Yes, we can't get into any mind other than our own. But we can communicate, and presuming honesty of reporting we can know what and how others think to the extent that they can know themselves. Obviously this is not possible with animals.

Are you claiming that we cannot know what the content of non linguistic thought/belief is because those creatures do not have language?

As I already said, I don't favour talking about there being "content" of thought in the absence of language. That is, since there is no determinate "content" of thought in the absence of language, and since the indeterminate cannot count as content, then it makes no sense to talk of content in that context. I say the most we can do is speculate about how the indeterminate process of non-symbolic thinking might be related to or analogous to the determinate content of symbolic thinking.

Nothing you have said so far convinces me to think otherwise.

As I already said, I don't favour talking about the "content" of thought in the absence of language — Janus

You've said many things my friend, including talking about the propositional content of belief statements.

We can take good account of thought/belief from it's earliest stages through it's most complex by virtue of taking account of it's content. All we need know is what our thought/belief consists in/of combined with a reasonable conception of what non and/or prelinguistic thought/belief must not consist in/of in order to be rightfully called non and/or pre-linguistic, along with what it must consist of to be sensibly, rightfully called "thought", "belief", "thinking", and/or "believing". — creativesoul

I want to see your response to the above.

I don't know what more I can say about it, beyond repeating what I've already said: that we can speculate about it, but since it's indeterminate we remain somewhat hobbled even in that speculation.

Do you have an argument for that? As it stands, it's a gratuitous assertion.

I've been setting out the content. It has already been determined.

I've already said why I think non-symbolic thinking is indeterminate. To symbolize just is to determine. I know what I think because I can represent it symbolically, I know what you think (presuming honesty of reporting) because you can communicate it symbolically to me.

To convince me that you can know how and what animals think you would need to outline how you think this can be done, which would also involve, obviously, a refutation of the notion that non-symbolic thought is indeterminate. I haven't see you do that.

Anyway you seem to have derailed this thread (your own thread at that!) away form its original concern with the incoherence of Gettier objections to JTB ( which I agree with) and steered towards your usual preoccupations. Frankly, I don't really understand those preoccupations, or see why the issue is of very much importance in any case, but it seems to be all you want to talk about.

I'm not claiming that pre-linguistic thought/belief is non-symbolic. Such a thought/belief would be meaningless to the creature, and being meaningful to the creature is a requirement that must be met in order to be rightfully called "thought" or "belief".

To convince me that you can know how and what animals think you would need to outline how you think this can be done... — Janus

And when that begins but goes unnoticed?

Are you claiming that we cannot know what the content of non linguistic thought/belief is because those creatures do not have language?

I know what I think because I can represent it symbolically — Janus

What makes you think/believe that we cannot represent non linguistic thought/belief symbolically?

:brow:

I don't know: all I can say is that I have read everything you wrote, and I haven't seen anything that convinces me that you have achieved it.

Are you claiming that we cannot know what the content of non linguistic thought/belief is because those creatures do not have language? — creativesoul

I am saying that I can see no way to know what non-linguistic creatures' thinking consists in. By contrast, we know that linguistic creatures' thinking consists in language, or at least that it is expressible in language and thus comes to have determinate content. But it is not as though we determine some "content" of what we think and then translate that "content" into language; the expression of thinking in language just is the determination of its content. Put another the way the content of thought is inseparable form its symbolic expression.

I am not going to keep answering the same question over and over.

I am saying that I can see no way to know what non-linguistic creatures' thinking consists in. By contrast, we know that linguistic creatures' thinking consists in language, or at least that it is expressible in language and thus comes to have determinate content. But it is not as though we determine some "content" of what we think and then translate that "content" into language; the expression of thinking in language just is the determination of its content. Put another the way the content of thought is inseparable form its symbolic expression. — Janus

I'm just curious...

Could you be wrong about this?

Could you be wrong about this? — creativesoul

Right now I can't see how, but of course I could be. If you can convince me that I am wrong then I think I should be humble enough to admit it.

On the other hand, could you be wrong about it?

As a aside which I think is relevant; when people ask me why I write, I usually tell them "to find out how and what I think". I also paint, and if asked why I do that I could equally reply, " To find out how and what I imagine".

We're both aware of our own fallibility.

Cheers!

Regardless of how we got here, or how many times we've failed prior to, we are here!

1.Are we agreeing that the thinking/believing creature cannot state it's own thought/belief?

2.Are we agreeing that the thought/belief of a pre-linguistic creature cannot be in propositional form — Janus

Do we also agree that all creatures' thought/belief(thinking/believing) begin(s) simply within some reasonably determinable time frame - after biological conception - and grows in it's complexity?
— creativesoul

Yes, I agree to that. :grin: — Janus

There's the basic outline. This is a good start to acquiring knowledge regarding the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief. Thought/belief, including statements thereof, must begin simply and gain in complexity.

You've agreed to all of the above. Time for the next step...

Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and grow in it's complexity from whatever it is prior to into linguistic expressions we all know and use. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms.

Yours is not. It has all the earmarks of conventional mistakes. Don't take that personally. You trusted the wrong people. I think you already know this. I mean, you're continually qualifying your remarks by stating stuff like we cannot get into the minds of animals. The whole fait accompli aspect...

You know the account you've adopted is not quite right.

The earlier bit about visual thinking was an open admission of anthropomorphism. The dog's thought/belief included use of it's eyes. "Visual thinking" draws a false equivalency between the way you think when looking for a ball and the way the dog thinks when looking for a ball. That method is fraught. Toss it aside.

As a aside which I think is relevant; when people ask me why I write, I usually tell them "to find out how and what I think"... — Janus

Not all writing leads to such knowledge.

Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and grow in it's complexity. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms. — creativesoul

Firstly assuming that symbolic thought evolved from non-symbolic thought, says nothing about the determinability of the latter. My own thinking is determinable only insofar as I can represent it symbolically. That's what thinking symbolically is for the language capable; determining thought. But there is no relation I can become determinably aware of between the indeterminable process of pre-symbolic thinking and the determining process of symbolic expression; the only relation is itself an indeterminable one of feeling.

In other words the relation between the indeterminable pre-symbolic process and symbolic contentful expression is exclusively a matter of feeling, not of discursive thought. And there is no feeling relation between an animals' "thinking" processes and what I might feel is plausible to say about it; I can only rely on analogies extrapolated from whatever felt relation I might be aware of between the pre-symbolic process and symbolic expression in my own case.

Yours is not. It has all the earmarks of conventional mistakes. Don't take that personally. You trusted the wrong people. I think you already know this. I mean, you're continually qualifying your remarks by stating stuff like we cannot get into the minds of animals. The whole fait accompli aspect...

You know the account you've adopted is not quite right.

You assume too much I think; I don't "know" any such thing!

And if you want to impute "mistakes" to my thinking then the onus is on you to clearly identify them and explain just what it is you believe is mistaken and how and in relation to what you think it is mistaken. Vague generalization and gesturing will not suffice to convince me.

Yes, I do say that we cannot get into the minds of animals: do you actually disagree with that, and if so, on what grounds?

So what? It is enough that some writing may.

Firstly assuming that symbolic thought evolved from non-symbolic thought, says nothing about the determinability of the latter. — Janus

Care to address what I wrote?

:brow:

Yes, I do say that we cannot get into the minds of animals: do you actually disagree with that, and if so, on what grounds? — Janus

I'm saying that such talk is unacceptable. There are better ways to acquire knowledge of what all thought/belief consists of.

The sheer number of things I've written that have been sorely neglected is continually rising. Do you really want to know what pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of?

And if you want to impute "mistakes" to my thinking then the onus is on you to clearly identify them and explain just what it is you believe is mistaken and how and in relation to what you think it is mistaken. Vague generalization and gesturing will not suffice to convince me. — Janus

You cannot take adequate account of what pre-linguistic thought/belief is because the framework doesn't allow it. The terminology you're using tend towards anthropomorphism, and admittedly so. Your position is based upon language use that cannot bridge the gap between non-linguistic thought and our own.

You know this. Thus, you deny all ability to take proper account of non linguistic belief. The odd thing is that you then go on to argue in favor of exactly what you say cannot be done.

Is that clear enough?

Careful what you wish for. Do you want to know what all thought/belief consist in or not?

There are better ways to acquire knowledge of what all thought/belief consists of.

The sheer number of things I've written that have been sorely neglected is continually rising. Do you really want to know what pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of? — creativesoul

And yet you seem to be unable to give an account of them that makes sense to me. So, I haven't "neglected" anything; I have just failed to be convinced by it. Your last question just makes you look arrogant or deluded, as if you think you know something hard to understand that others don't.

If you can give a clear account of what you think pre-symbolic thought consist in, and why you think that, then I'm all ears, but don't keep making vague claims about my "framework" not allowing me to understand what you have to say. As I said if you have something cogent and convincing to say it should be translatable into any framework, unless the central presuppositions are completely incompatible.

I'm not going to continue this unless and until you come up with something I can get my teeth into.

Blather. Rhetoric.

Care to address what I've written?

1.Are we agreeing that the thinking/believing creature cannot state it's own thought/belief?

2.Are we agreeing that the thought/belief of a pre-linguistic creature cannot be in propositional form — Janus

Do we also agree that all creatures' thought/belief(thinking/believing) begin(s) simply within some reasonably determinable time frame - after biological conception - and grows in it's complexity?
— creativesoul

Yes, I agree to that. :grin: — Janus

There's the basic outline. This is a good start to acquiring knowledge regarding the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief. Thought/belief, including statements thereof, must begin simply and gain in complexity.

You've agreed to all of the above. Time for the next step...

Non linguistic thought/belief must consist of something that is evolutionarily amenable to propositions, assertions, and statements. It must be able to evolve and seamlessly grow in it's complexity from whatever it is prior to language into the common linguistic expressions we all know and use. Any and all accounts of thought/belief must be amenable to evolutionary terms.

Do we agree?

OK now you're just repeating yourself and ignoring what I wrote, so I've had enough.

You have not addressed that and you know it Janus...

Well now I get it. Thanks for the clear explanation. I think you might just be right. Do you think this same sort of error afflicts other examples that are usually cited in this area?

PA

Nada.

The issue is a conflation of proposition and belief borne of an inadequate notion/conception/definition of thought/belief that is hard at work behind the scenes. Those consequences run deep and in all different directions, so to speak.

I am not comfortable with speaking about "content" of "pre-linguistic thought/ belief". I would instead speak about 'the process of pre-linguistic believing' or something along those lines.

Could you re-phrase this? What is the referent of "the believing"? The process of thought/belief formation? The 'act' of thought/belief formation?

We can definitely state what the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief is.

Do we still agree?
— creativesoul

As above, for me the referent of "the believing" would be the process or act of believing. I don't feel comfortable with referring to believing in that context as "thought/ belief formation". It may not be problematic, but I think it could be misleading, and I think "believing" is a perfectly sufficient term in any case, and that using a different term when referring to pre-linguistic contexts may help to avoid anthropomorphization and any confusion that might ensue from that. In other words I don't see any advantage, and perhaps no inevitable disadvantage, but I do see possible disadvantages, to be had in referring to the act of believing as an act of "belief formation" when speaking about a pre-linguistic context. — Janus

This where the first disagreement began. The expressed concern regarding anthropomorphism rings quite hollow now, given that it is the reason you offer for rejecting the framework I put to use(even though there is no such issue within my position), and yet the terms you're using in lieu of "content" are guilty of exactly that.

:brow: