And I've had a hard time understanding how scientists revel in evidence, yet think. Thinking has no evidence. There's no evidence for the empirical method, it was born of thought. "Science" (personifying it here), from a certain persepective is stuck at the level of sensorium. The senses have nothing to say, they're dumb. Any time we have a thought, idealism has entered the domain. Scientists are exceedingly ignorant of this point. The entire enterprise of science lies on a foundation for which there is no evidence because it is idealism. A heavy contradiction to put it mildly.

I oriented in science until realizing it can't address truth. It makes sense for the half of reality which is physical...but to only see half of reality is a chimerical chase...especially when the part of reality closest to each of us is without evidence. — Anthony

Well said.

If you have trouble grasping how the mechanics and electronics of our minds turn into feelings, perceptions, and thoughts, that doesn't have anything to do with consciousness. — T Clark

The scientific tools for looking at it closely are relatively new. — T Clark

How do you look at consciousness closely? Measuring brain activity is not looking at consciousness, it isn't seeing what the person sees or thinks or feels.

If you think biology could be derived in principle from chemistry, and that chemistry could be derived in principle from fundamental physics, then you think biology could be derived in principle from fundamental physics. Fundamental physics claims to describe the fundamental constituents of the universe and how they move, through equations of motion. These equations allow to derive where some particle will be at some point in the future, or what probability there is to detect one in some location, or even how some arrangement of matter is going to move or change, but by construction they can't allow to derive that any arrangement of matter perceives or thinks or feels anything at all.

If we claim the laws of fundamental physics govern the universe, and it's impossible to derive consciousness from these laws, then there's something huge missing in these laws. Essentially these laws only model what's within our perceptions and omit everything else, like feelings, thoughts, and the existence of perception itself. These laws can model how a brain looks like and how it behaves, but they can't say anything about what it experiences, they're only modeling appearances and not the underlying stuff that gives rise to these appearances. The best they'll give is models of brain activity, which boils down to motions of particles like electrons.

Or if you think biology couldn't be derived in principle from fundamental physics and you invoke some emergence to account for the existence of consciousness, then that amounts to invoking magic, to say there is some magical stuff happening that makes a bunch of moving particles become conscious. To say that we don't know yet how consciousness emerges from these particles but one day we'll find out, is just wishful thinking, it's logically impossible without sprinkling magic in the middle. Believing that it's possible is not proof that it's possible, it's just blind faith.

It's not just word play. It has significant consequences. If you call something a mystery, you treat it differently than if it were just unknown. — T Clark

In the context of me saying we have no idea what the mechanism is, I am happy to have someone from the 'we know a lot about it' camp couch it as unknown. I would think however that people probably react in a variety of ways to both what is or what we consider unknown and to what we consider mysterious. Mysterious it seems to me adds in that there is a surprising element to the phenomenon. I don't think that's ridiculous if one is coming from a physicalist viewpoint.

If you want to mix your personal mysteries in with science and philosophy, that's fine, but it undermines the credibility of your argument. — T Clark

He's not mixing in his personal mysteries, he is saying that it strikes him as mysterious. Which is probably true, unless is lying or quite bad at introspection. Mysterious and unknown both cover situations where our limited knowledge encounters something that seems real. One focuses on the epistemological absence, they other add feelings having to do with how the not known thing strikes us given our paradigms. This doesn't take away from any of his arguments.

How do you look at consciousness closely? Measuring brain activity is not looking at consciousness, it isn't seeing what the person sees or thinks or feels. — leo

Of course looking at brain activity associated with conscious experience is "looking at consciousness." Consciousness is something other than personal experience. All mental phenomena are something other than personal experience. It's like saying I'm not looking at disease because I look at factors other than the patient's symptoms.

If you think biology could be derived in principle from chemistry, and that chemistry could be derived in principle from fundamental physics, then you think biology could be derived in principle from fundamental physics. Fundamental physics claims to describe the fundamental constituents of the universe and how they move, through equations of motion. These equations allow to derive where some particle will be at some point in the future, or what probability there is to detect one in some location, or even how some arrangement of matter is going to move or change, but by construction they can't allow to derive that any arrangement of matter perceives or thinks or feels anything at all.

Or if you think biology couldn't be derived in principle from fundamental physics and you invoke some emergence to account for the existence of consciousness, then that amounts to invoking magic, to say there is some magical stuff happening that makes a bunch of moving particles become conscious. To say that we don't know yet how consciousness emerges from these particles but one day we'll find out, is just wishful thinking, it's logically impossible without sprinkling magic in the middle. Believing that it's possible is not proof that it's possible, it's just blind faith. — leo

Although biology must be consistent with the principles of chemistry and physics, it cannot be derived in principle from either or both. It operates on principles and according to "laws" that are not predictable from the laws of physics or chemistry. And so on on up the line. This is what people mean when they talk about "emergence." Consciousness and other mental experiences are emergent phenomena of biological anatomy and physiology. And that's why it's not a mystery, any more than the emergence of chemistry out of physics is a mystery. It's not magic, it's the way the world works. Or are you denying that emergence is a real phenomenon?

In the context of me saying we have no idea what the mechanism is, I am happy to have someone from the 'we know a lot about it' camp couch it as unknown. I would think however that people probably react in a variety of ways to both what is or what we consider unknown and to what we consider mysterious. Mysterious it seems to me adds in that there is a surprising element to the phenomenon. I don't think that's ridiculous if one is coming from a physicalist viewpoint. — Coben

I don't get it. The universe is chock full of stuff we don't understand. Is that surprising? No, it's a big place. We're just getting started. We have a very limited, parochial point of view - we're located somewhere in the middle of a continuum of scales that goes from subatomic and maybe beyond to galactic and maybe beyond.

He's not mixing in his personal mysteries, he is saying that it strikes him as mysterious. Which is probably true, unless is lying or quite bad at introspection. Mysterious and unknown both cover situations where our limited knowledge encounters something that seems real. — Coben

Fine, it's mysterious, but you shouldn't pretend it's science or good philosophy.

It's not just word play. It has significant consequences. If you call something a mystery, you treat it differently than if it were just unknown. I think it was Alan Watts who said that what we call mysteries are parts of ourselves that we're not aware of. That makes a lot of sense to me. If you want to mix your personal mysteries in with science and philosophy, that's fine, but it undermines the credibility of your argument. — T Clark

I disagree.

I disagree. — JosephS

What do you disagree with? That calling something a mystery will make people evaluate it differently than if it's just everyday old normal stuff? That it undermines the credibility of your argument?

Anyway, never mind. We seem to have taken this as far as we can.

Anyway, never mind. We seem to have taken this as far as we can. — T Clark

I agree.

I have learned something in the intervening day and that is that I initially misinterpreted your use of the word 'mystery'. I found your claim that consciousness wasn't mysterious a facile expression.

What I gather now is that your use of the term is rather more nuanced that mine. I don't accede to the contours that you (or Alan Watts) would give it, but I respect that you've considered what is and is not a 'mystery' longer than I have.

I will continue to use the term in the way I have and will continue to group the nature of consciousness into things mysterious, but will look into how Alan Watts would have us use it.

Of course looking at brain activity associated with conscious experience is "looking at consciousness." Consciousness is something other than personal experience. All mental phenomena are something other than personal experience. — T Clark

Definition of consciousness: a person's awareness or perception of something

So no, looking at brain activity associated with conscious experience is not looking at that conscious experience. That's like saying "of course looking at a fossil associated with a dinosaur is looking at a dinosaur".

Obviously if you define consciousness as brain activity then there seems to be no great unknown about it, it's just a matter of associating observed brain activity with reports of the person whose brain activity is observed. But that's not how consciousness is defined. Just like if you define dark energy as the discrepancy between observations of supernovae and the predictions of the CDM model of cosmology then there is no great unknown about dark energy, it's just a matter of computing that discrepancy from observations of supernovae, but that's not how dark energy is defined.

Although biology must be consistent with the principles of chemistry and physics, it cannot be derived in principle from either or both. It operates on principles and according to "laws" that are not predictable from the laws of physics or chemistry. And so on on up the line. This is what people mean when they talk about "emergence." — T Clark

There are physicists like Dirac who claimed that the whole of chemistry can be derived from the laws of physics: The underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known, and the difficulty is only that the exact application of these laws leads to equations much too complicated to be soluble. It therefore becomes desirable that approximate practical methods of applying quantum mechanics should be developed, which can lead to an explanation of the main features of complex atomic systems without too much computation.

It seems to be the implicit hypothesis of many physicists, we now have the field of quantum chemistry where computer simulations based on quantum mechanics are run to solve chemical problems. There doesn't seem to be a widespread belief among physicists or even chemists that chemistry is not completely determined by physics, it is simply that equations are not solvable exactly and require computer-intensive simulations to find accurate solutions.

In the same way it is imagined that molecular biology could be derived from chemistry, cellular biology from molecular biology, and so on, but that in practice it is simpler to find laws at a given level than to infer them from the laws of the level below.

Consciousness and other mental experiences are emergent phenomena of biological anatomy and physiology. And that's why it's not a mystery, any more than the emergence of chemistry out of physics is a mystery. It's not magic, it's the way the world works. — T Clark

If you say that laws at a given level emerge but couldn't be derived even in principle from the laws of the lower levels, then what is it that makes them emerge, at what point is the magic infused to make these new laws appear? You're saying we couldn't find a mechanism that would explain how cells behave based on how molecules behave, so what is the additional thing that cells are made of which isn't molecules? If it can't be described in any way then it might as well be magic.

I've been looking for the specific reference in Alan Watts I mentioned. Still not sure it's Watts. It's got me rereading "Nature Man and Woman." I'll let you know if I find anything.

Definition of consciousness: a person's awareness or perception of something

So no, looking at brain activity associated with conscious experience is not looking at that conscious experience. That's like saying "of course looking at a fossil associated with a dinosaur is looking at a dinosaur". — leo

Your definition doesn't say "the un-observable, personal experience of a person's awareness or perception of something." It's perfectly possible to talk about consciousness as an objective fact about a state of mind. Just like it's possible to talk about and study pain, depression, sight, language, and all the rest of our internal states based on observable and measurable external signs, symptoms and measurements. We talk about consciousness of non-human animals and try to determine what types of observable behaviors show us what the animal's internal state is. Of course we are also interested in personal reports of what consciousness feels like, but that is not the only way we can know about it.

So, yes, looking at objectively measurable evidence of consciousness, including brain activity, is a legitimate way of studying consciousness. Just as studying fossil evidence of dinosaurs is a legitimate way of studying dinosaurs.

obviously if you define consciousness as brain activity then there seems to be no great unknown about it, it's just a matter of associating observed brain activity with reports of the person whose brain activity is observed. But that's not how consciousness is defined. — leo

I didn't define consciousness as brain activity. The original point I made is that there's no mystery about how brain activity expresses itself as the observable phenomena we call "consciousness." Lot's of unknowns. No mystery.

There are physicists like Dirac who claimed that the whole of chemistry can be derived from the laws of physics: The underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part of physics and the whole of chemistry are thus completely known, and the difficulty is only that the exact application of these laws leads to equations much too complicated to be soluble. It therefore becomes desirable that approximate practical methods of applying quantum mechanics should be developed, which can lead to an explanation of the main features of complex atomic systems without too much computation. — leo

I'm skeptical, but I'll see if I can track down the references. If you have something more specific, it would be helpful.

In the same way it is imagined that molecular biology could be derived from chemistry, cellular biology from molecular biology, and so on, but that in practice it is simpler to find laws at a given level than to infer them from the laws of the level below. — leo

I believe that's not true. Here is a link to a well known article by P.W. Anderson about reductionism and emergence and how the properties of higher level phenomena are not predictable by the properties of lower level phenomena.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/177/4047/393

If you say that laws at a given level emerge but couldn't be derived even in principle from the laws of the lower levels, then what is it that makes them emerge, at what point is the magic infused to make these new laws appear? You're saying we couldn't find a mechanism that would explain how cells behave based on how molecules behave, so what is the additional thing that cells are made of which isn't molecules? If it can't be described in any way then it might as well be magic. — leo

That's just the way it is. Higher level behavior does emerge from lower level behavior. Biology is not predictable using chemistry and physics. It's not a short cut, it's the only way we can know the principles of higher levels of organization - by observing them directly. Reductionism doesn't work. It doesn't reflect reality.

Your definition doesn't say "the un-observable, personal experience of a person's awareness or perception of something." It's perfectly possible to talk about consciousness as an objective fact about a state of mind.

We talk about consciousness of non-human animals and try to determine what types of observable behaviors show us what the animal's internal state is. — T Clark

The problem is that in looking at brain activity or at observable behaviors of a particular being, nothing shows us that this being experiences anything at all, it could be a philosophical zombie for all we know. The huge unknown lies in explaining why these observations imply that the being experiences anything. Assuming right from the start that other beings have a consciousness is explaining away the problem of consciousness.

I'm skeptical, but I'll see if I can track down the references. If you have something more specific, it would be helpful. — T Clark

That's where Dirac said it: https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/abs/10.1098/rspa.1929.0094

The 1998 Nobel Prize in chemistry was awarded for the "development of computational methods in chemistry" based on quantum mechanics, and it mentions the Dirac quote without questioning it. Here are some other excerpts from the press release: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/chemistry/1998/press-release/

computational methods making possible the theoretical study of molecules, their properties and how they act together in chemical reactions. These methods are based on the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics as defined by, among others, the physicist E. Schrödinger.

The laws of quantum mechanics as formulated more than 70 years ago make it theoretically possible to understand and calculate how electrons and atomic nuclei interact to build up matter in all its forms.

Quantum chemistry is today used within all branches of chemistry and molecular physics. As well as producing quantitative information on molecules and their interactions, the theory also affords deeper understanding of molecular processes that cannot be obtained from experiments alone.

It doesn't sound like they're implying that laws in chemistry aren't a consequence of physical laws, rather they're implying that the underlying physical description gives a more detailed picture that cannot be obtained from chemistry experiments alone. They see laws of chemistry as high-level approximations.

Some quotes from other well-known physicists, all Nobel Prize laureates:

Heisenberg: Physics and chemistry have become fused in quantum chemistry (in his book Physics and Beyond)

Feynman: The Schrödinger equation has been one of the great triumphs of physics. By providing the key to the underlying machinery of atomic structure it has given an explanation for atomic spectra, for chemistry, and for the nature of matter. (in The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Vol. 3 Ch. 19)

Gell-Mann: I know of no serious scientist who believes that there are special chemical forces that do not arise from underlying physical forces. Although some chemists might not like to put it this way, the upshot is that chemistry is in principle derivable from elementary particle physics. In that sense, we are all reductionists, at least as far as chemistry and physics are concerned. (in his book The Quark and the Jaguar)

Gell-Mann goes on to say: A science at a given level encompasses the laws of a less fundamental science at a level above. The laws of elementary particle physics are valid for all matter, throughout the universe, under all conditions.

and

What about the relation to physics and chemistry of another level in the hierarchy, that of biology? Are there today, as there used to be in past centuries, serious scientists who believe that there are special “vital forces" in biology that are not physico-chemical in origin? There must be very few, if any. Virtually all of us are convinced that life depends in principle on the laws of physics and chemistry, just as the laws of chemistry arise from those of physics, and in that sense we are again reductionists of a sort.

and

Complex adaptive systems on Earth give rise to several levels of science that lie “above” biology. One of the most important is the psychology of animals, and especially of the animal with the most complex psychology, the human being. Here again, it must be a rare contemporary scientist who believes that there exist special “mental forces” that are not biological, and ultimately physicochemical, in nature. Again, virtually all of us are, in this sense, reductionists.

Biology is not predictable using chemistry and physics. It's not a short cut, it's the only way we can know the principles of higher levels of organization - by observing them directly. Reductionism doesn't work. It doesn't reflect reality. — T Clark

Gell-mann does say "The science of biology is very much more complex than fundamental physics because so many of the regularities of terrestrial biology arise from chance events as well as from the fundamental laws", but these "chance events" are the only thing he sees as preventing the prediction of the specific life forms here on Earth from chemistry and physics.

When Nobel laureates in physics all tell a similar story, it's no wonder that the reductionist view is the widespread one in physics.

Now after doing some looking up I have to admit that the non-reductionist view seems a little more widespread than I thought it was, but not among physicists or most scientists, rather among philosophers as Anderson mentioned in the article you linked.

But if you argue against reductionism, you would have to show that the laws at the higher levels are not predictable from the more fundamental laws not because of "chance events" that couldn't have been anticipated (for instance the laws of biology on Earth could have been different if other events had occurred in the past, so the laws of chemistry couldn't have predicted the particular laws of biology that would arise on Earth, but in principle these laws of biology could still be reduced to laws of chemistry). You would have to invoke something other than more fundamental laws and "chance events", something other than "our computers are not yet powerful enough to make more complex simulations", and what is that additional thing?

What is a cell made of besides molecules? Or what are the forces that dictate the behavior of a cell that don't reduce to the forces between the molecules that make up the cell?

The crux of the matter is that if the reductionist view is assumed (as it is by most physicists), then consciousness cannot arise from the more fundamental laws and from chance events, because these chance events are still constrained by the fundamental laws.

And if reductionism is not assumed, then one would have to explain for instance what is it about the behavior of a cell that doesn't depend on the behavior of the molecules that make up the cell, and if we can't describe that in any way then we might as well say something magical is going on, and similarly say that consciousness arises from the brain because something magical is going on.

But there is a way out of this conundrum: to stop assuming that our perceptions allow us to model what we are. Models of what goes on within our perceptions are not models of what gives rise to these perceptions. Then the question of reductionism becomes irrelevant, because then physics and chemistry and biology and neuroscience all together only tell a tiny part of the whole story, they only describe what goes on in one movie some of us are watching.

This is really interesting and well presented. I have some thinking to do. We'll pick this up again later.

The unknown is not the supernatural.

The issue is the importance of the unknown. Not knowing the cure for cancer is not the same as not knowing how many grains of sand there are. So it is not just a religious versus atheist issue.

But both sides of that dichotomy have a reason to exploit or diminish the unknown. I am a general agnostic in the face of the unknown.

The crux of the matter is that if the reductionist view is assumed (as it is by most physicists), then consciousness cannot arise from the more fundamental laws and from chance events, because these chance events are still constrained by the fundamental laws.

And if reductionism is not assumed, then one would have to explain for instance what is it about the behavior of a cell that doesn't depend on the behavior of the molecules that make up the cell, and if we can't describe that in any way then we might as well say something magical is going on, and similarly say that consciousness arises from the brain because something magical is going on.

But there is a way out of this conundrum: to stop assuming that our perceptions allow us to model what we are. Models of what goes on within our perceptions are not models of what gives rise to these perceptions. Then the question of reductionism becomes irrelevant, because then physics and chemistry and biology and neuroscience all together only tell a tiny part of the whole story, they only describe what goes on in one movie some of us are watching. — leo

Are you talking about the as of yet unknown or perhaps unknowable nature of qualia of perception and emotions?

Are you talking about the as of yet unknown or perhaps unknowable nature of qualia of perception and emotions? — Noah Te Stroete

I'm talking about the impossibility to explain consciousness in a materialist framework (by consciousness I refer to what a being experiences: perceptions, feelings, thoughts ...), or in other words the impossibility to explain what gives rise to our consciousness based on the contents of our perceptions alone (so if we claim to have a model that describes the fundamental laws that govern our universe, but it is impossible to derive from that model that anything experiences anything even in principle, then it's not a model of our universe, because at least something experiences something). Well we can always give an explanation by invoking magic (for instance say that consciousness arises from the brain because magic, or that it arises from some complex process we can't describe), but usually we expect more from an explanation, otherwise we can explain anything in any way we want.

I'm talking about the impossibility to explain consciousness in a materialist framework (by consciousness I refer to what a being experiences: perceptions, feelings, thoughts ...), or in other words the impossibility to explain what gives rise to our consciousness based on the contents of our perceptions alone (so if we claim to have a model that describes the fundamental laws that govern our universe, but it is impossible to derive from that model that anything experiences anything even in principle, then it's not a model of our universe, because at least something experiences something). Well we can always give an explanation by invoking magic (for instance say that consciousness arises from the brain because magic, or that it arises from some complex process we can't describe), but usually we expect more from an explanation, otherwise we can explain anything in any way we want. — leo

Just to make sure I understand - you think that consciousness rising up out of brain function is fundamentally different in kind than life rising up out of chemistry. And that this is the reason for the "hard problem" of consciousness. Is that right?

Can the hard problem be solved by science? If so, where do we look? If not, that's just magic too. I've been following up on our previous discussion with some reading. In what I've read, a lot of people equate the hard problem and vitalism. I'm assuming you disagree.

Just to make sure I understand - you think that consciousness rising up out of brain function is fundamentally different in kind than life rising up out of chemistry. And that this is the reason for the "hard problem" of consciousness. Is that right?

In what I've read, a lot of people equate the hard problem and vitalism. I'm assuming you disagree. — T Clark

It depends how we define life. We could have self-sustaining aggregates of molecules that follow the laws of chemistry and that we call life forms, in principle we might even have life forms that look like human beings and that obey the laws of chemistry, but these life forms wouldn't have any consciousness, they wouldn't perceive/feel/think anything. So life rising up out of chemistry, sure why not, but not life with consciousness.

Maybe the people who equate the hard problem with vitalism implicitly refer to life with consciousness.

Can the hard problem be solved by science? If so, where do we look? If not, that's just magic too. I've been following up on our previous discussion with some reading. — T Clark

Again it depends how we define science, here we have another kind of somewhat hard problem, the problem of demarcation between science and non-science, I had made a thread about it, basically my view on the subject is that there is no criterion scientists apply consistently to define what is science and what isn't, rather scientists call 'scientific' the theories that suit their personal desires/beliefs and 'unscientific' the ones that don't. So I don't agree that what isn't labeled 'science' is automatically magic.

The hard problem arises from assuming materialism, my view is it can't be solved within materialism. But the problem disappears if idealism is assumed instead of materialism for instance, in idealism consciousness is fundamental as opposed to matter so there is no hard problem of explaining how consciousness can arise from matter. There are some apparent problems with idealism, but they aren't 'hard' like the hard problem of consciousness in materialism. And we could very well have a science that assumes idealism, science doesn't have to be restricted to materialism.

This isn't to say that the hard problem only disappears in idealism, it also disappears for instance in panpsychism but in it another hard problem appears, the so-called combination problem. In interactionism we have instead the problem of interaction. Some form of idealism seems the less problematic to me, but I haven't thought thoroughly about all philosophical viewpoints yet.

I'm surprised. Maybe I wasn't paying close attention to what you have written. I thought we were talking about the hard problem of consciousness - the question of where and how our personal experience is generated through our bodies. Where it comes from. I thought you were arguing that emergence couldn't be the answer because it doesn't really exist so no new principles or behaviors can develop between one layer of organization and and the next. So that leaves the hard question unanswered.

Now it seems to me that you are saying that consciousness is somehow applied to us from the outside, which would be vitalism as I understand it. Or are you saying that the physical world develops out of consciousness, since it is fundamental? How does that work?

We have conscious surrounded—as a brain process, which ought to be enough to say that it is formed internally, it not needing to attach itself self—from floating around externally, independently. Its private nature prevents us from obtaining any more purchase, presently.

I'm surprised. Maybe I wasn't paying close attention to what you have written. I thought we were talking about the hard problem of consciousness - the question of where and how our personal experience is generated through our bodies. Where it comes from. I thought you were arguing that emergence couldn't be the answer because it doesn't really exist so no new principles or behaviors can develop between one layer of organization and and the next. So that leaves the hard question unanswered. — T Clark

Yes you understood that correctly. Strictly speaking I wouldn't say emergence doesn't exist, for instance I do agree that there are laws of biology and chemistry, I do agree that there are properties like density and viscosity that fundamental particles do not have, but I'm saying that in materialism these laws and properties can be reduced to laws and properties of the fundamental particles, and if we say they can't and we can't describe their emergence in any way then the emergent laws and properties are taken to be fundamental in themselves, and we end up describing the universe in terms of hundreds of fundamental laws at various levels, seeing all levels as disconnected.

For instance using the example of the cell again, we end up saying that there are fundamental laws that govern the behavior of a cell that don't reduce to the laws that govern the behavior of the molecules that make up the cell, and we do that at all levels. But then that also means that consciousness is taken as fundamental and not as reducible to brain activity, and that's not materialism, that's something else. So basically, if we say the emergence of consciousness from matter cannot be described in any way then we're refuting materialism, while taking consciousness as fundamental. The hard problem stems from saying that consciousness is not fundamental and arises from matter.

Now it seems to me that you are saying that consciousness is somehow applied to us from the outside, which would be vitalism as I understand it. Or are you saying that the physical world develops out of consciousness, since it is fundamental? How does that work? — T Clark

If consciousness is fundamental then it's not "applied from the outside" any more than if matter is fundamental it's "applied from the outside". Also, saying consciousness is fundamental is not equivalent to vitalism, because life doesn't necessarily have consciousness (or at least that doesn't have to be assumed).

But if we say that consciousness is fundamental and not matter, then the physical world is part of consciousness and that's the philosophy of idealism. Which doesn't reduce to solipsism, the physical world could be seen as a part of our collective consciousness. But there is no hard problem of explaining how that world can develop out of consciousness, because it doesn't exist outside consciousness, it is part of consciousness. It could be interpreted for instance as a shared dream.

Whereas in materialism we can't say that consciousness is part of matter, because it is said that consciousness arises from some matter, and that's what gives rise to the hard problem.

:clap:

[It] is perfectly possible to prove a negative — Filipe

No, it isn't.

No, it isn't — Pattern-chaser

At the risk of taking a joke seriously - since you'd be conceding your position is not provable - it is possible to prove a negative. At least in the sense of proof outside of math and symbolic logic.

The world did not end yesterday.
You are not dead [slap]

These impolve empirical demonstration. If we are not allow any empirical proofs (which yes, in the mathematical sense are not proofs), I think there can be deductions that prove negatives.

And a lot of positive assertions can be transformed into negative formulations.

it is possible to prove a negative. At least in the sense of proof outside of math and symbolic logic. — Coben

And what sense would that be? :chin:

And a lot of positive assertions can be transformed into negative formulations. — Coben

Yes, but so what?

Well, then it's not just negatives that can't be proved. For example, all of science is not proved in the sense of math proofs and symbolic logic proofs are proved.

Those are completely abstract and are not open to the kinds of revision scientific conlcusions must be.

IOW most positive conclusions we work with are not provable in that sense. Is that the sense you meant?

And then it would also hold that you cannot prove that we cannot prove a negative without contradicting your claim.

For example, all of science is not proved... — Coben

Exactly. So why this focus on proof? There is rarely proof of anything, especially when such a proof would prove ( :wink: ) useful! :wink:

People are floppy in their use of proof. Though perhaps that your point.
But it ain't just negatives, then.

And yes, lot's of the best stuff that would be good to have proof of, you have to rely on your intuition plus analysis of stuff idiosyncratically. Of course, everyone does that, even the people judging others for doing that.

...so your conclusion is?

[Mine is that debating proof is almost certainly a waste of time.]

[Edited to add: and you can't prove a negative.]

I try to avoid the word. Heck, I have even tried, elsewhere in here to get people to drop 'T' from JTB. I use true and truth in many contexts. But once we are talking about a definition of knowledge saying it is true adds no information and is not the conclusion of any process after justification.

[Edited to add: and you can't prove a negative.] — Pattern-chaser

That's just what your gut tells you.:razz: