My point, however, is Schopenhauer’s seeks to maintain restlessness — TheWillowOfDarkness

No he doesn't.

It is incapable offering people philosophical understanding which mutes or resolves anxiety about what happens next in life. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Actually, this is precisely what Schopenhauer's philosophy intends to do! Have you honestly read the man?

it fails to accept suffering — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I'm pretty sure it does.

It misunderstands Will, mistaking it for something to calm, when it is actually needs eliminating entirely. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Schopenhauer would concur. But the will cannot be eliminated by force, by means of its own objectifications. It requires being blown out, like a candle, from within, as a completely free choice.

Many other times though, it just makes someone bored, resisted or frustrated- an action which generates Will- as it denies the goal that have, meaning the go into “seeking mode” as they need to find it again — TheWillowOfDarkness

He never says eliminating suffering is easygoing. But there is an inner, ineradicable calm, even in the midst of great suffering or boredom, by those who have tasted the denial of the will, which enables them to overcome the blows of life battering them from without.

Schopenhauer would concur. But the will cannot be eliminated by force, by means of its own objectifications. It requires being blown out, like a candle, from within, as a completely free choice. — Thorongil

I know. My point was that his own philosophy works against this by proposing "restlessness" as THE feature of life. Within his understanding of suffering, he is still treating it as if it is something which can be captured and fought, something with which people "cope with."

He never says eliminating suffering is easygoing. But there is an inner, ineradicable calm, even in the midst of great suffering or boredom, by those who have tasted the denial of the will, which enables them to overcome the blows of life battering them from without. — Thorongil

And that's the problem. The absence of suffering is the easiest thing when it happens. One has nothing to do. They just are. Will demands nothing of them, no matter what they might be doing in a moment, for there is none. Schopenhauer's philosophy fails to understanding this, characterising avoiding suffering as if it is a desperate battle we are constantly fighting, as if we would resolve suffering by being "restless." The way his philosophy handles Will is to try and force it out by means of its own objections. In doing so he considers this the means to eliminate Will (even though it doesn't) and ends-up advocates for people to exist in this form of "restlessness."

Within his understanding of suffering, he is still treating it as if it is something which can be captured and fought, something with which people "cope with." — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm not entirely sure he would say this, but even if he did, I'm very curious as to what difference it makes. Basically, the full import of your criticism, which has been put so forcefully, is still lost on me.

One has nothing to do. They just are. Will demands nothing of them, no matter what they might be doing in a moment, for there is none. — TheWillowOfDarkness

And what - you're saying this is a state of boredom? Is that what you think he fails to understand? If so, then you have misunderstood what the denial of the will entails. The ego, as a mere phantasm of the will, dissolves when the will is dissolved, so there is no one to be bored, no one to suffer while the will is being denied.

The way his philosophy handles Will is to try and force it out by means of its own objections. In doing so he considers this the means to eliminate Will — TheWillowOfDarkness

How on earth can you say this after quoting my line about it being blown out from within? I explicitly stated that Schopenhauer does not think the will can be denied by its own objectifications. That is precisely the delusion one must overcome, for a fire can't extinguish itself, and the overcoming of it just is the denial of the will. How this is done is by knowledge, which is the water that puts out the fire. The will cannot act in the individual on what it does not know. Hence, so long as one remains ignorant concerning the futility of willing, one will continue to will, believing that what one wills will some day bring one fulfillment (happiness). To recognize the futility of this is to recognize that the world is only the mirror of the will and hence that no single objectification of the will, just as no single spark of the fire, can extinguish it. How does one acquire this knowledge? The simplest, most common, and most tragic way is through suffering, which either over time or through some particularly excruciating event, slowly erodes, chips away at, or detonates the inborn error that we exist to be happy (having our desires be fulfilled) and that one need only affirm one's will to be so. Then a set of choices presents itself: 1) denial of the realization, resulting in the strengthening of the delusion, 2) suicide, or 3) the path of asceticism. Schopenhauer advocates the third option.

I am going to be completely honest here and contradict parts of what I previously said on the first page of this topic, but I think there is something inherently attractive about a depressive intellectual to many people (including, amusingly enough, myself). Mostly because it is easy to think one is actually doing some deep-shit philosophy when all they are doing is recycling the same things over and over again.

This does not mean philosophical pessimism isn't a legitimate position. But the topic of this discussion is the motive of the temperament of the pessimist (not pessimism per se). I can see no correlation between pessimism and depressive symptoms.

Rather, the depressive symptoms arise when one has not let go of their prior expectations of life. Thus, the position of philosophical pessimism can be of legitimacy, but the temperament can be of relentless, sophomoric complaining.

complaining. — darthbarracuda

Can you elucidate the differences in the sophomoric complaining of the temperament vs. philosophical pessimism? Also you had some posts a while back on exustential boredom or something of that sort. Is this an indictment of your own views or views you once held? How do I not know, based on your previous posts that, at this point, you are just not trolling?

Can you elucidate the differences in the sophomoric complaining of the temperament vs. philosophical pessimism? — schopenhauer1

Like I said above, I don't think being a philosophical pessimist leads to a depressive demeanor. This is the point of this discussion, is it not?: why pessimists generally have a depressive-like temperament.

My opinion is that a philosophical pessimist that has a depressive temperament is fundamentally at fault, not the world. It's the fault of the pessimist that they cannot find a solution to the problems of existence (such as suffering, boredom, time, exile, and death), for if they could, then they wouldn't have such a poor temperament.

I think what you are asking about is the apparent Catch-22 nature of my position: how can someone argue for pessimism without complaining about the world? To which I reply, yes, I suppose pessimism is criticism of the world. But again this topic is about the temperament of the pessimist, not their position. Criticism of the world does not logically lead to depressive characteristics.

To a point, I think pessimists such as myself (and presumably you and others) are unable to completely escape the points of existence that we criticize. This is what depresses me. For example, watching a political debate and seeing just how petty and egoistic it is makes me depressive. Why? Because there is a contradiction between what I expect/desire the world to be like and what the world is really like.

But it is possible to move on from many our points of criticism, or at least mitigate them. It is possible to remove oneself from ennui, from anxiety, from a lot of suffering, from boredom, and even enjoy life (not implying that you do not enjoy life).

So I think, Schopenhauer1, the reason pessimists tend to have a sour temperament is that they see the world as it is, don't like it, but are unable to move past it completely, a case that I would self-diagnose myself with.

Alternatively, the temperament could always just be the result of a chemical imbalance, and the appeal to philosophy is just a silly, post-hoc rationalization (pace Russell).

Also you had some posts a while back on exustential boredom or something of that sort. — schopenhauer1

I don't recall this.

How do I not know[...]you are just not trolling? — schopenhauer1

What kind of response would satisfy your doubt?

And what - you're saying this is a state of boredom? Is that what you think he fails to understand? If so, then you have misunderstood what the denial of the will entails. The ego, as a mere phantasm of the will, dissolves when the will is dissolved, so there is no one to be bored, no one to suffer while the will is being denied. — Thorongil

Not boredom per se, it could be any restless state (e.g. boredom, pain, sadness, etc., etc. any time someone gets trapped Willing to be something the are not). I am saying that Schopenhauer doesn't understand what it means to be free of restlessness, to have eliminated Will. He fails to describe such a state and, as a consequence, his philosophy fails to pass on knowledge of what it entails.

How does one acquire this knowledge? The simplest, most common, and most tragic way is through suffering, which either over time or through some particularly excruciating event, slowly erodes, chips away at, or detonates the inborn error that we exist to be happy (having our desires be fulfilled) and that one need only affirm one's will to be so. Then a set of choices presents itself: 1) denial of the realization, resulting in the strengthening of the delusion, 2) suicide, or 3) the path of asceticism. — Thorongil

He is wrong though. Acquiring knowledge doesn't define the absence of Will. Someone could know everything yet still miss out on the critical change in their own outlook which is the denial of Will. This is what I mean about his philosophy trying to force the elimination of Will from within Will. Schopenhauer begins with an ego towards ending suffering and restlessness and remains there. He still thinks what he Wills (no more restlessness, though knowledge, through suicide, through asceticism) is the solution to eliminating Will. Schopenhauer might know Will cannot be eliminated by the Will, but he nevertheless argues it must be and offers that as THE solution to restlessness.

Critically, this makes his philosophy ineffective at doing what it is supposed to. Knowledge can often trigger a new state someone. Describing what it means to escape restlessness would help many people come to exist in a new state without the burden of Will. Schopenhauer philosophy actually fails to do this. Instead he offers a series moment of Willing, of merely searching for that which will resolve restlessness (maybe suicide? maybe asceticism?), in response to knowledge of suffering. He might say what required (the elimination of Will), but he neither shows it nor practices it within his own philosophy.

I'm not entirely sure he would say this, but even if he did, I'm very curious as to what difference it makes. Basically, the full import of your criticism, which has been put so forcefully, is still lost on me. — Thorongil

The difference it makes in whether or not suffering is recognised for what it is: something which cannot be "fixed," which cannot be "muted," which is not "coped" with under any circumstance.

Schopenhauer philosophy still treats suffering as if it is a problem to be fixed. It Wills the absence of Will from within Will. We can only make the choice, Schopenhauer says, between delusion (absence of knowledge), suicide or asceticism, in an attempt to fix the suffering of our lives. Instead of accepting suffering for what it is, and then asking how we might exist without suffering, Schopenhauer imagines we must fight ourselves (e.g. suffering) from within ourselves (e.g. turn suffering into non-suffering), as if we could Will the elimination of Will and were not bound to the identity of ourselves at a given time.

He fails to describe such a state and, as a consequence, his philosophy fails to pass on knowledge of what it entails. — TheWillowOfDarkness

He does this deliberately, though, for were he to describe such a state, then he would cease to be doing philosophy. Knowledge has applicability only to the world. When the world (as the reflection of the will) disappears through the denial of the will, so too does knowledge along with it. In other words, as he himself claims, Schopenhauer's metaphysical system is immanent; it makes no positive claims about the transcendent. Yet the subject of knowing does not disappear (i.e. upon attaining the denial of the will, "you," at least in the sense of your physical body, do not disappear), which means that something other than the will exists and is affirmed when this occurs. Thus, the denial of the will is simultaneously the affirmation of an unknown X.

Again, nothing positive philosophically can be said about it, but mystics, according to Schopenhauer, do provide some clues, albeit clothed in the language of religious myth (e.g. they will often describe it as "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" with God, Nirvana, Tao, Brahman, etc, depending on the tradition in question). In sum, where philosophy ends, mysticism begins. If you seek positive confirmation about what the denial of the will entails, as opposed to Schopenhauer's merely negative formulations, then your only recourse is to take the mystic's word for it and begin on the path of asceticism. Otherwise, it will forever remain an unfalsifiable possibility.

Acquiring knowledge doesn't define the absence of Will. Someone could know everything yet still miss out on the critical change in their own outlook which is the denial of Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Uh, by "knowledge," he's not talking about being a Jeopardy whiz. Schopenhauer would concur that such knowledge is useless and possibly even a hindrance. What he's referring to is, as I said, knowledge of the will and its effects. It's more akin to a fundamental insight into the nature of the world than the memorization of some meaningless fact.

Schopenhauer might know Will cannot be eliminated by the Will, but he nevertheless argues it must be and offers that as THE solution to restlessness. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Where are you getting this from? You seem very confused if I may say so.

He might say what required (the elimination of Will), but he neither shows it nor practices it within his own philosophy. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I have no idea what this means.

The difference it makes in whether or not suffering is recognised for what it is: something which cannot be "fixed," which cannot be "muted," which is not "coped" with under any circumstance. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Okay, but you're just stipulating this.

Instead of accepting suffering for what it is — TheWillowOfDarkness

What the deuce does this even mean? I think Schopenhauer does damn fine job of accepting suffering for what it is, i.e. something intrinsically undesirable as an end in itself. What else do you have in mind here?

Schopenhauer imagines we must fight ourselves (e.g. suffering) from within ourselves (e.g. turn suffering into non-suffering), as if we could Will the elimination of Will and were not bound to the identity of ourselves at a given time. — TheWillowOfDarkness

As I said above, your identity is not lost from an objective standpoint when the will is denied. Only from the subjective standpoint of the person in whom the will has been denied is it dissolved. And no, he never says we "must" do anything. He doesn't have any robust normative ethical theory and certainly makes no categorical demands on the reader.

I’m pointing out the error remains even with knowledge of “profound insight.” To know the world is full of suffering or that Will cannot eliminate itself doesn’t constitute the non-existence of Will. Someone could know all about those, could have all the knowledge spoken in Schopenhauer'd philosophy, yet be present with the ego of Will. People need more than “profound knowledge” to be without Will.

“Philosophically,” that is to say in terms of metaphysics, of logic, of the infinite, there is indeed nothing to say about the absence of Will. The problem is that “philosophy” is not the limit of description. We can talk about more than the metaphysical. Our knowledge is about more than just the meaning of logic. Sometimes we know stuff about the world, about states of existence, about finite, about the subject.

If we are taking about a person who is not burned with Will, we are describing the state of a subject. Metaphysics says exactly nothing about the subject of our description. Description seems impossible only because Schopenhauer is looking in the wrong place. Instead or raising what matters to description the absence of Will is the subject, he continue to talk only in the “profound insights” of metaphysics, missing it is in description of the subject where we can describe or show what it means to live without the ego of Will.

Rather than the end of philosophy and the beginning of mysticism, it is the end of metaphysics and the beginning of THE WORLD. As such the absence of Will is not incompatible with philosophy at all. The scope of philosophy is wider than merely questions of describing logic. It is also about asking questions about our descriptions of the world and interrogating how these relate to what is true. Our philosophy may dabble in the context of describing these states or help bring us to a point which allows us to in a specific way.

“Mysticism,” in so far as we are talking about it here (e.g. "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" ) is the confusion of THE WORLD (e.g. the state of ourselves which, in Spinozian terms, is our “Love of God” ) for metaphysics, such that people consider themselves to be defined by Will: as if there person is defined by some logical, metaphysical precept (God, PSR,etc.etc), as opposed to themselves as a state of the world. They say: “I am because of God” when, really, they are just themselves.

The absence of Will is actually the affirmation of oneself, whatever that state might be at the time, rather than the reduction of the subject and the world to nothing. The presence of this may be unstated. Or we may talk about about it, such that we describe that someone exists having rejected Will and is not burdened with the desperation to be something they are not. Shop. gets somewhat close to this. In realising the absence of Will is not defined metaphysically, that we must be “nothing” in those terms to be absent Will, he is right. The problem, however, is he doesn’t carry through to consider knowledge of the world. He limits our descriptions of the world and Will to metaphysics and so misses out on detailing so much knowledge, even to the point of suggesting it is impossible. Like the mystic traditions before (and after) him, he confuses talking about the world for talking about metaphysics. He says: “I am (or perhaps, "Everything) because of Will” when, actually, he (everything) has only ever been himself (itself).

We can’t specify “what it takes” to eliminate Will because, in all cases, it’s defined by the given individual being absent Will. Describing someone taking an action isn’t enough to tell whether to not this has been achieved. The best description we can give is to point out someone no longer has Will, the state in-itself, and trust that are description is an accurate reflection of their thoughts and feelings (just as we do with any other situation go out states of experience). In this respect Shop. is correct not to prescribe on any particular behaviour or ethical position. No suggestion of how to act can define the absence of Will.

However… this does not mean Schopenhauer doesn’t specify a “must.” He does, with respect to the goals of understanding suffering and eliminating Will, as if people must do these things to understand the nature of life and avoid existing with the restlessness of Will. Reaching these goals, he argues, must be achieved through specific practices (e.g. worrying about suffering, fighting suffering, eliminating desire, etc.,etc.), despite the fact it isn’t true at all. In the process, he completely fails to describe what it takes to live without Will and advocate people hold beliefs which fail to describe such a life.

What the deuce does this even mean? I think Schopenhauer does damn fine job of accepting suffering for it is, i.e. something intrinsically undesirable as an end in itself. What else do you have in mind here? — Thorongil

Something undesirable that CANNOT be escaped, altered or fought. If suffering is to be avoided, it must not exist. There is no struggle to turn suffering into the absence of suffering. When suffering is present, it is a state of the world we are powerless to change. Schopenhauer hasn't taken this step. He still viewing states of suffering as something to struggle against, as if we can somehow manipulate them into states lesser suffering or states absent of suffering.

To know the world is full of suffering or that Will cannot eliminate itself doesn’t constitute the non-existence of Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Ah, do you see what you've done here? You've cleverly shifted the language to impute a contradiction where none is present. I never spoke of the denial of the will entailing that the will ceased to exist, and neither does Schopenhauer.

People need more than “profound knowledge” to be without Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Prove it.

“Mysticism,” in so far as we are talking about it here (e.g. "rapture," "ecstasy," "illumination," or "union" ) is the confusion of THE WORLD (e.g. the state of ourselves which, in Spinozian terms, is our “Love of God” ) for metaphysics, such that people consider themselves to be defined by Will: as if there person is defined by some logical, metaphysical precept (God, PSR,etc.etc), as opposed to themselves as a state of the world. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, the will is only the word for what is immediately felt in experience. You seem to be mounting here a criticism of the way language functions as opposed to a criticism of Schopenhauer proper, in which case I can only say that we're stuck with language being inherently metaphoric.

The absence of Will is actually the affirmation of oneself — TheWillowOfDarkness

But see, this could be read as a (somewhat misleading) shorthand for what I said about the denial of the will being simultaneously the affirmation of an unknown X.

He limits our descriptions of the world and Will to metaphysics and so misses out on detailing so much knowledge, even to the point of suggesting it is impossible. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Once again, your criticism here is about how language works, not about Schopenhauer's philosophy. His descriptions are limited precisely to the extent that they are descriptions. The denial of the will cannot be positively described, hence he makes no attempt to describe the indescribable. You seem to lament the fact that he doesn't enter into a blatant contradiction by refusing to do just this.

as if people must do these things to understand the nature of life and avoid existing with the restlessness of Will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

As if? No, he nowhere says anyone must do anything. Period. Stop grasping at straw here.

Reaching these goals, he argues, must be achieved through specific practices — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, and this is called a hypothetical imperative. "If you want to do X, then you must do Y." It's entirely contingent on you wanting to do X, which he does not say anyone "must" want to do.

despite the fact it isn’t true at all — TheWillowOfDarkness

You have not shown this at all.

he completely fails to describe what it takes to live without Will and advocate people hold beliefs which fail to describe such a life. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No he doesn't. He has quite lengthy discussions on what it takes to deny the will and moreover refers one to a plethora of sources to further understand how to do so. Read the fourth book of the WWP and the supplements to it in the second volume.

Something undesirable that CANNOT be escaped, altered or fought. If suffering is to be avoided, it must not exist. There is no struggle to turn suffering into the absence of suffering. When suffering is present, it is a state of the world we are powerless to change. — TheWillowOfDarkness

These are unargued for assertions, my friend.