True statements, true propositions, and true conceptions...

If these are all to be called "facts", then what do we call the false ones?

Clearly, because some are false and facts cannot be, not all verbal statements, propositions, and/or conceptions are facts.

What makes them either true/false? What makes them a fact?

Correspondence to fact/reality/events/what's happened/what's happening. Wait, that doesn't work.

Calling them true/false statements, propositions, and conceptions works just fine. There's no need to call them "facts". They are true - and not false - because of their correspondence to fact.

I've been trying to avoid responding here beyond offering brief comments because time is precious for me at the moment. So I'll keep it as short as possible. — Janus

I wish everyone would keep it as short as possible--seriously. So I appreciate that.

There are two senses of 'fact': facts as verbal statements and facts as ostensive ontological propositions or conceptions of states of affairs. States of affairs are propositional in the sense that they are always given, even prior to their expressions, in the form that 'such and such is the case'. The verbal propositional equivalent is just the expression of what is already recognized to be the case. The fact need not be expressed, but it is always already in propositional form by virtue of its recognition as fact nonetheless. — Janus

The sense of "fact" that I use (which isn't a novel sense, but that's not important), is simply that facts are states of affairs. A billion years ago, there were countless facts. There was no language, there were no propositions, etc.

The sense of "proposition" that I use (which again isn't novel), is that propositions are the meanings of statements.

So again, a billion years ago, there were no propositions, as there was no meaning, because there were no creatures of the sort that create meaning, yet there were plenty of facts.

Facts are not propositional, they're not conceptions, they're not verbal statements. Facts are not in the form that "such and such is the case." They're in the form simply of existent things/processes, in (dynamic) relation(s) to other existent things/processes. Facts are certainly not in the form of meanings, and meanings are also not identical to any words, gestures, behavior, etc. (Well, or the only facts that are in the form of meanings are facts of meanings; that is, that so and so is thinking in some particular way that amounts to meaning.)

The proper dialectically consistent response to a proposition with a singular conception in its predicate (truth is a judgement), is with a predicate containing a singular conception of its own, hence truth is a cognition. However, just as judgement in and of itself is not the prime explication for truth, neither is cognition, in and of itself, insofar as truth is a relation, and no singular conception can in any way be relatable.

A more exact formulation for truth with respect to judgement might be: judgement is the necessary means to truth, and by association, the more exact formulation for truth with respect to cognition would be: cognition which conforms to its object is the necessary condition for truth.

Historians like ranke believed there was a truth to be discovered...post modernists like jenkins believe there is not. Richard Evans seeks a middle ground I look to quanrum mechanics where some say the observer finds schrodingers cat alive or dead penrose believes in the gravitational induced collapse of the wave function and others seek a middle way. I have a concept of relatiive objectivity which i would be happy to elucidate.

The sense of "fact" that I use (which isn't a novel sense, but that's not important), is simply that facts are states of affairs. A billion years ago, there were countless facts. There was no language, there were no propositions, etc.

The sense of "proposition" that I use (which again isn't novel), is that propositions are the meanings of statements.

So again, a billion years ago, there were no propositions, as there was no meaning, because there were no creatures of the sort that create meaning, yet there were plenty of facts. — Terrapin Station

You can work with whatever definition of the term 'fact' you like, of course. For me yours is an impoverished definition that removes the distinction between actuality and factuality. For me the notion of a fact is the notion of a Janus-faced semantic entity that "looks" or points both towards truth and towards actuality.

Of course facts can be thought of ontologically as synonymous with states of affairs and this understanding is shown in statements like "Global warming is a fact." But facts can also be thought of semantically as shown in the sentence "An encyclopedia is a compendium of facts". That factuality is also thinkable as synonymous with truth is shown by the univocity of the the statements: 'It is true that..." and "It is a fact that..."

Even as considered ontologically, though, facts as states of affairs only have meaning insofar as they are determined, and as determined they take conceptual or propositional forms. The very idea of a "state of affairs' is propositional; that affairs are in such and such a determinate state. Actuality, considered as the (human) mind-independent "in-itself" is indeterminate. It takes a sapient percipient to, in terms of some perspective or other, determine the indeterminate actuality as a factuality.

So, I would say that there were no facts, just as there were no truths or any determinate actuality, prior to the advent of humans.

If these are all to be called "facts", then what do we call the false ones? — creativesoul

Non-facts?

You have a belief that the cat is on the mat, say. You have a belief that such and such is the state of affairs that obtains.

Truth, on the other hand, is a judgment about the relationship of the proposition "the cat is on the mat" to the fact (as you believe) that the cat is on the mat. — Terrapin Station

This is not how I use these two terms. A proposition will be true or false regardless of your or my judgement. Judgement comes in when you decide to believe.

Facts are not propositional, they're not conceptions, they're not verbal statements. Facts are not in the form that "such and such is the case." — Terrapin Station

Trouble is, it's the fact that the cat is on the mat that makes "the cat is on the mat" true.

That is, we state facts and in the process we indulge in interpretation.

Which is what I suspect @Janus doesn't see.

Which is what I suspect Janus doesn't see. — Banno

You don't think I agree that facts are stated and that they are always already interpretations? You need to improve your reading skills my man!

Or you, your clarity.

Really? What did you find unclear?

If these are all to be called "facts", then what do we call the false ones?
— creativesoul

Non-facts? — Janus

And so what makes a proposition, statement, and/or conception true(fact)?

A more exact formulation for truth with respect to judgement might be: judgement is the necessary means to truth, and by association, the more exact formulation for truth with respect to cognition would be: cognition which conforms to its object is the necessary condition for truth. — Mww

It would follow from the first formulation that no creature lacking the faculty of judgment could have true cognitions, or they could if the aforementioned true cognitions are not existentially dependent upon - and thus do not require - truth.

Looks like a conflation between what's required for thinking about whether or not some thought/belief and/or statement is true, and what's required for some thought/belief to be true. Terrapin does the same thing. Judgment, as set out by him, is a metacognitive endeavor. True belief is prior.

If judgment were necessary for truth, true thought/belief could not be had by a creature incapable of judgment. I'm (vaguely)familiar with the introduction of CPR where Kant called judgment an innate talent that cannot be taught, etc. I disagree because judgment is far too complex a thought/process for a human to be born with already fully intact and working(innate). Rather, depending upon the notion of judgment, it comes later, sometimes much later in the individual and collective evolutionary progression of thought/belief.

...the more exact formulation for truth with respect to cognition would be: cognition which conforms to its object is the necessary condition for truth. — Mww

So the conformity of cognition to it's object. Like Saran Wrap? I'm trying to wrap my mind around this...

:meh:

Trouble is, it's the fact that the cat is on the mat that makes "the cat is on the mat" true. — Banno

Indeed. It's what already happened, and/or is happening that makes the statement(which is about those events) true.

Tarski shows this well.

That they are in accordance with reality. What else?

So, I would say that there were no facts, just as there were no truths or any determinate actuality, prior to the advent of humans. — Janus

Mark me up in that column as well. All that is required for facts and truths to arise may very well be extant, but in their own natural form, not in some form constructed by human understanding as a means to organize itself.

A proposition will be true or false regardless of your or my judgement. — Banno

Right, but I ask, "How is that supposed to work, exactly?" And my conclusion is that it can't. The notion of it rests on a number of confusions, misconceptions, etc.

The very idea of a "state of affairs' is propositional; that affairs are in such and such a determinate state. Actuality, considered as the (human) mind-independent "in-itself" is indeterminate. It takes a sapient percipient to, in terms of some perspective or other, determine the indeterminate actuality as a factuality. — Janus

That's just the usual Kantian nonsense that's so prevalent among regulars on the board. I'm not at all a Kantian. I think Kant was wrong . . . and he was a horrible writer to boot.

Yeah right Kant was an idiot...blah...

Tell me about them. I think we can work our way through them.

We've been doing that in other threads, but okay, first, do you use the definition that propositions are the meanings of statements?

Now, now....go easy on the po’ boy. He’s just jealous there isn’t a decent naive realist philosopher that can’t be run aground by even a mediocre Kantian espousing a logically consistent epistemological dualism.

(Chuckles to self....ego? ME??? Nahhhhh)

Sure. We can work with that.

:lol:

If judgment were necessary for truth — creativesoul

They are not, necessarily. Any analytic proposition is true in itself, without judgement related to it. “All bodies are extended”, “A = A” require no judgement whatsoever; extension belongs to bodies necessarily, and that an identity is not itself is both logically impossible and absurd. That “logically impossible” and “absurd” are themselves judgements, but under the conditions given in separate propositions which are not analytic.

Judgement is the means to a truth in synthetic propositions only, wherein the subject concept and the entirely different predicate concept contained by the proposition are understood as standing in logical relation to each other, or they are not, judgement decides, and cognition is the demonstration.
(E.g., I thought wrong, because I misjudged the situation as I understood it)

Sure. We can work with that. — Banno

Right. So the first problem is that there's no meaning aside from someone actively thinking in a meaning-oriented manner.

Any analytic proposition is true in itself, without judgement related to it. “All bodies are extended”, “A = A” require no judgement whatsoever; — Mww

They do, because outside of thinking about it, those are just marks on paper or a screen that mean nothing, refer to nothing, etc.

So the first problem is that there's no meaning aside from someone actively thinking in a meaning-oriented manner. — Terrapin Station

You're saying that meaning is thinking, propositions are the meaning of statements, so the meaning of a statement is a thought, not a state of affairs?

You're saying that meaning is thinking, propositions are the meaning of statements, so the meaning of a statement is a thought, not a state of affairs? — Banno

Yes, obviously, if meaning is a subset of thinking, then we have no meaning if we do not have that subset of thinking.