The point is that the contextual frameworks Quantum Mechanics and Every Day both contain cats. They do not "disappear on that view, so the statement that is true in the everyday context '"the cat is on the mat" becomes meaningless in the QM context' as you claimed.

All of which points to the more general point of the nonsense of incommensurable contextual frames or frames of reference or paradigms or whatever; and hence to the absurdity of an incommensurable distinction between subjective truth and objective truth.

I don't see that point. Quantum mechanics as a practice obviously involves everyday "macro" equipment, but it does not follow that what is being studied - let's call it the Quantum realm - has cats as one of its theoretically significant entities, or even that cats could be included in its pantheon of entities.

It is well-accepted by Quantum theorists that QM cannot even be understood in "everyday" terms.

And it seems that despite what I said above, which you didn't even attempt to address, you still haven't realized that there are no subjective truths, but only subjective beliefs. There are only objective truths and subjective beliefs, but even the objective truths only have meaning, even existence, within the inter-subjective context. I don't see how you can disagree with this last, since you acknowledge that the world is always already interpreted.

I don't see that point. Quantum mechanics as a practice obviously involves everyday "macro" equipment, but it does not follow that what is being studied - let's call it the Quantum realm - has cats as one of its theoretically significant entities, or even that cats could be included in its pantheon of entities.

It is well-accepted by Quantum theorists that QM cannot even be understood in "everyday" terms. — Janus

Neat switch. But I was watching.

...you still haven't realized that there are no subjective truths, but only subjective beliefs. There are only objective truths and subjective beliefs, but even the objective truths only have meaning, even existence, within the inter-subjective context. I don't see how you can disagree with this last, since you acknowledge that the world is always already interpreted. — Janus

I've no idea where to go with that. I guess we are talking past each other.

Cheers.

My point is that this true proposition is true under this set of criteria, that true proposition true under that set of criteria. — tim wood

Wha......that was all you were trying to get across the first time? Ok, fine. At least I see a way clear of that aporia issue.

Which leaves us with.......because, as you say, truth depends on which set of criteria is in use, it is reasonable to ask which set of criteria the rational agent uses? If a human uses a logical system, insofar as cognition logically sustains or contradicts observation, then we’re right back where we started.
(Major premise, minor premise, conclusion; understanding, judgement, cognition. The conclusion we call valid or sound, the cognition we call true or false. Same-o, same-o.)

With that in mind, we don’t prove it’s hot outside, per se, but rather, we prove that the observation it’s hot outside is sustained.
——————-

I just have come to see it (knowledge) as a many and not a one, nor reducible to a one — tim wood

And I will hold up the other end, by saying knowledge is reducible to one, but necessarily of many things. Knowledge *of* and knowledge *that* is still just knowledge. Knowledge itself being no more than the condition of the intellect.

I’m out of shoes.

Therein lies the issue with the concept of truth. — leo

Not really that much of a deal, given the Big Picture. Human empirical knowledge, that is, what we think of as true as detailed in propositions, is absolutely predicated on experience. Because extant experience is a minute fraction of possible experience, it follows necessarily that extant knowledge is a minute fraction of possible knowledge. Hence, what we think of as true is only so, until experience shows it isn’t.

All it does is to reveal the already bleeding obvious logic of our ways of talking about (empirical) things. — Janus

Agreed. Looking back, after recognizing the empirical truth of some proposition, and then saying such truth was always the case, or the conditions that enabled that truth were always the case, is just absolutely useless practical information. Who gives two shits and half a dollar if a thing always was before anything is known about what it is.

:cool: Just as it is said that our biggest problem is what to do about all the things we cannot do anything about, similarly when it comes to knowing our main problem seems to be how to know all those things we cannot know anything about.