I think I'm gonna dig into the time-consciousness book a bit - I think Husserl's own account goes against rentention being strictly perceptual, in the same way Derrida argues, but I've only read secondary sources and a few sections.

I agree, btw, that retention for Husserl doesn't extend into the distant past, but I think it kinda does in a deep psychological ot even spiritual way. Maybe along the lines of the ethical time you mention.

Husserl begins to speak at some point of sedimentation, whereby a transcendental ego is affected by a past and starts to take on a personal 'style' of constitution.

I like the idea of sedimentation, but I'd like to understand it better.

Not far into Time Consciousness but it feels like retention is less a razor's edge than a sense that one's current experience is a continuation of an earlier experience, part of the same movement (though not in a narrative way - in fact narrating the movement from what's been retained to where you are now would probably be a surefire sign that those moments are no longer retained.)

Not far into Time Consciousness but it feels like retention is less a razor's edge than a sense that one's current experience is a continuation of an earlier experience, part of the same movement (though not in a narrative way - in fact narrating the movement from what's been retained to where you are now would probably be a surefire sign that those moments are no longer retained.) — csalisbury

I like this representation. That's the continuity which appears to be so important to Husserl. And I think Husserl conceives of a similar continuity between retention and protension. This continuity is what is contrary to the punctuality of "the now". This is the continuity which Derrida intends to punctuate by positing an actual "present", through reference to the punctuality of the now, and claiming this ideality to be "more 'originary' than the phenomenological originarity itself".

I suppose it's my turn to do the summarization, so unless anyone else has a strong desire to do that, I'll volunteer.

Go for it. But this chapter is....I dunno.

I know, I've read it twice already before really apprehending anything. But a few things are now actually starting to come through. I'll go back and take some notes.

So I'm a bit late on re-reading 5, but I began to see your objection much better @The Great Whatever -- and I think I saw the response, too on the Husserl quote which spans page 55 through 56:

If we now relate the term perception with the differences in the way of being given which temporal objects have, the opposite of perception is then primary memory and primary anticipation (retention and protention) which here comes on the scene, so that perception and non-perception pass continuously into one another

So even granting that retention and protention are perceptive, it will still put a strike against the "solitary life of the soul" because there is non-perception passed continuously into this "blink of an eye".

At least, this reading brought that particular passage out for me. I'm saying something similar to what I said before (and I should note again that I'm not evaluating whether Derrida's claim is true or not, just trying to suss out how the argument works) -- but with a textual reference to back up what I was saying. I'm not sure if that actually persuades you or not. I would like to hear what you think.



Also, the last paragraph -- it was really confusing but I think I'm seeing what he's getting at with it. He's not just asserting the trace, which is what I kind of had as a take-away when I first read it, but claiming that the ideality which Husserl claims -- the Bedeutung of any signifier -- is fully granted, but possible only by repetition. That reptition is, in some sense, Bedeutung, or takes the place of Bedeutung once we see that the eternal now has differance inscribed into it through indication.


Yeah, this next chapter is a doozy. I have some notional ideas, but I'll wait to see what @Metaphysician Undercover says.

The chapter begins with a renewed examination of the distinction between indication and expression. Derrida refers to a double reduction. First the reduction of indication, which requires an other, then the reduction of expression, which has a fictional other. Expression is reduced to theory as not supported by sense (fictional). Here we have the basis of logic. Derrida questions this pure theoretical expression, as there always seems to be a "pointing" to an object, and therefore indication. This culminates at p62 where Derrida claims that the same thing which makes expression non-indicative paradoxically makes it non-expressive, as a fictional signification. The unity of the Zeigen is verified.

We proceed to a short analysis of the present indicative, third person, form of the verb to be, in the form of predication, "S is P". The "is" of predication forms the kernel of expression. But the examples provided by Husserl "you have gone wrong, you can't go on like that", do not utilize that "is", and it is claimed that the "S" must be a name, the name of an object. So we must speak.

It appears to me, that the need for a pre-expressive "sense" leads Husserl to the claim that one must hear oneself. The relationship between sense and expression produces the need for an object. The ideal object is one whose monstration can be indefinitely repeated, and this is related to the historical advent of the phoné. The ideal object is the most objective of objects, it can be repeated indefinitely while remaining the same. But it must be expressed, preserving its presence by means of "the voice". The subject is "immediately affected by its activity of expression"p65. The immediate disappearance, or erasure of the voice is significant in separating it from the written sign. The difference is that the ideal form of the written signifier is "outside".

Derrida calls this "the 'apparent transcendence' of the voice" p66. It is based in the immediacy of the relationship between the "expressed" and the act of expression. The body of the signifier erases itself the moment it is produced. This means that the phoneme is the most ideal of the signs. "Hearing-oneself-speak" is a unique auto-affection because there is no agency of exteriority. It is a pure auto-affection. It is a reduction of space, making it apt for universality, and there is no obstacle which the voice encounters. It is suggested that this universality results in the fact that no consciousness is possible without the voice. Pure auto-affection is produced without the aid of any exteriority. And the voice may be heard by others, and repeated immediately and indefinitely. There is an "absolute proximity" of the signified to the signifier.

Derrida asks, how is this claim, that there are ideal objects only in statements, consistent with the claim that there are scientific truths. The relationship between speech and writing, for Husserl, is discussed. It is proposed that writing is a secondary stratum which completes the constitution of ideal objects.

Husserl's explanation of writing doesn't suffice for Derrida: "the possibility of writing was inhabiting the inside of speech which itself was at work in the intimacy of thought." p70. Further, auto-affection as voice assumes that a pure difference divides self-presence. This is space, the outside. That auto-affection is the condition for self-presence is seen by Derrida as a problem for transcendental reduction. We must pass through the reduction to find the closest proximity to the movement of différance.

So he poses the question "why is the concept of auto-affection imposed on us?"p71. This is the issue of temporality. "Husserl describes a sense which seems to escape from temporality... he is considering a constituted temporality." p71. However, "Even prior to being expressed, the sense is through and through temporal." p71.

So we must move to a different conception of "pure auto-affection", the one which Heidegger uses, derived from Kant. We have now a "source-point", such that pure auto-affection is prior to the movement of temporalization. This is called "the originary impression" p71, and is conceived as the absolute beginning of this process. This impression, this "pure movement" is describable only by metaphor, as it is where language fails. Each now is an originary impression, affected by nothing other than itself, and this is pure auto-affection. When we insert a "being" into the description. we speak in metaphor, speaking about what this "movement" makes possible.

Self-presence, as the living present, is a pure difference with respect to the originary impression. This difference is called a "strange 'movement'", but is described in terms of space. The inside of non-space, time, appears to itself, and presents itself as this movement, while the outside insinuates itself into the movement. Such that, space is "a pure exiting of time to the outside of itself" p73. Derrida closes the chapter with an explanation of the implications which this notion of time has on the phenomenological reduction, and how this relates to expression. Time cannot be an absolute subjectivity.

In closing I'll make reference to the long footnote on p72. I recommend that everyone read this thoroughly, because it is explained here how "absolute subjectivity" is deconstructed through reference to temporality. A constituted temporality has no objectivity, and this lack of objectivity leads us to a point of "now" as a point of actuality, an originary source-point. But this assumption undermines any absolute subjectivity.

The first part of this chapter seems super dumb. Any thoughts on that?

Heh, I dunno about 'super dumb', but the significance of the first three or so pages are kinda lost on me. I'm not sure what the discussion of practise and theory is meant, precisely, to establish. Still, once you get past it, the stuff on the voice is wonderful, IMO. Also I see now that I was anticipating quite a bit when I dragged in the discussions of flow and space, which are probably far more appropriate for this chapter than any others. I'm excitable, what can I say.

Also, this is like one of my favourite places to point to, to anyone who says that Derrida is an idealist in any kind of straightforward manner. It baffles me that for years and years Derrida was considered so by so many of his detractors. This was one of my first Derrida reading experiences, and I remember just being taken aback by how flat out wrong were so many of the characterisations of his work that seemed to have passed around. It was probably Searle's fault.

On yet another unrelated note, ever since reading Henry's Material Phenomenology, I've always thought it would be a fascinating exercise to read this along with it. They're both dealing with almost identical material, but they move in diametrically opposite directions: where Derrida more or less tries to problemetize auto-affection, Henry absolutely embraces it; where Derrida places his emphasis on the sign, Henry places it on affection. It's an incredibly fascinating parallel with no point of convergence.

The first part of this chapter seems super dumb. Any thoughts on that? — The Great Whatever

I think that the point here is to outline what exactly expression could be. It seems to be imagination, a sort of fiction, so it takes the form of theory and logic. But Derrida is already inserting a wedge between expression and voice by characterizing expression with things that are more commonly expressed in writing. He later he turns back to question why expression is not more closely related to writing than to voice. This is an important point for Derrida to make because he wants to dismiss Husserl's claim that voice is the most pure form of auto-affection.

They're both dealing with almost identical material, but they move in diametrically opposite directions: where Derrida more or less tries to problemetize auto-affection... — StreetlightX

It appears to me, like Husserl has chosen voice to substantiate expression. He chooses voice over writing because it is seen as a more pure form of auto-expression. But Derrida appeals to an even more pure form of auto-expression which he calls "originary impression" at the bottom of p71. This is where language fails us, and we must speak in metaphor.

"The intuition of time itself cannot be empirical. It is a reception that receives nothing. The absolute novelty of each now is therefore engendered by nothing. It consists in an originary impression that engenders itself:..."

Also, this is like one of my favourite places to point to, to anyone who says that Derrida is an idealist in any kind of straightforward manner. It baffles me that for years and years Derrida was considered so by so many of his detractors. — StreetlightX

I don't think it is important, or productive, to attempt to class philosophers in this way, idealist, materialist, and such, because this is to place the philosophy within a particular conceptual structure defined by that classification. What is important is to understand the principles put forward by the philosopher, and these may not be so confined.. It is the original aspects of any particular philosopher's philosophy which offer us the most value. So to place the philosopher within a particular classification, is to neglect the principles from that philosopher which go beyond the conceptual structures of that class. And of course, this is the philosopher's originality.

For instance, if Derrida is invoking an objective principle which is more originary than matter itself, then it is impossible to class him as materialist. By going beyond the fundamental principles of a classification, a philosopher cannot be placed within that class. Perhaps some would assume an opposing name, idealist. But his method is not idealist. So what's the point in imposing such names? This is just the progression of philosophy, old principles are overturned by new ones. Then those who classify must produce new classifications.

Home stretch! How is everyone feeling! I'm sorry this has been dead for several days – my mental effort has been taken up elsewhere. We're on the final chapter, then it's on back to the introduction. Let me know if anyone wants to volunteer to summarize again, if not, I'll do it (though it may take me a bit).

Heh. Honestly this last chapter was hard for me. But I'm still down for pushing on.

More often than not I don't absorb everything on a first reading and things start to click later, or on a 2nd reading after letting it sit for awhile.

Yeah, I find this chapter difficult, it seems to be full of inconsistency. I'd better read it again to see what I'm missing.

On Chapter 6:

Stuff started clicking for me once I just decided to ignore the beginning of the chapter. I don't know what the lead-in about silence is supposed to be on about. It almost reads like it comes from another essay -- which, as I recall (though I don't remember where I read this) isn't too far from what Derrida does in these books published this year. After all it would only make sense, being a philosopher of writing, to question the dimensions of the book with a supplement.

But yeah, the stuff about the voice and it leading to auto-affection and securing the seat of ideal meaning and expression -- that all seemed to flow naturally from the last chapter. I just wanted to note that the beginning kept me stumped for awhile. I still don't know what it's about, except by way of some vague metaphorical connections (such as with the notion of hiatus, and the analogy with the trace).

On to chapter 7 then.

Chapter 7 is rather long and convoluted, and no one has offered a summary yet. I vote we give it another week. I, for one have been rather busy, and unable to give it a proper reading.

I'd be fine with that at this point. I just finished 7 the first time last night.

Yeah, I'm down for an extension, I got burnt out on V & P for a bit and had to take a break, but I'd like to still finish.

I don't get the end of chapter 7 at all, where he starts to say that the infinite différance is itself finite. Then he says absolute knowledge is closure, the end of history, and that this closure has already happened. Then he goes on to talk about what "begins", "beyond" absolute knowledge. Then he goes on to look for "old signs", older than presence, older than history, older than sense, more ancient than originary, etc.. Anyone have any idea of what that's all about?

Alrighty, I have today off and I'm making a second go at chapter 7. I think I'll go piecemeal as I switch between pages and tasks (laundry, phone calls, etc. )

The opening is a little confusing in an almost analogous way to the opening of Chapter 6. He introduces a concept at the end of Chapter 6 -- the originative supplement -- and briefly elucidates said concept in relation to Husserl at the opening, then switches topics to a closer reading of Husserl's distinction between intention and intuition, while questioning not the distinction itself, but rather that Husserl goes too far in the direction of intuition when the original argument should keep the meaning separate from intuition even if there is a "fulfilling object" within intuition.

That takes me up to just before the example of statements about perception to another person on the top of page 79.

79-83 makes a nice thought-bridge.


So the example of statements about perceptions, it seems to me, is meant to draw out how a statement means something even when it doesn't have an intuition which can, in principle, give the statement an object. Bedeutung without intuition -- "I see a person standing before me", "I have a perception of a person standing before me" are about how we see things, and so naturally can't be given over to the person I'm talking to -- yet we understand their meaning. This leads directly into the conversation "I" through the question, "In what way is writing...implied in the very movement of signification in general, in particular, in speech that is called 'live' ".

Husserl will make a special place for the use of the word "I". They are indicative when spoken to others, as is all communication. But "in solitary discourse, the Bedeutung of the 'I' is realized essentially in the immediate representation of our own personality..."

That is, the root of these expressions is the 'zero-point of the subjective origin, the "I," the "here," the "now" "

Derrida goes on to point out that "I" functions like any other word, in that it has a meaning regardless of who speaks it and that meaning is understood. That is we do not need to have a representation of our own personality -- "I" is repeatable, the Bedeutung (being ideal) remains the same, and it will keep its sense "even if my empirical presence is erased or is modified radically...even in soliatary discourse" the possible absence of the object is what gives "I" sense. "I am" is discourse only under the condition that, as with all expressions, that it is intelligible in the abscence of the object. "Therefore in this case, in the absence of myself"

Which is to say, the death of the speaker is a possibility of the statement having sense -- which seems to be how Derrida answers the original question. This is the manner in which writing is implied, even in speech -- even in 'the solitary life of the soul'.

"One has no need of knowing who is speaking in order to understand it ((me: that is the "I am")) or even to utter it. Once more, the border appears hardly certain between solitary discourse and communication, between the reality and the representation of the discourse"

I think Derrida just continues to elaborate this point up to the bottom of the first paragraph on 83, taking note that the distinction between "sense" and "object" reinforces the point that the meaning of the statement "I am" (and, likewise for other statements using this indexical) have no need of an object in order to mean, and must actually be able to mean without an object (and hence are forms of writing).

"Why does Husserl refuse to draw these conclusions from the same premises? The motive for full 'presence', the intuitionist imperative and the project of knowledge continue to govern -- at a distance, let us say -- the whole of the description"

This is argued on the basis that language's telos is the truth, and the truth of its comparison to an object. "If the 'possibilty' or the 'truth' happens to be lacking, the intention of the statement is obviously achieved only 'symbolically'"

"Authentic meaning is the wanting to say-the-truth."

That is, in Husserl, while "the circle is square" has a kind of sense, it is not the kind of sense which is good or authentic. Authentic sense, normalcy, is relagated to knowledge. And not just any knowledge, but the sort of knowledge which can be understood with the form "S is P" -- as opposed to signs like "green is or" or "abracadabra".

"the efficacy and the form of signs that do not obey these rules, that is, that promise no knowledge, can be determined as non-sense only if we have already...defined sense in general on the basis of truth as objectivity"

Why? Because if Husserl meant signification by sense, then poetry would be nonsensical. Husserl wouldn't deny signifcation, but would deny them sense, i.e. they do not want to say-the-truth, when truth is understood as truth as objectivity.

(That takes me to the asteriks on p. 85)

Taking me to the top of 87, and adding some of my own connections along the way that I'm making --

It seems to me that the argument here is to focus in the living-present as the founding concept of phenomenology as metaphysics, because this is the common matrix of all the concepts which have, thus far, been put to the test.

And this concept of the living-present is deferred to infinity, in the sense that Kant states we are approximating the truth -- and that this concept lives on a play between, at least in this demonstration (and I presume elsewhere) ideality and non-ideality -- between objectivity and subjectivity, between Bedeutung and wanting-to-say.

This is important because "In its ideal value, the whole system of the 'essential distinctions' is therefore a purely teleological structure" -- hence, metaphysical. It is teleological in that our goal, our objective is the ideal, and an ideal that is never realized at that.

Which, so it seems to me, is elucidating the concept of erasure. We have the moment prior, where the meaning is objective and divorced from the truth, and the moment after, where language -- though it be divorced from truth -- is always reaching for truth, and is thereby still following a notion of the sign determined as sensical only by the form "S is P" -- so the original insight of language, the sign, having meaning regardless of who is speaking, is erased by this infinite deferal, and the phenomenology of the sign shows in what way differance is the origin of this presence (that we choose to focus on presence).

So, to the end now -- as always, guess work is involved, and this is provisional. I think I get the gist, though the reasoning of the paragraph on page 87, where you were referring @Metaphysics Undercover I'm still smudgy on.



Starting where I just left off:
"How does difference give itself to be thought?" What does all this mean?


Husserl, according to the previous, makes Derrida believe that he never believed in the achievement of an absolute knowledge as presence nearby to itself -- but Derrida also states that even though this is the case, that even though sense and the sign are not anchored by wanting to say-the-truth, the metaphysics of presence weaves its way through Husserl's project and tries to make the sign, difference, derived from presence.

The indefiniteness of differance appears only by way of the positive infinity previously discussed, the telos of language. And, likewise, the Ideal as infinite differance is only produced in relationship to death (generally speaking) -- where said Ideal is the infinite differance of presence, in the case of my-death.

Comparing the ideality of the positive infinite to the relation between my-death and the Ideal (as infinite differance) makes this realtion between my-death and the Ideal finite, an empirical matter. So once infinite differance appears, it is finite, rather than infinite. Differance is the finitude of life as the essential relation to itself as to its death. "The infinite differance is finite" -- a contradiction, of course, but a contradiction meant to elucidate differance as play between oppositional concepts -- finite:infinite, absence:presence, negation:affirmation.

If differance appears between, outside, or points to a place that is not dominated by these oppositions, by the metaphysics of presence, then the metaphysics of presence is the end of history. Or, perhaps a better way of saying it, it is a closed history whereupon we master it as we master an object. And, furthermore, even "history" has this quality of mastering, of knowledge as a relation to an object, and is the production of the being in presence.

And full presence is meant to go to infinity to where we have absolute presence to itself -- where we achieve absolute knowledge. But this is only possible in an ideal sense. Hence the oppositional categories which "passes over" ((to use a Heideggerian phrase)) differance and the play between. Metaphysics is wanting-to-hear-itself speak (autoaffection). And this voice, being without differance, is both alive and dead.

2nd paragraph, page 88: Seems to me to be speculating on what this outside of a closure would mean, and acknowledges that if we were to encounter such a question it would sound unheard-of, that it would not be either knowledge or not-knowledge, and that it would seem as if we were wanting to say nothing. I believe the reference to "old signs" is the sort of phenomenological etymology that Heidegger practices, but clearly Derrida believes something more must be done in order to escape this closure. It seems to me that this paragraph acknowledges that we must use signs such as "knowledge", "objectivity", "affirmation:negation", "absence:presence", "finite:infinite" because these oppositions structure our very way of thinking. But there is some hope that through differance we can "break free" of these hierarchies.

Since this is the case we don't know when using these old signs if they are used in the metaphysics of presence or in some novel way. We do not know if the classical distinctions which we have inherited are actually true, or if they are a way of suppressing the truth (since they are so totalizing of our way of thinking, but differance shows us that this totalization, to be cryptic about it, is not total).

The concluding paragraphs seem to be wrapping up these conclusions through metaphore, and noting that, yes, we must speak, yes, we are engaging philosophy in the same manner as it has always been engaged, through the opposition of these concepts -- but what Derrida is after is outside of the concepts of intuition and presentation, outside of sense and non-sense. In fact, given what was just said, it would sound like non-sense.

And though Husserl is the foil through which we are able to see this, he, like others in the philosophical tradition, makes a choice and secures the thing itself -- when the thing itself is infinitely deffered and in each deferal there is a difference from it, something which defines it. Therefore, "the look" (present-at-hand) cannot "remain" (itself a sign steeped in the metaphysic of presence).

I will say -- at parts of the text I feel like, even just to understand the argument, I just need to be more familiar with Husserl than I am. I did my best with my passing familiarity, which includes selections from the Logical Investigations but not Time Conscsiousness, but there was a lot of presumed understanding in the arguments -- which seems to almost always be the case anytime I read Derrida. (For Of Grammatology I had to stop and read Saussure, for instance)

Comparing the ideality of the positive infinite to the relation between my-death and the Ideal (as infinite differance) makes this realtion between my-death and the Ideal finite, an empirical matter. So once infinite differance appears, it is finite, rather than infinite. Differance is the finitude of life as the essential relation to itself as to its death. "The infinite differance is finite" -- a contradiction, of course, but a contradiction meant to elucidate differance as play between oppositional concepts -- finite:infinite, absence:presence, negation:affirmation. — Moliere

Thanks Moliere,
Now here's where I have difficulty. We have first, "the ideality of the positive infinite". Then we have "the Ideal (as infinite differance)". Then "the Ideal finite". How can the Ideal be both infinite differance, and also finite? Don't you think that there is contradiction in referring to the Ideal as both infinite, and finite? What could be the purpose for such a move? We could assume two distinct Ideals, one infinite and the other finite, but then one would be the true Ideal, and the other not.

"So once infinite differance appears, it is finite rather than infinite". This really doesn't make sense either. If the true Ideal is infinite, then how could it ever appear as finite? It is as if Derrida cannot decide whether the true Ideal is infinite or finite, and so wants to say that it is both. Is it the case that the true Ideal is infinite, but it appears as finite? To say of something, like the Ideal, that it is both of two exclusive attributes, does not demonstrate that this thing is the "play between oppositional concepts", it is simply to make contradictory claims.

We can express the relationship between the Ideal and the opposing terms in far simpler ways. For instance, the Ideal is comprised of both opposites, like temperature, an ideal, consists of both hot and cold, and size consists of big and small, etc.. That is how the Ideal allows each of the two opposing terms to partake in itself.

The issue here though, I believe, is that finite and infinite are not properly opposed. Unlike true opposites, each of which always exists within the same category as the other, infinite and finite are categorically different. Those words name distinct categories. So I think that what Derrida is exemplifying here is a crossing from one category to the other. Perhaps what he is saying is that I relate to my death through the Ideal, as infinite differance, but this act itself causes the Ideal to become finite. However, if this is the case, it implies that we have a deep misunderstanding of the nature of the Ideal, as infinite.

If differance appears between, outside, or points to a place that is not dominated by these oppositions, by the metaphysics of presence, then the metaphysics of presence is the end of history. Or, perhaps a better way of saying it, it is a closed history whereupon we master it as we master an object. And, furthermore, even "history" has this quality of mastering, of knowledge as a relation to an object, and is the production of the being in presence. — Moliere

Under the interpretation which I offered above, this "mastering" is really the developing of a deep misunderstanding. It is a deep misunderstanding because the Ideal is understood as being of a particular category. But when the Ideal is mastered, the Ideal is known and knowledge is therefore absolute, according to knowing the Ideal, history is closed, but then the Ideal is suddenly of a different category, and all that existing knowledge is for naught. It is as if knowing the object turns it into a subject, and then it is no longer an object but a subject, so that the entire knowledge of it, as an object is no longer valid knowledge, such that we have to start all over again, to come to know it as a subject.

2nd paragraph, page 88: Seems to me to be speculating on what this outside of a closure would mean, and acknowledges that if we were to encounter such a question it would sound unheard-of, that it would not be either knowledge or not-knowledge, and that it would seem as if we were wanting to say nothing. I believe the reference to "old signs" is the sort of phenomenological etymology that Heidegger practices, but clearly Derrida believes something more must be done in order to escape this closure. It seems to me that this paragraph acknowledges that we must use signs such as "knowledge", "objectivity", "affirmation:negation", "absence:presence", "finite:infinite" because these oppositions structure our very way of thinking. But there is some hope that through differance we can "break free" of these hierarchies. — Moliere

I think, that what might be hidden in these cryptic messages is that this closure is not complete, it is not really absolute. How could it be absolute when the infinite changes to become finite the moment it becomes known? Then the finitude of it cannot be known because it is known as infinite, and this knowledge of it as infinite, reveals that it is finite. So I believe there is some cyclical process being referred to here. That is why we must go back, and refer to "old signs", to pick up the cycle all over again, from the beginning. We have to face the reality, that what we think of as absolute knowledge, must really be a closure of history, a closure not because knowledge is complete, and there is nothing more to know, but because of that deep misunderstanding, we have to go back and start the cycle all over again.

Still pondering the rest, but on your closing -- I agree that there is a cyclical process. But I don't think the solution is to restart the cycle as much as it is to disrupt the cycle -- the discovery of differance, in this case through the sign and through Husserl's phenomenology, is that concept which is meant to stop the cycle from repeating itself.