I am not proving it necessarily follows necessarily. — schopenhauer1

So then what's your point? That some people feel so about the world? Sure.

Someone can be happy now making hand puppets and then break their leg walking down the street. They can feel miserable and hate their situation and then they can recover and feel the joy of friends at their bedside, but then get bored in the hospital room and have a moment of existential ennui, in which case they crack open a book and read about their favorite philosopher, by which time they get thirsty, and they can't get comfortable in their bed, but then they get used to it, but now something itches, then they worry about the work they are missing, some anxiety takes place and heartbeat quickens as they see in their minds the work piling up, then they think of that person they work with that really makes their day not so good, then they think of strategies to try to deal with it, oh wait the nurse came with a more comfortable pillow and some juice, great.. oh wait the juice is really watered down and kind of nasty, but wait, the nurse left.. come back, I still want more.. oh well, I can press the button but I don't want to be a nuisance, oh the philosopher book, I forgot about that. I'm going to read that. Oh crap, I have to go to the bathroom, I'll just get up myself.. oh crap my leg really hurts and I have a headache.. — schopenhauer1

There is something fake about this. And what is fake, is that the emotion/feelings generated by reading this are not the same as the emotions/feelings generated in living through, or having lived through the same thing. The experience that you are describing through the text just isn't the experience one would generally have in going through that.

Is it like a mission to create people who will deal with life? To be frutiful and multiply? No, it is not. — schopenhauer1

No it isn't. But this applies equally to the opposite. It's not a mission to cease creating offspring and become unfruitful until the species becomes extinct. That too isn't a mission.

So, all things being equal, just because someone likes dealing with burdens and responsibilities they should put this onto another person? — schopenhauer1

Neither should they put it, nor should they not put it. It's not a moral question.

Also, you didn't answer my question regarding Spinoza a few posts back. — schopenhauer1

I will answer it, just didn't have much time recently...

I think you have it backwards. Philosophical pessimism is the ultimate version of the idea that suffering is inevitable. Your contention should not be with phil. pess. but with the more "optimistic" worldviews that overlooks suffering or tries to downplay it in official rhetoric. However, as stated with Agustino, this doesn't mean they don't deal with it just because they spew out optimistic rhetoric..after the dust is cleared, they still have to live the down and dirty business of life like the rest of us lesser fortunate souls. — schopenhauer1

My problem isn't with philosophical pessimism per se; I more less agree with that. Suffering is inseparable from life. To create life is to make a person who will suffer. The antinatalist has a strong argument for not bringing new life into the world. If I was to asked to suggest the defining attribute of philosophical pessimism, it would be recognising the suffering of life and that there is no joy in the world which can undo it.

It is Schopenhauer's particular brand of philosophical pessimism which I have an issue with:

He is just describing what goes on on a meta level, like stepping back and trying to look at the situation from afar. Whether one "knows" the situation from the meta level or one is actually just living out the situation, that doesn't change or amplify the suffering. One person is just living through the suffering and the other is just recognizing what is going on. — schopenhauer1

Indeed. And that is the problem with his arguments. Suffering it not meta. It is lived. Rather than metaphysical, suffering is of the world. The "restlessness" Schopenhauer identifies is neither a description of any state of suffering nor any particular states of suffering he is worried about. It is "meta" description which says absolutely nothing about any state of suffering. There is no such thing as "meta" suffering. Most critically, a description of instances of suffering is not the state of living through them.

So there is a great deal of difference between a lived moment of suffering and talking about it on a "meta level." The latter is distinct in that it is never the suffering being spoken about. If the "meta" description is suffering at all, it must be its own unique state of anxiety, pain or restlessness which it doesn't say anything about. Rather than a profound insight into the nature of suffering, Schopenhauer's philosophical pessimism is merely one more state of suffering we might encounter. Instead of a description of a states of suffering, it is the state of suffering because one knows there is suffering which one cannot avoid. It is to put an extra scoop of suffering on top all the other suffering we have. Schopenhauer notes the inevitability of suffering and then demands we must suffer for that too.

Again, I just read this as "just deal with it and stop talking about it". — schopenhauer1

I'm actually calling something far more excessive and, fortunately, possible: the elimination of a particular state of suffering.

To ask someone to "deal with suffering" does not make sense. The whole thing about suffering is one does not deal with it. It's impossible. Suffering always hurts. One cannot turn suffering into non-suffering. At best one manages to live through a moment of suffering to be relieved at its passing (or perhaps, dies, so they no longer have to endure it).

What I am calling for here is the elimination of the state of suffering which is Schopenhauer's anxiety about having to suffer. We suffer enough otherwise. We don't need to add to that be worrying about how we can't escape it.

Critically, from the point of view of mitigating suffering, Schopenhauer's philosophy is deeply unethical. It implores are to be anxious about our inability to avoid suffering. If we aren't, it accuses us of failing to understand suffering and grossly misrepresenting what it manes to life a life of suffering. Schopenhauer's philosophy attempts to increase suffering, to make people anxious about how they will inevitably be suffering, because it mistakes suffering at the knowledge of the inevitable suffering for the inevitable suffering of life.

I just don't see what the intellectual love of god really means in practical terms. — schopenhauer1

In terms of the context of this discussion: to be free of anxiety about the contingency of the world. To accept the inevitable outcomes of the world for what they are. Not to, as Schopenhauer does, feel entitled to a world which never exists.

God is the infinite substance immanent in all states of the world. For us to love God means, without exception, to "love" all that happens; to recognise the world for what it is and avoid the notion it "must be" something else, merely because what exists is so painful. It is to recognise suffering for what it is (including the inevitability of suffering and what that means for ethics). It is to recognise the absence of suffering for what it is (and what this means for ethics).

In terms of the context of this discussion: to be free of anxiety about the contingency of the world. To accept the inevitable outcomes of the world for what they are. Not to, as Schopenhauer does, feel entitled to a world which never exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think Schopenhauer's meta-level analysis of suffering creates suffering. He is just describing it. I don't feel suffering because I read Schopenhauer. Rather, I feel suffering and am drawn to a fellow thinker who so eloquently states what I feel. My bet is this is similar to many other people's draw to the philosopher. Schopenhauer thinks that suffering mainly stems from the restless nature of existence (always becoming but never being). Since, in his view, he has the problem, he also provides the solution. There's nothing wrong with him writing about that. A doctor must know what is wrong in order to figure out how to cure it. Personally, I don't necessarily buy into a metaphysical Will, but I do think that there is an analogous thing going on in terms of the restless nature of human experience and how boredom, survival, and comfort drive much our motivations.

God is the infinite substance immanent in all states of the world. For us to love God means, without exception, to "love" all that happens; to recognise the world for what it is and avoid the notion it "must be" something else, merely because what exists is so painful. It is to recognise suffering for what it is (including the inevitability of suffering and what that means for ethics). It is to recognise the absence of suffering for what it is (and what this means for ethics). — TheWillowOfDarkness

So this huge insight is that we are to accept suffering as inevitable? That is just a given. We have to deal with the challenges of life. Recognizing that suffering will happen doesn't make me feel any better about it. Again, this just seems to say "suffering happens, deal with it". Unless we are dead, we are dealing with it, what else can you tell me?

I don't think Schopenhauer's meta-level analysis of suffering creates suffering. He is just describing it. I don't feel suffering because I read Schopenhauer. Rather, I feel suffering and am drawn to a fellow thinker who so eloquently states what I feel. — schopenhauer1

No doubt he gives descriptions of the suffering which is the anxiety about suffering too. In the sense that he is describing this of suffering some people are in, he is talking about suffering what is already there. The problem is his position then goes on to advocate this position continue. Instead of recognising the anxiety about having to suffer is state we may (and ought to) avoid, he confuses it with the inevitable suffering of life. His philosophy increase suffering because it drags more people into the state of anxiety about the suffering of life and helps keep those who are already there in that state.

It is no wonder you feel drawn to written which describes what you feel. Everyone one does. The point is not that you shouldn't be drawn to such writing, but rather that what you feel (and what Schopenhauer describes, the (almost) ever present anxiety about having to suffer) is an unnecessary state of suffering. And that his philosophy advocates maintaining this.

So this huge insight is that we are to accept suffering as inevitable? That is just a given. We have to deal with the challenges of life. Recognizing that suffering will happen doesn't make me feel any better about it. Again, this just seems to say "suffering happens, deal with it". Unless we are dead, we are dealing with it, what else can you tell me? — schopenhauer1

But it is anything but a given. The world is full of people who don't accept suffering as inevitable. People deny that all the time. They give ridiculous rationalisation of why suffering is present. Some ignore it under the impression there is something can be done about it. Some still insist the world must be otherwise and the fact it's not means we must be in constant pain (e.g. Schopenhauer). Our world is full of people who don't accept the suffering of life, even amongst those who know its absence is impossible.

The fact you are still thinking of suffering to be "dealt with" clearly shows you don't accept it. You are still thinking of it as something which can be resolved. As if it were possible to somehow take a state of suffering and remove that it was suffering. That's why suffering is so bad. No-one deals with suffering. It is impossible. Nothing can make it better. We just live in a given pain until that pain stops. In life we are never dealing with suffering. We are just hurting until the hurting stops.

My point doesn't ask you deal with suffering. It argues that one form of suffering (anxiety about having to suffer) ought to be eliminated (as much as possible). This is what the acceptance of suffering achieves.

No doubt he gives descriptions of the suffering which is the anxiety about suffering too. In the sense that he is describing this of suffering some people are in, he is talking about suffering what is already there. The problem is his position then goes on to advocate this position continue. Instead of recognising the anxiety about having to suffer is state we may (and ought to) avoid, he confuses it with the inevitable suffering of life. His philosophy increase suffering because it drags more people into the state of anxiety about the suffering of life and helps keep those who are already there in that state.

It is no wonder you feel drawn to written which describes what you feel. Everyone one does. The point is not that you shouldn't be drawn to such writing, but rather that what you feel (and what Schopenhauer describes, the (almost) ever present anxiety about having to suffer) is an unnecessary state of suffering. And that his philosophy advocates maintaining this. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think that Schopenhauer's description of restlessness is one of his best points. The emptiness one feels and the constant-goal seeking rings very true to the human experience. If anything, it may produce less anxiety to know there is relatively famous thinker out there that not only feels similarly but states the ideas so eloquently. I don't know anyone who reads Schopenhauer who feels an extra source of anxiety from his idea of Will. If anything, it makes people calmer to understand there might be an abstract model that is describing what is going on. Now, in one respect I can see what you are saying- the idea that there is an escape from the suffering might be a pipe dream (like Nirvana, heaven, utopia, etc.). However, that doesn't necessarily cause anxiety. You either except his conclusion like @Thorongil apparently does and go with it (live more ascetically in the hope that this calms the Will), or one does not. If one does not, one simply admires some of the author's main points without accepting the conclusion. Again, no anxiety need be involved in evaluating Schopenhauer's claims. This seems like a strawman or a misconception at the least.

Also, I still don't get this idea of "inevitability of suffering". It still sounds like a tautology "You have to deal with life's challenges". Yep, you do. There is no way to avoid it. The only conclusion I can make from this is the antinatalist stance that you don't have to spread it to other individuals. At least Schopenhaur has some ideas to try to help soothe some of what he sees as why life is suffering (compassion, aesthetic contemplation, and ascetic practice). You can't fault him for trying to explain ways that may make one "escape" some of what may seem painful about life. He thinks that by knowing the situation, you can know how to solve it. Again, even if he is not accurate, by reading his thoughts, one doesn't get more anxious. On the contrary, if one is inclined to agree with his ideas anyways, one may be more comforted that there is a thinker that gives a voice to one's prior feelings. Besides antinatalism, I think compassion is an interesting idea that is useful. If people see everyone else as fellow sufferers and also having to deal with life instead of overlooking life's problems or trying to have a veneer of optimism, then people can commiserate together about it and perhaps feel a bit better knowing that we are dealing with life's challenges. I can also understand the turn towards asceticism if one has these ideas of the suffering and life's challenges because one's natural reaction is to try to rebel against that which is giving suffering. If one is truly adept at being ascetic then perhaps this does provide some relief knowing that one is living in a sort of rebellion against the Willing nature of life. If that doesn't cut it, perhaps knowing you are in the same situation with others who feel the same way will provide at least a moderate amount of comfort.

Isn't it a pity that you diagnose the optimists so well for seeing the world through tinted glasses, and yet fail to see that the pessimists also see the world through the prism of their own feelings? — Agustino

This pregnantly worded question is only interesting to the degree that it suggests the impossibility of truthfully analyzing the character of the world. If you meant to imply such an impossibility, then you end up begging the question by asserting the impossibility of making true statements about the world by means of purportedly true statements about the world, i.e. that it contains beings who are determined by their feelings and that these feelings in turn determine their statements about the world. Such a claim is self-defeating. If you did not mean to imply such an impossibility, then it is possible to make true claims about the world, and I would again maintain that pessimism truthfully describes the world. It is then up to you to refute my position if you disagree.

Your whole post attempts to be an apologetic. And just like all apologists, it seems you feel the need to justify why pessimists feel as they do. — Agustino

I'm not sure I meant it as this. I find it to be more analytic than apologetic, though I suppose an explanation can be a defense in the sense that it clears away misconceptions about the position in question.

A free man is neither pessimist nor optimist. He sees the world as it is. He is a seer; doesn't stamp himself all over the world. — Agustino

Pessimism is realism, in that it adequately describes the world as it is. Do not confuse pessimism as a psychological disposition with pessimism as a philosophical position. The latter is all I am concerned with.

The difference being that one is denying in Schopenhauer, and one is affirming nature in Spinoza. — schopenhauer1

While true, there is a way to read the denial of the will as an affirmation. He says, for example: "It can still be asked from what this will has sprung, which is free to affirm itself, the phenomenal appearance of this being the world, or to deny itself, the phenomenal appearance of which we do not know." So the affirmation of the will results in the world, but the denial of the will is in some sense the affirmation of something of which we know not.

Thanks for your thoughts in this thread, too, by the way.

No it isn't. But this applies equally to the opposite. It's not a mission to cease creating offspring and become unfruitful until the species becomes extinct. That too isn't a mission. — Agustino

But that isn't a mission for antinatalism, just a consequence of preventing other's from suffering. What you would have to justify is that a new individual "needs" to live life despite there being suffering. What "x" reason (aka mission/telos/intrinsic good) needs to be carried out by the an individual such that the suffering is justified? If you fill in the "x" reason/mission/intrinsic good, then this starts going down a slippery slope of individuals being beholden to some external principle and then this external principle has to be justified for why it needs to be carried out in the first place without being circular logic.

Questions for schopenhauer1;

1. How do you integrate Benatar's "hedonistic calculus" with Schopenhauer's moralistic pessimism (e.g. a normative judgment on existence)?

2. By what standard do you (and Schopenhauer) find life wanting?

2. What makes you reject Nietzsche's Dionysian pessimism? From the standpoint of a Dionysian pessimist, existence is blameless, “one cannot judge, measure, compare the whole, to say nothing of denying it”.

3. Even Schopenhauer saw possibility for the aesthetic perceiver, the artist, the compassionate agent, and the ascetic saint to diminish suffering; why don't you entertain this option as a way out and is antinatalism the natural "consequence" for you?

Nietzsche is quite reproachful towards Schopenhauer and accuses him of lacking the philosophical strength to say "yes" to life. In the Gay Science he claims that Schopenhauer’s pessimism represents “an impoverishment of life”, the reaction of a suffering individual who takes “revenge on all things by…branding his image on them, the image of his torture”. I'll be frank in this respect as well; I find the continuous return by pessimists to discuss pessimism akin to TV evangelism: repetitive, futile and a little annoying - nobody who isn't already a pessimist is going to be convinced by it because it is an interpretation of the world incompatible with personal experience for most.

I would think far more interesting would be, instead of trying to convince one another of one thing or another, to understand what one or the other sees when looking at the world.

I disagree, by the way, with your assertion that any one would have to justify that a new individual needs to live. It's sufficient not to ascribe to Benatar's hedonistic calculus or Schopenhauer's pessimism, which I don't. It's only if we accept the premises of the pessimist that we have to play by those rules.

Hi Benkei, I hope you are doing well.

Questions for schopenhauer1;

1. how do you integrate Benatar's "hedonistic calculus" with Schopenhauer's moralistic pessimism (e.g. a normative judgment on existence)? — Benkei

I think they integrate in the idea of existential angst. While Benatar is more of a classic utilitarian, Schopenhauer believes that life is necessarily a restless Will. However, part of what one can take into the utilitarian calculus is restless Will.

2. By what standard do you (and Schopenhauer) find life wanting? — Benkei

Being that there is always a lack of "something" that motivates human behavior, every act that is trying to achieve a goal means something we didn't have to begin with.

2. What makes you reject Nietzsche's Dionysian pessimism? From the standpoint of a Dionysian pessimist, existence is blameless, “one cannot judge, measure, compare the whole, to say nothing of denying it”. — Benkei

Nietzsche seems to claim that the suffering is itself a sort of meaning, but if suffering is viewed as something to avoid, this would be wrong

3. Even Schopenhauer saw possibility for the aesthetic perceiver, the artist, the compassionate agent, and the ascetic saint to diminish suffering; why don't you entertain this option as a way out and is antinatalism the natural "consequence" for you? — Benkei

I do entertain these notions. If we are all fellow-sufferers then it is easier to empathize with others and commiserate, thus being a source of comfort. If aesthetic contemplation is a source of brief escape from the mundane Will, of goal-seeking and deprivation, this is also a source of comfort. If an individual is comforted by rebelling against one's Will by trying to practice asceticism, that is also good. Antinatalism means that people don't want to spread the responsibilities, burdens, and suffering onto a new person.

Nietzsche is quite reproachful towards Schopenhauer and accuses him of lacking the philosophical strenght to say "yes" to life. In the Gay Science he claims that Schopenhauer’s pessimism represents “an impoverishment of life”, the reaction of a suffering individual who takes “revenge on all things by…branding his image on them, the image of his torture”. I'll be frank in this respect as well; I find the continuous return by pessimists to discuss pessimism akin to TV evangelism: repetitive, futile and a little annoying - nobody who isn't already a pessimist is going to be convinced by it because it is an interpretation of the world incompatible with personal experience for most. — Benkei

Frankly, where else do you see antinatalists or pessimists besides philosophy forums or other niche places on the internet? So, unless you just happen to want to engage with such unfortunate souls like myself, where else will you come into contact with such folk in this day and age? You can simply disengage from us annoying people and live your life in your own worldview. Unless antinatalism got to a point where we took out ads for "not having kids from the standpoint of suffering" and were an intrusive and daily occurrence in the most marketed avenues, I don't see how this is a big deal for anyone.

I disagree, by the way, with your assertion that any one would have to justify that a new individual needs to live. It's sufficient not to ascribe to Benatar's hedonistic calculus or Schopenhauer's pessimism, which I don't. It's only if we accept the premises of the pessimist that we have to play by those rules. — Benkei

I'll just propose to you what I proposed to Agustino:

What you would have to justify is that a new individual "needs" to live life despite there being suffering. What "x" reason (aka mission/telos/intrinsic good) needs to be carried out by the an individual such that the suffering is justified? If you fill in the "x" reason/mission/intrinsic good, then this starts going down a slippery slope of individuals being beholden to some external principle and then this external principle has to be justified for why it needs to be carried out in the first place without being circular logic.

I think they integrate in the idea of existential angst. While Benatar is more of a classic utilitarian, Schopenhauer believes that life is necessarily a restless Will. However, part of what one can take into the utilitarian calculus is restless Will. — schopenhauer1

The moral judgment of Schopenhauer is "life isn't worth living", which you take into account when making a utilitarian judgment that "life isn't worth living" (I paraphrase). That doesn't seem entirely the right thing to do for several reasons. The most obvious to me is that Schopenhauer's conclusion should not be part of a utilitarian calculus because the utilitarian consequences of a moral judgment are nil.

Being that there is always a lack of "something" that motivates human behavior, every act that is trying to achieve a goal means something we didn't have to begin with. — schopenhauer1

This is simply not true. The presence of my wife, makes me want to cuddle. It's not the absence of a cuddle that makes me want to cuddle. If it's always a "lack" it would simply make that person profoundly self-absorbed. That's just one particular instance of a motivation but I think people are complex creatures that are motivated by a variety of things - a lack is only one of many possible motivations.

Only a living person can experience a lack of something by the way, so it's not a standard by which to judge life because it presupposes life.

The question stands therefore, by what standard do you find life wanting?

Nietzsche seems to claim that the suffering is itself a sort of meaning, but if suffering is viewed as something to avoid, this would be wrong — schopenhauer1

I do not see how that logically follows. If suffering is something to avoid then how could it not have meaning? If it does not have meaning, why avoid it?

I'm not a Nietzsche expert but as far as I'm aware Nietzsche rejects "being" and embraces "becoming". It's in that difference that his judgment of Schopenhauer enters. For, the disorder and suffering of a world of becoming can only be impugned in the context of an imagined world of being, but, if one truly affirms becoming, “one must admit nothing that has being…the better world, the true world…the thing-in-itself".

So perhaps a further study of Nietzsche and Montaigne would be of interest for you as neither of them reject pessimism but - in a way - take it a step further.

What you would have to justify is that a new individual "needs" to live life despite there being suffering. What "x" reason (aka mission/telos/intrinsic good) needs to be carried out by the an individual such that the suffering is justified? If you fill in the "x" reason/mission/intrinsic good, then this starts going down a slippery slope of individuals being beholden to some external principle and then this external principle has to be justified for why it needs to be carried out in the first place without being circular logic. — schopenhauer1

I don't need to justify suffering because it simply is there. I'd neither make the mistake of raising a single example to a standard, nor the reverse, to abstract away individual differences. That my life and that of my daughter are intrinsically meaningless is a given. Luckily, we are human beings and we can build the greatest edifice of meaning in our life time by entering into meaningful relations with the world around us.

Through living we come to mean something and give some things meaning.

The moral judgment of Schopenhauer is "life isn't worth living", which you take into account when making a utilitarian judgment that "life isn't worth living" (I paraphrase). That doesn't seem entirely the right thing to do for several reasons. The most obvious to me is that Schopenhauer's conclusion should not be part of a utilitarian calculus because the utilitarian consequences of a moral judgment are nil. — Benkei

I am not quite sure what you mean that "utilitarian consequences of a moral judgement are nil." If life's restless nature (always becoming) is (mostly unconsciously) a part of the suffering of existence (the pendulum swing of survival, goal-seeking out of a lack, and general existential boredom), I don't see how this shouldn't be considered part of a calculus of sorts.

This is simply not true. The presence of my wife, makes me want to cuddle. It's not the absence of a cuddle that makes me want to cuddle. If it's always a "lack" it would simply make that person profoundly self-absorbed. That's just one particular instance of a motivation but I think people are complex creatures that are motivated by a variety of things - a lack is only one of many possible motivations. — Benkei

You can look at it a number of ways and still come up with the conclusion I gave earlier. Assuming for a moment that the Will is endless, your example just reiterates the lack that pervades our motivations. If, let's say basic drives and boredom are very much at the base of these motivations, the myriad of goals and desires we have are thus not that complicated to see always arising. First the need for companionship and to be loved, then the need for cuddles. But it is never satisfied and if or when it is denied can become a source of further distress. Post facto excuses that the distress and the initial lack are "good for you" seem suspect as a way to justify inevitable pain and want in a life, but not facing the problem directly.

Only a living person can experience a lack of something by the way, so it's not a standard by which to judge life because it presupposes life. — Benkei

I'm not sure the coherence of the statement. When there is x then y. When there is life, then there is lack of something. This should prove more that life entails a lack. The more self-aware the animal, the more this lack is compounded by nuances of lack, awareness of lack, and distress of lack.

I do not see how that logically follows. If suffering is something to avoid then how could it not have meaning? If it does not have meaning, why avoid it? — Benkei

I guess this is how Nietzsche is using meaning. He seems to like the idea that suffering is the highest intrinsic good. Although at times it seems like a means to another end- something like greatness or achievement. Endurance, suffering, and greatness are all kind of intertwined here in this conception and a life worth living is one that endures many hardships related to the maintaining and improving of one's life which leads to perhaps his actual or other intrinsic good which is greatness.

However, a different conclusion follows if one sees suffering as not an intrinsic good but rather an intrinsic bad. Suffering in Schopenhauer's conception of necessary suffering combined with common sense notions of contingent suffering bring us more of a negative view of life. The necessary suffering is tied to the lack (becoming) which always indicates a lack of something. This lack in itself (the noumenal perhaps) doesn't equate to much except a hollow concept but the outcome of lack when substantiated in living animals that experience this sense of lack, is suffering for that animal.

I'm not a Nietzsche expert but as far as I'm aware Nietzsche rejects "being" and embraces "becoming". It's in that difference that his judgment of Schopenhauer enters. For, the disorder and suffering of a world of becoming can only be impugned in the context of an imagined world of being, but, if one truly affirms becoming, “one must admit nothing that has being…the better world, the true world…the thing-in-itself".

So perhaps a further study of Nietzsche and Montaigne would be of interest for you as neither of them reject pessimism but - in a way - take it a step further. — Benkei

I am not sure how seeing the world as "becoming" is much different than Schopenhauer's ideas. His very noumenal principle is that the world is Will- an ceaseless striving force. However, I think you mean to say that since there is no chance of ever "being" and hence, to free ourselves from the mess, the only option is to embrace it, and embrace it fully. That is not necessarily saying Schopenhauer is wrong though, it is saying that we should be happy that we are suffering. This goes back to viewing suffering as intrinsically bad rather than intrinsically good. One idea conception is saying we simply must deal or cope with with what we are given (which is itself a given if one does not commit suicide). The other is rejecting the premise as not good to begin with (and in Schopenhauer's view) trying to get free of it as much as possible.

This brings me to another point. You may (or will) I am guessing trying to counter that "see, it is just outlook that is determining what is correct or what is most truthful. You choose to suffer by embracing the philosophy". If this is the rebuttal, I lead you back to what I was telling TheWillowofDarkness. There is the life lived and the life analyzed. Schopenhauer is removing himself (metaphorically) from the situation and writing about it as a phenomenon. However, as humans, even if we are not conscious of how it is that we are suffering, we still suffer. Reading Schopenhauer or having similar viewpoints prior to reading him do not add to the suffering, it is just describing it to make sense of what is going on.

I don't need to justify suffering because it simply is there. I'd neither make the mistake of raising a single example to a standard, nor the reverse, to abstract away individual differences. That my life and that of my daughter are intrinsically meaningless is a given. Luckily, we are human beings and we can build the greatest edifice of meaning in our life time by entering into meaningful relations with the world around us.

Through living we come to mean something and give some things meaning. — Benkei

So there is your "x" telos, "Through living we come to mean something and give some things meaning". Now, you are justifying the inevitable harm of life by saying that a person can make their own meaning and give meaning to things. Now you must explain why someone needs to go through this in the first place in a world that has inevitable suffering? Why must this "giving meaning" be carried out without devolving into circular logic?

So there is your "x" telos, "Through living we come to mean something and give some things meaning". Now, you are justifying the inevitable harm of life by saying that a person can make their own meaning and give meaning to things. Now you must explain why someone needs to go through this in the first place in a world that has inevitable suffering? Why must this "giving meaning" be carried out without devolving into circular logic? — schopenhauer1

If that's your interpretation then you don't understand what teleology is. It's not a goal or purpose of life, it's the natural consequence of living as a human.

It's also a gross misrepresentation of my remarks (as other paragraphs show). As I stated before, I'm not interested in being convinced or trying to convince as it is futile. I was hoping to create understanding but that requires you to read compassionately.

You can look at it a number of ways and still come up with the conclusion I gave earlier. Assuming for a moment that the Will is endless, your example just reiterates the lack that pervades our motivations. If, let's say basic drives and boredom are very much at the base of these motivations, the myriad of goals and desires we have are thus not that complicated to see always arising. First the need for companionship and to be loved, then the need for cuddles. But it is never satisfied and if or when it is denied can become a source of further distress. Post facto excuses that the distress and the initial lack are "good for you" seem suspect as a way to justify inevitable pain and want in a life, but not facing the problem directly. — schopenhauer1

No I can't come up with the conclusion you gave earlier because it requires me to tortuously rationalise my actions in a manner that is simply an incorrect representations of my actual motivations. But ok. I guess I'm not seeing things how they "really" are. :B

PS: I'm sorry you're such a one-dimensional character that the only things that motivates you is the "lack" of things.

If that's your interpretation then you don't understand what teleology is. It's not a goal or purpose of life, it's the natural consequence of living as a human. — Benkei

I think the quoted remark works either way. If the point of carrying out life is to make meaning through living, as you indicated, or if it the summum bonum of intrinsic goods to be alive, and thus why life life should be carried out, then the question still stands: "Why does someone need to go through this in the first place in a world that has inevitable suffering? Why must this "giving meaning" be carried out without devolving into circular logic?"

It's also a gross misrepresentation of my remarks (as other paragraphs show). As I stated before, I'm not interested in being convinced or trying to convince as it is futile. I was hoping to create understanding but that requires you to read compassionately. — Benkei

I have definitely appreciated your remarks, even if I disagree with them. After I reread your first post, I will try to change the tone of the argument so that it is more of an inquiry and less of an argument/rebuttal style if that is how you so choose. However, you have to play along as well. If I am willing to "see your side" for the sake of argument, you must also meet me half way as we try to make a synthesis of understanding.

No I can't come up with the conclusion you gave earlier because it requires me to tortuously rationalise my actions in a manner that is simply an incorrect representations of my actual motivations. But ok. I guess I'm not seeing things how they "really" are. :B

PS: I'm sorry you're such a one-dimensional character that the only things that motivates you is the "lack" of things. — Benkei

This so far is not the compassionate synthesis I was hoping :P . However, to elaborate, I think that there might be two forms of suffering going on here: necessity and contingent. Necessary suffering is determined by the nature of restless beings that lack certain things and thus motivated to obtain certain goals. The basic characteristic in humans is the proverbial survival/boredom pendulum he describes. Beyond this though, we live in a world of contingent forces, where any number of genetic, physical, mental, and situational factors can come into play and cause suffering or at the least slight discomfort that requires a reaction.

With necessity aspect, if we were to base most drives on survival and boredom (products of big-brained animal natures) as Schopenhauer states, leads to the myriads of goal-seeking endeavors we have. Boredom is connected with loneliness in intimate ways for example. Humans, generally surviving as social animals, need each other for survival and entertainment. Life simply is less boring when shared with other people. Survival has also equipped us with sexual pleasure and sexual attraction. Combine these things and the needs exist to and you can see where one (unconsciously through the actions of living or consciously through a deliberate goal) tries to find a companion- preferably someone that can also derive mutual sexual pleasure with. Then let's say one finds this person over time. Then other goals, desires, and things pop in. Perhaps, the person is being courted by someone else. Now a sort of reaction bubbles up of fear that the person will go with this other person. Now a new goal/desire begins. Perhaps you end up being with this person and win them back, then other goals/desires bubble up. Then one stubs a toe and tries to alleviate it, etc. etc. All these motivations are a mixture of contingent forces and necessary desires/goals.

So if we were to split the categories.. the "lacking" part is the necessary part that will never go away. The contingent parts are things that can happen otherwise, but nonetheless cause suffering and thus causes one to try to alleviate it or at the least deal with it.

Put on top of this that besides the Schopenhauer lacking aspect of desire and the contingent suffering of one's environment (sickness, disaster, misfortune, disappointment, negative social circumstances), there is a third kind of suffering that is quasi-necessary. I call it this because although there might be a society where this might not be true, it is almost always a guarantee that in life one will have to deal with responsibilities and burdens that otherwise one would not want to deal with. It is the price of being born.

Combine all these together and there is plenty of suffering that is unavoidable. As I was saying to other people in the thread.. Ways to deal with the suffering is to see everyone as fellow-sufferers and thus use compassion to help relieve others burdens, but also acknowledge that it the suffering is never completely going away.

I think the quoted remark works either way. — schopenhauer1

Certainly not in the context it was written...

If the point of carrying out life is to make meaning through living, as you indicated, or if it the summum bonum of intrinsic goods to be alive, and thus why life life should be carried out, then the question still stands: "Why does someone need to go through this in the first place in a world that has inevitable suffering? Why must this "giving meaning" be carried out without devolving into circular logic?"

That's not the point and you know I already stated as much when I said "my life [...] is intrinsically meaningless". So the question doesn't stand.

Read the following not as a point to argue but as a possible glimpse in how my thoughts work:

I take joy in the fact that I can give meaning and now that I am alive I do find meaning - not in life itself - but what my particular life contains (the summum of my relations to the world). My life isn't meaningful, but my relationship to my daughter is. As it is to you via this forum or to my grand piano. There are obvious degrees in importance there but you get the picture.

I also consider this "giving meaning" a very creative force that only sentience has made possible. We're the only beings that can articulate meaning out of nothing. Where there was no meaning - poof - there's a chair, and a table, and a cat on a mat and a brain in a VAT. "Awesome" doesn't do that possibility justice. The knowledge we have developed through giving the world around us meaning is to me the greatest observable miracle in the world - that despite our total insignificance in this universe and the meaningless of it all, we have a reasonable control over our direct surroundings as a consequence of that knowledge.

It's therefore not that I "must" give meaning (I'm sure most people don't care) or that it justifies whatever suffering there is. It's that despite suffering life is just a lot of fun and in any case not something I can judge based solely on my experience of it - that would be hubris. I can only tell you what it means to me.

As it is, I don't care about most of the things Schopenhauer considers suffering. Restlessness is temporary, as is everything. The "perfect state", the life Schopenhauer would consider acceptable, is a state of being (static) that isn't of a world that is always becoming (flux). So if I stop comparing between "being" and "becoming" because of a rejection of "being" a judgment of "becoming" is no longer possible (at least, not in any absolute sense).

Does that make sense to you? You don't have to agree to it, it only has to make sense.

PS: I trust you realised this was tongue in cheek!

PS: I'm sorry you're such a one-dimensional character that the only things that motivates you is the "lack" of things. — Benkei

I'm convinced that isn't the case.

As it is, I don't care about most of the things Schopenhauer considers suffering. Restlessness is temporary, as is everything. The "perfect state", the life Schopenhauer would consider acceptable, is a state of being (static) that isn't of a world that is always becoming (flux). So if I stop comparing between "being" and "becoming" because of a rejection of "being" a judgment of "becoming" is no longer possible (at least, not in any absolute sense).

Does that make sense to you? You don't have to agree to it, it only has to make sense. — Benkei

Yes, it does makes sense. I see your argument. I am not going to do the same old arguments by trying to refute it (not yet anyways), so I am going to do a more inquiry based approach. Why do you think Schopenhauer appreciated static rather than flux? I know one can point to Vedic and Buddhist influences for sure, but I think one can easily look to the Western tradition of thought as well. Neoplatonic and Gnostic thought comes to mind regarding the One or wholeness which has been shattered by space-time. Schopenhauer gives this monism a Kantian flavor by giving reality a polar structure, one in which there is a noumenal aspect (which is "flux-proper") and one which is shattered into individuation by space-time (which is flux-as-mediated-by-space-time-and-causation). One can't help but see parallels with Gnosticism whereby the perfect One is somehow disturbed and by various processes of breaking apart, the physical world of space-time is created (albeit explained through mythological analogy).

Expanding more on this "static" and "flux" terminology (which I think is an interesting one, and thus I am going with it), I would say that antinatalism definitely seems to retain this Gnostic aesthetic. Being not born, though strictly speaking is a "nothingness" (which itself is not accurate because there is no "is" with nothingness- but you get the picture) and the idea of nothingness can be seen as pure being (ironically..I know, since nothingness is pure non-being, but you get what I am saying). The idea of being born is seen as flux or a "disturbance" of the static, if you will. Thus, the "becoming" (and always lacking) aspect of life. This could be a matter of differences in aesthetic attitudes towards life. Perhaps it is temperament (this thread, to @Thorongil's credit started as a discussion of temperament). Perhaps it is an ability to step back and see life as a whole rather than in particular events. Perhaps certain people with a propensity for aesthetic synthesis and existential reflection may come to these type of ideas. Certainly there are themes for people who do seem to reflect on existence itself (positive existentialists or otherwise). These themes surround ideas of things like boredom, angst, suffering, choice, and meaning. So, I don't think Schopenhauer is far off from many subsequent (and prior) philosophers in existential issues. In fact, I think he anticipated a lot of modern attitudes towards existential thought more than any other major thinker of his time period who tended to focus more on purely metaphysical abstractions, political theory, and logico-mathematical writing (with some exceptions like Kierkegaard).

Read the following not as a point to argue but as a possible glimpse in how my thoughts work:

I take joy in the fact that I can give meaning and now that I am alive I do find meaning - not in life itself - but what my particular life contains (the summum of my relations to the world). My life isn't meaningful, but my relationship to my daughter is. As it is to you via this forum or to my grand piano. There are obvious degrees in importance there but you get the picture.

I also consider this "giving meaning" a very creative force that only sentience has made possible. We're the only beings that can articulate meaning out of nothing. Where there was no meaning - poof - there's a chair, and a table, and a cat on a mat and a brain in a VAT. "Awesome" doesn't do that possibility justice. The knowledge we have developed through giving the world around us meaning is to me the greatest observable miracle in the world - that despite our total insignificance in this universe and the meaningless of it all, we have a reasonable control over our direct surroundings as a consequence of that knowledge.

It's therefore not that I "must" give meaning (I'm sure most people don't care) or that it justifies whatever suffering there is. It's that despite suffering life is just a lot of fun and in any case not something I can judge based solely on my experience of it - that would be hubris. I can only tell you what it means to me. — Benkei

In continuing with the theme of flux and stasis, the above question is trying to understand why set up challenges to overcome for a new individual in the first place. The challenges are the flux, the nonexistence is the stasis (let's put picayunish debates about nonexistence aside for now). Why create the challenges? Your life does sound relatively good as you explain it there. No doubt, others have larger challenges to overcome. And in a sort of post facto way, people can make a sentimental 60 Minutes or Nightly News piece about how the challenges of someone's particular life were worth it, but that always seems to focus on the people that have overcome the challenges and not those mired in the suffering of it. People who suffer with mental illnesses, physical illnesses, are going through unfortunate circumstances. This is not to mention the small (but still significant) annoyances of having to figure out daily challenges (insomnia, bad drivers, abrasive personalities, and the list can go on forever it seems). So with all this being said, although I recognize that humans have an amazing capacity to try to make bad things into some sort of learning experience (always in hindsight), it doesn't necessarily justify going through the negative experiences in the first place. Also, these many annoyances are usually unavoidable and are probably will never be overcome. We will all feel the stinging pain of an extremely cold day, the physical exhaustion of this-or-that chore, the occasional sleepless night (or perhaps not-so-occasional). Again, this is the theme of flux and stasis.

Also, you mentioned meaning. Your view is certainly valid in so much as that you seem to hold this to be true. However, at the same time, many people throughout the start of civilization have recognized the instrumentality of the flux of life. I use the word instrumentality because that captures the idea that there is some sort of emptiness/incompleteness at the end of all endeavors. We are doing to do to do to do. But this ceaseless flux and feeling of emptiness is itself a form of suffering. Now, again, we can argue that this is temperament, but certainly, at least some individuals see this throughout the history of civilizations and seem to not be contingent only on a few specific people, but is a relatively common viewpoint.

Yes, it does makes sense. I see your argument. I am not going to do the same old arguments by trying to refute it (not yet anyways), so I am going to do a more inquiry based approach. Why do you think Schopenhauer appreciated static rather than flux? I know one can point to Vedic and Buddhist influences for sure, but I think one can easily look to the Western tradition of thought as well. Neoplatonic and Gnostic thought comes to mind regarding the One or wholeness which has been shattered by space-time. Schopenhauer gives this monism a Kantian flavor by giving reality a polar structure, one in which there is a noumenal aspect (which is "flux-proper") and one which is shattered into individuation by space-time (which is flux-as-mediated-by-space-time-and-causation). One can't help but see parallels with Gnosticism whereby the perfect One is somehow disturbed and by various processes of breaking apart, the physical world of space-time is created (albeit explained through mythological analogy).

Expanding more on this "static" and "flux" terminology (which I think is an interesting one, and thus I am going with it), I would say that antinatalism definitely seems to retain this Gnostic aesthetic. Being not born, though strictly speaking is a "nothingness" (which itself is not accurate because there is no "is" with nothingness- but you get the picture) and the idea of nothingness can be seen as pure being (ironically..I know, since nothingness is pure non-being, but you get what I am saying). The idea of being born is seen as flux or a "disturbance" of the static, if you will. Thus, the "becoming" (and always lacking) aspect of life. This could be a matter of differences in aesthetic attitudes towards life. Perhaps it is temperament (this thread, to Thorongil's credit started as a discussion of temperament). Perhaps it is an ability to step back and see life as a whole rather than in particular events. Perhaps certain people with a propensity for aesthetic synthesis and existential reflection may come to these type of ideas. Certainly there are themes for people who do seem to reflect on existence itself (positive existentialists or otherwise). These themes surround ideas of things like boredom, angst, suffering, choice, and meaning. So, I don't think Schopenhauer is far off from many subsequent (and prior) philosophers in existential issues. In fact, I think he anticipated a lot of modern attitudes towards existential thought more than any other major thinker of his time period who tended to focus more on purely metaphysical abstractions, political theory, and logico-mathematical writing (with some exceptions like Kierkegaard). — schopenhauer1

Nice post!

I don't necessarily think Schopenhauer appreciated static above flux - I haven't read him directly (only second-hand sources) to venture an actual judgment in that respect. That said, it does seem he did have some sort of an ideal on the basis of which he found existence lacking. At least, that's the conclusion at this time that seems logical to me - his judgment appears to be of existence held against that static ideal.

Why this conclusion seems logical to me is that when we accept life as a "becoming", in flux, then the ideal is not part of existence because it is static. It would be a metaphysical construct. All instances of existence, existence in its totality, don't measure up to that ideal. In my view such a comparison would not be fair.

As a metaphor, imagine the painter who has a perfect image in his mind. He paints and paints, each painting never reflecting that image he has and discards them as worthless. Yet to a casual observer some paintings are still masterpieces. The created instances are worthwhile in and of themselves and as a casual observer I can say "that picture is better than this one" but the image inside the painter's mind is unknownable to the casual observer.

So we can compare individual existences, possible existences, past existences or current existences (and their directions) but not to this unknown ideal. We could construct our own ideal, of course, and then find that all individual, possible, past and current existences will be found lacking. Which is why I don't hold an idea of the ideal in this respect. Which in a sense is what, for instance, Stoicism is about in my view, I can't control my existence to such an extent that any ideal is ever attainable because existence is flux so I let go of (absolute) ideals.

So I think the main difference between our viewpoints boils down to what we do with "being" in our philosophy. I more or less state it doesn't have a place because it isn't part of existence (purely mental). You accept it as being there (excuse the pun) and from it, it necessarily follows this world of flux is lacking. Is that a fair approximation?

And if it is, don't you think it's wildly interesting that something that seems so minor has such major implications in our everyday behaviour?

As to predispositions. I think people have a preferred view point but believe both optimism and pessimism are psychologically motivators used alternatively (or simultaneously) by most.

For instance, I had a car accident yesterday. Nobody got hurt, thank god. I was relieved everyone was ok, a bit bummed it will cost me a half month of salary in damages and mostly angry with myself for the mistake last night: I let myself be distracted due to the car seat for the baby not being fastened correctly by my father-in-law (with baby present, eeek!). It could've been worse (optimism), it would've been better if it hadn't happened (pessimism). Both predispositions exist, one allows me not to beat myself up too much and motivates me to carry on and get into that car again right after the accident "shit happens" and the other motivates me to be more careful next time "don't be an ass".

PS: baby thought it was funny.

PPS: I unfortunately don't have time for more for awhile. :(

Nice post! — Benkei

Thank ye, Benkei! Yours as well!

I don't necessarily think Schopenhauer appreciated static above flux - I haven't read him directly (only second-hand sources) to venture an actual judgment in that respect. That said, it does seem he did have some sort of an ideal on the basis of which he found existence lacking. At least, that's the conclusion at this time that seems logical to me - his judgment appears to be of existence held against that static ideal. — Benkei

Yes, you might be right about the static ideal as he scorned Will which, practically speaking, is a stand-in for flux. Will is characterized as insatiable, ever striving, and never satisfied. I think the ideal that you speak of is actually embodied in the concept of stasis itself. It is a sort of metaphoric calm of non-striving akin to a Nirvana-like state.

Why this conclusion seems logical to me is that when we accept life as a "becoming", in flux, then the ideal is not part of existence because it is static. It would be a metaphysical construct. All instances of existence, existence in its totality, don't measure up to that ideal. In my view such a comparison would not be fair.

As a metaphor, imagine the painter who has a perfect image in his mind. He paints and paints, each painting never reflecting that image he has and discards them as worthless. Yet to a casual observer some paintings are still masterpieces. The created instances are worthwhile in and of themselves and as a casual observer I can say "that picture is better than this one" but the image inside the painter's mind is unknownable to the casual observer.

So we can compare individual existences, possible existences, past existences or current existences (and their directions) but not to this unknown ideal. We could construct our own ideal, of course, and then find that all individual, possible, past and current existences will be found lacking. Which is why I don't hold an idea of the ideal in this respect. Which in a sense is what, for instance, Stoicism is about in my view, I can't control my existence to such an extent that any ideal is ever attainable because existence is flux so I let go of (absolute) ideals. — Benkei

I like your analogy there of the painter to convey your point.

So I think the main difference between our viewpoints boils down to what we do with "being" in our philosophy. I more or less state it doesn't have a place because it isn't part of existence (purely mental). You accept it as being there (excuse the pun) and from it, it necessarily follows this world of flux is lacking. Is that a fair approximation? — Benkei

I see what you are saying. However, I think Schopenhauer's point was that, even if you are not aware of the metaphysical "pull" of your striving Will, it is unavoidable, and does cause suffering when goals or desires are not obtained. Added to this is the transitory, instrumental nature of our desires when we are satisfied with attaining desires and goals. I think Stoicism has some parallels with Buddhism and Schopenhauer's asceticism in that being indifferent is a starting path to "denying" the Will. The difference is that Schopenhauer would go a step further than the Stoics in that Will cannot be fully denied until one actually becomes "self-aware" of the situation, sees the tragedy of it, and then tries to enter a program of sorts of denying the Will. Notice that in Schopenhauer's version, you are suffering whether you understand the metaphysical understanding of Will or not. In fact, in his system, one is not given an added source of tragedy by apprehension of the ideal of "denial-of-Will", but rather one can now save oneself "(metaphorically) from one's own suffering as a result of having this insight.

And if it is, don't you think it's wildly interesting that something that seems so minor has such major implications in our everyday behaviour?

As to predispositions. I think people have a preferred view point but believe both optimism and pessimism are psychologically motivators used alternatively (or simultaneously) by most. — Benkei

I think Schopenhauer's "insight" has an aesthetic appeal. To be fair, I think people who agree with Schop will have a predisposition to this aesthetic appeal, and not, by and large, because of any arguments that Schopenhauer makes on behalf of the evils of flux. I could be wrong though. Maybe there's someone out there who was happily whistling along with life, read Schopenhauer, saw the horrors of existence, and decided to become a full-fledged pessimist. This seems less likely though. Let me also say that I don't agree with many of Schopenhauer's metaphysics including the folowing:

-His use of Platonic Forms in his ontology of objects. I think this is unnecessary and runs into issues involving identity. Empirically, we know that evolution provides minor genetic changes and many contingent environmental forces combined with the changes lead to successful adaptation/survival in which case, subsequent environmental forces combined with genetic mutations will lead to more changes, adaptations/survival, etc. This conception ironically has much more in common with Schopenhauer's idea of endless, exhausting flux/Will. It would have been much more interesting if he was able to combine the idea of the Universe's ever-expansion and changing nature with his metaphysics of flux and striving. Unfortunately, Darwin's theory of evolution (though anticipated by Schopenhauer) was not fully developed and explained until 1859.

-His theory of intelligible character vs. empirical character seems strained and unnecessary. He needs to account for why we seem to give agency of someone's action to a person and not cause/effect. If we live in a world mediated by space/time/causality, then agency has no room. This is where he comes up with the idea of intelligible character which is an individual's true character which is beyond space/time and the ultimate originator for how we perceive motives. The empirical character is sort of the contingent way that our intelligible character interacts with the world of space/time/causality. The intelligible character of the individual, as far as I know, is a personalized Platonic Form of each individual human. Again, this seems unnecessary and he could have probably tried to answer the problem of free will and agency in another way than resorting to Forms.

However, with that being said, his strongest point is the instrumental nature of life, its flux, and the fact that we are all dealing with this flux. That has an intuitive appeal. To go back to what Thorongil was saying in his first post. There are some people that embrace the flux and some that give a proverbial sigh to the constant need for having to do to do to do. The ever present need to attain goals/desires and responsibilities of survival is seen as a burden. The emptiness at the end of things seems to be significant. Also, to many pessimists, the many unfortunate contingent pains and annoyances would have rather been avoided in the first place (which is an impossibility) than to have gone through (even if we are somehow "stronger" at the end of it). Isn't it natural for people of this temperament (or insight perhaps) to go on a philosophy forum like this and see if anyone else feels this same aesthetic and to discuss the implications of this?

For instance, I had a car accident yesterday. Nobody got hurt, thank god. I was relieved everyone was ok, a bit bummed it will cost me a half month of salary in damages and mostly angry with myself for the mistake last night: I let myself be distracted due to the car seat for the baby not being fastened correctly by my father-in-law (with baby present, eeek!). It could've been worse (optimism), it would've been better if it hadn't happened (pessimism). Both predispositions exist, one allows me not to beat myself up too much and motivates me to carry on and get into that car again right after the accident "shit happens" and the other motivates me to be more careful next time "don't be an ass". — Benkei

I'm glad no one was hurt! Oddly enough, I knew someone who got into an accident under the exact same circumstances; he was adjusting his daughter's car seat and got into a crash. Anyways, I see what you're saying by motivation. However, I think there is a common and philosophical version of pessimism. Pessimism, as you just used it is kind of its usage in everyday language for seeing the glass "half empty". The combination of optimism and pessimism might be, "hope for the best, expect the worst". The philosophical version of pessimism is more of an aesthetic idea that life is some sort of burden and that the flux of becoming is as a whole is not something to embrace.

I'd like to see if @Thorongil has anything to add as I know he usually has some interesting things to say about pessimism and Schopenhauer.

Added to this is the transitory, instrumental nature of our desires when we are satisfied with attaining desires and goals. I think Stoicism has some parallels with Buddhism and Schopenhauer's asceticism in that being indifferent is a starting path to "denying" the Will. — schopenhauer1

Interesting difference of interpretation. ;)

I didn't see Stoicism as denying Will or flux, because that's undeniably there. To me it's letting go of absolute ideals, not having idealistic expectations about the fluctuating world around us. Otherwise we'd be continuously confronted with the fact we can't change the world to that extent (and therefore be disappointed) and that would lead to continuous restlessness. If you don't have those expectations - speaking from experience - it's pretty quiet inside your head.

I'm glad no one was hurt! Oddly enough, I knew someone who got into an accident under the exact same circumstances; he was adjusting his daughter's car seat and got into a crash. Anyways, I see what you're saying by motivation. However, I think there is a common and philosophical version of pessimism. Pessimism, as you just used it is kind of its usage in everyday language for seeing the glass "half empty". The combination of optimism and pessimism might be, "hope for the best, expect the worst". The philosophical version of pessimism is more of an aesthetic idea that life is some sort of burden and that the flux of becoming is as a whole is not something to embrace. — schopenhauer1

I agree and I didn't mean to conflate the two. I understood Thorongil's reference to "predispositions" as having a preference for either type of the psychological versions of pessimism and optimism but perhaps I misunderstood. How do you think the psychological meaning of pessimism/optimism are different from predispositions?

I also agree that flux as a whole isn't something to embrace, we (can) embrace the good, fight the bad, if possible, and at worst accept it. And if suffering is really constant and unbearable with no chance of it getting better then we can always get out.

Interestingly enough, speaking of Plato, reminded me that he quite easily accepted (more or less as a given) that the ideal was not attainable. In his Politea he didn't argue for the ideal polis but best (ariste poleis).

I agree and I didn't mean to conflate the two. I understood Thorongil's reference to "predispositions" as having a preference for either type of the psychological versions of pessimism and optimism but perhaps I misunderstood. How do you think the psychological meaning of pessimism/optimism are different from predispositions? — Benkei

I think Thorongil's quote at the beginning describes the dispositions well:

Optimists throw themselves into every aspect of the foreign country with great zeal and interest, as if they've always lived there and were born to do so. Pessimists approach the situation they find themselves in with much more caution and forbearance. To them, the very inconceivableness of their existence, not to mention its origin and fate after death, is reason enough to refrain from leaving any deep footprints. — Thorongil

Pessimists don't want to have to deal with the flux in the first place. The fact that we are given a deficit in order to get out of is not a good situation. Whether the program to "get out" be the "indifference" of Stoicism, self-help, alcohol, or any other coping mechanism, the fact is, there was a deficit to cope with in the first place. Rather than choose a program (or no program, which is still a program of sorts), Philosophical Pessimists rebel against the fact that any program must be heeded at all. Again, it is probably about temperaments. More optimistic-types might relish the challenges, deprivations, hardships, etc.

Regarding your quote about "letting go" of absolute ideals, I don't think that is going to calm the average pessimists "restlessness". The restlessness is just a part of life. A creature that must survive and entertain itself is inherently restless. The annoyances and challenges will be there too.

I think that Schopenhauer's description of restlessness is one of his best points. The emptiness one feels and the constant-goal seeking rings very true to the human experience. If anything, it may produce less anxiety to know there is relatively famous thinker out there that not only feels similarly but states the ideas so eloquently. I don't know anyone who reads Schopenhauer who feels an extra source of anxiety from his idea of Will. If anything, it makes people calmer to understand there might be an abstract model that is describing what is going on. Now, in one respect I can see what you are saying- the idea that there is an escape from the suffering might be a pipe dream (like Nirvana, heaven, utopia, etc.). However, that doesn't necessarily cause anxiety. You either except his conclusion like @Thorongil apparently does and go with it (live more ascetically in the hope that this calms the Will), or one does not. If one does not, one simply admires some of the author's main points without accepting the conclusion. Again, no anxiety need be involved in evaluating Schopenhauer's claims. This seems like a strawman or a misconception at the least. — schopenhauer1

Oh, it does reduce anxiety in that sense. To see oneself describe is often relaxing- at least one knows what problem is, even if it isn’t resolved. My point, however, is Schopenhauer’s seeks to maintain restlessness, as if the ignitible of suffering in life meant we obligated to be restless.

When I talk about Schopenhauer’s philosophy causing anxiety, I am talking about it failure to conceive of life as anything but restlessness. It is incapable offering people philosophical understanding which mutes or resolves anxiety about what happens next in life. Instead of redirecting us to think of life in terms of its existence in the moment, it traps us in the cycle of worrying about what goals to find.

In the absence of restlessness, there is no goal seeking. When someone is where they ought to be in a moment, they have their goal, they know what they are doing. To seek a goal is irrelevant because they already have one. And they, as much as they need to, completing or working towards it in the given moment. They need to get nothing because, for that moment, they have everything they require. Suffering included, for as horrible as it might be, it has been accepted (despite being unwanted and horribly painful) until such time as it passes. The suffering which is beating oneself-up about failing to escape suffering is avoided.

The entire point of Schopenhauer’s philosophy works against understanding this. It is so desperate for the pipe dream (sufferingless life) it fails to accept suffering, while also advocating for a form of suffering ( “life is always restless” ) which is frequently avoidable.

My problem is with Schopenhauer’s main points because they tell falsehoods about the world and the relationship of life to suffering. It speaks a falsehood about suffering, suggesting it is something which can be “dealt with,” even though that’s exactly what’s impossible with suffering (and why its so terrible). It misunderstands Will, mistaking it for something to calm, when it is actually needs eliminating entirely.

(and this why the argument to live ascetically fails so often. Sometimes that calms or eliminates the Will, if one is constantly feeling pressured by a hedonistic lifestyle, to a point where stepping back offer respite from restlessness. Many other times though, it just makes someone bored, resisted or frustrated- an action which generates Will- as it denies the goal that have, meaning the go into “seeking mode” as they need to find it again).

Pessimists don't want to have to deal with the flux in the first place. The fact that we are given a deficit in order to get out of is not a good situation. Whether the program to "get out" be the "indifference" of Stoicism, self-help, alcohol, or any other coping mechanism, the fact is, there was a deficit to cope with in the first place. Rather than choose a program (or no program, which is still a program of sorts), Philosophical Pessimists rebel against the fact that any program must be heeded at all. Again, it is probably about temperaments. More optimistic-types might relish the challenges, deprivations, hardships, etc. — schopenhauer1

Do you not see the irony here? What is this "pessimism" but a "coping mechanism?" A program of restlessness which is instituted to feel better about the flux which is impossible to deal with. These pessimists might say they don't want to deal with the flux, but that is really what they are interested in doing the most. Anything to draw attention to the abject failure to deal with suffering- "Hurt, be restless, for life will never be without suffering" they say. In no uncertain terms this pessimist thinks: "There is a deficit we have to cope with." They fail to understanding coping is exactly what is impossible.

It really amounts to, I would argue, a failure of pessimism. Instead of, deep down, knowing there is nothing which can save us, that the flux of life is doomed to suffering, it still holds onto the "optimist" illusion there is some action we take to "cope" with it. For a "pessimistic" position, it sure is afraid of stating how the deficits of life cannot possibly be "coped" with.

It really amounts to, I would argue, a failure of pessimism. Instead of, deep down, knowing there is nothing which can save us, that the flux of life is doomed to suffering, it still holds onto the "optimist" illusion there is some action we take to "cope" with it. For a "pessimistic" position, it sure is afraid of stating how the deficits of life cannot possibly be "coped" with. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I feel quite the opposite. I think pessimism is understanding that the deficits of life cannot be coped with. I don't think many things will get rid of the deficit and at best, if there is some magic formula, that fact that one has to undergo this program is also suspect as one was put in a deficit and then one must pursue this formula in order to maintain some balance. Overall, it is simply taking a rebellious attitude towards having to make a lot of sound and fury to survive and keep satisfied. As I stated, just because there is a marked self-awareness that this is the case, does not mean there is added suffering, but just that a the temperament of a pessimist keeps this understanding in mind.

When I talk about Schopenhauer’s philosophy causing anxiety, I am talking about it failure to conceive of life as anything but restlessness. It is incapable offering people philosophical understanding which mutes or resolves anxiety about what happens next in life. Instead of redirecting us to think of life in terms of its existence in the moment, it traps us in the cycle of worrying about what goals to find. — TheWillowOfDarkness

This is a misconception. Schopenhauer does have suggestions to mitigate suffering (mainly aesthetic contemplation, compassion for fellow-sufferers, and ascetic practice).

In the absence of restlessness, there is no goal seeking. When someone is where they ought to be in a moment, they have their goal, they know what they are doing. To seek a goal is irrelevant because they already have one. And they, as much as they need to, completing or working towards it in the given moment. They need to get nothing because, for that moment, they have everything they require. Suffering included, for as horrible as it might be, it has been accepted (despite being unwanted and horribly painful) until such time as it passes. The suffering which is beating oneself-up about failing to escape suffering is avoided. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think this is a big distortion of Schopenhauer and is more of "Willow's take on Schopenhauer". It is not about accepting or not accepting. Just because it is accepted that goals are a given of life, doesn't mean we don't suffer because of them. Also, you ignore the point of this thread which is that temperament has a lot to do with it. Telling a pessimist to change their temperament can be like asking to change their personality. Pessimists naturally gravitate towards the idea that the whole project is not good in the first place.

In fact, it is you who adds more stress to the pessimist's life by essentially saying: "you are not as good as these people over here who do not hold this view.. You are not following the magic formula, or not good enough in your outlook like these people." This doesn't seem to create non-suffering either. Also, Willow, if you are happy in your goals, why are you so vehement and earnest in your responses? I can't tell for sure, but your posts have so much bitterness towards the pessimist, it makes me think you are harboring pessimism yourself but trying to defend the other side. Why not live your happy, non-suffering life instead of combating philosophical pessimism on an internet forum? Do you think this is "helping" the pessimists see the light of just dropping their understanding? You have the answer and you seek to promote it? You are on a mission? Why not start a thread that lays out your views in the positive "my view is..." rather than always in the negative "my view is not..." and is always to attack pessimism? You sound like a frustrated pessimist. Provide your view and stop shrouding it in attacks.

(and this why the argument to live ascetically fails so often. Sometimes that calms or eliminates the Will, if one is constantly feeling pressured by a hedonistic lifestyle, to a point where stepping back offer respite from restlessness. Many other times though, it just makes someone bored, resisted or frustrated- an action which generates Will- as it denies the goal that have, meaning the go into “seeking mode” as they need to find it again). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Denying the Will is not easy. Schopenhauer himself did not really try it himself. I think Schop's point was that certain individuals of a certain character will be so horrified that they truly will endeavor to see that the Will's flux will be diminished as much as possible. I don't think he thought this was easy or even attainable for most people. He thought that most people can have some reprieves in aesthetic contemplation, art, music, and compassion though. For the most of life, we are just going to have to live out the flux until we die. But the temperament of the pessimist doesn't let this picture of reality recede, but quietly lives his/her life in this understanding and quietly rebels against it by talking about it. I guess the therapy comes from recognizing it, and finding fellow-sufferers who are willing to share their understanding of the situation and realizing we are all part of the same flux story.

I personally don't think there is so grand way out. I don't even think Nirvana-like states can be achieved really. However, that doesn't stop me from seeing the world in a holistic light. If anything, pessimists, with their temperament, see life in a certain aesthetic where the whole flux cannot be discarded in life's evaluation. It is part of his/her sensibility when evaluating life. Tied with pessimism, is antinatalism because this is again, evaluating life holistically. At this decision you must tackle ideas of whether the flux is worth it for the next individual. This is why I pointed out to Benkei that the stasis of the IDEA of nonexistence (notice I said IDEA) seems more appealing than the flux of existence.

Also, you focus solely on Schopenhauer's pessimism. Pessimism writ large does not solely have to be based on Schop's conception. People like David Benatar can happily show you that it can be based on the contingencies of life as well. While life could have otherwise been a charmed one, it is almost always not, and many times much worse. Sometimes it is way worse than we even evaluate it if just given a questionnaire about it in a study about life quality. Life is always giving us challenges we would otherwise not ask for. There are always little annoyances throughout the day, at the least. For some, mental and physical illness is added to the stresses of maintaining a living. For some, the struggle to fit in, get a handle on things, etc, is harder than others. The stress of others saying how it is easier for them, and they have to get on board with the program, doesn't help.

Overall, again, pessimists probably have an aesthetic sense about life that, though perhaps in the minority, cannot help but view it as suffering that is not good to endure in the first place. Though one can try to live the best life one can, this aesthetic sense is always in the background. There is a tendency for pessimists to see existential boredom, instrumentality, and angst more readily in the flux of life.

The life lived without reflection contains suffering. The life lived with reflection, for the person of a pessimistic temperament, sees the suffering and cannot readily accept with joy or (morose indifference) that this is life and so be it. To the pessimist, this is a basic truth of life and truth cannot be simply discarded once recognized. For the pessimist, there is a reaction of rebellion that life is this way in the first place. If one does not commit suicide, one will have to live life, but one doesn't have to view the situation as good. The indifference approach is cold and does nothing more than say a truism: "life is suffering and we know this". The pessimistic approach not only takes into account that there suffering and we know this, but sees the suffering as negative or an "evil". Perhaps it cannot be overcome, but at least it is recognized for what it is and not ignored or downplayed- discounting its pervasive part of life for many people in many instances.

For those who do not "see" this truth or who overlook the suffering- it is their prerogative. I haven't seen a pessimist forcefully make anyone believe anything before. The pessimist has every right in a free society to state his views and see if he finds others who see the same thing as him/her. If people vociferously disagree due to temperamental or aesthetic differences, then they can explain their view to each other. I have no illusions that people have the exact same aesthetic tendencies towards the human condition. Each side can make their case, but this doesn't mean each side will win out the other person's view. Philosophy is all about dialectic, and the same basic themes unfolds over and over again throughout history.

I will say this for the pessimistic theme though- the pessimistic theme is pervasive throughout all of civilization, has been embraced at times by many deep thinkers (not just philosophers), and at one point or another, crosses the minds of most adults at some point in life. Perhaps these fleeting thoughts are simply judged as youthful angst or a depressive mood, but pessimists are willing to stare at it directly and explore this understanding further. The aesthetic sensibility of the pessimist sees these ideas not as fleeting depressive states but as a truth about the human condition itself. They cannot help but see it this way. Life's flux, challenges, contingent suffering, annoyances, instrumentality and existential boredom seem so pervasive to life itself that being indifferent to the suffering is hardly an option if it is one at all.

@jamalrob @The Great Whatever @Baden @mayor of simpleton @180 Proof

Pessimism is an attitude — Agustino

False. It is in one sense an attitude, and in another, a position about the nature of the world.

It presupposes that new individuals could possibly not deal with life. — Agustino

You commit the same presupposition by using the phrase, "dealing with life." That life must be "dealt with" at all already acknowledges an adversarial relationship between oneself and what it is one is dealing with. It implies a problem to be solved, something to wrestle with and combat, and a non-ideal state of affairs. In other words, you acknowledge that life is inherently a struggle, to borrow a Darwinian phrase, and yet think it might be possible for it not to be so. I might be willing to grant that the latter is indeed possible, but then it would cease to be life!

doesn't mean everyone ought to feel so — Agustino

The "ought" is only ever implicit. No categorical imperative about accepting the pessimist's conclusions is being foisted upon you.

This is integrity, and courage. — Agustino

I don't see how this amounts to either integrity or courage. In fact, the opposite seems apparent, that this is actually cowardice. Defending what you take to be true is real courage, for it entails sacrifice and an element of danger not present in simply submerging oneself in an echo chamber of like minded opinions.

I noticed that most people are not like me - for them, it's extremely meaningful to struggle - for them, this is the point of life. — Agustino

Sometimes one must struggle to maintain and vouchsafe the quiet life you so desire (and I desire) from those who do like struggling for its own sake. They greatly outnumber us and daily seek to obliterate self-reflection and contemplation.

Philosophical pessimism is a certain state in addition to all other states (including suffering) of their life. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, it is not a state of being but a judgment.

Rather than accept that suffering is an inevitable part of life, he ties himself up in knots over our inability to avoid it. To Schopenhauer we are failures because we cannot compete the task of eliminating suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I am not aware of him denying that suffering is an inevitable part of life. On the contrary, it sounds like something he would quite readily admit. Nor, also, does he call any human beings failures.

Why not a form of philosophical pessimism which recognises we cannot escape suffering, but avoids the practice of beating ourselves up for that inability? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Because we can escape from suffering, according to him. The inevitability of suffering does not negate the possibility of escape from it.

Is life, suffering, something we can accept as inevitable? You don't think so. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I'm pretty sure Schopenhauer does think this.

It is not a description of how life is suffering. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes it is.

it is the state of suffering because one knows there is suffering which one cannot avoid. It is to put an extra scoop of suffering on top all the other suffering we have. Schopenhauer notes the inevitability of suffering and then demands we must suffer for that too. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Again, Schopenhauer makes no demands of anyone. You seem intent on ramrodding a very peculiar reading of Schopenhauer onto us that has little basis in the actual words of the man himself. You also seem to be saying that anyone who is already suffering will only multiply their suffering merely on account of reading a book that tries to make generalized statements about suffering, which constitutes a form of philosophical pessimism. This is bizarre! Most pessimists, including myself, take great pleasure in reading pessimistic literature, for it comes as a welcome antidote to the optimistic drivel contained in almost everything else one reads. It reminds me of something Einstein said, which is somewhat related:

"I do not believe in freedom of the will. Schopenhauer’s words: ‘Man can do what he wants, but he cannot will what he wills’ accompany me in all situations throughout my life and reconcile me with the actions of others even if they are rather painful to me. This awareness of the lack of freedom of will preserves me from taking too seriously myself and my fellow men as acting and deciding individuals and from losing my temper.”

Likewise, Schopenhauer's pessimism more generally, far from increasing one's anxieties and suffering, rather aids in alleviating them to a considerable extent.

I find the continuous return by pessimists to discuss pessimism akin to TV evangelism: repetitive, futile and a little annoying - nobody who isn't already a pessimist is going to be convinced by it because it is an interpretation of the world incompatible with personal experience for most. — Benkei

What a ridiculous statement. No one is evangelizing. We're simply having a discussion on a forum, trying to clarify our own views and correct misrepresentations of our position as best we can. We even welcome debate and criticism, which is necessary to test any position, not just ours. What's wrong with that and how is that any different from debating the merits of any position in a (hopefully) clear and intelligent way?

The moral judgment of Schopenhauer is "life isn't worth living", which you take into account when making a utilitarian judgment that "life isn't worth living" (I paraphrase). That doesn't seem entirely the right thing to do for several reasons. The most obvious to me is that Schopenhauer's conclusion should not be part of a utilitarian calculus because the utilitarian consequences of a moral judgment are nil. — Benkei

Schopenhauer is not a utilitarian and no where, to my knowledge, says that life is not worth living, for that directly implies suicide, which he condemns. He rather says that life has no intrinsic worth, which is quite another thing, and that no compassionate, rational person would impose the burdens of existence on the coming generation.

It's not the absence of a cuddle that makes me want to cuddle. — Benkei

No one would make the absurd claim that you cuddle your wife due to the absence of cuddling in your life. The privation is deeper than that. "There are no real pleasures without real needs," as Voltaire says. There are a whole host of more primitive and primordial needs for which cuddling is merely one minor attempt at fulfilling.

I don't need to justify suffering because it simply is there. — Benkei

The justification the pessimist is looking for is for not doing anything to prevent it, alleviate it, or escape from it.