consciousness, your sense of self, etc. are simply brain states re your particular brain" and if identity does not persist over time, then how is it that we talk of the the same person having multiple brain states throughout their life, rather than a myriad of people, one for each brain state?

Either we need a more robust theory of identity, or we need a robust conception of some other type of continuity.

It is useful to examine a problem as abstract as this by focusing on a concrete and visceral example: Alex is worried about his future torture because he believes that he (not someone else) will experience that torture.

Here is what I said:

Thus if nervous Alex (brain state 1) is nervous because he is about to be tortured (this will be agonizing brain state 2) (I'm abstracting here! of course there are multiple brain states throughout!) then he is confused. He won't be the one being tortured. There's nothing to worry about.

Is this fair? If not, why not?

Let me break this down. I'm offering a hypothetical example of a man awaiting torture according to the viewpoint of someone who neither believes in the persistence of identity over time nor has supplied an alternative, robust explanation of continuity. I am not insinuating that, based on your own beliefs, you ought to agree with the scenario as I've presented it. I'm offering up something absurd as a foil that will allow you to articulate your own position.

Importantly, this is where the 'good reason' comes into play. "There's nothing to worry about. Is this fair? If not, why not?" is synonymous with 'does he have a good reason to worry [that he, not some different future alex, will suffer?]" It's possible that you may not be familiar with this usage of 'good reason.' It's very common among the english speakers I know, but perhaps it's a regional thing. If so, I apologize for the confusion.

As I'd hoped, you did not simply agree with my scenario (implicitly agreeing that yes, there is something Alex has to worry about) but began tentatively to articulate a corrective:

That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time.

Now we're getting somewhere. We seem to both agree that we'd be worried if we were soon to be tortured (while we may not agree about whether we can worry about existing again after death, we understand worrying about things that will happen to us within our own lifetime.) To understand this, we ought look not to identity, but to connection.

I then asked you to explain what you meant by connection here, since it's doing a lot of work! You gave some reasons and I explained why those reasons, while fine, are not enough to explain why one would be worried about one's future torture.

Note where we are in terms of the argument: We are still trying to understand why the fear of impending torture is different than the fear of existing again after death. This significance of this question is that identity and brain-states alone don't explain why you, I, anyone would worry about our future torture. You have recognized this and offered the additional idea of 'connection'

So you offer a quick sketch of what you mean by connection, I explain why it seems insufficient to address the question at hand.

And that's where everything goes haywire.

You ask me to explain the causual connection of the torturer to the victim. I do. You ask what my point is. I say my point is that causal connection cannot explain why T1 Alex has a good reason to worry about T2 Alex's suffering, as you had implied. Instead of responding to the argument, you say that you never said anything about 'good reasons' (though it's perfectly clear what 'good reason' means in this context) and then to talk about the nature of justification and fact.

What I want to do is to take up where we left off. If there's something particularly irksome about the term 'good reason' to you, I am all too happy to jettison it, because I'm interested in the argument itself.

So to return once more to where this all came from

"[For T1 Alex looking ahead to the torture of T2 alex] There's nothing to worry about. Is this fair? If not, why not?"

Again, I would love nothing more than to continue this conversation in good faith.

So here is where we are: You laid out what you meant by 'connection.' I responded with my doubts. Can you respond to that? You still have not.

You ask me to explain the causal connection of the torturer to the victim. I do. — csalisbury

You did? Especially to a person who just read a bunch of stuff about Leibniz, it's reasonable to imagine that causality here is an illusion. So some reasoning says yes, some reasoning says no. The sequence of words "there is no fact of the matter" was apparently typed by Terrapin, which signals us that there's some Quine on the scene somewhere... maybe he read it... maybe his aunt's next door neighbor mentioned it.. we don't know.

Are you really talking about what's reasonable? Or what's common sense? Or are you conflating the two?

Obviously, causality is a very complex topic. Did I explain causality tout court? No, certainly not, nor was I trying to.

Terrapin cited causality as one explanatory factor. This is what I was responding to - in terms of the argument, I'm making no commitment to any theory of causality - I'm trying to demonstrate that if one appeals to causality here, it fails on its own terms.

The world of philosophy is huge! But an argument cannot progress if we spend it hunting influences, seeking proper names. If we do this, we become more like birdwatchers than philosophers, seeking examples in the wild by their distinguishing marks. It is far more fruitful to follow the argument itself, and where it leads.

Terrapin cited causality as one explanatory factor. This is what I was responding to - in terms of the argument, I'm making no commitment to any theory of causality - I'm trying to demonstrate that if one appeals to causality here, it fails on its own terms. — csalisbury

Oh. I was addressing the way you kept coming back to "reasonable." All we have to do to determine if the anxiety is common sense is to do a poll. Observe the results.

Determining if the anxiety is reasonable is a different ball of bananas.

The world of philosophy is huge! But an argument cannot progress if we spend it hunting influences, seeking proper names. If we do this, we become more like birdwatchers than philosophers, seeking examples in the wild by their distinguishing marks. It is far more fruitful to follow the argument itself, and where it leads. — csalisbury

Fear not. I wasn't hunting anything. "There is no fact of the matter" seemed like a standard waving amongst enemy troops. Not saying it was... it just struck me that way. Terrapin may have never heard of Quine.

As for your admonition to look to arguments rather than names, you're preaching to the choir. And.. I'm fine with zero contact with you beyond. Happy trails, dude.

It may just be a problem with the forum format, but I'm increasingly dismayed by how difficult it is to sustain a discussion. Too often single posts are treated as stand-alone statements to poke holes into by whatever means, as though nothing came before them. That or as launchpads for whatever is on one's mind at the moment. I was a bit irritated but it was nothing personal, it's a general problem that I myself sometimes contribute to. I did something similar on Street's selection thread.

Like some kind of philosophical drive-by. Hmm. Yea. Sorry.

I don't remember it ever being easy to sustain discussions on PF. Stuff comes up. You don't feel like defending or even explaining x. The trust level is close to zero. It's a wonder anything ever happens.

If, as you say, "Your consciousness, your sense of self, etc. are simply brain states re your particular brain" and if identity does not persist over time, then how is it that we talk of the the same person having multiple brain states throughout their life, rather than a myriad of people, one for each brain state?

Either we need a more robust theory of identity, or we need a robust conception of some other type of continuity. — csalisbury

I explained this already. First, I'm talking about identity in the sense of logical identity, not personal identity. Again, these refer to two quite different ideas conventionally.

The continuity obtains via the sorts of connections I mentioned between Alex @ T1 and Alex @ T2, especially direct/contiguous causal connections between the two,

Sorry, Terrapin, we're not getting anywhere. Chalk that up to whatever you please.

Well, of course one can't sustain a discussion by just abandoning it when it's not going exactly how one would like it to go.

thank you for your participation.

<eye roll>

last word

Yeah, I can see that your concern is sustaining philosophical discussions.

No worries, sorry I got prickly.

I explained this already. First, I'm talking about identity in the sense of logical identity, not personal identity. Again, these refer to two quite different ideas conventionally. — Terrapin Station

Do you say consciousness reduces to physical stuff or are you eliminative? What is a logical identity.. or a logical x from your POV?

Do you say consciousness reduces to physical stuff or are you eliminative? — Mongrel

I'm not at all an eliminative materialist. I say that consciousness is identical to physical stuff--namely, to particular brain states. If you want to say "reduces to" that's okay, although reductionism is often characterized in a way that I don't agree with, but arguably it's a straw man characterization.

I'm not using logical identity in any sort of novel manner. Just plain old morning star=evening star identity.

You say:

'I say that consciousness is identical to physical stuff'

But you also say:

' I'm talking about identity in the sense of logical identity, not personal identity. Again, these refer to two quite different ideas conventionally.'

Is what you call 'personal' identity identical to physical stuff? Is 'oneself' wholly and solely physical? If it is, then how is there a difference between 'conventional' and 'personal' identity? If it isn't, what's the difference?

In respect of 'consciousness being identical to brain states' - I have pointed out that this is the subject of various objections, one of which involves the nature of meaning.

Your response to that was:

'In my view, meaning is subjective. It's a mental association that a particular individual makes at a particular time.'

So, if you don't agree that meaning can be expressed consistently between different people, and that different people all mean different things by words, how is debate possible?

Some people make the effort and enjoy lengthier discussions. Even try to reach out to the understanding of others, to exchange ideas. I have been looking forward to a discussion of the OP, but I have found this topic intractable in the past for the reasons I gave in my last response to you. I used to post on a forum where threads would go on for thousands of posts and last for years. I miss those days, threads seem to burn out to soon around here.

That's true. I've had month-long conversations with TGW and a few others. I value those conversations a lot. TGW, in particular, I disagree with on almost everything, but he can follow and respond to arguments, and I get a lot out of debating with him.

I still think the best way to talk about the OP is to delicately draw out the aporias of common-sense understandings of identity (whether that be an eternal soul or brain-states.) This doesn't leave you with an answer, but it leaves you with a better sense of what the problem is. I've become more and more convinced that aporia isn't something to be overcome, but maybe the terminus of philosophical inquiry. Like the old socratic cliche - you come only to know that you don't really know much of anything. A big part of the problem is that you have these analytic/continental or spiritual/material splits where both sides come in with a kind of a priori understanding that the other is wrong - and that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to have a good faith, good old fashioned dialectic discussion.

I'm not at all an eliminative materialist. I say that consciousness is identical to physical stuff--namely, to particular brain states. If you want to say "reduces to" that's okay, although reductionism is often characterized in a way that I don't agree with, but arguably it's a straw man characterization.

I'm not using logical identity in any sort of novel manner. Just plain old morning star=evening star identity. — Terrapin Station

So you're a physicalist who's maybe a little foggy on how to characterize consciousness. We could say the very same thing of a lot of neuroscientists. But being that this is a philosophy forum, I think I could point out some ways it looks like you're walking around a philosophical minefield. But I wouldn't do that unless it was understood that I'm not interested in being combative.. I respect your right to think whatever you want... and hey... only if you're interested.

Yes I found that it is better to work with aporia, rather than on them, by changes in one's perspective. Or to take a metaphorical microscope to it, as an explorer rather than a scientist. To approach from many different angles, to become acquainted, to use it as stepping stone into the self. I agree about the issues with those philosophical splits, I find them tedious. Although they might be a feature of forums as a means to generate discussion. Personally, I come to the table with a library of ideas I have collected, none are right, or wrong and all are ready to be improved.

Looking to the OP, my first thoughts are that one's identity is on two levels, the subjective identity and the objective self. I think that the OP is referring to the objective self, but doesn't make this distinction, or recognise it and probably only thinks about it in the subjective sense.

Also, as I take an interest in mysticism, my approach is largely apophatic.

'I say that consciousness is identical to physical stuff'

But you also say:

' I'm talking about identity in the sense of logical identity, not personal identity. Again, these refer to two quite different ideas conventionally.'

Is what you call 'personal' identity identical to physical stuff? Is 'oneself' wholly and solely physical? If it is, then how is there a difference between 'conventional' and 'personal' identity? If it isn't, what's the difference? — Wayfarer

Everything is "physical stuff" on my view, I'm a physicalist. So yes, personal identity is physical.

Here are a couple definitions of "personal identity" since either you're pretending to not know what that term conventionally refers to, or unbelievably, you somehow managed to get a bachelor's in philosophy without any familiarity with it:

Personal identity is the concept you develop about yourself that evolves over the course of your life. This may include aspects of your life that you have no control over, such as where you grew up or the color of your skin, as well as choices you make in life, such as how you spend your time and what you believe. You demonstrate portions of your personal identity outwardly through what you wear and how you interact with other people. You may also keep some elements your of personal identity to yourself, even when these parts of yourself are very important.

Personal identity: What is it that makes a person the very person that she is, herself alone and not another, an integrity of identity that persists over time, undergoing changes and yet still continuing to be — until she does not continue any longer, at least not unproblematically?

The problems of personal identity:

* Who am I? (in the above sense)
* Personhood--what is it to be a person?
* Persistence--what does it take for a person to persist from one time to another
* Evidence--how do we find out who is who?
* Population--If the persistence question asks which of the characters introduced at the beginning of a story have survived to become those at the end of it, we may also ask how many are on the stage at any one time.
* What am I? What sort of things, metaphysically speaking, are you and I and other human people?

So, if you don't agree that meaning can be expressed consistently between different people, and that different people all mean different things by words, how is debate possible? — Wayfarer

If you're really curious about my views re what meaning is, what understanding is, what communication is, etc., it would probably be better to start a separate thread about that. It would be a huge tangent that wouldn't have much to do with the topics we've already hijacked this thread with.

So you're a physicalist who's maybe a little foggy on how to characterize consciousness. — Mongrel

In your opinion you mean?

I think I could point out some ways it looks like you're walking around a philosophical minefield. — Mongrel

You can do that if you want to. It's extremely unlikely that you're going to present anything I'm not already familiar with, though, and I'm just going to respond with explanations why your take on it is mistaken or misconceived on my view. If that would have some value to you for some reason, though, I have no problem with that.

No. I doubt either of us would find value in that. Deuces!

Yeah, I wouldn't say it will do me much good, although I always figure there's some value in refining how I'm expressing things with respect to my personal ideals of expression . . . but in this case that would be kind of a stretch of a search for a benefit.

Anyway, it seems kind of like you were assuming that I must not be familiar with the perspective you'd be expressing. That's not the case. I just don't agree with that perspective.