[deleted]

One might think that 'personal identity' is a subclass of the much broader class of 'identity' — csalisbury

Also re this, sure, one might think that, and it's not that there's no relation, but the way the terms are used conventionally in philosophy is really two quite different ideas.

If duty is too abstract (we can easily say, using your way of talking, that his sense of duty is a brain state and thereby reinscribe it in the chain of physical causality you're talking about, but let's pass that over) but then let's say the executioner qua physical mass is causally connected to alex's anguish (a brain state.) He causes Alex's brain-state. Yet he, the executioner, justifiably feels no anxiety about suffering Alex's anguish.

If I'm going to directly answer questions when you ask them, then you need to do that too. Detail the causal connection you're referring to.

Also re this, sure, one might think that, and it's not that there's no relation, but the way the terms are used conventionally in philosophy is really two quite different ideas.

True, but we're talking as peers aren't we. If you think that identity does not persist over time, then the very idea of personal identity is incoherent. The only way to salvage it is to make it a conventional term that has nothing to do with identity. Unless you're claiming that identity doesn't persist over time except for one kind of identity, personal identity, which does.

If you think that identity does not persist over time, then the very idea of personal identity is incoherent — csalisbury

That's a conflation of two different ideas.

That's a conflation of two different ideas.

And I clearly presented two ways of understanding the relationships between the two terms.

Let me do it again.

Does there exist any identity that persists over time? Yes or No.

If no, then 'personal identity' is a conventional term that doesn't have to do with actual identity. It refers to something that is not, strictly speaking, an identity. While it means something quite specific and is not meaningless, it doesn't actually refer to a persisting identity.

If yes, then you are wrong to say that identity can't persist over time.

What am I missing?

I just corrected my post two back (I'm on my kindle and I wasn't proofreading the auto-corrects very closely). You'd need to answer that post for me to continue the Socratic dialogue game.

You're asking me to detail how the executioners knife is causally related to Alex's anguish?

And I clearly presented two ways of understanding the relationships between the two terms. — csalisbury

What would that have to do with how the terms are conventionally used?

You're asking me to detail how the executioners knife is causally related to Alex's anguish? — csalisbury

Yes, if you're claiming that it's the same sense of direct, causal connection.

Well, you'd be able to recognize a CAD model of a Cadillac as opposed to a Cad model of a Dodge pickup, wouldn't you? Surely something counts as a model of something else if it is recognizable as such.

Well, you'd be able to recognize a CAD model of a Cadillac as opposed to a Cad model of a Dodge pickup, wouldn't you? — John

How is that not about my interpretation?

Ok.

The executioner's muscles move a knife which cuts into Alex's flesh and his nerves and cause pain.

I'm assuming you're not asking for the physio-mathematical explanation of how sharp edges cleave flesh? I'll admit I'm not qualified to provide that.

I think i might be losing you, Terrapin.

The executioner's muscles move a knife which cuts into Alex's flesh and his nerves and cause pain.

I'm assuming you're not asking for the mathematical explanation of how sharp edges cleave flesh? — csalisbury

Okay, and you're saying that has what to do with the causal connection between Alex at T1 and Alex at T2?

I understood you to be saying that it was an interpretive matter as to whether a Cad model of anything actually counts as a model. I'm saying it would count as model if it is recognizable as such; and that doesn't seem to be a matter of mere interpretation.

Okay, and you're saying that has what to do with the causal connection between Alex at T1 and Alex at T2

I'm not saying it has anything at all to do with it.

You cited causality as a way of understanding why T1 Alex has good reason to be nervous about T2 Alex's suffering. Since the executioner is also causally responsible for T2 Alex's anguish, yet has no reason himself to worry about suffering that anguish, then pointing to causality doesn't explain why T1 alex's anxiety is justified.

I don't know how to figure that "recognizing" something like that wouldn't be a matter of interpretation.

As far as I can tell the 'sense of self' is the only thing you've offered that explains why T1 alex is justified about being nervous about T2 Alex's anguish. The other explanations are easily dispatched.

I'm not saying it has anything at all to do with it. — csalisbury

But that was what we were talking about!

I brought up causal connection as an example of the non-identity connection of Alex @ T1 to Alex @ T2. That was the whole point of that.

But that was what we were talking about!

I brought up causal connection as an example of the non-identity connection of Alex @ T1 to Alex @ T2. That was the whole point of that.

Once more:

You cited causality as a way of understanding why T1 Alex has good reason to be nervous about T2 Alex's suffering. Since the executioner is also causally responsible for T2 Alex's anguish, yet has no reason himself to worry about suffering that anguish, then pointing to causality doesn't explain why T1 alex's anxiety is justified.

I didn't say anything pro or con about "having a good reason"--there are no facts about whether one has a good reason to feel some way or other. There are no facts re justifications a la whether something is really justified or not, either. I explained that identity isn't all there is to potential relations of Alex at T1 and Alex at T2. I was explaining the other relations or connections between the two.

I didn't say anything pro or con about "having a good reason"--there are no facts about whether one has a good reason to feel some way of other.

If you're willing to state, for the record, that a person who knows he is going to be tortured soon has no good reason to be anxious about his impending torture, then we can leave it at that. (please please please don't do the juvenile thing of saying something like 'well, there's no good reason to be anxious if it's inevitable!' That would miss the point entirely.)

Again, there aren't any facts about whether someone has a "good reason" to feel any particular way.

Is your dog interpreting anything when she recognizes you?

Different people will feel that something counts or doesn't count as a good reason for feeling some way, but they could feel either way about any reason.

Did you stop talking about models, or are you suggesting that things are models of themselves or something like that?

Again, there aren't any facts about whether someone has a "good reason" to feel any particular way....Different people will feel that something counts or doesn't count as a good reason for feeling some way, but they could feel either way about any reason.

& We're done! Thanks for playing Terrapin. You've defended your position well! I raised some objections and you made the very good point of someone who is about to be tortured has no reason to be worried about that.

& We're done! — csalisbury

LOL

Just to note, by the way, that this whole thing started because I had said, "That something is non-identical through time doesn't imply that there's no connection through time," and then you asked me to elaborate that, so I did.