If you agree with the logic of the argument I've presented then yes. If not, why not? — Wayfarer

In order to be epistemically consistent, a scientist's religious beliefs would have to satisfy the same criteria he requires his science claims to satisfy.

The epistemic criteria for scientific claims typically require independently observable empirical corroboration, specifically rule out intervention by supernatural agents, and entail independently observable predictions.

If the religious claims a scientist believes in do not satisfy these standards, then his epistemic standards for accepting or rejecting religious claims is inconsistent with his epistemic standards for science claims.

We perpetually inhabit the present - the past is unobservable. — dukkha

Perhaps we do perpetually inhabit the present, but we arguably only experience the past, given that our sensory organs and brain require a nonzero amount of time in which to receive and process information from our environment. We experience the world not as it is, but as it was.

I also find people like Dennett, Dawkins & Co. somewhat insensitive. But I don't think that their dismissal of religion is a dismissal of spiritual experiences. Neither religion nor art have a monopoly on spiritual experiences, they occur in many different domains: e.g. sports, sciences or in one's relation to other people, animals, or other things.

There was also a super awesome book that I forget the title and author of now (herhaps someone will know?), but it was written by a journalist, about the history of scientists themselves, what quirky crazy fucks most of them were, and how much infighting posturing, and tribalism is present among scientists, for some reason I remember the author being on a plain... or something... but anyway, it was a sweet counter-balance to the distancing/denotative/former language scientists like to use by focusing on the people themselves. — Wosret

Perhaps you're thinking of Laboratory Life by Latour and Woolgar.

In any event, is it any surprise that scientists are humans? Did anyone really think they were some kind of emotionless robots who valiantly strive for an understanding of nature, completely devoid of the human passions which are part of every other aspect of life?

Yes, they wish to remove the person and render everything in the third person, which is why they use the language that they use. At work now, I'll have to look up the book when I get home. T'was good.

So, believers believe. But unlike intelligent design proponents, Catholics don't look to science to validate that belief. — Wayfarer

I doubt that Behe and company also look to ID to "validate" their belief in God. They likely believed in God long before the ID movement began. They probably believe in God for the same reason(s) that most anyone else believes in it. They use irreducible complexity and the other accoutrements of ID to try to convince others, including (presumably) nonbelievers.

Aquinas's theological proofs of God's existence were not intended as polemical devices to convert unbelievers, but as theological exercises for the faithful. Aquinas would always say that one must have faith at the outset.

But when someone deploys the cosmological argument for God's existence (or really any argument whatsoever), they do so with the intent to prove (deductively) or make probable (inductively or abductively) the conclusion of their argument, i.e. the existence of God. That's what arguments are for: they're intended to convert. Whether Thomists believe that God can be "known" through faith alone, they also believe that God's existence can be demonstrated by appeals to observable features of the universe. They thereby appeal to empiricism, in other words, something you've claimed that "real" believers don't do.

I personally find the cosmological argument philosophically persuasive, but I would never suggest it amounts to an empirical hypothesis. How could it? How could you empirically validate such an idea?

Well, this is part of the problem with these families of arguments (the argument from design, the cosmological argument, etc), as pointed out by Hume and others: we have no experience with a range of universes, some of which are created and some which are uncreated, in order to calibrate our notions of designedness vs. lack of design. We have to muddle through with resort to analogies with manmade artifacts (clocks, watches, and the like).

The argument from design, including the ID incarnation, and the cosmological argument allege to explain empirically observable phenomena, but do not themselves entail any empirical consequences or predictions. They are, therefore, quintessentially rationalist--not empirical--arguments.

The argument from design, including the ID incarnation, and the cosmological argument allege to explain empirically observable phenomena, but do not themselves entail any empirical consequences or predictions. They are, therefore, quintessentially rationalist--not empirical--arguments. — Brainglitch

Then you and I have a different notion of empiricism and rationalism.

Then you and I have a different notion of empiricism and rationalism. — Arkady

Well, I may well be mistaken.

Can you explain?

Because the arguments appeal to observable aspects of nature in order to bolster their case for the existence of God (as opposed to relying upon revelation or pure logic-chopping as with the ontological argument and its ilk), something Wayfarer claimed that "real" believers don't do.

Hypotheses or theories, not arguments, make (or entail) testable predictions. Arguments simply purport to derive a conclusion from one or more premises, which is what those propounding the cosmological argument and the others attempt to do.

Because the arguments appeal to observable aspects of nature in order to bolster their case for the existence of God (as opposed to relying upon revelation or pure logic-chopping as with the ontological argument and its ilk), something Wayfarer claimed that "real" believers don't do.

Hypotheses or theories, not arguments make (or entail) testable predictions. Arguments simply purport to derive a conclusion from one or more premises, which is what those propounding the cosmological argument and the others attempt to do. — Arkady

I think the distinction you're making between argument and hypothesis here is a red herring.

A hypothesis is a proposed explanation for phenomena. For a hypothesis to be empirical, it has to be observable or testable. In these arguments, God is the hypothesis proposed as the logically necessary explanation for nature.

P1: Nature
P2: Nature entails a supernatural Designer/Creator
C1: Therefore, a supernatural Designer/Creator
P3: The only supernatural Designer/Creator is God
C2: Therefore God

The alleged knowledge of the conclusion is arrived at by armchair deductive reasoning devoid of empirical data--rationalist knowledge.

This thread has become quite the post-dispensing mechanism. Quite intelligently designed by Mr. Colin, I must admit. Clearly Colin is a secret guru for philosophy forum orgies, so let's get even wilder, my merry friends! Wosret, give us your blessing, Lord Jester Forum Bro O:)

More people talk about God. Yup, love me some sacred cow. Yum yum yum. — Wosret

Double up good.

The dispute in this thread is not about people's experiences, it's about the propositional claims--such as the existence and action of a supernatural agent source--of their experiences. — Brainglitch

One would first accept some sort of validity to the religious experiences described, as a premiss to a claim, if that were the basis of the dispute.

The epistemic criteria for scientific claims typically require independently observable empirical corroboration, specifically rule out intervention by supernatural agents, and entail independently observable predictions. — "Brainglitch

Isn't this an idealised version of scientific claims? I'm just studying a module on metaphysics of mind, for instance, where the claims for 'physicalism' and 'causal closure of the physical' are extrapolations from metaphysical claims arising from studies other than the one in hand. This is not to knock extrapolation as such: i we weren't often using extrapolation, in biology for instance, we'd never get things done.

One would first accept some sort of validity to the religious experiences described, as a premiss to a claim, if that were the basis of the dispute. — mcdoodle

Sure, we take the person's word for it that he had what he believes to have been a religious experience.

Isn't this an idealised version of scientific claims? I'm just studying a module on metaphysics of mind, for instance, where the claims for 'physicalism' and 'causal closure of the physical' are extrapolations from metaphysical claims arising from studies other than the one in hand. This is not to knock extrapolation as such: i we weren't often using extrapolation, in biology for instance, we'd never get things done. — mcdoodle

Perhaps idealized, but I think the vast majority of established scientific claims satisfy those criteria. That's how they got to be "established."

Sure, we take the person's word for it that he had what he believes to have been a religious experience. — Brainglitch

Yep. That's the right way to word it, as well as the right approach. If you want more than that, then you'll have to provide stronger grounds.

@mcdoodle, it's not really a matter of being more or less sympathetic to Colin, more or less sensitive or appreciative, or of being more or less equipped at imagining similar experiences for comparison. When it comes down to it, it is about applying a reasonable standard and assessing the available evidence; or, like some seem to have opted, one could discard reason because it is a fawn in the side of wishful thinking and might just cause one to wake up to harsh reality. Are we here to ascertain the truth or to give each other a pat on the back?

If science has 'no jurisdiction' when it comes to religion, then why is it okay for religion to stick it's oar in on science? — Sapientia

It isn't but it can point out the ways that moral judgements made on ostensibly scientific grounds have overstepped the mark.

Then perhaps what you should do is realise that evolutionary biology, palaeontology, and other branches of science, are not a matter for religion. — Sapientia

They're not, but when they are used to define human identity, then again, they're no longer simply scientific judgements. To say that they are, would be rather like saying that your medical records constitute your biography.

Yet you, on the other hand, accept the conflict thesis. Trying to have it both ways? — Sapientia

I don't accept a necessary conflict between religion and science. I think there's an obvious conflict between scientific materialism and religious fundamentalism.

it's nice to see you concede, rather than evade. — Sapientia

I haven't been 'evading' anything, although my meaning often seems to be misunderstood.

How does one validate any idea except empirically? — Harry Hindu

From what I have read of your posts, you don't understand the distinction between empirical and a priori, which is philosophy 101.

Like the "Complex Design" argument that says that complex designs require a designer, it creates an infinite regress — Harry Hindu

Not if the first cause is defined as an 'uncreated creator' - but you had better get your head around the other point first.

written by a journalist, about the history of scientists themselves... — Wosret

Not The Sleepwalkers, by Arthur Koestler? Excellent book, in any case.

I'm a hardline atheist but mostly in Wayfarer's corner. — McDoodle

I would be glad to be in a corner with adversaries as intelligent as yourself, McDoodle!

we have no experience with a range of universes, some of which are created and some which are uncreated, in order to calibrate our notions of designedness vs. lack of design. — Arkady

That doesn't stop the theorists from trying! In fact, irony of ironies, one of the main drivers behind the 'multiverse conjecture' is to defuse the appearance of a 'fine-tuned universe'.

A remarkable fact about our universe is that physical constants have just the right values needed to allow for complex structures, including living things. Steven Weinberg, Martin Rees, Leonard Susskind and others contend that an exotic multiverse provides a tidy explanation for this apparent coincidence: if all possible values occur in a large enough collection of universes, then viable ones for life will surely be found somewhere. This reasoning has been applied, in particular, to explaining the density of the dark energy that is speeding up the expansion of the universe today. I agree that the multiverse is a possible valid explanation for the value of this density; arguably, it is the only scientifically based option we have right now. But we have no hope of testing it observationally. Additionally, most analyses of the issue assume the basic equations of physics are the same everywhere, with only the constants differing--but if one takes the multiverse seriously, this need not be so [see "Looking for Life in the Multiverse," by Alejandro Jenkins and Gilad Perez; SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, January 2010].

Don't you love the idea that 10^500 universes is considered a 'tidy explanation'? I wonder what 'an untidy explanation' would look like? (considering that this number is larger than the number of atoms in the universe we do know about).

And in fact, they're having exactly the same argument about what constitutes empiricism, in regards to whether speculations about multiple universes amount to a scientific hypothesis. (In the yay side, Sean Carroll, the nay side, George Ellis.)

Current physics makes medieval theology seem timid.

In order to be epistemically consistent, a scientist's religious beliefs would have to satisfy the same criteria he requires his science claims to satisfy. — Brainglitch

Not at all. There are plenty of religious scientists who have no trouble recognising the different domains of the two.

Vera Rubin is an American astronomer who pioneered work on galaxy rotation rates. She uncovered the discrepancy between the predicted angular motion of galaxies and the observed motion, by studying galactic rotation curves. This phenomenon became known as the galaxy rotation problem. Although initially met with skepticism, Rubin's results have been confirmed over the subsequent decades. Attempts to explain the galaxy rotation problem led to the theory of dark matter.
...
Rubin is an observant Jew, and sees no conflict between science and religion. In an interview, she stated: "In my own life, my science and my religion are separate. I'm Jewish, and so religion to me is a kind of moral code and a kind of history. I try to do my science in a moral way, and, I believe that, ideally, science should be looked upon as something that helps us understand our role in the universe.

(Wikipedia).

There was a very interesting article on The New Atlantis not long ago about the religious lives of Faraday and Maxwell. Max Planck was an non-orthodox Christian and passionate critic of scientific materialism. Albert Einstein eschewed organised religion but always denied being atheist. Examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

Not The Sleepwalkers, by Arthur Koestler? Excellent book, in any case. — Wayfarer

It was A Short History of Nearly Everything. I remember it fondly, and fairly well I believe, it had lots of dirt on a lot of histories greatest scientists, it was great.

Oh yeah I have that. Sleepwalkers is a better book but it was a good read.

Double up good. — Bitter Crank

I would prefer to triple up excellently.

It isn't but it can point out the ways that moral judgements made on ostensibly scientific grounds have overstepped the mark. — Wayfarer

Can you give an example? Do you think that Dawkins has done this?

They're not, but when they are used to define human identity, then again, they're no longer simply scientific judgements. To say that they are, would be rather like saying that your medical records constitute your biography. — Wayfarer

I'm interested in whether you think that Dawkins has done this. Like I mentioned, I plan on reading 'The Blind Watchmaker' in the near future, so I am glad that this subject has come up, and I'll try to bear these things in mind when reading it.

I don't accept a necessary conflict between religion and science. I think there's an obvious conflict between scientific materialism and religious fundamentalism. — Wayfarer

I don't think that that was clear from some of your earlier comments, but thanks for clarifying.

I haven't been 'evading' anything, although my meaning often seems to be misunderstood. — Wayfarer

Hmm. Maybe it's just me, but on several occasions in which you were challenged on something, you seemed to either change the subject or go silent.

I don't think Prof. Dawkins has any real grasp of moral philosophy or religion. His approach to religion, since 'The God Delusion' anyway, is that it is the source of everything evil in human affairs, and that the sooner it dies out the better off we'll be. And that is not exagerration on my part, it is his stated belief.

Dawkins appeared here in Australia on a panel discussion a couple of years back, and he was asked 'Do you think Darwinian principles ought to be used to organise society?' And he said, to his great credit, heavens no, it's a horrible principle for organising a social philosophy, we have to get away from that.

But he honestly doesn't seem to realise that, in the very next breath, he will condemn the Christian tradition as being a pernicious delusion and a threat to civilization. As an opinion piece on Dawkins said:

Dawkins’ narrowmindedness, his unshakeable belief that the entire history of human intellectual achievement was just a prelude to the codification of scientific inquiry, leads him to dismiss the insights offered not only by theology, but philosophy, history and art as well.

To him, the humanities are expendable window-dressing, and the consciousness and emotions of his fellow human beings are byproducts of natural selection that frequently hobble his pursuit and dissemination of cold, hard facts. His orientation toward the world is the product of a classic category mistake, but because he’s nestled inside it so snugly he perceives complex concepts outside of his understanding as meaningless dribble. If he can’t see it, then it doesn’t exist, and anyone trying to describe it to him is delusional and possibly dangerous.

Eleanor Robertson

His philosophy of biology is built around 'the selfish gene', which proposes that humans are like robots who are driven by a genetic programme to propogate the genome. Yet he doesn't seem to realise the profoundly anti-humanistic implications of this view. I think that's because, as many of the reviewers of The God Delusion have said (including Michael Ruse, who really ought to be one of his natural allies), his grasp of philosophy and ethical theory is less than undergraduate.

But he seems to feel this urge to go on a crusade, pardon the irony, against all forms of religion.

I recommend Karen Armstrong and Mary Midgley on these topics, they're both capable scholars and neither represent themselves as theistic apologists but as humanists in the true sense 1, 2.

But his biological writing is said to be very good, if he hadn't launched himself into a holy war I would probably read more of it myself.

How does one validate any idea except empirically? — Harry Hindu

From what I have read of your posts, you don't understand the distinction between empirical and a priori, which is philosophy 101. — Wayfarer

Actually, it's that you don't understand that one cannot exist without the other. The rationalist vs. empiricist shouldn't be arguing, they should be working together - just like our senses and our brains.

Like the "Complex Design" argument that says that complex designs require a designer, it creates an infinite regress — Harry Hindu

Not if the first cause is defined as an 'uncreated creator' - but you had better get your head around the other point first. — Wayfarer

In other words, you can just make stuff up that can't be falsified or validated and it should be accepted to be as valid as any other idea that has been falsified and validated.

I don't accept a necessary conflict between religion and science. I think there's an obvious conflict between scientific materialism and religious fundamentalism. — Wayfarer

Conflict between science and religious fundamentalism arises over conflicting explanations for certain phenomena--such as species, in the current ID v evolution dispute. But there are other conflicts, and they're not limited to fundamentalism.

Conflict arises whenever science proposes naturalistic explanations for phenomena that religion explains via supernatural agency of some kind. Historically, such conflict has occurred numerous times, (as I've already noted somewhere upthread) from the dreaded thunder god and other meteorological events, to disease and healing, to famine, warfare, to the divine right of kings, to astronomical events, to demon possession, etc. Presently, and surely in the future, science proposes alternative naturalistic explanations for morality/ethics, allegations of supernatural encounters (including visitations, revelations, inspirations, prophecies, ecstacies ...)--essentially any experiences people report and understand to be religious or spiritual.

What science can address and propose is--not information about the alleged supernatural agent or ineffable mystery itself--but, rather, naturalistic causes and conditions for such experiences, for how it comes to be that people believe such experiences are of the supernatural. And such naturalistic explanations are inherently in conflict with religion's supernatural explanations.

In other words, you can just make stuff up — Harry Hindu

You don't seem to have the slightest familiarity with the discipline of philosophy, otherwise you would understand that the concept of 'uncreated creator' has been part of the subject for millennia. You will understand why I'm no longer going to reply to your posts.

Conflict arises whenever science proposes naturalistic explanations for phenomena that religion explains via supernatural agency of some kind. — BrainGlitche

That is the essence of 'the conflict thesis':

The "conflict thesis" is a historiographical approach in the history of science which maintains that there is an intrinsic intellectual conflict between religion and science and that the relationship between religion and science inevitably leads to public hostility. The thesis retains support among some scientists and in the public, while most historians of science do not support the original strict form of the thesis.

~Wikipedia

There are conflicts between religious authorities and scientists about all kinds of things. But as you note, 'What science can address and propose is--not information about the alleged supernatural agent or ineffable mystery itself--but, rather, naturalistic causes and conditions for such experiences.'

But on purely philosophical grounds it can be argued that 'naturalistic explanations' will never necessarily culminate in discovery of any kind of fundamental ground or first cause for the phenomena we observe.

For instance, above, there was some debate about what 'scientific laws' are. What scientific laws are, is not a scientific question at all! There are some science popularisers around, like Lawrence Krauss, who appear not to realise this, and instead get themselves into a complete muddle attempting to explain how science explains everything (for which read David Albert's review of his book.) But the bottom line is that, science is limited in scope, method and outcome; it has to be, because scientific method operates by exclusion.

Hence the deficiency of naturalism as a philosophy: it treats humans as only parts of nature, i.e. basically as a species. And then the only basis for ethical principles becomes one or another form of utilitarianism, what is 'useful' for that species in terms of surviving and getting along. Sam Harris has demonstrated that, in his forays into ethical philosophy (and kudos to him for trying.) But it amounts to declaring that the only real good is 'human floushing' because there is no conception of a higher or absolute good, knowledge of which is salvific, as found in all of the religous cultures; it can't encompass such ideas, for obvious reasons.

But on purely philosophical grounds it can be argued that 'naturalistic explanations' will never necessarily culminate in discovery of any kind of fundamental ground or first cause for the phenomena we observe. — Wayfarer

If naturalistic explanations cannot explain something, then what else is there besides (1) it goes unexplained, or (2) we subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently?

For instance, above, there was some debate about what 'scientific laws' are. What scientific laws are, is not a scientific question at all! There are some science popularisers around, like Lawrence Krauss, who appear not to realise this, and instead get themselves into a complete muddle attempting to explain how science explains everything (for which read David Albert's review of his book.) But the bottom line is that, science is limited in scope, method and outcome; it has to be, because scientific method operates by exclusion.

Of course science is limited in scope, method and outcome.

What's your point?

Hence the deficiency of naturalism as a philosophy: it treats humans as only parts of nature, i.e. basically as a species. And then the only basis for ethical principles becomes one or another form of utilitarianism, what is 'useful' for that species in terms of surviving and getting along. Sam Harris has demonstrated that, in his forays into ethical philosophy (and kudos to him for trying.) But it amounts to declaring that the only real good is 'human floushing' because there is no conception of a higher or absolute good, knowledge of which is salvific, as found in all of the religous cultures; it can't encompass such ideas, for obvious reasons.

Right, science cannot identify, explain, or prove an asdolute good.

And neither can you or anybody else. You can just express your opinion, your own value judgement that something is an absolute good. And your defense of your belief can consist in nothing more than reasoned argument--which, by the way, is also part of what science does.

Conflict between science and religious fundamentalism arises over conflicting explanations for certain phenomena--such as species, in the current ID v evolution dispute. But there are other conflicts, and they're not limited to fundamentalism.

Conflict arises whenever science proposes naturalistic explanations for phenomena that religion explains via supernatural agency of some kind. — Brainglitch

I just want to point out that this conflict only arises if one subscribes to a non-instrumentalist view of science. If you take scientific instrumentalism to be the case, then there is no conflict between say believing god created the world in seven days, and using the theory of evolution to explain the biodiversity in the world.

Right, science cannot identify, explain, or prove an asdolute good.

And neither can you or anybody else. You can just express your opinion, your own value judgement that something is an absolute good. And your defense of your belief can consist in nothing more than reasoned argument--which, by the way, is also part of what science does. — Brainglitch

But I think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be. If we are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, we can forever seek higher goods, always in pursuit of that absolute good. But if we are of the opinion that there is no absolute good, then the good determined today, or yesterday, as the highest good, might be continually forced upon us, into the future, as the highest good, denying the possibility that we could discover higher goods, And if we allow that there are higher goods, how would we create any hierarchical system without any direction toward an assumed absolute good?

If naturalistic explanations cannot explain something, then what else is there besides (1) it goes unexplained, or (2) we subscribe to some hypothesis that's unverifiable, unfalsifiable, untestable, and offers no independebtly confirmable predictions--and provides no way, even in principle, to resolve dispute with other such unverifiable hypotheses that explain the matter differently? — BrainGlitch

So you beieve that nothing that can't be explained by science, is a factor or cause in human's lives?

You can just express your opinion, your own value judgement that something is an absolute good. — BrainGlitch

I have tried to analyse the significance of religious experience in a broader way than that offered by religious apologetics, by saying that it is indicative of a core of insight into areas that can't be plumbed by naturalism, which is found in many diverse wisdom traditions. And your answer is given in terms of 'scientism' and moral relativism, which I see as the exact predicament of the modern secular intelligentsia. That's my point. So thanks, I think we've cleared that up.