I agree, but think this becomes clearer once you put scientism inside a person in a specific life. That person will always need to assume things are true, even to use their scientific knowledge or to obtain their scientific knowledge, that they did not get through science. And they will use this knowledge gained in other ways to directly affect the lives of people around them. IOW they trust this knowledge enough to potentially adversely affect the lives of people, including those they care about. A person in situ must make a number of assumptions related first to their own personal memory and perception. They cannot begin each day making sure that their memories of epistemological issues and specific bits of knoweldge they have are true by redoing empirical research. The can consider their memory to a great extent accurate, in both general and specific ways. They will also use intuition about the conclusions of others - could something like this be wrong and yet have made it part peer review, for example. They are always making real world decisions about what they consider real and we should consider real that are not based on scientific processes FOR THEM. And then, yes, then how do they test whether other knowledge is possible.

It is an exceedingly hubristic lecture by Hawking. One of the things that stands out:

in principle, we ought to be able to predict human behavior, though I can't say I have had much success myself. The trouble is that the human brain contains far too many particles for us to be able to solve the equations. But it is comforting to think we might be able to predict the nematode worm, even if we can't quite figure out humans.

What this is blind to, in my opinion, is that the objective sciences can never even in principle determine what a human is, or what any being is, because they are beings, and not simply objects. At best, the equations of physics describe objects and the relations of objects, but do they have anything to say about the nature of being qua being, which is the subject of philosophy proper?

The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.

We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.

However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.

So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. ¹ — Thomas Nagel

And will forever do so, whilst ever they remain physical.

Personally, I think it is self-evident that there is 'more going on' than falls within the limits of science. At least a science that rejects phenomena that don't fall neatly into its current schema.

If you follow current theories in dark matter and energy and quantum field theory, however, you will find that there are lots of credible cross-domain thinkers. And that many modern physicists are seeking to broaden science to include the concept of mind.

Obviously, thousands of years studies in the humanities have immense value. So if the adherents of a narrowly construed science are dismissive, what of it? I study everything with equal curiosity, interest, and effort.

Science, on the other hand, cannot even investigate if science would be complete. There are no equivalent scientific incompleteness theorems in science about the scientific method. That alone makes science very, very incomplete.

I'm not sure if that's completely accurate. In 2015, there was an article, Quantum physics problem proved unsolvable: Godel and Turing enter quantum physics, which claims that physicists have found a problem that can't be solved. An excerpt from the article:

A mathematical problem underlying fundamental questions in particle and quantum physics is provably unsolvable, according to scientists at UCL, Universidad Complutense de Madrid - ICMAT and Technical University of Munich.

It is the first major problem in physics for which such a fundamental limitation could be proven. The findings are important because they show that even a perfect and complete description of the microscopic properties of a material is not enough to predict its macroscopic behaviour.

That's not as broad as Godel's Theorem in mathematics; but it does imply that physics is capable of recognizing the existence of problems that it can't solve.

"Scientism" usually has a connotation of treating science more or less as a religion. Scientism sees science as uttering dogmatic truths, for example.

On the connotation of treating science like a religion, this is neither necessary nor sufficient: "There is only one knowledge-justification method, i.e. the scientific one. Every question would be decidable by experimentally testing possible answers. In other words, the scientific domain would be all-encompassing and complete."

There are definitely people who treat science as a religion. I'm not sure if there's actually anyone with the view you describe in quotation marks above. If there is, they probably either (a) believe that mathematics actually is characterized by experimental testing in some sense, or (b) stress that mathematical utterances are not actually true or false, so that they're not knowledge in the jtb sense.

(b) can be the case on a constructivist view--a view that sees mathematics as simply a language that we've constructed to talk about how we think about relations on an abstract level.

because they are beings, and not simply objects. — Wayfarer

Beings are "simply" objects. ("Simply" is in quotation marks because objects are not really that "simple.")

There are definitely people who treat science as a religion. I'm not sure if there's actually anyone with the view you describe in quotation marks above. — Terrapin Station

A couple of common things I could put under the banner of scientism would be:
treats the results of scientific research as proofs and treats scientific models as proven. More of less in the mathematical sense, that is, not every potentially revisable. (I think you said this in other words)
2) Considers current science complete. Very rarely will someone assert this, unless it is to couch it as, well, there are details to work out but no more fundamental surprises. However it seems implicit in how they react to beliefs held outside the scientific community and also within the scientific community that have not gained consensus. If it isn't consensus scientific belief, it is wrong.
3) There seems to often be a conflation of insufficient evidence with no evidence.
4) They often think it is easy to rule things out by reference to current models. Of course science uses similar types of deduction, and this is one of the ways they sift through potential research, but it isn't particularly scientific to rule things out in this way. It certainly isn't empirical research, for example.

Generally mathematics is grouped in with the sciences. But your point can be made at a less abstract level. Check out Massimo Pigliucci's Why Plumbing Ain't Science.

I don't agree with Pigliucci in that essay. What he calls the "expansive" definition is the one on track, I'd say. That doesn't make the term meaningless. We don't always employ reasoning about empirical matters in a way where we'll make changes based on recalcitrant evidence, etc. The important thing to stress is rather that scientists aren't really doing something significantly different than what plumbers do, what we do when we learn how to cross the street, etc.

They are doing something significantly different than what preachers do (or at least, they should be doing something different than that).

Cool. I pretty much agree with him.

But perhaps it is the example that's in the way. Let me try this question out -- is there any practiced field, like plumbing but something else, where you would say the person is both employing empirical methods and is not doing science?

Some examples that come to mind for me: A machine operator. A lighting technician. A cook.

If those don't seem to "ring true" for you, are there any that do?

This by way of getting to the heart of the question of how you and I understand science and what you and I understand science to be.

but something else, where you would say the person is both employing empirical methods and is not doing science — Moliere

I can't think of something where I'd say that offhand.

The examples where people aren't doing science are things like when someone simply intuits that they're the reincarnation of Napoleon, or that aliens are monitoring their thoughts, or that Gods exist, etc.

What is it that makes these activities not-scientific, in your view?

I agree with the examples, but I suspect our disagreement is the reasoning behind them.

For my reasoning --

The examples you provide aren't the sorts of things that scientists research. So if science is what scientists do then clearly personal intuitions, delusions, or theological claims aren't the stuff of science. Though in some far-fetched sense I suppose they could be, if scientists began research programs around such stuff.

I take a pretty hard historicist stance on science. I believe that such an approach allows us to, through familiarity with the history, begin to gain an understanding of what science is without boiling it down to a programatic methodology or set of allowed inferences based on rules. It allows us to discover what this thing called science consists of while leaving breathing room for the creative aspect which goes into scientific work.

The counter-part to that, however, is that machine operators, lighting technicians, and cooks are not scientists, and therefore they are not doing science. Same goes for plumbers.

But then I don't think that science can be characterized along methodological lines. Even broad ones will come across exceptions simply because science isn't static, it grows and changes with the people that do it. I suspect that those who wish to demarcate science wish to do so along either methodological lines, or possibly other ways too -- like natural vs. supernatural or something like that; something which is metaphysical.

But to pronounce methodologies as science leads one to absurdities, on the whole -- unless construed along historicist lines which observe tendencies while keeping room open for new methodologies. And to put up metaphysical barriers on science seems to poison the well from the get-go. Either science answers questions about metaphysical things or it does not -- we can't go about prescribing to scientists what it is they should discover. And if it doesn't answer metaphysical questions at all then there is no reason for a metaphysical demarcation ala natural/supernatural.

Some examples that come to mind for me: A machine operator. A lighting technician. A cook. — Moliere

Any user of technology who isn’t trying to fix that technology.

Edit: except scientists who are employing technology in the pursuit of science.

where you would say the person is both employing empirical methods and is not doing science? — Moliere

Psychiatrists

What is it that makes these activities not-scientific, in your view? — Moliere

A lack of making observations, formulating and testing hypotheses, and then revising beliefs and hypotheses in response to evidence.

Scientism is the idea that there is only one knowledge-justification method, i.e. the scientific one. — alcontali

More in a way that it (science) answers everything. Yet the fact is that we have extremely important and necessary questions that are simply subjective.

How the physical world is doesn't gives us an answer to what is morally right or wrong, how things ought to be. Or answer things about what we like or not.

Where many believers in scientism go wrong is when they think that these subjective questions can be answered objectively by science...and typically simply assume their own subjective view has to be the natural answer that science gives.

A mathematical problem underlying fundamental questions in particle and quantum physics is provably unsolvable, according to scientists at UCL

Well, that is again mathematics (abstract-Platonic provability) answering the question and not science (real-world testability) itself.

Generally mathematics is grouped in with the sciences. — Moliere

Ahum, correction!

Mathematics was possibly somehow grouped in with sciences.

You see, the easy part is reading the classics, but the hard part is to know what exactly still makes sense.

Ever since Karl Popper published his seminal article, Science as Falsification, science has become defined as the collection of propositions, i.e. the epistemic domain, that can be tested experimentally.

Mathematics utterly rejects experimental testing as an epistemic method. Mathematics belongs to the epistemic domain of axiomatic derivation.

You see, according to the classics, in terms of subject matter, mathematics was about quantities, i.e. numbers (Diophantes arithmetica), and anything that you can reasonably draw with unmarked straightedge and compass, i.e. Greek geometry (Euclid).

They generally still held that view in 18th century, while this view was already fundamentally outdated in the 12th century, after Algorithmi's publication, the "Liber Algebrae".

That is why they undoubtedly did not see it coming when Carl Friedrich Gauss published his theorems on the fundamental limitations of (geometrically) constructible numbers, which can only represent the absolutely simplest radical field extension (√2):

This has the effect of transforming geometric questions about compass and straightedge constructions into algebra. This transformation leads to the solutions of many famous mathematical problems, which defied centuries of attack.

Grouping in mathematics with science is even a bigger misconception than the idea that mathematics would be about quantities or numbers. Seriously, not everything in the classics is still applicable today.

A lack of making observations, formulating and testing hypotheses, and then revising beliefs and hypotheses in response to evidence. — Terrapin Station

I'm guessing the reverse would be that having these qualities makes something science, in the broad sense you espouse.

But I'd say the emphasis on observe-hypothesize-test-revise misses out what's going on in theoretical discussions. The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies doesn't have observations and tests and so forth. It is largely an argument from the basis of what difficulties are resolved -- towards a more coherent theory.

Surely you'd include this in your notion of science. But then there must be more to science than just these qualities. And if there be more to science than just these qualities I'd wonder -- how would you differentiate theoretical discussions on the existence of the ether from, say, discussions on the existence of God?

I'm afraid I do not believe what Karl Popper believed about science. And if that be the case then whether or not mathematics is grouped with science depends on our beliefs about what science is, rather than on what Karl Popper thought was proper.

I group math with science because they have the similar resonances to one another. Mathematicians create knowledge by publishing and having peers review their work. Scientists are similar. I don't think that the emphasis on reasoning vs. empirical matters much in treating it as something different because all knowledge requires us to reason as well as sense. It's just the way our mind works.

And if there be more to science than just these qualities I'd wonder -- how would you differentiate theoretical discussions on the existence of the ether from, say, discussions on the existence of God? — Moliere

Theoretical discussions about possible scientific hypotheses have not yet managed to pass the unforgiving knowledge-justification filter in science. The justification will become available only after successful experimental testing.

A scientific theory that has not been experimentally tested is not a scientific theory (=justified) but a scientific hypothesis or conjecture (=unjustified).

Therefore, discussions on the existence of God are not part of epistemic domain of science. If you want to make them part of the domain, you will have to propose how exactly the hypothesis is supposed to be experimentally tested.

Hence, adding the question concerning the existence of God to the scientific domain is first and foremost a question of experimental test design.

In the meanwhile, all the pseudo-scientific-sounding hypotheses about the existence of God, usually atheist ones, are objectively just a pile of bullshit, as they are in gross violation of the rules and regulations governing the epistemic method that generates the scientific domain.

First I just want to say that what you're replying to was directed at @Terrapin Station -- not that you aren't welcome to answer the question, but there is a flow to the conversation that I'm following with him that would be different in your case -- because you two both clearly have very different beliefs about science.

Let's put this to you, then: You wouldn't call theoretical discussions scientific knowledge. But would you still count theoretical publications in physics as doing science? It is still science, even if it is not knowledge, right?

I'm afraid I do not believe what Karl Popper believed about science. — Moliere

Well, at the highest level of epistemology, concerning the nature of science, or the nature of mathematics, or the nature of any knowledge field, really, we have a conversation, with sometimes acrimonious debates. We have schools of thought, and we may or may not have a majority view, i.e. a consensus.

There is obviously criticism on Popperian falsificationism.

If the criticism is useful, I will certainly adopt it. Still, the descriptions of the criticism in the link above, of why they dislike Karl Popper's falsificationism, does not sound convincing to me.

I personally very much like Popper's views, because they allow for the concept of "epistemic domain", and to shift the debate on the nature of the various knowledge disciplines away from the otherwise arbitrary concept of "subject matter".

As far as I am concerning, a knowledge discipline is not "about something". A knowledge discipline is what you can justify with a particular method. Therefore, it is an epistemic domain.

So, I personally consider Karl Popper to be a gigantic step forward.

Let's put this to you, then: You wouldn't call theoretical discussions scientific knowledge. But would you still count theoretical publications in physics as doing science? It is still science, even if it is not knowledge, right? — Moliere

As long as we clearly distinguish between hypothesis/conjecture (no experimental test available) and theory (experimentally testable), I am ok with the hypothetical-theoretical discussions.

We need to be able to black-swan a scientific theory, i.e. search for a counterexample, otherwise it is not a scientific theory.

Since all scientific theories obviously start their life cycle as mere conjectures, I am certainly not against the activity of conjecturing. So, yes, it is "pre-science". Conjectures are the staging area for science. They are therefore necessary.

Well we can set aside our disagreement on Popper for the moment, I think. Another time perhaps.

Would you say that the methods of a plumber, a machine operator, a lighting technician, or a cook are based on his criterion? I wouldn't.

As long as we clearly distinguish between hypothesis/conjecture (no experimental test available) and theory (experimentally testable), I am ok with the hypothetical-theoretical discussions.

We need to be able to black-swan a scientific theory, i.e. search for a counterexample, otherwise it is not a scientific theory.

Since all scientific theories obviously start their life cycle as mere conjectures, I am certainly not against the activity of conjecturing. So, yes, it is "pre-science". Conjectures are the staging area for science. They are therefore necessary. — alcontali

Hrm. Pre-science? Alright. I guess I would just call it science, but that's OK. So to you "science" is knowledge specifically, it seems. Yes?

Science to me is not just knowledge, but it has to at least have the possibility through falsification to become knowledge. I know I don’t have the knowledge base that you have, but it seems to me that the lines of science is getting blurred these days seemingly in an attempt and hope for a TOE.

You should read Quine's two dogmas. He makes a good case against apriori justification.

So, to yourself, science is knowledge plus the beliefs which could become knowledge should they withstand the test of falsifiability -- and if something is not falsifiable at all then it can't count as science of either kind.

I don't think that science is getting blurry "these days", but that it's always been at least a little blurry -- when we put the question of demarcating science from not-science up, at least. And whence the importance of such a question? What does the charge of scientism denote?

To myself, at least, philosophy seems to be a kind of cure to scientism -- which I think of in a more relational manner. Rather than making an epistemic mistake of saying that science is the one and only knowledge, I think scientism is more about how an individual feels about science -- and given that the word is a pejorative the person in question feels too strongly that science gives us the best answers to questions.

So it's kind of a charge against one's character, really, rather than a fallacy. At least as I construe these things. And philosophy (of science) is a cure because I think that philosophy is just doing what philosophy does best -- making us all a little less confident in what we thought was certain and beyond needing explanation.

Well said.