Yes, you and I have been on the same side of that argument. — Fooloso4

But we don't know there has ever been a time without consciousness. We don't know what consciousness is.

So the conclusion of the argument is an assumption of one of its premises, right?

I would say that we do know first hand what consciousness is, although we cannot explain how it came to be, or, as some would argue, that it came to be rather than it being fundamental. We also know that at least some organisms have consciousness, but there is no evidence that less complex and inorganic things do. In addition, we know that there was a time without complex organisms, and so the assumption that there was consciousness requires evidence.

As some would have it, however, we cannot even speak of time in the absence of human beings, that 'before man' is an oxymoron. Such a view, in my opinion, is based on a theoretic construct of time. that attempts to dismisses time as a theoretical construct

I would say that we do know first hand what consciousness is, — Fooloso4

Newton knew first hand what gravity is, while making it known that he didnt know what it is in the sense of having a theory for it.

so the assumption that there was consciousness requires evidence. — Fooloso4

Sure. I'm not making any claims. I'm just pointing out that lacking a scientific theory of consciousness, there is nothing but personal bias and possibly contemporary fashion supporting the idea that consciousness had a beginning.

Newton knew first hand what gravity is, while making it known that he didnt know what it is in the sense of having a theory for it. — frank

A good example in that with both we know that they work but not how the work.

I'm not making any claims. I'm just pointing out that lacking a scientific theory of consciousness, there is nothing but personal bias and possibly contemporary fashion supporting the idea that consciousness had a beginning. — frank

Actually, I think the contemporary fashion, at least in some quarters, favors panpsychism, and part of the fashion may be due to the appeal of being fashion forward; but I agree, the matter is far from settled. My own bias is a kind of theoretical modestness - don't build too much on theories unless we have good reason to think they are probably true. That is not to say they should be dismissed but unless there is good evidence that consciousness is not a property limited to sufficiently advanced organisms able to demonstrate consciousness, I won't rule it out but I won't rule it in either.

This strikes me as analogous to the "God question". Interestingly from the little I have read Meillassoux does not approve of the religious turn in philosophy. I don't know if he names names but I am guessing he has in mind Derrida.

My own bias is a kind of theoretical modestness - don't build too much on theories unless we have good reason to think they are probably true. That is not to say they should be dismissed but unless there is good evidence that consciousness is not a property limited to sufficiently advanced organisms able to demonstrate consciousness, I won't rule it out but I won't rule it in either. — Fooloso4

I'm with you there. My impression was that theoretical modestness was being put to service as a metaphysical arbiter. You can't do that.

This strikes me as analogous to the "God question". Interestingly from the little I have read Meillassoux does not approve of the religious turn in philosophy. I don't know if he names names but I am guessing he has in mind Derrida. — Fooloso4

Would he approve of Chalmers? I was thinking of him rather than religion.

I don't know. I was just introduced to him a few hours ago by @fdrake.

Would he approve of Chalmers? I was thinking of him rather than religion. — frank

I don't think Meillassoux' research interests overlap with Chalmers, or even approaches in analytical philosophy of mind. He's mostly situated among the various 'realist' reactions against the dominance of post-Kantian idealisms (see some of @Joshs posts in this thread for various signifiers that such an idealism is in play) in various contexts. The arche-fossil is a kind of master argument that attempts to implode such idealisms from within their correlations of thought and being that human beings are invariably situated entirely within.

Edit: at @Fooloso4's request, a relevant quote:

“Scientific truth is no longer what conforms to an in-itself supposedly indifferent to the way in which it is given to the subject, but rather what is susceptible of being given as shared by a scientific community.

Such considerations reveal the extent to which the central notion of modern philosophy since Kant seems to be that of correlation. By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so defined. ”

Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every philosophy which disavows naïve realism has become a variant of correlationism.

Let us examine more closely the meaning of such a philosopheme: ‘correlation, correlationism’.

Correlationism consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another. Not only does it become necessary to insist that we never grasp an object ‘in itself’, in isolation from its relation to the subject, but it also becomes necessary to maintain that we can never grasp a subject that would not always-already be related to an object. If one calls ‘the correlationist circle’ the argument according to which one cannot think the in-itself without entering into a vicious circle, thereby immediately contradicting oneself, one could call ‘the correlationist two-step’ this other type of reasoning to which philosophers have become so well accustomed – the kind of reasoning which one encounters so frequently in contemporary works and which insists that: (begin quote)

"it would be naïve to think of the subject and the object as two separately subsisting entities whose relation is only subsequently added to them. On the contrary, the relation is in some sense primary: the world is only world insofar as it appears to me as world, and the self is only self insofar as it is face to face with the world, that for whom the world discloses itself […]"

I agree with correlationism. The dinosaur argument undermines it?

The dinosaur argument undermines it? — frank

I find it a persuasive undermining. I think the force of it might be summarised as; if we only have access to the correlation between thought and being, how are we demonstrably able to think (conceptualise, more precisely) being before thought emerged?

I think the force of it might be summarised as; if we only have access to the correlation between thought and being, how are we demonstrably able to think (conceptualise, more precisely) being before thought emerged? — fdrake

It's covered by what Kant describes as 'transcendental realism', that 'regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding (CPR, A369).' This doesn't deny the empirical fact of geological time, any more than it denies the empirical reality of the objects in your immediate vicinity. But it is the mind that provides the perspective of extension, duration, and scale upon which and within which all such empirical claims are grounded. By referring to the time 'before human minds existed', we're simply trying to posit a universe in which there is no such mind. But there is still an implicitly human perspective in that construction, as the sequence of time itself and its relationship to the present is provided by the mind of the scientist.

So, I'm deploying exactly the argument the quoted passage states. I think the argument against it is based on the conviction of naturalism, i.e. that the mind is a product of the geological and evolutionary processes that modern science has described.

But again, in order for science to attain any kind of coherency relies on a reasoned inference. The argument about the fossil record is based on the foundation of rational inference. In that sense, reasoned inference has a kind of epistemic priority, in that empirical claims rely reasoned argument. The circularity is that naturalism wishes to explain reason as a consequence of material or physical interactions, which, naturalism never tires of assuring us, are themselves devoid of anything that could be described in terms of meaning, purpose or reason. (As if by magic!)

Meillassoux argues that the stakes are high since science is able to think a time that cannot be reduced to any givenness, or that preceded givenness itself and, more importantly, whose emergence made givenness possible. 1

Notice the 'able to think'. I rest my case.

The fossil is a red herring. You don't need dinosaurs to refer in speech to a world without any consciousness. The average myth starts with a primordial thoughtlessness.

Whether such a thing can truly take shape in the imagination (when all shapes are in fact ideas) is another question.

Deserves some pondering.

Thanks. That clearly states what has been at issue a a couple of recent discussions here. As well, of course, within the philosophical community at large.

A provocative claim from Meillassoux:

... there is only one thing that is absolutely necessary: that the laws of nature are contingent.

And at the risk of being unfair to Meillassoux without providing his defense:

... all those aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in itself.

The thesis we are defending is therefore twofold: on the one hand, we acknowledge that the sensible only exists as a subject’s relation to the world; but on the other hand, we maintain that the mathematizable properties of the object are exempt from the constraint of such a relation, and that they are effectively in the object in the way in which I conceive them, whether I am in relation with this object or not.

I think the subject is just off camera in dinosaur world.

↪fdrake I think the subject is just off camera in dinosaur world. — frank

I really like what this is gesturing in the direction of. But I don't actually know how to articulate it. Can you help me?

The fossil is a red herring. You don't need dinosaurs to refer in speech to a world without any consciousness. The average myth starts with a primordial thoughtlessness. — frank

I agree with this. The science angle is to leverage the empirically realist and 'non-intervention in science' intuitions that correlationists like to have.

I agree with correlationism. The dinosaur argument undermines it? — frank

Geology and cosmology even more so. The fact that science says we evolved and depend on mindless processes to be here is good reason for thinking correlationism is somewhat misleading. Even the fact of your birth accomplishes that, although Meillassoux focused on death and the world after humans are extinct.

I really like what this is gesturing in the direction of. But I don't actually know how to articulate it. Can you help me? — fdrake

I was once staring at an object and I realized that the idea of the object was organizing my experience. I thought for a moment that I'm projecting ideas all over the place, but then I noticed: I am an idea. I exist in contrast to not-me. Take away that division and I would disappear. I am a product of the dividing nature of thought. Because of that experience and the way it changed my outlook, I can't come unprejudiced to the dinosaur argument. Not really. But I can try.

The question is whether we are really able to imagine a thoughtless world. Whatever world we imagine is going to be organized around ideas. Those ideas imply a thinker.

M's argument seems like this: I take a picture of the left side of a building and show it to you. I explain that this proves that left and right are independent because if they weren't I would have been bound to photograph the whole building.

Geology and cosmology even more so. The fact that science says we evolved and depend on mindless processes to be here is good reason for thinking correlationism is somewhat misleading. Even the fact of your birth accomplishes that, although Meillassoux focused on death and the world after humans are extinct. — Marchesk

Science doesn't actually say we evolved from and depend on mindless processes. Science doesn't have a working theory of consciousness.

Notice the 'able to think'. I rest my case. — Wayfarer

If one calls ‘the correlationist circle’ the argument according to which one cannot think the in-itself without entering into a vicious circle, thereby immediately contradicting oneself...

You're blindly following exactly what Meillassoux is criticising. Though, exactly the same thing happened the last time we talked about it.

Edit: I should be clear, though. Rehearsing exactly the argument that he's criticising is as if it is a refutation is the thing which makes me not wish to go through this again with you. If you actually engaged with the argument and came out a correlationist anyway (as some old poster TGW did last time the forum had a speculative realist vs transcendental idealist moment) I'd have a lot more patience.

If you actually engaged with the argument and came out a correlationist anyway... — fdrake

I did that. I wasn’t ‘blindly’ repeating the argument that M. criticizes, I was repeating it consciously and conscientiously for the reasons given.

Science doesn't actually say we evolved from and depend on mindless processes — frank

No, but it is widely presumed. It is explicitly what Dawkins and Dennett believe and implicitly what many others believe.

You don’t see a fundamental hubris in M’s argument?

By referring to the time 'before human minds existed', we're simply trying to posit a universe in which there is no such mind. — Wayfarer

And you're positing that there's a universe in which it makes sense to say things like "stuff didn't have location or size before the existence of humans"! You say:

But it is the mind that provides the perspective of extension, duration, and scale upon which and within which all such empirical claims are grounded.

which makes things like "the universe is about 14 billion years old" or "the Earth has rotated around the sun for most of its existence" literally false, as the space within them must have been the product of a human mind rather than the space concept which we understand space through.

You can't make extension, space and time merely perspectival while simultaneously saying you're fine with their empirical reality; because dinosaurs. Stuff existed before us, our concepts of stuff did not.

You don’t see a fundamental hubris in M’s argument? — Wayfarer

No, not at all, I see a profound openness in his gesture, it recognises the "subjective pole" of our concepts without reducing being to thought. Much better than anthropomorphic just so stories.

I suggest you don’t understand what ‘thought’ signifies in this context. You’re still viewing ‘the mind’ as a phenomenon i.e. from the outside.

But it is the mind that provides the perspective of extension, duration, and scale upon which and within which all such empirical claims are grounded. — Wayfarer

Ok. Tell me where this argument goes wrong.

(1) A moving asteroid existed before humans. (premise)
(2) Its movement requires a residing space to move through. (premise)
(3) Space existed before humans. (from 1,2)
(4) Humans need to exist for there to be an a-priori concept of space. (premise)
(5) The space which existed before humans is not our a-priori concept of space. (from 3,4)

Substitute in transcendental apperception for 'a priori concept' if you want, the argument goes the same. This kind of argument is supposed to be senseless or unthinkable without performative contradiction, but it's actually very easy to understand and is consistent with its own articulation. IE, even when there is an a-priori structure of experience, we can still articulate other structures using that understanding.

Then develop that theme of space:

(6) The space which existed before humans did was not markedly changed by our coming to be.

and you wind up in a nature indifferent to us. Indifferent in the sense that our a-priori structures of experience are not determinative of the character of nature, nor do they 'ground' the structure of nature. What they do do though is ground our experiences (perceptions, sensory manifold, sensibility, whatever) of nature. This isn't hard.

Science doesn't actually say we evolved from and depend on mindless processes
— frank

No, but it is widely presumed. It is explicitly what Dawkins and Dennett believe and implicitly what many others believe. — Wayfarer

Yes. Do you think a mindless world is conceivable?

Tell me where this argument goes wrong.

(1) A moving asteroid existed before humans. (premise) — fdrake

Well, in the context of this particular discussion, I think that the argument begs the question i.e. it assumes what it sets out to prove.

(4) Humans need to exist for there to be an a-priori concept of space. — fdrake

Are a priori or necessary truths dependent on there being humans? Did the law of the excluded middle come into existence as a consequence of evolution? I think not. I understand the basic laws of logic to transcend any particular or contingent facts - 'true in all possible worlds', I think the saying has it. We use our grasp of logic to determine what is objectively the case; hence the role of mathematics in the objective sciences. But a priori truths are not dependent on contingencies, by definition; they would be the case for any species that evolved to the point of being able to reason.

What they do do though is ground our experiences (perceptions, sensory manifold, sensibility, whatever) of nature. — fdrake

But what do we know outside of experience (including experience augmented by scientific instruments such as telescopes and microscopes)? Remember it was just that question that Berkeley proposed to answer. Kant answered it differently again, by showing 'percepts without concepts are empty' - in other words, drawing on both experience and reason.

The problem is, you're actually investing the common-sense understanding of reality with independence, when actually it's dependent on the conceptual framework within which you declare what it is that exists. That goes as much for the facts of common experience, the proverbial 'cup in the cupboard' or 'tree in the courtyard' as much as 'earth before there were humans'. In all such cases, the mind is one pole of that described reality, but it is not perceived, as it is the subject, not the object, of experience.

I know this is an outrage to common sense, but it is also very much a consequence of 20th century science. Why do you think Einstein asked (exasperatedly!) 'Doesn't the moon continue to exist when we're not looking at it?' Why would he have to ask that question? What prompted it? My reading of the conundrum of the observer issue, is simply that nature has reminded us that we're not all-knowing, that our knowledge is situational and contextual. It's not wrong on that account, but it's also not omniscient, either.

Do you think a mindless world is conceivable? — frank

There are many possible answers. One answer is, that if you're not a philosophical materialist, then you don't accept that material reality possesses intrinsic reality.

Well, in the context of this particular discussion, I think that the argument begs the question i.e. it assumes what it sets out to prove. — Wayfarer

This was in response to (1), are you denying that there was a moving asteroid prior to the existence of humans? This seems consistent with your response to @frank:

There are many possible answers. One answer is, that if you're not a philosophical materialist, then you don't accept that material reality possesses intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer

I can respond to the rest of your post when I understand if you're actually coming out and saying that there were no moving asteroids prior to the existence of humans.

There are many possible answers. One answer is, that if you're not a philosophical materialist, then you don't accept that material reality possesses intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer

That doesn't really answer the question, though. I'm not asking about what you accept, but about what you can imagine.

Are you a panpsychist?

when I understand if you're actually coming out and saying that there were no moving asteroids prior to the existence of humans. — fdrake

But can’t you see that the same principle applies to all empirical facts? Not simply what existed prior to human life, but anything that happened in the past. From a naturalistic perspective, of course there’s a temporal sequence within which the human species is a recent arrival (‘a mere blip’, as if often said).

What I’m arguing is that time itself, the sequential ordering of events along a specific scale, is grounded in the mind. That’s the import of the passage I quoted from Paul Davies:

The passage of time is not absolute; it always involves a change of one physical system relative to another, for example, how many times the hands of the clock go around relative to the rotation of the Earth. When it comes to the Universe as a whole, time loses its meaning, for there is nothing else relative to which the universe may be said to change. This 'vanishing' of time for the entire universe becomes very explicit in quantum cosmology, where the time variable simply drops out of the quantum description. It may readily be restored by considering the Universe to be separated into two subsystems: an observer with a clock, and the rest of the Universe. So the observer plays an absolutely crucial role in this respect. Linde expresses it graphically: 'thus we see that without introducing an observer, we have a dead universe, which does not evolve in time', and, 'we are together, the Universe and us. The moment you say the Universe exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness...in the absence of observers, our universe is dead'.

I’m not saying, in the absence of humans, nothing exists, but whatever we say about ‘what exists’ implicitly assumes the framework provided by the mind. You can’t get outside that framework to see ‘what really exists’ in its absence. (I suppose this is actually similar to the point made by positivism although I don’t agree with positivism.) But generally what you will think is, the absence of mind nothing exists, as if it goes out of existence. But that is simply imagined non-existence, it too is a mental construct.

I'm not asking about what you accept, but about what you can imagine. — frank

The three philosophical traditions that I am slightly familiar with are Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist. None of them are materialist, but all of them would answer the question differently. My (tentative) answer to ‘what is mind?’ is that there is nothing objectively knowable as ‘mind’ but nevertheless nothing can be known outside of it. The consequence of Cartesianism was the reification of mind as a ‘thinking substance’ which is objectively incoherent; it is this attitude which gives rise to materialism generally. But it’s based on a kind of ‘false consciousness’. But unpacking all of that could take a book.